The Armenian Church during the Cold War: Ejmiatsin Antelias Crisis. Hratch Tchilingirian

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1 Nor Haratch Hebdo (Paris), Supplément No. 265, 9 Juin 2016 To be published in French: L Eglise arménienne pendant la guerre froide : la crise Etchmiadzine Antelias. The Armenian Church during the Cold War: Ejmiatsin Antelias Crisis Hratch Tchilingirian During the last two centuries, the Armenian Church as a religious institution in general and the clergy in particular was assigned secular or civil duties to lead the nation and became state mandated agent and mediator between rulers, governments and political interests. At the same time, Armenian society in general in the homeland and in dispersion had gone through a process of secularization as a result of emergent rationalism and modernity, which brought about capitalism, industrialisation and the nation state. These historical developments have led the Armenian Church through a process of secularization. Sociologically speaking, secularization is "the process by which religious institutions, actions, and consciousness, lose their social significance." This does not mean that individuals are less religious or spiritual or have abandoned religion altogether, but simply "religion ceases to be significant in the working of the social system." 1 While the debate among scholars continues over the concept of secularization and desecularization, I argue that the Armenian Church as an institution has gone through a process of what I call self secularization by accommodating the expectations and impositions of the two processes mentioned above: the rulers/states/governments and the secularized Armenian society. As such, the institutional church s self secularization is the resulting effect of the processes of, on one hand, the state imposed secularization and, on the other, society driven secularization. In this context, when applied to the Armenian Church, by secularization I mean the difference between the substantive and functional definitions of the Church, i.e., the difference between what the Church is (theologically,

2 Hratch Tchilingirian 2 missiologically, ecclesiologically, canonically, etc.) and what the Church does (institutionally, politically, socially, etc.) facetiously put, the difference between " ologies" and " isms". It is in this wider conceptual framework that I discuss the Catholicossal election in 1956 in Antelias as an example during the Cold War, where the various significant aspects of the secularization process can be observed. Starting in the first half of the 19 th century, secularization of the Armenian Church continued in the post WWII period, especially as the Church became a battle ground for ideological and political battles against the background of the Cold War. Whereas the Russian Polozhenie ( ) had put church administration in the hands of the clergy 2 and the National Constitution ( ) in the Ottoman Empire the hands of the laity, the Soviets took away the administrative independence of the church in Soviet Armenia ( ) from the clergy and laity and put it in the hands of Communist Party apparatchiks. In turn, during the Cold War, political parties in the Diaspora embroiled the Church in the wider politics of super power rivalries and their narrower internal interests. The Sovietization of Armenia, after the end of the ARF led First Republic of Armenia in 1920, and the subsequent bipolar world of East West competition, divided Armenians around the world as well: between the pro Soviet and anti Soviet camps. On the one hand, the division between the ARF and the pro Soviet Armenia parties in the Diaspora, on the other, the division between ARF and what was now a Communist homeland, were so deep that it "had a significant impact," as Khachig Tölölyan describes, "even on the poems we would memorize, the songs we sang, and the books and newspapers we read." 3

3 Hratch Tchilingirian 3 In the background of this short introduction, this paper will present a discussion of the political processes related to the Catholicossal election in Antelias in 1956 and the agency of high ranking clergymen (both in Ejmiatsin and Cilician Sees) who became the main actors in the political high dramas played out under the canopy of the Armenian Apostolic Church and in the wider context of regional conflicts and international rivalries. The Church in the War Years and the Aftermath At the start of the Cold War, the Holy See of Ejmiatsin was still struggling under Stalinist persecutions and its devastating consequences. The Catholicosate did not have an incumbent from 1938 to 1945, the Holy See was practically closed because of the Stalinist purges and persecution of the Church at the height of which Catholicos Khoren I was assassinated in Ejmiatsin by the KGB operatives. It was after the devastation of WWII that Stalin allowed the election of the Catholicos to take place as he needed the support of the Church in the process of recovery from the ravages of the war and the enormous human loss. The Catholicos of Cilicia, Karekin I Hovsepiants, was ill and bed ridden in Antelias for some time and died in In Jerusalem, Patriarch Giuregh had passed away in 1949 and the See had a vardapet as a Locum Tenens (successor was enthroned only in 1960). The Patriarchal See of Constantinople had no incumbent and there were disputes surrounding the patriarchate and the election of an incumbent, which was allowed in Meanwhile, the conflict in Palestine had caused major dislocations for the Armenians in the Middle East. To complicate matters further, a new "religious front" was opened by the Armenian Uniate Patriach, Cardinal Grigor Petros Aghajanian challenging the entire Armenian Apostolic

4 Hratch Tchilingirian 4 Church. Pope Pious XII had elevated the Armenian Catholic Patriarch to the rank of Cardinal. Soon after becoming a Cardinal, in 1950 Aghajanian published a Pastoral Letter in which he appealed with a direct invitation to the Armenian nation to accept the authority of the Roman Church. The relationship between Ejmiatsin and the Catholicosate of Cilicia were cordial and cooperation on a number of major national events showcased the unity that existed in the Armenian Apostolic Church. Indeed, the Catholicos of Cilica, Karekin I (Hovsepian) personally took part in the election and consecration of Catholicos Gevorg VI in 1945 in Holy Ejmiatsin. The Church in the Soviet Union By the early 1950s, the Soviet government was concerned about the decline of the position of the Armenian Church ironically having caused the decline in the first place especially in view of the fact that Ejmiatsin had some two dozen dioceses outside the USSR. Ejmiatsin was not only financially weakened, but was at the verge of administrative collapse due to government restrictions, lack of clergy and resources, qualified personnel to run the affairs of the church, especially its relations with oversees dioceses, and generally poor conditions. As one repatriate Armenian observed in 1950: the Church was waging a life and death struggle. 4 While this was a success in terms of the Soviet regime s anti religious and atheistic policies, the opportunity to further exploit the Church for political influence and propaganda oversees could not be missed by the Soviet authorities. The process of rescuing

5 Hratch Tchilingirian 5 Ejmiatsin from collapse as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Armenia SSR, Sahak Karapetya put it was discussed on the highest levels of Soviet government in Yerevan and Moscow. The Council on the Affairs of the Armenian Gregorian Church (CAAGC), which was the government arm that dealt with religious matters, had warned the Soviet authorities that the Armenian Church in Soviet Armenia is at the verge of collapse, a prospect that would be advantageous to the Dashnaks to increase their influence on communities in the Diaspora. Indeed, the majority of the dioceses outside Soviet Armenia did not have primates and were vulnerable administratively and politically. The CAAGC report warned that the Dashnaks are attempting to weaken the Ejmiatsin Catholicosate and are attempting to make Antelias or one of the other Hierarchical Sees in Jerusalem or Istanbul the worldwide centre of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The report said: In recent years the reactionary forces hostile to the Armenian Church have engaged in especially violent, aggressive activity which has pretty much complicated the state of affairs in foreign centres of the Armenian Church. Under strong American influence, it continued, the Dashnaks are attempting to discredit the Catholicos of All Armenians in the eyes of the overseas Armenians. On the other hand, Soviet authorities were also concerned that the elevation of Armenian Catholic Patriarch Bedros Aghajanian (Agianian) as a cardinal in 1946 and his appointment as head of the Pontifical Commission for Russia was another attempt by the Vatican to challenge the authority of the Armenian Apostolic Church. 5 Soviet authorities considered Aghajanian as a fanatical enemy of Soviet power in general and the Armenian SSR in particular, 6 and perceived Armenain Catholics as Dashnak sympathizers, as well as a community that opposed the repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia. 7 Widening the scope of the foreign threat, the report even alleged that the deceased Patriarch of Jerusalem Guregh I was an agent of

6 Hratch Tchilingirian 6 British imperialism, implying that the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was outside the political orbit of Ejmiatsin. The issue of saving Etchiadzin s authority with commensurate resources and administrative support was discussed on the highest level of government. In a 1951 directive Moscow relegated the task of strengthening Ejmiatsin s leadership of the overseas dioceses to the Soviet Armenian government. 8 Nevertheless, despite the relative easing of restrictions on Ejmiatsin, in the Diaspora the Dashnak supported communities in the United States continued to point out that the Catholicos is under the thumb of the Soviet authorities. As archival documents indicate, we now know that these allegations were relatively true. For instance, public pronouncements by Catholicos Kevrok and later Catholicos Vazken I were required to be approved by the authorities in both Yerevan and Moscow. 9 Beyond Ejmiatsin, Moscow was also monitoring and trying to influence church affairs and elections in other Hiearchical Sees of the Armenian Church. In fact, the CAAGC in Armenia regularly monitored events and incidents in oversees Armenian churches, receiving intelligence briefings from Soviet diplomatic stations in the Middle East and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Many at times, CAAGC would have information about Armenian Church affairs in the Diaspora before the news had reached Echmiadzin. 10 In 1950 Soviet authorities attempt to obstruct the candidacy of Archbishop Karekin Khachadourian for the Patriarchal seat of Constantinople. Khachadourian, who was the Primate of the Diocese of Argentina, was considered a Dashnak supporter by the Soviets. He was elected Patriarch in December 1950 after the Turkish government gave the go ahead reversing initial objections and procedural obstructions. Back in the fall of 1941 and again in 1952 the Soviets had also opposed Khachadourian s candidacy for the Cilician Catholicosate.

7 Hratch Tchilingirian 7 Relevant to our discussion on the elections in Antelias is a secret directive issued by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Vyshinsky, dated 30 May 1952 a few months before the death of Catholicos Karekin Hovsepiants of the Cilician See in which Soviet diplomats in Lebanon and Syria were ordered to carry out a list of task. Task six of nine was the following: Given the importance of preserving the influence of supporters of Echmiadzin in the Cilician Catholicosate, watch out for attempts by Anglo American agents, reactionary Arab circles and Dashnaks to seize influence in this Catholicosate; inform the USSR MFA on the situation in the Catholicosate and submit proposals in a timely manner with the aim of backing supporters of Echmiadzin in the Catholicosate. 11 Shortly thereafter, when the Karabakh born and pro Soviet Catholicos Karekin Hovsepiants passed away on 21 June 1952, the Soviet government intensified its efforts to prevent the election of a successor favoured by the Dashnaks. The Soviets were aware that the ARF had two candidates in mind. Bishop Khoren Paroyan, Primate of Lebanon, and Bishop Zareh Payaslian, Primate of Aleppo, were the favoured candidates of the Dashnak Party over other candidates, including the Locum Tenens of the Cilician See Archbishop Khat Achabahian. According to the 1941 Constitution of the Catholicosate of Cilicia, a successor was to be elected no later than six months after the death of the incumbent Catholicos. Therefore, the date for the election was set by the Locum Tenens to be on 17 December However, it was postponed a number of times over a three and a half year period, until 14 February 1956 a period that became one of the most politically charged and divisive periods in modern Armenian history, where the interests of outside and international

8 Hratch Tchilingirian 8 powers and Armenian party politics intersected. The postponements also benefitted the prospects of the candidates of the Dashnak Party. In 1952 Bishops Khoren was 38 years old and Zareh was 37 years old, they would have been disqualified as candidates since the required minimum age for a Catholicos was 40. As such, the Dashnaks were not in a hurry for the elections to take place (cf. Kouymjian 1961: 97). When Gevorg VI s died in May 1954, both Catholicosates of the Armenian Church were left without leaders. The Soviet authorities on the one hand whose main objective was to strengthen the influence of the Ejmiatsin Catholicosate on the overseas Armenian dioceses 12 and different factions in the Diaspora on the other, intensified their efforts and competition for influence and control. It was important for the Soviet authorities to have a Catholicos of All Armenians enthroned in Ejmiatsin before the elections in Antelias. To this end, they did everything in their power to prevent loss of the entire Diaspora to Dashnak influence. Therefore, the search, recruitment and installation of a new incumbent in Ejmiatsin became a matter of extreme urgency, especially as the Cilician Brotherhood had already announced that the election in Antelias would take place on 17 June 1955 and had notified Ejmiatsin to send their two delegates to take part. After a long silence to the invitation, Ejmiatsin announced the date for its own election of a successor to Gevorg VI and asked the Cilician Brotherhood to postpone their election and send their two delegates to Ejmiatsin. A number of telegrams later, Locum Tenens Archbishop Khat reluctantly agreed to postpone the election in Antelias and sent two delegates Bishop Terenig Poladian and Hrant Grigorian from the Cilician See to participate in the election of the Catholicos of All Armenians. Soon after, on 23 October, Archbishop Khat Achabahian resigned as Locum Tenens, because, he said, the state of my health does not permit me to fulfil such a responsible and difficult office. 13 The Religious Brotherhood of the Cilician See then elected Bishop

9 Hratch Tchilingirian 9 Khoren Paroyan as the Locum Tenens, which would become a historic decisive moment for the Catholicosate of Cilicia. Within days of his election, Bishop Khoren and Bishop Zareh, the Primate of Aleppo, accompanied by the Armenian members of the Lebanese Parliament, paid an official visit to the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, who received the delegation in the presidential palace. This was followed by a visit to the Syrian President Choukri al Kouatli. These high level favorable and friendly meetings confirmed the legitimacy of the election of the Locum Tenens, who then began final preparations for the long delayed Catholicosal election (Kouymjian 1961: 33). Having Bishop Khoren, an ARF supporter, at the helm of the preparations for the election sharpened the public rhetoric in the opposition camp. The Election in Antelias The election of a catholicos in Antelias was going to be held against the background of wider regional and international politics, rivalries and brewing conflicts. Even as the ARF was politically in a stronger position in Lebanon and vis a vis the Western powers, the reality in the Armenian community was that the Dashnak Party had a strong and dominant presence on all levels of church assemblies and councils, especially in Syria and Lebanon, from local parish councils, to Church constitutional committees, to the National Representatives Assembly and Catholicossal election delegates. In short, the Dashnak Party controlled the administrative and electoral structures of the Catholicosate of Cilica. Indeed, the previous three catholicoi (Babken, Petros, Karekin I) were elected by a majority of Dashnak votes. 14 Thus, it was a virtually impossible objective for the Soviet

10 Hratch Tchilingirian 10 authorities and the pro Soviet Armenian political front that supported Ejmiatsin to break the influence of Dashnak Party through the administrative and electoral process. The only choice left to the non Dashnak front was to use political pressure rather than the parliamentary/electoral system in place, which meant expensive efforts to deny legitimacy to the electoral Assembly. Indeed, aware of ARF s dominance and given the highly politicized atmosphere of the late 1940s, Catholicos Karekin I Hovsepian had been unwilling to formally invite the Church Assembly of the Cilician See. Instead, he had worked with an executive committee on an consultative basis to run the affairs of the Catholicosate. The Dashnak Party, in turn, rather than cooperating with Catholicos Karekin I and gaining his confidence in the process of establishing a clear legal order in the Cilician See, they, on the contrary, publically criticized him for ostensibly not respecting the parliamentary order and at times threatening him in the name of defending the people s rights. As Piuzant Yeghiayan notes, this was a superficial method of intimacy which [the ARF] had used [in the past] against the elderly Catholicos Sahak II and Babken Co Adjutor Catholicos. 15 By 1952, when Karekin I passed away, the Catholicosate had not convened a National General Assembly for almost a decade. Antelias was, in the words of Yeghiayan, in an administrative vacuum. In this vacuum, the General Assembly of the Brotherhood (Միաբանական Ընդհանուր Ժողով), the highest clerical body in the Catholicosate made of all the clergy and monks of the Cilician See which also had the mandate to nominate candidates took the lead in the process of organising the Catholicossal election. But, as it became clear, the matter was not in the hands of the clergy. The election of the Catholicos of Cilica was postponed for three and a half years. The issue was not the candidate for the Cilician See, but political influence

11 Hratch Tchilingirian 11 on the Cilician See. The opposition and Soviet Armenian authorities wished to prevent ARF from influence and total control of the Cilician See and wished to see an incumbent who is favourable towards Ejmiatsin and Soviet Armenia. When in May 1954 Catholicos Gevorg VI passed away, three of the four Hierarchical Sees of the Armenian Church became vacant. Right after the funeral of Gevorg VI, which was attended by a delegation from Antelias, a meeting was held urging everyone to gather around the Armenian Church, Mother Armenia and Mother See of Holy Ejmiatsin. The obvious secret was, as Yeghiayan says, that all efforts should be put in place to put the election of the Catholicosate of Cilicia and [her] jurisdictions under the authority of the Fatherland and Ejmiatsin. 16 After several postponements, the General Assembly of the Cilician Brotherhood, following much infighting, declared that the election will take place on 14 February This was the beginning of what would become known as the National Ecclesiastical Crisis («Ազգային Եկեղեցական Տագնապ»). In the meantime, the Soviet had succeeded in having a Catholicos enthroned in Ejmiatsin before the election in Antelias. On 30 September 1955, Bishop Vazken Baljian, the Primate of Rumania, was elected Catholicos of All Armenians. The visit of Vazken I to Beirut Less than six months after his election, Catholicos Vazken I of All Armenians notified the Locum Tenens in Antelias, Bishop Khoren Paroyan, that he will personally take part in the election of the Catholicos of Cilicia.

12 Hratch Tchilingirian 12 Vazkin I arrived in Beirut (via Paris) on 12 February 1956 and was greeted by a crowd of some 25,000 Armenians in the official procession between the airport and Antelias. The following day he paid a visit to President Chamoun with his entourage of high ranking clergymen, national figures, and Lebanese Armenian MPs. Not surprisingly, he paid an official visit to the Soviet Embassy in Beirut and was received by Ambassador Serge Kiktiev. On the eve of the elections, Vazken I met with various delegations who pointed out illegalities in the procedures. In particular, a lay delegation headed by Dr. Yervant Jidejian, protested on behalf of a segment of the Armenian faithful against the legality of a number of delegates participating in the electoral Assembly. They contested the proxies of the Aleppo delegates, which they claimed put under suspicion the legality of the Electoral Assembly itself (Kouymjian 1961: 38). High ranking clergymen warned that there are serious disagreements among the rank and file. Vazken thought that holding the elections under such circumstances would cause divisions in the communities. When Catholicos Vazken I relalized that he had no control over the situation, he decided to leave early and not participate in the election at all. A newly elected, 48 year old Catholicos, Vazken neither had the experience nor the political savvy to navigate through the complex and multi dimensional politics within the church and community and the world outside. Had he stayed in Antelias, he would have disappointed the opposition, who were his supporters and lose credibility among his backers and would have been viewed as supporter of the other side, the ARF and their sympathizers. As Vazken I left for the airport, Bishop Zareh Payeslian was elected Catholicos of the Cilician See with 32 votes of the 39 delegates in the Assmebly, which was boycotted by 11 pro Ejmiatsin delegates. The catholicos elect said: There is no winner in this elections, there is no loser. Let us realize

13 Hratch Tchilingirian 13 and wish that the winner is only and only the Holy Gospel, our Christian religion and the spirit of our national consciousness and self understanding. 17 Vazken convened a Bishops Conclave in Cairo on 5 March 1956, with 11 bishops. Among the resolutions, the Bishops declared the election taken place in Antelias as deficient and unacceptable. They put conditions for recognition which were virtually impossible for Antelias to accept. For instance, that Catholicos Zareh had to sign a letter of loyalty to the Catholicosate of All Armenians, etc. Months of negotiations for reconciliation and unity did not result in any tangible outcome. Antelias proposed a text of agreement, issued on 23 June 1956, which included important concessions to Ejmiatsin, but was rejected by Vaken I. So, Zareh I, reiterated Antelia s resolve to remain steadfast on Cilician See s independence and defence of its rights (Yeghiayan 1975: 700). Negotiations continued for months as Antelias lacked the canonical requirement of having a minimum of three bishops to consecrate the Catholicos elect. Other than two Cilician bishops, none of the bishops of the Armenian Church were willing to take part in Zareh s consecration. The matter remained unresolved and Ejmiatsin had the upper hand in preventing Zareh s consecration. Eventually, to end the stalemate, Antelias invited a Syriac Orthodox bishop to join the two Antelias bishops and consecrated Zareh as Catholicos of the Cilician See. The crisis in the Armenian Church deepened when Antelias established counter prelacies I North America and took over the dioceses of Greece and Iran. De facto schism and attempts for reconciliation

14 Hratch Tchilingirian 14 From the perspective of Antelias, the blame for the schism in the Church was put fully on Catholicos Vazken I. This view is captured by a comment by Puzant Yeghiayan, when he writes: The Catholicos of All Armenians hastily and led people with only extreme political thoughts, approved one mistake after another, formalized and brought the situation into an untenable confrontation between the two Sees (Yeghiayan, 1975: 721). Some thought that, as Attorney Shavarsh Sevhonkian put it, Ejmiatsin received a blow by the hands of the very supporters of Ejmiatsin («Էջմիածինը հարուածուեցաւ էջմիածնականներուն ձեռքովն իսկ»). 18 Observers of Antelias, on the other hand, argue that the Catholicosate of Cilicia was completely taken over by the ARF and the Catholicos, along with the clergy, became puppets of the party. Indeed, Catholicosate Vazken I put the blame squarely on the ARF. As far as he was concerned: "The Ejmiatsin Antelias crisis is not a church crisis, it is political, more correctly, party political. Because there is the well known party [ARF] which has imposed its influence on the See of Cilicia in order to spread its dominance on the Diaspora through the church organisation. This party has imposed its position on the Cilician See. And tries to realise its political objectives by taking control of one part of our Church body into its hands, by dividing the Mother Church in the Diaspora." 19 Some forty five years later, during a speech at the Armenian community centre in Tehran in 2001, Catholicos Aram I reiterated this relationship between the church hierarchy and the Dashnak Party:

15 Hratch Tchilingirian 15 "Antelias and ARF have been together concerning general issues affecting our nation and fatherland. Our See and the ARF have cooperated, especially since We struggled together by all means, in all our communities [in the Diaspora]." 20 The administrative schism since 1956 is not resolved and continues until today. Cold but cordial relations were maintained between the two Sees until the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Armenia's independence, the relationship improved from being cold to warm, but still relatively formal. Hopes to resolve the jurisdictional conflict were raised when Karekin I ( ) was elected Catholicos of All Armenians in April He was the first Catholicos of Cilicia ( ) to be elected Catholicos of All Armenians in Ejmiatsin. Many thought, unrealistically, that Karekin I s move to Ejmiatsin would bring a de facto unity in the Armenian Church. But that did not happen. Conclusion The study of the case of the 1956 schism in the Armenian Church provides important insight into the multidimensional process of secularization of the institutional church. The process works as if within concentric circles and on two important levels. On the structural level, the circles include at the core the church institution, then the Diaspora and Armenian political parties, and finally states and international politics. On the level of personalities agency of actors at the core of the concentric circles are the hierarchs of the church, namely the Brotherhood of the Cilician See, Catholicos Vazken, Bishops Khoren and Zareh. Even as they have their personal beliefs, convictions, leadership style and vision for the good of the church, their agency becomes limited by the structures within which they have to work and

16 Hratch Tchilingirian 16 constrained by the political interests of the lay actors, the second circle, which is made of the Armenian political parties and the functionaries of the Soviet government. Finally, the third circle on the structural level is the Diaspora, dispersed communities across geographic and political divides. While seemingly working towards a common goal of serving the best interests of the people or their constituency, the actors in each level of the circle have competing interest and ends to meet. Most relevant to the process of secularization of the Church, we see how the Armenian Church as an institution accommodated the expectations and impositions of the states/governments and the secular political parties. The clergy, willingly or unwillingly, became agents of political interests rather than ministers of a religion they had taken vow to serve. As one contemporary of the events in Antelias observed, the Brotherhood of the Catholicosate of Cilicia could not keep its oath unshakable concerning the Holy See and naively took sides and was sidelined by falling behind [certain forces] and evaporated. In turn, Ejmiatsin, despite her pan national position, sacrificed the interests of Armenia in the Diaspora to the pursuit of historically and traditionally indefensible position of supremacy. 21 As in the past, in this case as well, the secularisation of the institutional Church was imposed by state interests and secular ideologies. Finally, the self secularization of the clergy could be observed in the difference between what they were supposed to be as religious figures and what they did as agents of political interests of secular authorities. Indeed, the secularization of the Church continues to have an effect on not only the relationship between Ejmiatsin and Antelias, but on the relationship of the Church with Armenian society in Armenia and the Diaspora. Dr. Hratch Tchilingirian, Oriental Institute, University of Oxford

17 Hratch Tchilingirian 17 1 Bryon Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford University Press, 1982, p Polozhenie was abrogated by Catholicos Kevork V in April Khachig Tölölyan (2002) Redefining Diasporas: Old Approaches, New Identities. London: Armenian Institute. p Tom Mooradian, The Repatriate: Love, Basketball, and the KGB (Seattle: Moreradiant Publishing, 2008): 276, Archive of Recent History (ARH), Yerevan, f. 823, op. 3, d. 5. The 14 page report is dated in the files, but in fact dates from 1950 or I am grateful to Felix Corley who kindly provided the archival sources quoted in this article. 6. Letter from Grigoryan to Sadovsky of the Moscow CARC, 28 September 1948, State Archive of Russian Federation, Moscow (GARF), f. 6991, op. 3, d. 236, pp. 13ff. 7. Ovanesyan report, sent to Polyansky 14 April 1947, GARF, f. 6991, op. 3, d. 234, pp Polyansky letter to Karapetyan, 17 October 1951, ARH, f. 823, op. 3, d. 22, p GARF, f. 6991, op. 3, d. 237, p Tatyana Chumachenko, Moskovskaya Patriarkhia v dvizhenii storonnikov mira: , Izvestiya Chelyabinskogo nauchnogo tsentra, Vyp. 1 (35), 2007: ARH, f. 823, op. 3, d Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, f. 0106, op. 11, p. 17, d. 1, pp GARF, f. 6991, op. 3, d. 100, pp GARF, f. 6991, op. 3, d. 242, pp Quoted in D. K. Kouymjian, The Recent Crisis in the Armenian Church, Master of Arts thesis, Department of Arab Studies, American University of Beirut, 1961: p. 33.

18 Hratch Tchilingirian See P. Yeghiayan, Բիւզանդ Եղիայեան, Ժամանակակից Պատմութիւն Կաթողիկոսութեան Հայոց Կիլիկիոյ Antelias, Catholicosate of Cilicia Press, 1975, p. 653; Kouymjian 1961: Yeeghiayan, p Yeghiayan, p Yeghiayan, 1975, p Quoted in Yeghiayan 1975: Tatul Hakopyan, Թաթուլ Հակոբյան, «Հայով Եկեղեցին Պառակտուած չէ» Araks (Tehran), No. 15, Issue , July August 2001, p. 19. Վազգէն Ա. «Էջմիածին-Անթիլիաս տագնապը եկեղեցական տագնապ չէ, քաղաքականէ, աւելի ճիշտ կուսակցական: Որովհետեւ կայ ծանօթ կուսակցութիւնը, որ իր ազդեցութիւնը պարտադրած է Կիլիկեան Աթոռին Եկեղեցւոյ կազմակերպութեան միջոցաւ իր տիրապետութիւնը տարածելու Սփիւռքի վրայ: Այս կուսակցութիւնը իր դիրքորոշումը պարտադրած է Կիլիկեան Աթոռին: Եւ իր քաղաքական նպատակները կփորձէ կենսագործել, մեր Եկեղեցւոյ մարմնի մէք մասը իր ձեռքերուն մէջ առած Մայր Եկեղեցին պառակտելով Սփիւռքի մէջ:» 20 Մովսէս Քէշիշեան (թերթի խմբագիր) «Տէր, ցոյց ինձ ճանապարհ... կամ բաց նամակ Արամ Ա. Կաթողիկոսին» Արաքս (Թեհրան) ԺԵ տարի, թիվ , Հուլիս Օգոստոս 2001, էջ 19: 21 Yeghiayan, 1975, p. 664.