One could not have calculated eight cases in the beginning of the

Transcription

1 One could not have calculated eight cases in the beginning of the פטור ומותר Mishna, since the beginning discusses cases that are exempt and permitted. Tosfos agree the beginning cannot equal eight prohibitions in hilchos shabbos, since the householder is completely exempt and permitted to allow the poor man to commit the entire act of both lifting and placing. Tosfos point out that there is a different prohibition for the householder; - לפני עור placing a stumbling block in front of a blind man. The householder is causing the poor man to transgress by allowing him to remove the object. However, the householder is transgressing on the prohibition of do not place a stumbling block in front of a blind man? - Tosfos will refute two potential answers; 1) That the poor man was able to lift the item without the householder s help, and 2) That the poor man was a gentile. And even if the case was in an instance where the poor man could have taken it, because the object was not in the householder s hand, and according to Torah law he did not place the stumbling block in front of the blind man Because to tender a cup of wine to a nozir, we set up the case in the first perek of Avodah Zara (6 b.), that one only violates the prohibition when the nozir and the bartender were standing on 1

2 opposite sides of a river, only then is it forbidden according to Torah law, there is still a rabbinic prohibition because it is the householder and the bartender s responsibility to extricate the poor man and the nozir from their prohibitions. And even if the first part of the Mishna was discussing a gentile, where לפני עור does not apply However, there is still a rabbinic prohibition in that case too. As we learned in a Braiso later in this perek (19a.): One who gives food to a gentile in a courtyard, if he takes it and goes out we are not responsible for him. It is deduced, that we are not responsible specifically in the case that the gentile is in the courtyard. However, if the gentile was standing outside and extending his hand inside (as in our Mishna) it would reason that it is prohibited to give an object even to a gentile where it is clearly intended for the purpose of taking it out. We may answer that our Mishna is discussing a case where the poor man is a gentile and the object belongs to that same gentile, that as long as the householder is not involved in the act, even if he brings in and takes out all day, there is no violation at all since the object does not belong to the householder. Any questions about this Tosfos may be addressed to elifeldman@bellsouth.net 2

3 Rabainu Tam finds another case where the Mishna says that for doing a given deed one is exempt and it is actually permissible to do that deed. Rabainu Tam asked: How can the Gemara say there only three places where it is exempt and permissible, there is also what we learned in a Mishna in Bameh Madlikin (Below 29b): One who extinguishes a lamp because he fears etc... and if he extinguishes the lamp, so that a sick person should be able to sleep, he is exempt. And the Gemara says that this case is speaking of an ailing person whose life is endangered. And if so, that we are discussing extinguishing a lamp for an ailing person whose life is endangered, then this is a case of being exempt and permissible, for you have nothing, not even the stringent Shabos laws that stands in the way of a life threatening situation, and it is definitely permitted to violate the Shabos laws in order to save a life by extinguishing the lamp so that the ailing person can sleep. And he, Rabainu Tam, answered that this is a matter of simplicity and it is not necessary for Shmuel to teach us this, as the Gemara soon answers, that Shmuel did not have to teach us about those that are permissible when he is passive and not doing any action. Now that we have seen that when something is a matter of an endangered life, Shmuel doesn t need to teach us that it is permissible, Tosfos turns his attention to the case of trapping a snake, which Tosfos initially understood to be a case of a life threatening danger and that is the reason that it is permitted to trap the snake on Shabos. But now that we have learned that Shmuel is not discussing life-endangering situations, we must know why trapping a snake is permissible. 3

4 And trapping a snake, which Shmuel said is permissible, is speaking of when there is no life threatening danger, that he can be rescued from death in some other manner, but because of the pain he would suffer from the snakebite, the Sages permitted him to trap the snake, as with lancing a boil, which is not a life-threatening situation and is permissible in order to avoid the pain. And so, is it evident at the beginning of perek Sh moneh Sh rotzim (107b), that trapping a snake is exempt not because of the danger, for he sets it up according to R Shimon who holds that when one performs a m lochoh that is not needed for the specific purpose of that m lochoh, he is exempt. (1) If the reason that one was exempt is because of the life threatening danger, there is no need to say that the Braiso follows the opinion of R Shimon. It is precisely because we are not speaking of a life threatening danger, that we must say the reason for the exemption is because the Braiso holds like R Shimon. Once we establish that the Braiso holds like R Shimon, we can then take it a step further and say, that since this is not a violation of Torah law but rabbinic law, the Sages were lenient where it is being done to avoid pain and permitted even to begin trapping the snake. And R I has another difficulty: there what we learned in a Braiso in Bameh Eeshoh (62a): R Eliezer exempts a woman who carries a packet of spices (2) and a flask of balsam oil. And that is exempt and permissible for in another Braiso taught there, R Eliezer says a woman may initially go out wearing a packet of spices. We see that when R Eliezer said she is exempt it means that it is permissible as well. And R I answered in the name of Rabainu Avrohom that Shmuel only reckoned those exemptions that are taught in a Mishna, for trapping a deer is a Mishna in HoOraig (below 106b) and one who 4

5 traps a snake and lances a boil are taught in a Mishna in Aiduyos (perek 2, Mishna 5). According to some texts, the Gemara later (62a) actually asks the contradiction between the Braiso that R Eliezer says that one is exempt and the Braiso where he says that it is permissible. And according to the books that have the text in perek Bameh Eeshoh (later 62a): since R Maier said that one is liable for a chatos, R Eliezer said to him, she is exempt from a chatos, but not permissible. This means: that R Eliezer said to R Maier, that even according to your thinking as well, maximally it should only be exempt but not permissible but R Eliezer himself holds that it is permitted even initially. According to this text R I s question comes out well. The Braiso never meant to say that R Eliezer holds that wearing a spice packet and a flask of balsam oil are prohibited rabinically, it was only because of the nature of his dialogue with R Maier that he expressed himself as if it is prohibited rabbinically. 1) We will come across this term many times throughout this Maseches and throughout the entire Shas as well. See Artscroll note 3. Tosfos explanation of this concept is that a m lochoh is defined not only by the physical act but by the purpose for which it was used in the construction of the mishkon. For example: trapping was done for the purpose of using the hides of the animals. When one traps and does not need the animal itself, but just doesn t want to be bitten by the animal, that is m lochoh that is not done for the it s purpose as it was done in the Mishkon. R Shimon holds that such m lochoh is not forbidden by Torah law, only by rabbinic law. In our Gemara we learn that if one s intention is to avoid pain, the Rabanan suspended their prohibition and permit it. 2) These were worn to mask body odor. Any questions about this Tosfos may be addressed to shaya@shayadesign.com 5

6 As we explained in note 1, on the previous Tosfos the underlying reason for the exemption for one who traps a snake to avoid being bitten is because that is a m lochoh that is not needed for it s purpose during the construction of the mishkon. It appears from our Gemara that Shmuel subscribes to that opinion, since he is the one who says that in these three instance one is exempt and it is even permissible. That position as we have seen must be based on holding that such m lochoh is not forbidden by Torah law. Tosfos will show us that elsewhere Shmuel contradicts what we see in our Gemara. Baal Halochos G dolos raises a contradiction from Shmuel s teaching here and Shmuel s teaching elsewhere. Shmuel holds here that when one does a m lochoh which is not needed for the purpose which it was used in the mishkon he is exempt, like R Shimon, and because of the bodily pain he might suffer, it is even permitted. And in perek Keeroh (below 42a), the Gemara says about Shmuel, in the matter of when one performs a m lochoh without intention, (1) he holds like R Shimon who says that it is permissible. In the matter of m lochoh which is done not for its purpose in the construction of the mishkon, he, Shmuel, holds like R Yehudoh that one is liable for such m lochoh. There is a clear contradiction in Shmuel s opinion on this matter. As is often the case when faced with such contradictions, we must say that in one place Shmuel is stating his own opinion and in the other place he is explaining somebody else s opinion. 6

7 And Rabainu Tam answered: that Shmuel is saying that according to R Shimon who holds m lochoh that is not needed for its purpose in the mishkon one is exempt, in these three cases one is exempt and it is even permissible as Shmuel proves in the end of HoOraig (107b) that he, R Shimon, certainly said that one is exempt and it is even permissible, however, he, Shmuel, does not hold like R Shimon in this matter. This is Shmuel s opinion; that we do not rule like R Shimon. However, for ourselves, we do rule like R Shimon. Because Rovo who chronologically comes after Shmuel, is a later authority and he holds like R Shimon as we see at the beginning of perek Notail (141b). (2) 1) This too, is a term that we will meet very often in this Maseches and throughout the entire Shas. A prime example of this case is one who drags a bed or a couch through an field or garden. His intention is to move the bed or couch from one end of the field to the other. While he is moving the bed, the legs may dig a trench in the ground. The digging of the trench was done without intent. R Shimon holds that one is exempt when this happens and even if he is aware that this may happen as he drags the bed it is permissible to drag the bed. When the bed is so heavy that it will definitely dig a trench the rule changes as we will learn in this Maseches. 2) The Gemara says there in perek Notail: Rovo holds like R' Shimon who says that m lochoh that is done not for its purpose in the mishkon- one is exempt for doing it. Any questions about this Tosfos may be addressed to shaya@shayadesign.com Our Gemara quotes the Mishna in Aiduyos only partially. The Mishna discusses more details about lancing a boil than are discussed in our Gemara. Tosfos wants to take a closer look at what is taught there. 7

8 In Aiduyos (perek 2) The Mishna taught: about lancing a boil, if his intention is to make an opening he is liable for a chatos, (1) if his intention is to remove the fluid, the pus, he is exempt. And if you ask: how can one be liable for opening a mouth of the boil? But the Gemara says later in perek Chovis (146a) any opening that is not made for the purpose of bringing in and taking out is not an opening? The opening of a boil which Tosfos thought is solely for the purpose of removing the pus is only to take out and does not satisfy the condition that it must also be made to bring in. And Rabainu Tam answered: that this opening also, is made to bring in air and take out fluid, and satisfies the conditions of an opening of the Gemara in Chovis. 1) The Mishna means a relatively permanent opening that will remain for some time. The m lochoh involved is בונה building. According to our Sages understanding an improvement in the human body is thought of as building. Any questions about this Tosfos may be addressed to shaya@shayadesign.com See Artscroll 2a2; note 14, who divides the Mishna into cases, to which we can easily refer. Being familiar with that systematic approach to the Mishna will be extremely helpful in understanding this Tosfos. Rashi says that when the Gemara defines the two rabbinic prohibitions for the poor man and the householder as those that can lead to a chatos liability, it is referring to the one who picks up the article. For example in the third illustration, the poor man picks up an object in a public domain and extends his hand into a private 8

9 domain and the householder takes the object (5a). Neither has violated a Torah prohibition. Both have participated in a rabbinic prohibition. The one that the Mishna counts is the movement of the poor man because he picked up the object. In the next case, the householder picked up an object and put it into the extended hand of the poor man (6a). Once again both have participated in a rabbinic prohibition, but it is the householder who is counted by the Mishna, because he picked up the object and had the option of completing the transfer. The poor man could not have possibly completed the transfer. 5b and 6b are not counted. In the fourth illustration, the same is true. The activity of the householder who extended his hand with an object in it is counted (7a) the activity of the poor man who took it from his hand is not counted (7b). The activity of the poor man who lifts up an object in the public domain is counted even though he only places it into the extended hand of the householder is counted (8a). The activity of the householder who transferred it into a private domain and put it down is not counted (8b) by the Tano. That which Rashi explained that the Tano counted the lifting up of the object, does not appear correct to R I for a number of reasons: The first reason is: First: that lifting up without carrying an object out, as in (6a) is merely a movement, and there is no hint of a chatos liability at all. The second objection: And furthermore according to Rashi s explanation, the Tano counts for the householder three acts of carrying out (3, 6a, 7a) and one act of bringing in (4). And for the poor man he counts three acts of bringing in (1, 5a and 8a) and one act of carrying out (2). Tosfos sees this as an imbalance in the symmetry of the Mishna. The third objection: 9

10 And furthermore: he, the Tano, does not count the two that are exempt for the poor man (5a and 8a) in one illustration and for the householder (6a and 7a) in one illustration, as he counts the cases of liability in the beginning of the Mishna. The first illustration of the Mishna העני) (פשט counts both liabilities of the poor man and the second illustration בעל הבית) (פשט counts both liabilities of the householder, but the third illustration (the second העני (פשט of the Mishna counts only one for the poor man (5a) and the fourth illustration (the second בעל הבית (פשט counts (8a) for the poor man. So (פשט העני too for the householder, the third illustration (the second counts one for the householder (6a) and the fourth illustration (the second בעל הבית (פשט counts one (7a)for the householder. Once again Tosfos sees this as an imbalance in the symmetry of the Mishna. Riv o now offers his explanation: And Riv o explains that the term that it may come to a chatos liability means the one who extends his hand and brings the object in or takes it out. In the third illustration, in both cases (5a and 6b), it is the poor man who moves the object between the domains and those two, the Tano count towards his four, because they are the ones that come closest to liability for a chatos. Similarly in the first illustration the poor man is liable in both instances (1 and 2) for a chatos, and here, in the third illustration he is exempt because he did not do the entire m lochoh. It is counted as his exemption because He only missed a small part of it, either the lifting up (6b) or the putting down (5a). So too, for the householder, the second illustration discusses both of his liabilities (3 and 4), and the fourth illustration discusses both his exemptions (7a and 8b). Riv o finds support for his explanation in Yerushalmee. And he brought proof from Yerushalmeee: that says that the Mishna comes only in the format of the Tano counting the exemptions 10

11 of the poor man (5a and 6b) in the third illustration that begins with the words העני,פשט which is opposite the first illustration (1 and 2)which also starts with the words פשט העני that speaks of the liabilities of the poor man. Yerushalmee is clearly stating that the two rabbinic prohibitions (5a and 6b) counted for the poor man are in the third illustration as are the two Torah prohibitions in the first illustration (1 and 2). This agrees with Riv o who holds that both rabbinic פשט prohibitions of the poor man are in one sentence beginning with.העני (1) And it is for this reason that he only counts the exemptions in that third illustration, which is opposite the first illustration of liability in the first section of the Mishna, for example, the poor man extended his hand inside etc. (1 and 2) and it says that the poor man is liable in both cases, his exemption is counted in the case at the end of the Mishna of, the poor man extended his hand inside (5a and 6b) and both those cases are the exemptions of the poor man. And the same is for the householder. The second illustration beginning with the words פשט בעל הבית speaks of the liabilities of the householder(3 and 4) and the fourth illustration which also begins with the words פשט בעל הבית speaks of the exemptions of the householder (7a and 8b). In summation Riv o answers the three questions that he asked against Rashi s explanation as follows: First question: lifting up alone is nothing but a mere movement and does not come close to a chatos liability. According to Riv o the exemption that is counted is the one that moves the object from one domain to the next. That is certainly more of an action than just lifting up an object. Second question: According to Rashi there is an imbalance in the Mishna because the Tano is counting three acts of bringing in for the poor man versus one act of taking out and he is counting three acts of carrying out for the householder versus one act of bringing in. According to Riv o: The Tano is counting for both the poor man and the householder two act of bringing in versus two acts of taking out. 11

12 Third question: According to Rashi there is an imbalance in the Mishna in that the third illustrations that begins with פשט העני does not contain all the exemption of the poor man as the first illustration that begins with פשט העני contains both liabilities of the poor man. And the same problem with the second and fourth illustrations that begin with.פשט בעל הבית According to Riv o the third illustration speaks of both exemptions of the poor man as the first illustration speaks of both liabilities. The fourth illustration speaks of both exemptions of the householder as the second illustration speaks of both liabilities of the householder. 1) This is no longer a quotation of Yerushalmee. This section of Tosfos does not appear in Tosfos HoRosh. It is somewhat unclear what reason Tosfos is referring to, in his explanation of the reason behind Yerushalmee s thinking. Any questions about this Tosfos may be addressed to shaya@shayadesign.com 12