Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth

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1 Chapter 7 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth Martin Westerholm Abstract This paper defends the cogency of Karl Barth s presentation of the interplay between human moral agency and the nature of time, and suggests that Barth s theology offers an alternative to the unstable conceptions of moral character that result from contemporary culture s absorption in a bare present moment. The argument proceeds by examining the differing implications for moral selfhood of the accounts of time offered by Barth and by Immanuel Kant. Where Kant s philosophy of time is informed by his conception of freedom, with the result that, for him, the moral horizon consists in a bare moment of decision, Barth takes Christ as the material reality that informs his speech about time, and is thus able to give a more coherent account of time s function as the formal framework within which humans develop as moral selves. Keywords: Time, memory, moral agency, modernity, Karl Barth, Immanuel Kant This paper took form for a conference entitled The Present Moment ; were it not for the fact that the conference explicitly invited reflections on the theme of memory, it could have been seen as partaking in one of the peculiar ills of late-modern culture. Ours is an epoch consumed with the present moment the most immediate now and characterized by cultural forms and practices that have been emptied of the kind of memory required to put this moment in an intelligible context. This deemphasizing of memory is manifest, for instance, in the political and economic arrangements that shape our public space. While democracy calls for an electorate that is alert to the promises and patterns of behaviour of its elected representatives, in its modern origins and intent it is a form of government that reflects modernity s fundamental privileging of freedom over the memory embedded in tradition. A similar privileging of freedom over memory is expressed in our money-

2 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth based economies, in which the flexibility and convenience of the consumer are given precedence in a system of exchange grounded in present values rather than incurred debt or obligation. In addition to these structural features of our public sphere, the cultural marginalization of memory is also reflected in the artifacts most characteristic of our age television and the internet which serve as tools of forgetting by making distraction ubiquitous and memory obsolete insofar as anything one could wish to know is available at the click of a button. T.S. Eliot gave apt expression to the cultural ethos of the present moment when he spoke of being distracted from distraction by distraction (Eliot 2001, 6). My aim in this paper is to explore the roots of the marginalization of memory in our public sphere, its consequences for our capacity to understand our moral lives as a process of developing and acting in accordance with character, and the adequacy of one theological account of this dynamic. I propose to begin with a brief look at one depiction of the repercussions of the loss of memory for our lives as moral agents, before going on to examine the contrasting accounts of the interplay between time and agency in the work of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth. I hope to show that the privilege afforded freedom over memory in contemporary culture is given philosophical expression and justification in Kant s conception of time, and that this account of time does not provide an adequate framework within which to understand the ebbs and flows of our moral lives. I will then go on to argue that, in opposition to the perception of many critics, Barth s theology balances sufficiently well-developed conceptions of created time and ethical selfunderstanding in order to render intelligible talk of character and virtue. In order to set the stage for a consideration of the relationship between time and moral agency, let us begin by asking what happens when the moral, social, and cultural space that we inhabit ceases to be shaped by memory. Here, again, T. S. Eliot s work offers a powerful depiction of our cultural moment and its attendant dangers. April is the cruelest month in Eliot s Wasteland because it represents a present devoid of vital attachment to the past. 1 Eliot s wasteland is a culture of banality in which the offerings of a rich spiritual, moral, and intellectual heritage are commodified in gaudy 1 This judgment requires some exegetical justification. April is the present that falls between winter, a past that kept us warm, covering / Earth in forgetful snow, and summer, a future that surprised us, coming over the Starnbergersee / With a shower of rain. Like the present, April mixes memory, oriented to the past, with desire, oriented to the future. It brings the new out of the old: breeding / Lilacs out of the dead land ; stirring / Dull roots with spring rain. Yet in Eliot s poem it represents a present devoid of memory. Eliot asks, What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow / Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man, / You cannot say, or guess, for you know only / A heap of broken images. His point is that his contemporaries did not know the roots from the past that hold on to us and so they know only a heap of broken images, the inchoate experiences of the present (Eliot 1999, 23). 101

3 Martin Westerholm artistic representations and reduced to withered stumps of time told upon the walls (Eliot 1999, 26). While the past ought to provide a textured perspective for the present, the inhabitants of the wasteland are consumed by the latest fad and are thus blind to the ephemeral reflection that their society casts in the mirror held up by tradition. 2 Lacking the depth of experience that results from participation in a context informed by memory, they experience time only as a sequence of discrete nows and thus see themselves, not as moral agents, but as inchoate selves instantiating a series of actions that do not form an intelligible whole. They are, as it were, characters without character: the various female figures in the poem pass through different experiences but meld into one because they lack the sense of moral selfhood required to differentiate themselves from the faceless crowds of modern London. Eliot s work shows that our capacity to develop and act in accordance with character is dependent on the soundness of the nexus formed by time, memory, and ethical self-understanding. The importance of the interplay of these three has been brought to the fore in recent decades by the renewed interest in virtue as a central component of the moral life. Virtue language has a necessary temporal reference, for in order not simply to do that which is good but also to be good, one must exhibit a consistent pattern of behaviour across time. 3 One of the crucial functions of an account of time is thus to explain how time serves as the formal structure within which we develop as moral selves. It is this function that I wish to examine through a comparative analysis of the work of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth; but a methodological problem stemming from the delicate nature of talk about time needs to be addressed before we attempt any comparison. This problem concerns the very possibility of intelligible speech about time. On the one hand, it is critical that our speech about time not go astray, for time provides the formal framework that structures our lives, and to fail here is to jeopardize all else that is to be said about our being and acting. On the other hand, it is unclear how best to protect against fallacious speech regarding time, for it is not selfevident where we might find criteria by which to judge an account of a formal reality. How can we guard against error where there is no material content from which criteria can be derived? Martin Heidegger points out that, historically, accounts of time have tended to be judged by criteria drawn from 2 An inhabitant of the wasteland accuses Tiresias, the prophetic character who represents the wisdom of memory, of knowing and remembering nothing, before betraying her own banality by praising a popular dance tune. O O O O that Shakespeherian Rag - / It s so elegant / So intelligent (Eliot 1999, 27). 3 Linda Zagzebski defines virtue as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end (Zagzebski 1996, 137). 102

4 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth the context in which they are found (Heidegger 1967, 480). Thus, for instance, if we ask about time in relation to human agency, the criteria for an account of agency tend to spill over and become the criteria for an account of time. This spillover is a function of the fact that time s formal nature forces us to talk about it indirectly. In order to speak about time we must speak about some material reality in time; in short, speech about time requires speech about something other than time. This recognition allows us to give precise formulation to the problem by which we are confronted. In seeking to inquire into time as the formal condition of a notion of agency, we find ourselves in a position from which we cannot ask about time directly, and to frame the question in terms of human agency is simply to appeal to the principle. What question, then, ought we to pose in relation to time, memory, and agency? I propose to put the problem like this: by speaking of what other reality are we enabled to speak of time in a way that can support an adequate notion of moral agency? My hope is that this explicit consideration of the mediating concepts that inform our speech about time will allow us to see something of the logic of Barth s account of the matter. With that methodological groundwork in place, let us turn to the material question of time and moral agency. I propose to begin with Kant, in part because his thought is programmatic for all subsequent philosophical and theological reflection, and in part because we can trace in his work the privileging of freedom over memory that is so formative of contemporary public space. Let us begin by inquiring after the material reality that informs Kant s conception of time. The reduction of time to an organizing principle of perception that has no objective reality of its own is among the most well known features of Kant s transcendental turn (Kant 1998, A33/B49), and it plays a crucial role in furthering Kant s overall aim of reconciling epistemic necessity and moral freedom. At the broadest level, Kant seeks to show that the objects of our knowledge are subject to strict causal necessity while our action is entirely free and thus the subject of meaningful moral evaluation (Kant 1996, Groundwork, 4:455-6). His problem is how what we know can be subject to causal determination while what we do is not; his answer is a twofold structuring of experience in which objects of knowledge are located in a phenomenal realm that is causally determined, while our active subjectivity is located in a noumenal realm that stands apart from this determinism. 4 In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes explicit that the upshot of this split between the phenomenal and noumenal is that it enables us to locate the active subject above time itself, securing its freedom from determination by the past (Kant 1996, Practical Reason, 5:94-7). 4 For a brief introduction to the way in which the distinction between appearances and things in themselves allows Kant to reconcile freedom and necessity see Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxvii-Bxxx. 103

5 Martin Westerholm Kant s treatment of time as a form of sense applying only to appearances is thus informed by his conception of freedom. What are the consequences of this conception for human agency? Complications arise in the Kantian story because the split between the phenomenal and noumenal means that there are two senses in which I can say I. 5 In the first place, I can say I in reference to the self that I intuit as an object projected against the backdrop of time. This phenomenal I is the I of which, for Kant, there is some possibility of forming an understanding; in my case it is the I born in Canada, living in Scotland, and unduly concerned about the state of his favourite baseball team. Yet the objectification of this phenomenal I means that it cannot lay claim to being the subject that I am. 6 As an acting subject, my transcendental I is a noumenal reality, the freedom of which is secured by its elevation above the biases and habits of my phenomenal self. Kant s concern for freedom thus means that the subject is taken out of time and severed from the particularities of her past. Freedom transfers us into an intelligible order of things that stands apart from all that is peculiar to the subject (Kant 1996, Practical Reason, 5:42). Moral behaviour, in turn, consists in overcoming the peculiarities and predispositions of the dear self in order to act, not in accordance with character, but in accordance with universal moral maxims (Kant 1996, Groundwork, 4:407). That this conception distances acting subjects from the idiosyncrasies of their phenomenal selves is clear from Kant s discussion of the value of good character. Kant writes that a morally good disposition is above all price because it affords the subject a share in the giving of universal moral laws in a sphere free of the influence of all that is bound by time (Kant 1996, Groundwork, 4:435). On this account, good character means the sublimation of the individual subject into a changeless universal whole. For Kant, the actions of the ideal moral subject express not a timebound subjectivity but a timeless rationality. This should not of course be taken to suggest that time and history have no place in Kant s ethics, for moral development plays a key role in Kant s conception of the good life; yet we must attend carefully to the peculiar place occupied by time and history within Kant s conception of moral growth. For Kant, moral development consists in a temporally bound process of emancipation through which the subject moves from a condition of 5 For Kant, the inner sense that is dependent on time presents ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves (Kant 1998, B152-3). 6 Kant writes that inner sense the determination of which through the succession of different states is represented in time, is not the real self as it exists in itself, or the transcendental subject, but only an appearance of this to us unknown being, which was given to sensibility (Kant 1998, A492/B520). 104

6 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth self-inflicted heteronomy to a properly rational autonomy. Heteronomy corresponds to a state in which subjects allow their behaviour to be determined by vagaries of circumstance like attraction to or repulsion from the objects with which they interact. Kant writes that human beings are so constituted as sensible beings that objects of desire force in upon them prior to ethical reflection, and our pathologically determinable self the self that is subject to heteronomy wishes simply to give in to these enticements (Kant 1996, Practical Reason, 5:74). For Kant, the end of moral development consists in increasing one s capacity to rise above the heteronomy to which this pathological self is subject, conditioning the will to respond only to the call of duty. Duty elevates a human being above himself, raising him into the timeless space of universal, homogeneous rationality (Kant 1996, Practical Reason, 8:85-7). Moral development thus aims to further distance subjects from experience in time, and thus from all that is particular to the agent. Kant refers to freedom from determination by temporally conditioned objects as personality ; yet personality here does not correspond to individual peculiarities but rather to that which can be observed in universal reason (Kant 1996, Practical Reason, 5:87-8). No element of the personal remains in it. In sum, then, in the context of the Kantian narrative we can see that individual particularity is sublimated into the indistinguishable homogeneity of universal rationality when freedom is the material reality that informs our talk about time. In Kant s system, time is, in a sense, complicit in its own marginalization: it provides the framework within which moral development occurs, yet this development consists in increasing one s capacity to transcend all that is temporal. We thus find in Kant s account something like the narrowing of the temporal scope, the jettisoning of relation between the present and the past that Eliot decries in the Wasteland. Kant s moral horizon consists in a moment of decision shaped by freedom and duty to the exclusion of memory. When we think about time in terms of freedom, present options exhaust that which is morally significant while memory and character are rendered irrelevant a point that provides a framework within which to think about the amnesia that is the peculiar pathology of contemporary culture. I propose to turn, now, to Barth s conception of time in an effort to determine whether his theology offers an antidote to this pathology. My hope is that explicit attention to the fact that our speech about time is inevitably shaped by mediating concepts will enable us to see the logic of Barth s approach, but it should be conceded that, in framing the discussion in terms of character and agency, we appear to have stacked the deck against Barth, for the persistent critique of his work is that he gives so totalizing an account of the action of God that no room is left for any meaningful action or agency on 105

7 Martin Westerholm the part of the human. This critique exists on both a formal and a material level. The former concerns the reality of time as the formal dimension of our lives. R. H. Roberts details the way in which Barth separates the relationship of time and eternity from an abstract opposition of finite and infinite, but argues that in so doing Barth offers a theological conception that is divorced from time as we know it (Roberts 1979, 113-4). Roberts argues that there is a contradiction between the real time that Barth associates with Christ s presence and time as it is experienced by extra-theological humanity (Roberts 1979, 123). He thus holds that the total structure of Barth s theology remains enclosed within its own temporal envelope (Roberts 1979, 88), systematically standing at one remove from the texture of reality as normally experienced (Roberts 1979, 124) and exposing a distinct Docetism in Barth s presentation of created reality (Roberts 1979, 127). On Roberts account, then, Barth makes a notion of moral agency impossible from the beginning by failing to allow any integrity to the formal structure of our lives. In addition to this criticism of Barth s handling of the formal, there are also widespread concerns that Barth does not allow the material content of our lives to come together into the kind of coherent narrative required for a conception of moral identity. According to this critique, any sense of character growth and personal continuity is lost in the fact that human narratives take on significance only when they are interrupted by intersection with the divine narrative (Hauerwas 1988, 147). In short, then, Barth is charged with constructing a theological version of Eliot s wasteland in which each moment is isolated from the past, not by a lack of memory, but by the disruptive presence of God. Equipped with this understanding of its perceived shortcomings, let us turn to Barth s discussion of time. As a preliminary matter, we need to establish that we are not at cross purposes with Barth in making human character and agency the focal point of our investigation. It may well be that Barth would shrug at, or even embrace the charge that he does away with the kind of personal continuity required for a stable account of who we are as acting agents, since the aim of his theology of time is not to show that we can carry on with our projects as self-constituting agents, secure in our sense of the intelligibility of the sequence of our actions, but rather to show that our time stands in relation to God s time in a way that constitutes a continual, critical challenge to a secure sense of self-possession. That Barth is more interested in disrupting than in constructing an account of human agency is suggested by the strong language of his early period: We are the people in Christ who we never were, never are, and never could be; because we stand in Christ, we are new creatures, unique, incommensurable with our existence in time (Barth 2010, 347). It is claims of this kind that foster the charge that Barth makes temporal existence ethically irrelevant (Cullberg 106

8 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth 1938, 10); in order to respond to this charge we must pay close attention to that which Barth is seeking to accomplish here. That the early Barth can also hold that it is our part to confirm [the world of the Bible] in our lives by labouring to relate ourselves, our daily task, and our hour of history to God the Creator and Redeemer (Barth 1928, 51) suggests that he is not interested in undermining the value and intelligibility of human action tout court but rather in challenging the typical modern picture of the human agent as a deliberative consciousness standing over a neutral moral field onto which it can project its own values (Webster 1998, 35-6). In opposition to this view, Barth holds that human action acquires intelligibility from its relation to divine action (Barth 2009, 510), and that this relation is achieved within a determinate moral space that Barth describes through the Pauline notion of being in Christ. Particularly for the early Barth, then, whose formulations are considered so damaging to the integrity of human agency, the question is how to describe the being and acting of subjects who stand, not against a blank moral slate, but in Christ. Understood on these terms, the troublesome consequences of Barth s language of being in Christ those who we, as subjects in time, are not, can be seen as symptomatic, not of a disinterest in the question of agency, but rather of an underdeveloped Christology that does not allow for more than a bare, evental relation between divinity and humanity, time and eternity (McCormack 1995, 280). The maturation of Barth s Christology through his time in Göttingen, culminating in the adoption of the classic Reformed anhypostatic enhypostatic Christology, allowed him to speak of God s real presence in time in Christ, and thus to move towards the well-developed ethical accounts that accompany each volume of the Church Dogmatics. With the possibility of God standing in relationship to time secured, Barth has no problem in his mature work affirming the veracity of our status as human agents in time. He continues to insist that to be a human agent is to be in relation to God, and not a self-directed center of moral deliberation, but where, in his early work, his Christology could not support a relationship between God and human history, forcing him to speak of eternity touching time as a tangent, he can now say that to think of God and humanity together is to think of a real history that is enacted between them (Barth 1960, 124). For him, then, human being is a history (Barth 1960, 157); or, because existence in time is the condition of participation in this history, he also writes that humanity is temporality (Barth 1960, 522). In view of this link between the human and the temporal, he asserts that the reality of our being, choosing, and acting, all depend upon the fact that this present moment is real (Barth 1960, 527-8). Barth thus ties the reality of our agency to the reality of our time; our question is whether he provides an adequate account of the latter. An important clue is offered here by the fact that there is a shift over the 107

9 Martin Westerholm course of the Church Dogmatics in the way in which Barth thinks about time. The first extended treatment of time in the Dogmatics occurs in the context of Barth s theology of revelation; there, Barth appears to be working with a realist conception that grants not only formal but also material being to time. He is led, then, to speak of three distinct times (Barth 1956, 46-7): the created time originally willed by God; lost, or fallen, time, which represents the unstable space inhabited by sinful humanity; and the time that is taken up into God s eternity when it becomes an occasion of revelation (Barth 1956, 52). On this realist account, Roberts claim that Barth s theological structure is enclosed within a temporal envelope that is incommensurate with our time has some justification, for revelation time is alone thought to be real and is set in opposition to the time in which we live. Yet the realist language regarding time that is found in the context of Barth s theology of revelation drops away by the time he comes to his doctrine of creation. There, instead of speaking of created time as an entity that has been lost, he writes that we ought instead to speak of co-created time, time as the form that is created along with the content of creation (Barth 1960, 438). Similarly, he no longer speaks of lost time but instead of sinful man in time, so that now the time of sin is not a real entity in which we are condemned to dwell but simply the form of sinful human existence (Barth 1960, 517). This development in Barth s work allows us to align our interests with his. We are interested in the reality about which Barth speaks in order to enable speech about time, and, in coming to see time as a form of existence, Barth recognizes that he cannot speak of it directly. He thus links the problem of time to the problem of anthropology (Barth 1960, 439) and, for Barth, the existence of the man Jesus is determinative for anthropology. It is thus speaking of Jesus that allows Barth to speak of time; the question is whether this Christological approach leaves space for time to function as the form of human agency. In considering this question, let us think further about the shift that takes place in Barth s view of time over the course of the Dogmatics. In volume I, Barth argues that Christ brings a new, third time that can alone be seen as real, stable and good. Here the possibility of an intelligible moral identity is jeopardized by the fact that our time is real only in discrete episodes; yet, concomitant with the view of time as pure form that is developed in volume III of the Dogmatics is a new conception of what Christ does. Instead of inaugurating a time that takes the place of our own, Barth now suggests that Christ serves as a hermeneutic lens through which we see that time is the form genuinely willed for our lives by God (Barth 1960, 520). Crucially, he argues that, apart from Christ, our reflections on time yield only the conclusion that we do not in fact possess any time that is real, for the present, which we imagine we can point to as the real time in which we live, evades all our attempts to pin it down (Barth 1960, 514). Thus, when we take 108

10 Time and Moral Selfhood in the Thought of Immanuel Kant and Karl Barth ourselves as the material objects in relation to which we speak about time, we cause ourselves to lose this form, for we have no capacity to demonstrate its reality. On Barth s logic, then, we cannot ground our own moral selfhood, for we cannot secure its formal dimension. Barth thus argues that the best that can be produced from consideration of time apart from Christ is the ethic of self-transcendence that Kant suggests (Barth 1960, 516). For him, then, human agency is established by taking Christ as the material object that enables us to speak of time, for Christ does that which we cannot in making of our time something sure and sound. Rather than introducing a real time that, as Roberts suggests, is always at one remove from our actual existence, Christ s existence in time assures us that the time that we have is the form of human life willed by God. At this point, then, we can see that, in principle, Barth is not guilty of compromising the formal aspect of our moral character; but thus far this stands as a bare affirmation. In order to give it flesh we must consider this formal affirmation in relation to some material content; indeed, we saw earlier that concerns regarding Barth s conception of agency extend beyond the formal into the material and so our work is but half done. The concern, to recall, is that Barth s description of human being as a history in which God is always the initiating agent means that human narratives have only episodic significance in relation to a totalizing divine narrative. We still require, then, an account of the material cogency and integrity of the narratives in which we ground our sense of self. Within the constraints of this paper, however, we cannot undertake a detailed material demonstration; thus, let us instead try to see the logic of Barth s method with regard to the material content of our moral selfhood. One way to approach this is through Paul Ricoeur s notion of emplotment as a necessary component of a narrative. Ricoeur suggests that narrative identity requires not only succession, the assurance of the stability of its formal aspect, but also emplotment, an operation through which one mimetically situates oneself in relation to a larger frame of reference in order to draw a configuration out of a simple succession (Ricoeur 1984, 65). This second characteristic is crucial, for a narrative that is purely self-referential offers only an arbitrary configuration of events while an emplotted narrative gives meaning to events. On this account, then, narrative cogency depends on external reference; our sense of self thus requires a material frame of reference within which our stories achieve intelligibility. It is here that we encounter the true strength and logic of Barth s presentation of human selfhood. Barth recognizes that we need an account of the reality of time as the basis of our being, having, and doing, but we can neither speak of time directly nor take human existence as the material reality informing our conception of time. The emphasis in Barth s conception of human being in time is thus the participation in and reference back of this being to the 109

11 Martin Westerholm narrative of God s actions. Crucially, this reference does not jeopardize human agency, for the shift to a view of time as a formal reality means that God s narrative is not in competition with ours, for time is not an exhaustible material space in which only one story could be enacted. The history of God s actions constitutes instead a founding narrative that emplots our action in a wider referential field within which it is possible to develop a sense of self. Rather than constituting an assault on our agency, God s narrative is the founding condition of our capacity to be moral selves, for it provides the material frame of reference within which our narratives can take on meaning. So where, by way of conclusion, are we left? We began with Eliot s wasteland, a moral space in which agents are subsumed into an indistinguishable mass by a lack of memory. We have seen that this picture is reflective of Kant s conception of the moral life, a conception in which freedom crowds out memory by demanding that the agent raise herself out of time. This notion of a need on the part of the agent to transcend time is in turn diagnosed by Barth as the result of a system in which human existence serves as the material reality in relation to which we speak of time, for Barth argues that, apart from the hermeneutic lens provided by Christ s actions, humans experience time only as a vanishing reality that constantly eludes their grasp. For him, then, a coherent notion of agency requires that Christ serve as the material object that informs our conception of time. On the one hand, this serves to emplot our actions within a larger narrative, but it is of course important that Christ do more than this. Were this all that is missing from our lives then the concern of Eliot s wasteland could be addressed by a wide range of narratives giving structure to our experience. It is thus crucial, for Barth, that Christ not only provide material structure but also affirm for us the reality of the formal dimension of our lives. In doing this, Christ secures rather than jeopardizes the narratives in which our character and agency are grounded. 110

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