Radicalization Prevention and the Limits of Tolerance

Transcription

1 Radicalization Prevention and the Limits of Tolerance May 26-27, 2011 Organized jointly by Department of Political Science, Aarhus University with funding from the Faculty of Social Sciences, Aarhus University ACCEPT Pluralism funded by the EU Commission s Seventh Framework Program Primary organizer and contact Assistant Professor Lasse Lindekilde lindekilde@ps.au.dk Research Assistant Anne Hedemann Nielsen hedemann@hotmail.com Phone: Venue Preben Hornung Room, Aarhus University, building 1422 Nordre Ringgade Aarhus C

2 Background Europe is experiencing growing concern with radicalization processes and violent extremism, sparked by 9-11 and later episodes of homegrown terrorism. In recent years a new policy field on the prevention of radicalization has emerged. It identifies radicalization, particularly among young Muslims, as a growing social problem to which governments have felt obliged to react. Radicalization prevention policies are often presented as a trade-off between tolerance and security. On the one hand liberal societies have a fundamental commitment to tolerance and individual liberty. On the other hand the same societies pursue societal security through zero tolerance of terror rhetoric, curbing tolerance of illiberal attitudes and actions, and embarking on individual liberties through increased surveillance. Toleration, at a general level, is the conditional acceptance of or noninterference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still tolerable, such that they should not be prohibited or constrained (Forst, 2003). The radicalization discourse and preventive policies are thus intimately linked to the limits of tolerance, stipulating which attitudes and actions should be tolerated by liberal-democratic states, and which should be defined as radical and dangerous, and, thus, actively confronted. The dilemma of tolerance, also in the field of radicalization prevention, is how to deal with those individuals in society who express intolerance of others views and practices: Should we tolerate the intolerant, or should we meet the intolerant with intolerance? Should classic reasons from liberal thought for not preventing what is otherwise considered unreasonable and objectionable be suspended with these practices? This dilemma manifests itself in a current clash in Western Europe and elsewhere between those who urge a balanced form of multicultural sensitivity and those who argue that we should stand firm on individual equality, freedom of speech and mutual respect. Two fundamentally opposing narratives on radicalization prevention exist: The first narrative sees post 9-11 measures of counter-terrorism and radicalization prevention as overreactions, which jeopardize legal and cultural commitments to difference. In this perspective the pursuit of security is seen as jeopardizing the concern for tolerance in a way that is basically counter-productive. The second narrative sees radicalization as a product of under-reactions to the threat of terrorism and of too much tolerance. In this perspective the multiculturalism of especially some Western European states is said to provide space for intolerant groups to radicalize and plan violent attacks. Tolerance is exploited by people who wish to undermine the very system that supports them, and authorities fail to set sufficient limits on tolerance. Aim and Focus of Conference The aim of the international conference Radicalization Prevention and the Limits of Tolerance at Aarhus University is to discuss recent European measures of radicalization prevention in the context of a critical encounter with the outlined narratives of tolerance and radicalization prevention. The conference investigates how recent radicalization prevention policies shape and enact the limits of tolerance in liberal democracies, how tolerance and security commitments can be pursued simultaneously, and what effects radicalization prevention policies have on targeted communities, their perceptions of tolerance, identity-formation and possibilities of participating in public debates. Paper-givers at the conference will address the following interlinked questions:

3 1. What are the internal and external determinants of radicalization among Muslim minorities in the West, and how are we to understand the interplay between processes of alienation, exclusion, identity crisis, Islamophobia and policies aimed at maintaining social cohesion and security? How are we to design policies, which adresses these mechanisms of interaction without reinforcing the narrative of much Islamic political radicalism of a war on Islam, both in terms of military engagement in Muslim countries and in terms of integration/assimilation pressures in the West? 2. How can societies communicate tolerance of difference when they also, through radicalization prevention policies, produce suspicion of especially those who already feel marginalized? How do integration and radicalization prevention policies, in different countries try to strike a balance between tolerance and securitization? And how is the balancing of concerns affected by the sense among political elites of immediate danger and high levels of uncertainty? 3. What are the effects of the challenge, restructuring, or re-emphasis of the limits of tolerance inherent in radicalization prevention policies on the target groups in terms of constructing suspect communities, and producing feelings of inclusion/tolerance vs. exclusion/intolerance? How is Muslim participation in radicalization prevention and engagement in the public domain shaped by elite discourses calling for Muslim actors to align with and affirm core liberal, democratic values? These questions are of fundamental importance to liberal democratic states in the age of terrorism as they touch upon the very liberalness of liberal states and the willingness to protect the liberal democratic order against illiberal and intolerant people if necessary through essentially illiberal means. From a more practical point of view the answers to the raised questions can throw light on how to prevent radicalization without alienating entire communities, including actors who might be important allies in the fight against radicalization. Although some of these questions have been addressed in regard to hard counter-terrorist measures enacted in the immediate aftermath of 9-11, little academic attention has been given to the implications on the limits of tolerance of recent soft preventive measures of radicalization. Conference Organization The conference will be organized as a one and a half day public conference with paper presentations and discussions by invited, leading scholars in the field. The conference program will be structured in three panels with each two paper presentations. The panels will address in turn the key questions raised above. Each panel s objective is described below. Each paper-giver will have approximately minutes to present, followed by interventions by discussants of minutes, and general discussion of minutes.

4 Conference Program Thursday 26 9:00 9:30 Introduction and Welcome: Lasse Lindekilde, Aarhus University 9:30 12:30 Panel 1. Radicalization Prevention within the Limits of Tolerance Experiences of alienation, exclusion and discriminatory/intolerant behavior from surroundings are often said to be key ingredients in radicalization processes. Pushing for equal treatment and tolerance, at the same time as for adherence to core liberal, democratic values, thus becomes a central aspect of any comprehensive radicalization prevention strategy. But how can this be done in practice, and without reinforcing the narrative of Islamic political radicalism of a war on Islam, both in terms of military engagement in Muslim countries and in terms of integration/assimilation pressures in the West? 9:30 10:50 Mark Sedgwick, Aarhus University: Radicalization Prevention within the Limits of Tolerance: Focusing on Key Security Concerns Discussant: Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen, Danish Institute for International Studies 10:50 11:10 Coffee break 11: Tahir Abbas: Faith University, Istanbul: Islamic Political Radicalization in Britain: The Interplay between Culture and Politics 12:30 14:00 Lunch Discussant: Manni Crone, Danish Institute for International Studies 14:00 17:00 Panel 2. Radicalization Prevention Balancing Tolerance and Security Concerns A central aspect of radicalization prevention is the striking of a balance between concerns of integration and tolerance of difference and risk-management/security - in the short as well as the long run. How do concrete integration and radicalization prevention policies in different contexts deal with this balancing in terms of mixing

5 integration and security agendas? And how is the balancing of concerns affected by the sense of acute danger and crisis among policy-makers? 14: TBA Discussant: Tore Vincent Olsen, Aarhus University 15:20 15:40 15:40 17:00 Coffee break Therese O Toole, University of Bristol: Post Prevent : Balancing Tolerance, Security and Muslim Engagement in the UK Discussant: Lasse Lindekilde, Aarhus University 19:00 Conference Dinner - continues

6 Friday 27 9:00 12:30 Panel 3. Radicalization Prevention, Target Group Perceptions and Outcomes An under-researched aspect of preventive efforts of radicalization is the reception and perception of such policies among the targeted groups, and how such perceptions structure policy effects. Are perceptions formed by experiences of misrecognition and the construction of suspect communities, or are the limits of tolerance inherent in preventive policies perceived as fair? And what are the effects of such perceptions on the possibilities of realizing policy objectives in practice, i.e. identifying and preventing radicalization? 9:00 10:20 Gabe Mythen, University of Liverpool: Why should we have to prove we re alright? Risk, Suspect Communities and Contingent Securities 10:20 10:40 Discussant: Mikkel Rytter, Aarhus University Coffee Break 10:40 12:00 Lasse Lindekilde, Aarhus University: Intended and Un-intended Consequences of Radicalization Prevention Policies: Creating Liberal Citizens or Fostering Illiberal Counter-identities? Discussant: Henrik Reintoft Christensen, Aarhus University 12:00 12:30 Concluding Remarks and Publication Plans 12:30 14:00 Lunch and Goodbye

7 Abstracts Mark Sedgwick, Aarhus University Radicalization Prevention within the Limits of Tolerance: Focusing on Key Security Concerns Many current counter-radicalization strategies do not effectively address security concerns because they are based on false premises. This is partly a consequence of the failure to understand or define what is meant by radicalization, and partly a consequence of a confusion of agendas which results in objectives drawn from the integration agenda being incorporated in counter-radicalization programs, as I have argued elsewhere. Counter-radicalization actions based on these false premises may be problematic in terms of classic Western conceptions of tolerance, and also in terms of the conceptions of tolerance of the target group: European Muslims. Because of this, they may well be counterproductive, possibly reinforcing rather than challenging one of the three major elements in jihadist propaganda. However, as this paper argues, one other major element in jihadist propaganda can be challenged, and can also be challenged in ways that are not problematic in terms of anybody s understandings of tolerance. One way of understanding radicalization is to look at jihadist propaganda. This approach assumes that jihadist propaganda is effective, which is not an assumption tested in this paper, but is an assumption made by Western security agencies, almost certainly correctly. The major themes in jihadist propaganda can be divided between (a) the analysis of the current situation, (b) the vision of a better future, and (c) the course of action promoted: jihad. Of these, it is the course of action that raises direct security concerns, and most needs to be addressed. It is, however, relatively neglected, with initiatives more commonly directed at other objectives. Central to the jihadist analysis of the current situation is the idea of a war on Islam. This is highly effective because it builds on what many Muslims already think. It is to some extent shared by most Arabs and by many other Muslims, in Europe as in the Middle East, and is deeply rooted in Arab popular historical memory that is, in the understanding of the past that plays a major part in how current events are understood. Little can be done to change this in the short or medium term, and counterradicalization initiatives that contradict this popular historical memory stand little chance of success. In fact, initiatives which are perceived as intolerant and as directed in any way against Islam or Muslims will instead reinforce the jihadist narrative. The jihadist vision of a better future is, like all such revolutionary visions, not developed in much detail. It relies on general visions of the good, of justice and of honor, that are in themselves unproblematic. As such, it is hard to counter. Again, any attempts to counter it that are perceived as intolerant and as directed in any way against Islam or Muslims will reinforce the jihadist narrative. The course of action promoted by jihadist propaganda, however, may be challenged. The fact that this element (unlike the other two) is not widely shared suggests that it is the weakest element in jihadist ideology. It is also the most important element, since it is the element that leads directly to violence. The view that jihad is an appropriate course of action can be questioned in terms of the jihad s past and likely future lack of effectiveness in achieving its objectives, and also by drawing attention to one of the related and least widely shared aspect of jihadist ideology, the doctrine of takfir, which potentially classifies ordinary pious Muslims as legitimate targets for attack, and is the very opposite of tolerant. At an emotional level, the suffering caused to such ordinary pious Muslims by jihadist activities can usefully be emphasized. The romantic appeal of the jihad can also be undercut, both by ensuring that

8 Western governments and the Western press do not accidentally enhance the heroic status of individual jihadists, and by portraying individual jihadists as incompetent and personally inadequate. None of these approaches raises significant questions with regard to tolerance. The paper, then, is in effect arguing for the use of minimum necessary force in counter-radicalization, carefully targeted at the element in jihadist propaganda which directly raises security concerns, and which can be countered, rather than at other objectives. Tahir Abbas: Faith University, Istanbul: Islamic Political Radicalization in Britain: The Interplay between Culture and Politics The problems of violent extremism in relation to British Muslim minorities has become a noticeable feature of the social, political and cultural life of young people. The problem has been characterised as one of Islam by some and by the workings of majority society by others. This paper provides a theoretical framework in relation to the discussion of Islam-inspired radicalisation set in an historical and sociological context. Exploring the ideas of alienation, exclusion and disadvantage, the paper offers an analysis of the conditions of identity crises facing young Muslims through a perspective on intergenerational conflict in relation to endogenous factors and the role and function of Islamophobia in relation to exogenous concerns. It is the interplay between the internal and external that provides the conditions for violent conflict, but these very same forces can all provide the solutions to cohesion. Based on ethnographic observational research and analysis in the UK over the period of , this paper charts the experience, understanding and the policy impacts of the problems and solutions to Islamic political radicalism. Therese O Toole, University of Bristol Post Prevent : Balancing Tolerance, Security and Muslim Engagement in the UK The Prevent strand of the UK New Labour government s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy was a community-led, hearts and minds approach which aimed to challenge violent extremist ideology and support mainstream voices. This agenda saw engaging with Muslim communities to address disaffection and the spread of violent extremist ideology among (particularly young) Muslims as key to tackling radicalisation and terrorism. Critics of Prevent were many however: Muslim communities with whom the government sought to engage were suspicious of an engagement agenda that was seen as embedded in the surveillance and control of Muslim populations. The agenda was also criticised by those who saw targeting funding at particular ethnic or religious communities as running counter to integration and the government s community cohesion agenda. The Conservative party in opposition accused the Labour government of having no clear criterion for evaluating the (cost) effectiveness of Prevent in the fight against terrorism. Thus, on coming to power in 2010 as the lead coalition government partner, it announced an immediate review of Prevent, which would take counter-terrorism strategy away from the Dept of Communities and Local Government and back to the Home Office. The details of its successor policy to Prevent will be announced in January A key issue at stake in the formation of the post-prevent agenda will be the forms and logic of the government s engagement with Muslim actors and organisations particularly in relation to its willingness to engage with moderate and

9 radical or extremist religious and political groups. New Labour s position on this matter alternated between condemning intolerant and extremist perspectives and seeking out and supporting moderate, mainstream Muslims on the one hand, and differentiating between extremist and violent extremist positions to pragmatically engage with radical Islamist organisations on the other. In this paper, we explore the changing logics of governments soft-security approaches to combating radicalisation, based on analysis of policy documents and interviews with policy-makers and Muslim elites engaged in governance, drawn from our research on Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance. We analyse the modes and rationale of government engagement with Muslim actors and organisations to ask whether the demand for engagement with moderate Muslims runs counter to security aims, and we evaluate the implications of the securitisation of Muslim engagement for the organisation of Muslim civil society organisations and the presence of diverse Muslim views within the public domain more broadly. Gabe Mythen, University of Liverpool Why should we have to prove we re alright? Risk, Suspect Communities and Contingent Securities Over the last decade, issues of risk, identity and security have become topics of political exchange, media speculation and public debate. The 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, coupled to the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, have served as touchstones for discussion about the construction of religious, political and national identities amongst British Muslims. In the UK, young British Muslims continue to negotiate and maintain their individual and collective identities in an environment in which they are cast as a threat to national security whilst being simultaneously invited to align more readily with core British values. A series of studies report that being located in such a contradictory situation can engender feelings of frustration, resentment and injustice. Furthermore, the trend toward pre-emptive counterterrorism policing and surveillance has led to ruptures in community relations between the police and Muslim communities. Situated in this context, this paper analyses the reflections of a group of young British Pakistanis living in the North West of England. We elucidate three key issues which emerged in the course of our discussions, namely anger about the effects of counter terrorism legislation on Muslim communities, the formation of resistant identities and the exclusionary and partial nature of security as defined and applied in political, policy and legislative spheres. Lasse Lindekilde, Aarhus University Intended and Un-intended Consequences of Radicalization Prevention Policies: Creating Liberal Citizens or Fostering Illiberal Counter-identities? This paper investigates the intended and un-intended outcomes of radicalization prevention policies, focusing on the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization from 2009, and Danish Muslims as the primary target group. The paper argues that the ultimate goal of radicalization prevention is intended to follow from the transformation, shaping and disciplining through various governing techniques of illiberal and violence prone radicals into active, liberal citizens. However, the paper asks if the implementation of the action plan in practice may also yield unintended (negative) consequences. The paper argues, building on empirical research that at least three sets of unintended consequences may occur. First, using insights from policy learning and labeling studies the paper argues that the formulation, content,

10 presentation and implementation of policies convey important information to target groups (in this case particularly the Muslim minorities) of their position in society. Concretely the argument is that the policies directed at Danish Muslims might teach them that they are generally not perceived as active, liberal citizens, but rather as a security risk. Secondly, and building on theories of recognition, the paper discusses if perceived misrecognition in policies may shape negative identity strategies among target groups. Thirdly, the paper argues that radicalization prevention policies and the radicalization discourse in general limit the possibilities for Muslim participation in public debates and collaboration with authorities by making the certification and de-certification of certain beliefs and values a prerequisite for participation. Out of fear of being labeled radical, Muslim actors are withdrawing from the public sphere, including actors who might be important allies in the battle against radicalization.