Peter L.P. Simpson January, 2015

Transcription

1 1 This translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of the Venerable Inceptor, William of Ockham, is partial and in progress. The prologue and the first distinction of book one of the Ordinatio fill volume one of the critical edition of the Latin text of Ockham s theological works edited by the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, NY. The paragraph numbers are my own additions for ease of cross-reference. The intertextual numbers in italics in {} brackets indicate the volume and page number of the Latin critical ediction. Peter L.P. Simpson January, 2015

2 2 THE ORDINATIO OF THE VENERABLE INCEPTOR, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Prologue Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology Num. 1 Question 7: Whether the Theology that of Common Law is Possessed by Theologians is a Science Properly Speaking Num. 1 Opinions that Hold the Affirmative Side Num. 7 Rejection of these Opinions in General Num. 18 Against the Same Opinions in Particular Num. 23 Opinions that Hold the Negative Side Num. 34 Ockham s Opinion Num. 36 Opinion of Peter Aureoli about the Theological Habit Num. 38 Rejection of Peter Aureoli s Opinion Num. 43 Ockham s Opinion about the Theological Habit Num. 46 Response to the Arguments for the Other Opinions Num. 55 Response to the Principal Arguments Num. 76

3 3 Prologue {1.3} Question 1: Whether it is Possible for the intellect of the Wayfarer to have Evident Knowledge of the Truths of Theology 1. Concerning the prologue I ask first whether it is possible for the intellect of the wayfarer to have evident knowledge of the truths of theology. 2. That it is not: Because evident knowledge of the truths of theology cannot be had without a distinct knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity; but a distinct knowledge of the deity is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore impossible for it too is evident knowledge of the truths of theology. Proof of the major: because indistinct knowledge of the deity does not suffice, because if it did, since it would be possible for us from our pure natural powers, the consequence would be that we could from our pure natural powers have evident knowledge of the truths of theology, which is manifestly false; therefore for evident knowledge of the truths of theology {1.4} there is required a distinct knowledge of the deity. The minor is plain: because knowledge of the deity under the proper idea of deity, since it is of the infinite and beatific object under the idea of beatific, is itself beatific; but beatific knowledge is impossible for the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. 3. Second as follows: if the intellect of the wayfarer had evident knowledge of the truths of theology, those truths would either be known per se or would be known by other things that are more known to it. Not in the first way because the truths would be known

4 4 when the terms are known; but such propositions, which are per se known, are known by everyone who apprehends the terms, and so they would be naturally known to anyone who apprehends the terms, which is manifestly false. Nor in the second way, because those things more known to it would either be simply more known and prior or would be so only to itself. Not in the first way because nothing is prior to this proposition God is three and one, since there is no middle term between God and the three persons in which the predicate could be first present. Nor in the second way, because nothing that is posterior can lead to evident knowledge of this proposition God is three and one ; therefore etc. 4. Third as follows:

5 5 {1.183} Question Seven: Whether the Theology that of Common Law is Possessed by Theologians is a Science Properly Speaking 1. Third principally I ask whether the theology that of common law is possessed by theologians is a science properly speaking. 2. That it is: Every intellectual habit veridical with respect to necessary truth is either intellect or wisdom or science, Ethics b16-17, b31-1b8. But theology is not intellect, because then theological truths would be self-evident; nor wisdom, because wisdom is intellect and science, Ethics a18-19; therefore it is science properly speaking. 3. Second as follows: the theologian has a more perfect knowledge than the layman; but the layman has faith with respect to these necessary theological truths; therefore the theologian has a habit more perfect than faith. But with respect to necessary truth there is no habit more perfect than faith save intellect, wisdom, or science; therefore etc. 4. Third as follows: I Corinthians 12.8, To others is given the word of wisdom, to others the word of science, etc. But this science, since it is a supernatural gift, can only be in respect of necessary theological truths; therefore etc. 5. {1.184} To the opposite: The habit that precisely rests on authority is not science properly speaking; but theology is of this sort; therefore etc.

6 6 6. There are diverse opinions on this question. Some hold the affirmative side, some the negative. Opinions that Hold the Affirmative Side 7. Among those who hold the affirmative side, some [Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] hold that once faith in the first principles of theology is possessed with respect to which principles there is in us neither science properly speaking nor evident knowledge science is acquired about the conclusions that follow from those first principles, so that the conclusions are known by science properly speaking, even though the principles are not evidently known. So it is said that [Aquinas ST Ia q.1 a.1] there is a twofold class of sciences: for some proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, as geometry does; some proceed from principles known by the light of a superior science, as optics proceeds from principles made known in geometry. And in this way theology is a science that proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science, namely the science of God and of the blessed. Hence, just as music believes the principles handed on to it by arithmetic, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed by God. 8. Again, it is agued by others [Richard of Middleton, also Aquinas] that to assert the opposite is to derogate from the dignity of theology, and is contrary likewise to the truth. {1.185} The proof of the first point is that theology excels all other sciences both as to certitude and as to dignity of matter. That it excels in the first way is plain, because it rests on the light that cannot deceive nor be deceived; but the other sciences rest on the

7 7 natural light, which can deceive and be deceived. That it excels in the second way is plain, because it is about things that exceed human reason. There is a confirmation, because the other sciences are said to be handmaids of theology. Similarly, theology has to pass judgment on the other sciences. The proof of the second point is, first, that all who treat of theology call it a science. Hence Wisdom 10.10, He gave them the science of the saints. Likewise I Corinthians 12.8, To others is given the word of wisdom etc. Likewise Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, I attribute to this science [whatever in human affairs can be known by man]. The proof, second, is that the veridical intellective habits are only five, Ethics b16-17, as was argued at the beginning [supra n.2]. 9. Another opinion holding the affirmative side [attributed, not altogether correctly, to Francis of Marchia] is that theology is a true science not only as to its conclusions but also as to its principles, so that, once faith in the first principles is possessed, science of the same things is acquired by virtue of the faith and of the light of the agent intellect. 10. This can be made clear thus, that theology is not intellect or prudence or art, as is certain, or faith, because theology and faith {1.186} are distinct habits, according to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, Most are not strong in this science, although they are most strong in the faith itself. Likewise, those habits whose acts are distinct are themselves distinct; but the acts of faith and theology are distinct, because faith s act is to assent by command of will without evidence, and theology s act is to defend and confirm, according to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n The proof that theology is a science is: that thing about which it is known that nothing impossible follows from it can itself be known. But about any theological truth it can be known that nothing impossible follows from it, because there will be an error

8 8 either in the form, and it can be solved, or in the matter, and it can be denied, because from the very fact it is false it is not self-evident. 12. Secondly as follows: an intellect able to know some subject under the idea under which the subject includes all knowable truths can evidently know those truths. But God under the idea of deity includes all theological truths, and he can be abstractively known by us under that idea; first because the intellect reaches God discursively, so either God is known at the end of the discursive process, and the conclusion is obtained, or something else is known and then the end of the discursive process has not been reached; second because the intellect distinguishes God from creatures, so it knows both under their proper idea. 13. Thirdly, because the first in any genus has most the character of that genus {Metaphysics b24-25]; but among all sciences or intellectual habits theology is first; therefore etc. 14. {1.187} Fourthly, because otherwise a theologian would not have a more perfect habit than an old woman has, which seems unacceptable. 15. A further opinion holding the same side [Henry of Ghent] is that both the principles and the conclusions in theology are known, but that this is not possible by the light of faith or by the natural light but by a superior light that is a mean between the light of faith and the light of glory, which is in the fatherland. 16. The proof of this is that otherwise one person would not have a clearer knowledge of the truths of faith than another, though he might have a firmer knowledge, contrary to Augustine On the Trinity 14.1 n.3, Most are not strong in this science, etc. ; but this being strong consists in clarity of knowledge.

9 9 17. If it be said that faith receives increase, on the contrary: for then faith and this science would always be at an equal level, so that the more someone is strong in the faith the more would he be strong in this science; which is contrary to blessed Augustine. Rejection of these Opinions in General 18. Against the principal conclusion in which all these opinions agree I argue as follows: first, that however much there could, by God s absolute power, be a science properly speaking of theological truths, and however much this may perhaps be in fact the case with some people as regard certain truths, yet that it is not a science according to the common course I argue initially thus: everything that is evidently known is either self-evident, or made known by what is self-evident, or made known through experience by means of intuitive knowledge either mediately or immediately. But in none {1.188} of these ways can these truths of faith be known. That they are not self-evident is manifest; for then they would be known to unbelievers. Nor are they made known by what is selfevident, because then any unbeliever, when questioned in order about them, would assent to them, according to blessed Augustine Retractions 1.8 n.2. Nor are they known through experience by means of intuitive knowledge, because all the intuitive knowledge that a believer has an unbeliever has too; and consequently, whatever a believer can know evidently by intuitive knowledge, an unbeliever can know, and so an unbeliever could know these truths of faith evidently. 19. In addition, there is no greater reason for necessary truths of faith to be known by science properly speaking than for contingent truths of faith to be known evidently in

10 10 their own way. But these latter are not known evidently; for then it would be possible for anyone to known that he was in a state of charity and that the body of Christ is on the altar, which seem simply false. Therefore necessary theological truths are not known by science properly speaking. 20. Second I argue against the statement that faith is a presupposition of this science [nn.7,9]. First thus: two habits that judge about the same object are never so ordered that one necessarily presupposes the other as is plain from induction, although a habit with respect to one object may presuppose a habit with respect to another object. But this faith and this science will be about the same object, according to the last two opinions. Therefore etc. 21. There is a confirmation, because any reason by which one habit with respect to one object might presuppose another habit with respect to the same object, would be a reason for the like holding of all other habits; but this is not true. 22. Also I prove that infused faith is not necessarily presupposed because, when some habit makes nothing for, nor disposes to, another habit save by means of its own act, then every habit that inclines to the same act seems to suffice for acquiring this other habit. But infused faith does nothing for acquiring the scientific habit save by means of an act of faith, because as was said in the first question [supra 1.17] a habit never inclines to an act not its own, nor consequently to another habit, save by means of its own act to which it first inclines. But acquired faith inclines to the same act of faith to which infused faith inclines, for as will be plain elsewhere [Sentences 3 q.8] infused habits do not incline to acts other than those that acquired habits incline to. Therefore someone could,

11 11 by means of acquired faith, acquire the scientific habit; therefore infused faith is not presupposed. Against the Same Opinions in Particular 23. Second I argue in particular against these opinions. First against the first [n.7]. First as follows: the habit of principles is more known and more evident than the habit of conclusions, so it is impossible for the principles to be merely believed and for the conclusions to be known. The antecedent is plain, for anything because of which something else is known is itself more known [Posterior Analytics a29-30], that is, {1.190} known more evidently; therefore the premises are always known more evidently than the conclusions. 24. Further, as opinion about the principles is related to opinion about the conclusions, so is evident knowledge about the principles related to evident knowledge about the conclusions. But it is impossible for someone to have opinion about the conclusion on account of the premises unless he has opinion about the premises. Therefore it is impossible for someone to know the conclusions evidently on account of the premises unless he knows the principles, that is, knows them evidently. 25. Further, whoever knows some conclusion evidently on account of the principles, knows evidently that the conclusion follows from necessary truths; therefore he knows evidently that the principles are necessary; therefore he knows the principles evidently. 26. Against the second opinion [n.9]. First, because no proof is given that theology is a distinct habit as a science properly speaking is, for theology cannot be proved to be a

12 12 science from the distinction of acts [n.10]. Proof: because every act a believer has an unbeliever trained in theology can have. For such an unbeliever could defend and strengthen the faith, persuade similarly believers and unbelievers, respond to the reasonings of heretics and unbelievers, just as any believer could. And yet it is manifest that such an unbeliever would not have science properly speaking. Therefore no proof that theology is a science properly speaking can be taken from such acts. 27. Further, it would follow that someone could know these things [of belief] evidently on the basis of pure natural powers, because as was accepted before [supra 1.17, n.22] no habit inclines to the act of another habit save by means of its own proper act. Therefore whatever can be done by means of such habit can be done without it, {1.191} if the act proper to it could be elicited without it. Therefore since an act of faith can be had on the basis of pure natural powers without infused faith, the science could be acquired by means of acquired faith without the infused habit. 28. Against the third opinion [n.15]. Every infused habit has an act that is of a nature to be elicited by some acquired habit. But there is no acquired habit that naturally inclines to an act of knowing matters of belief, because every naturally acquired habit that a believer can have an unbeliever can also have; therefore etc. The major is plain inductively about charity, faith, and hope, and the like; nor is there greater reason about one of these than about another. 29. Further, every act of the intellect is evidently known to the intellect, so this act of knowing would be evidently known to the intellect, because it would be known intuitively. And consequently no theologian when studying theology could doubt that he

13 13 had such an act; but this is manifestly false, because many and great theologians deny that they have such an act. 30. A confirmation: there is no greater reason for someone who believes some matter of faith to be certain that he believes, than for someone who knows such matter of belief to be certain that he knows. But no one can believe some matter of belief unless he is certain that he believes; therefore no one can know either unless he is certain that he knows. 31. If it be said, according to what was said in the first question [1.41], that it is possible for something to be intuitively known and yet contingent truths cannot be evidently known by virtue of that knowledge; therefore it is not unacceptable for the act of knowing to be intuitively known by someone and yet for him to doubt whether he believes or knows: {1.192} 32. This reasoning is not valid, because although someone could know his own act intuitively and yet be ignorant how to discriminate it from another, nevertheless he can know he has the act if the act is intense. For example, if someone has an intense love and an intense delight, he can well doubt whether the love is really distinct from the delight, yet he is certain that he loves and delights. Therefore if someone believes matters of belief and knows them, then although he could doubt whether this believing and knowing are really distinct, yet he must be certain that he believes and that he knows; and thus any theologian could know know evidently that he knows things of belief. 33. Further, whoever evidently knows some proposition cannot dissent from that proposition by mere command of will, but he must be persuaded by a reason more strongly moving his intellect to dissent, or he must forget something evidently known.

14 14 But a theologian, however much he has studied theology, can dissent by mere command of will from things of belief, even without a reason more strongly moving him; because no reason from falsehoods can move more strongly than a reason from truths evidently known; nor does he have to forget anything in order to dissent. Therefore he does not have evident knowledge with respect to any such thing. Opinions that Hold the Negative Side 34. Others hold the negative side, and this in two ways. Some, as philosophers [Averroes], hold that we can naturally attain to every science {1.193} possible for us, and so there is nothing merely a matter of belief that cannot be evidently known. But this opinion cannot be refuted by natural reasons but only by authorities, as will be plain elsewhere [1.202]. 35. There is another opinion [William of Ware], 1 which posits that, although matters of belief can be evidently known yet, of common law, not by us in this present state. And therefore theology, as we commonly learn it, is not a science with respect to such matters of belief properly speaking, though with respect to some people it could be a science. Ockham s Solution 1 Sentences Prol. q.3, I say otherwise, then, that, taking science properly and perfectly, this science is in itself perfect, nay most perfect, and this comes from the evidence of the thing; however it is not science for a wayfarer, and this by common law. Or it can be said more clearly, in other words, that this science can be considered in two ways: first either in itself, or in comparison to its object, and in this way it is science most of all, because its principles are most evident and its object most knowable; in another way it is compared to the wayfaring knower, and since to him the principles of this science are not evident, then with respect to the wayfaring knower it should not be called a science.

15 And this opinion I reckon to be true. So about this opinion I will first show that every habit, besides faith, which a believing theologian can acquire, an unbelieving theologian can acquire too; second there is need to see what sort of habit, besides faith, is acquired by a theologian. {1.194} 37. Proof of the first point: because no habit is to be posited in us save one that we can be convinced of by some act manifest to us or by the authority of Scripture; but neither any act manifest to us nor the authority of Scripture can convince us of such a habit. The first part of the minor is plain, because every act that a believer can have, besides the act of believing, an unbeliever can have, provided he was raised among Christians or was trained in theology. The thing is plain from induction. The second part of the minor is plain, because a habit in respect of matters of belief besides faith is not found in Scripture. Therefore I say that all actual knowledge, besides faith, whether propositional or conceptual, that a believer can have an unbeliever can also have. Opionion of Peter Aureoli about the Theological Habit 38. As to the second point [n.36], there is an opinion [Peter Aureoli] that theologians acquire by study a habit beyond faith, but this habit does not unite the intellect, nor does it cause any assent in the intellect, with respect to matters of belief, but only clarifies them; and it truly has the nature of the intellectual virtue of wisdom of which Ethics a9-b8 treats, and it is the light or intelligence that the Saints make mention of and which they try to reach in the disputations and treatises {1.195} that they compose. 2 For the proof that some habit beyond faith is acquired is, first, because the agent intellect 2 Sentences Prol. sect.1 a.3 nn (not quoted completely or in this order by Ockham).

16 16 as principal agent and propositions as instrument are cause of some intellectual habit; but not cause of faith, because the theologian already had faith about the truth; therefore some other habit; second, because such a theologian has some act about matters of belief other than believing them, for he knows how to give a reason for them and how to defend them against the impious and how to confirm them in the minds of the pious and how to speak wisdom among the perfect [I Corinthians 2.6]. 39. Further, something is acquired from such study, for otherwise it would be vain; therefore an act or a habit is acquired. And whichever it is, a habit will be acquired. 40. But that the habit does not unite the mind to matters of belief is plain, because then it would be opinion and consequently it would make the believer fear about [the certainty of] theological truths. 41. That it is, however, a habit that clarifies truths is plain, because a habit that makes something to be imaged by the intellect without any assent to it is a habit that makes things clear. For it gives explanation of terms, unties involved reasonings, provides examples and directions, and the aid of probable reasons, and inductions. 42. And that it has the nature of wisdom is plain, because metaphysics has the nature of wisdom, and yet as regard some of its acts it only clarifies things. Rejection of Peter Aureoli s Opinion 43. But this opinion, it seems, is false, because, even if some habit is acquired, yet this habit does not have the nature of wisdom; {1.196} because, as is plain from what has been said [n.37], every habit a believer could acquire by such study an unbeliever could

17 17 also acquire from the like study; but it is manifest that an unbeliever does not have true wisdom about theological truths; therefore etc. 44. Further, wisdom does not exist without intellect and science, according to Aristotle Ethics b2-3. Hence Aristotle says in the same place, It is manifest that wisdom is science and intellect about things most honorable in nature. But a habit of the sort in question that clarifies things can exist without intellect and science, both because it can exist with faith alone, according to him [Aureoli, Sentences Prol, sect.1 a.3 nn ], and because all the acts, besides the act of believing, that a believer can experience an unbeliever could experience; for an unbeliever might know how to give the same account of the faith as a believer does, and how to defend it against the impious and to confirm it in the minds of the pious and to speak wisdom among the perfect in the same way that a believer does. 45. There is a confirmation, because wisdom does not exist along with error about the same thing; but this habit exists along with error about matters of belief; therefore such a habit is not wisdom. Ockham s Opinion about the Theological Habit 46. Therefore I say to this article that, with respect to matters of belief, a theologian increases the habit of acquired faith when acquired faith precedes his study; but when it does not proceed then {1.197} he acquires acquired faith if he is a believer. And such habit does not exist in an unbeliever. But apart from this habit, and for the most part in fact, a student of theology, whether a believer or a heretic or an unbeliever, acquires

18 18 many other scientific habits that could be acquired in other sciences. And besides these, he also acquires many scientific habits about implications that do not pertain to any natural science. But with respect to all of these implications whether propositions or concepts, and this whether they are statements or implications of any sort, whether they are matters of knowledge or only of belief any student of theology can acquire a habit of apprehending things. And by means of these habits, namely scientific habits with respect to things naturally knowable and to implications proper to theology and by means of these apprehending habits, he can have all the acts possible, by common law, to a theologian, besides only the act of believing, because by means of these habits he can preach, teach, confirm, and do all such things. 47. But that such a habit besides faith and the scientific habits that can be naturally acquired is not a science properly speaking is plain, because nothing is known evidently that requires faith for being assented to; for the habit that inclines to evident knowledge no more depends on faith than the reverse. But according to all the Saints, and according to all who think the contrary, no one can assent to truths of belief without faith. Therefore there is no science properly speaking with respect to them. 48. If it be said that then there would be no supernatural knowledge besides faith, which does not appear to be true, I reply that supernatural knowledge is taken in two ways. In one way that it cannot be acquired naturally; and no supernatural knowledge is, by common law, necessary for us in this way besides infused faith. {1.198} In another way knowledge is called supernatural because it is of truths that cannot be known on the basis of purely natural powers but only supernaturally; and in this way supernatural knowledge besides faith is necessary for us.

19 To the first argument for the last opinion [of Peter Aureoli, n.38.] I say that by means of the agent intellect, and of some propositions, acquired faith is sometimes increased, and sometimes acquired faith is acquired, but not infused faith; nor is it necessary always to have faith about such things beforehand. 50. The other two arguments [nn.38-39] prove that some other habit besides faith is acquired, which I concede. 51. To the argument which proves [n.40] that a uniting faith is not acquired, I say that such an acquired uniting faith will not be opinion, when one distinguishes opinion from faith. And thus no uniting habit distinct from infused and acquired faith is acquired with respect to matters of belief. 52. To the other argument [n.41] I concede that the habit can be called clarifying. 53. To the final argument [n.42] I say that this habit, other than faith, with respect to matters of belief does not have the nature of wisdom, because it can exist along with error and can naturally exist without intellect and science. 54. And when it is said that metaphysics has the nature of wisdom [n.42], I distinguish metaphysics in the way I distinguished science in the first question [1.8], that it can be taken either for knowledge of many things in proper order, or for knowledge that immediately inclines to some proposition. I say that in the first way no part of metaphysics is wisdom, because responding to sophistical arguments is not formally wisdom, although wisdom is presupposed if anyone is to have evident knowledge of how to respond to them. And so it is in the issue at hand, that a theologian would necessarily have wisdom if he had evident knowledge of how to defend the faith and confirm it; but

20 20 this is not possible naturally. Metaphysics in the second way can be called wisdom. But how this is to be understood will be plain in the following question [1.223]. Response to the Arguments for the Other Opinions 55. To the first argument for the first opinion [n.7], when it is said first that there is a twofold class of sciences, one that proceeds from principles self-evidently known by the light of a superior science etc., I say that, although this is true in the case of a subalternated science, yet never does anyone evidently know the conclusions unless he knows them by experience or by some premises evidently known. Hence it is saying nothing to say that I know some conclusions because you know the principles that I believe because you tell me. And in the same way it is puerile to say that I know the conclusions of theology because God knows the principles that I believe because he reveals them. 56. To the next argument [n.8] I say that the fact that the conclusions are not known evidently does not derogate from the dignity of our theology, just as the fact that the principles of theology are not known evidently does not derogate from the dignity of the knowledge of those principles. And therefore, just as without derogation the principles are not known evidently, so without derogation the conclusions are not known evidently either. {1.200} 57. And when it is said [n.8] that theology exceeds other sciences both in dignity of matter and in certitude, I say that this argument equally proves that the principles of theology are evidently known, for these, just as much as the conclusions, exceed both in

21 21 certitude because they are not subject to human reason and in dignity of matter. So I say that certitude is taken either as adhesion to something or as the evidence for it. In the first way the principles and conclusions exceed, but not in the second way; therefore etc. 58. To the confirmation [n.8] I say that the other arts are called theology s handmaids, and that theology has to judge them, because of the greater truth in the things known and because of greater adhesion to them. 59. To the next argument [n.8] I say that all the Saints call it science by extension of the name of science to knowledge that is certain and to a habit that apprehends things of which as concerns themselves there is naturally science and wisdom. 60. To the next [n.8], when it is said that the veridical intellectual habits are only five, I say that in the case of naturally acquired veridical habits there are only five kinds, which the Philosopher enumerates in Ethics b For, according to the Philosopher, faith in its whole extent is not a veridical habit, because it can exist with respect to falsehoods, in his view, as well as with respect to truths. However, there is, besides, these habits, a veridical habit of faith, because falsehood cannot fall under it. And of this sort is faith with respect to theological matters of belief, whether it is infused or acquired faith. In another way one can say that the Philosopher is {1.201} only speaking of habits that are both evident and certain, and theology with respect to matters of belief is not of this sort, because it is not evident though it is certain. 61. Hereby is plain the answer to the first argument for the second opinion [n.9], because theology as to its whole habit of passing judgment is science or faith etc. And when it is said that the acts of faith and theology are distinct [n.10], I say that as to all

22 22 those acts, besides the act of belief, the apprehending habits, along with knowledge of the consequences, are sufficient, as is plain from experience. 62. And if it be said [Peter Aureoli, Prol. sect.1 a.1 nn.54, 59] that such a habit is a logical habit, I say that it does not pertain to logic to know consequences in particular but only to know the nature of consequences in general. And therefore every science uses logic as its instrument, by means of which it knows its consequences in particular. So a logician does not have to know that this inference, the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon, therefore the moon may be eclipsed, is good, but this belongs to the astronomer. 63. To the next argument [n.11] I say that that is known evidently about which it is known evidently that nothing impossible follows from it. But this is not known in the issue at hand except by some proposition of belief; hence it is not known evidently that the matter of belief is not the antecedent in a consequence wherein something impossible is inferred. And when it is said that every [such] argument is erroneous in matter or form, I concede it; however this cannot be known evidently. 64. Hence the argument, the divine essence is the Father, the divine essence is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father, errs in form, and yet no one, by common law, can know evidently that the argument errs in form; just as no one, by common law, can know evidently that one absolute thing is several relative persons really distinct. Likewise this argument, God is immortal, no man is God, therefore no man is immortal, errs in

23 23 matter, 3 because it takes a false minor. And yet no theologian, by common law, can know evidently that the minor is false, but he only believes that it is false. 65. As to the second [n.12] I deny the major the point will become plain in another question [q.9, 1.226ff.]. I also say that the minor is false, because God cannot be known by us wayfarers under the proper idea of deity so as to be known by that simple cognition alone. 66. To the first proof [n.12] I say that at the end of the discursive process there is a stand at the one propositional complex that is known through the process and was unknown before, although all the terms of it were known by conceptual knowledge. Hence since the discursive process is precisely between propositional complexes and in no way between concepts by themselves, then by this process in no way is conceptual knowledge of any term acquired, because any such knowledge is presupposed before the end of the process. Nor is any knowledge that apprehends a complex proposition acquired, because it can be had beforehand; but by the discursive process is acquired precisely knowledge that judges. For example, [1.203] someone who wants to proceed discursively from creatures to God according to their way of speaking presupposes conceptual knowledge of God and of creature, namely what is signified by each term; also any complex proposition can be formed before the discursive process, and so all knowledge of concepts and also all apprehending knowledge can precede and is not acquired. But what is acquired is the knowledge by which assent is given to this complex, God is an infinite being, or something is a supreme being, or some such. 3 Strictly speaking it errs in form too, because the conclusion would only follow if the major premise said only God is immortal or everything immortal is God. But Ockham deals with this matter extensively later in 1 dd.3-4.

24 To the second proof [n.12] I say that the intellect distinguishes between God and creatures because it has one composite concept proper to God and it denies all creatures of it. For example, the intellect discursively concludes that some being is infinite, first, and supreme; and then it has a concept proper to God, infinite and supreme being. And it knows that no creature is of this sort, and so it distinguishes this being from every other. 68. And if the question is asked as to why then, from the fact the intellect has only a composite concept of God which is not God really, it more understands God than before, I reply that God is then understood because a single concept proper to him is understood, and this concept is of a nature to supposit for God alone. Nor is God of a nature to be otherwise known by us wayfarers on the basis of our pure natural powers; and God does not immediately terminate our act of understanding in this present state, but the above concept alone immediately terminates it. And this is what blessed Gregory says On Ezekiel 2 hom.2 n.14, However much our mind advances in contemplation of God, it does not attain to that which he himself is but to something that is beneath him. {1.204} 69. And this is what must be said if a concept is not intellection or cognition but something created by the act of understanding, having the sort of objective being that the thing has in subjective being [cf. Ordinatio 1 d.2 q.8]. But according to the opinion which posits that a concept predicable of something in reality standing not for itself but for the thing is the intellection itself, and that all universals are certain intellections inhering in the mind, it seems one should say that, when the intellect thus makes a distinction so as to know God and not something else, it reaches one concept composed of many intellections, by any one of which intellections taken separately something other than God may be understood just as much as God himself is, yet only God is understood by the whole

25 25 concept composed of all the intellections joined together; and so God is the object of that whole and nothing else is. And as to such intellection composed of many intellections, each of which is common to God and other things, the fact that God alone is understood by it is not unacceptable. But such an intellection does not suffice for getting theological truths. 70. But against this seems to be the authority of Gregory cited before [n.69], because in this way the mind would in contemplation be able to advance to the attaining of deity itself, and consequently not merely to the attaining of what is beneath God. 71. It can be replied that, according to this opinion, the intention of blessed Gregory is that the mind can never, by common law, advance so far that it does not always reach something that is beneath God, {1.205} because, by common law, no cognition can be had by wayfarers without something other than God being as much understood by the cognition, or by a part of it, as God is. And so the mind never reaches to what God precisely is but also to what is beneath God. 72. To the third [n.13] I say that theology, as to some part of it, is neither first nor lowest nor in the middle of sciences properly speaking, because it is, as to that part, not a science properly speaking. 73. To the fourth [14], that a theologian knows many things that an old woman does not know, I say that nevertheless an old woman does sometimes have as perfect a knowledge in respect of some one thing as a theologian has, but she lacks many other things. 74. As to the argument for the third opinion [n.15], when it is said [n.16] that one person would not have a clearer knowledge than another, I concede that it would not be

26 26 clearer, understanding by clearer knowledge more evident knowledge, because no one has evident knowledge of matters of belief. Nor is this against blessed Augustine, because blessed Augustine is there using the name science in an extended sense. And so I concede that many are strong in the faith although they are not strong in this science, namely the science by which they may know how to expound Scripture, defend it, etc. And therefore a superiority in knowledge of the same matter of belief does not consist in clearness of knowledge. 75. And when it is said [n.17] that then faith and science would be on an equal level, plainly this need not be so, because this science involves many other habits over and above faith that are not habits of faith, as was said [n.46]. {1.206} Response to the Principal Arguments 76. To the first principal argument [n.2], that every intellectual habit veridical with respect to necessary truth is either wisdom or science etc., I say that nevertheless an inevident veridical habit can be faith, and this is what theology is in great part. Likewise, there is some habit with respect to such truths that is not properly veridical, because it does not judge but only apprehends, and this is what theology is in some part. 77. To the second [n.3]: it is plain that the whole habit of a theologian is more perfect than the habit of one layman; however it is not always more perfect with respect to some matters of belief.

27 To the third [n.4], I say that the Apostle is extending the name of wisdom and of science to the habits by which one knows how Scripture should be expounded, defended, confirmed etc. 79. And if it be asked what the probable reasons achieve that are adduced for matters of faith, whether they lead to faith or opinion or science or nothing one can say that they increase acquired faith, though they do not increase infused faith; hence too such reasons sometimes generate [acquired] faith. And this is what the remark means, Some people sometimes have opinions about a thing as firm as others who have knowledge [Ethics b29-30]; and opinion here is not opinion as it is distinguished from faith. {1.207} Question Eight: Whether the Habit of Theology is Really One in Number 1. Fourth I ask whether the habit of theology is really one in number 2. That it is: