Treatise 7. On Fallacies The description of real elenchus and sophistic elenchus The art of sophistry. 7.1 Chapter 1: General Remarks

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1 --1 Treatise 7 On Fallacies 7.1 Chapter 1: General Remarks The description of real elenchus and sophistic elenchus (1) Turning now to sophistic elenchi and the fallacies they are naturally liable to generate, we preface this treatise with some general remarks concerning them. We may say, therefore, that an elenchus is a syllogism demonstrating the contradictory of the position of the respondent. (2) A sophistic elenchus, however, is an expression that appears to be an elenchus, but is not. (3) Now the cause of illusion [causa apparentiae] in a sophistic elenchus is that in which it agrees with a genuine elenchus; (4) and the cause of not-being [causa nonexistentiae], or defectiveness, is the failure to meet some condition required in a genuine elenchus. This is the seventh treatise of this work, and it deals with fallacies that arise in sophistic arguments. I will divide it into six chapters. The first will contain some general preliminary remarks, the second will deal with the classification and number of fallacies, the third will be about fallacies of words [in dictione] in particular, the fourth about the fallacies apart from words [extra dictionem], 1 the fifth about the modes of arguing for the sake of diverse tactical goals [modis ducendi ad diversas metas], 2 and the sixth about the solutions of sophistic arguments. The first chapter will have seven parts. The first describes both real elenchus and sophistic elenchus; the second will describe the art of sophistry; the third will describe disputation; the fourth will list the genera of disputation; the fifth will describe the tactical goal [meta]; the sixth will provide the number of such goals; and the seventh will describe fallacy. The first part contains four sections. The first is the description of elenchus, along with a statement of the aim [of this treatise]. An elenchus is presented to refute [ad redarguendum] a respondent or someone holding a false opinion. But a refutation [redargutio], properly speaking, comes about only by means of a necessarily conclusive argument that generates belief, although sometimes it may appear to come about otherwise. Of [all the forms of] argumentation, however, only a syllogism is necessarily conclusive on account of its form, as was said elsewhere. 3 Therefore it is necessary that every elenchus properly so called be a syllogism, and not just any kind of syllogism, but one that proves the contradictory of the conclusion of the respondent. For no respondent would be refuted by a syllogism proving nothing against him. Hence it is clear that the description of elenchus was correctly given. Now the description of elenchus given here is restricted to syllogistic argument, not because a sophist only uses syllogisms (for he uses whatever argumentation he deems advantageous for himself in order to appear to defeat the respondent), but because, aiming above all to appear to refute, he aims above all to appear to produce an elenchus. The second section describes sophistic refutation in terms of appearance [apparentia] and not-being [non existentia], since 'sophistic' means the same as 'deceptive'. For we are deceived only by some false appearance, that is to say, by believing an appearance, even though the thing is not as it appears to be. The third and fourth sections show the causes of appearing to be a refutation and not being a refutation; they will be clarified later in the course of the specific discussion of each fallacy The art of sophistry Sophistry is the art by which an opponent is able to appear to defeat a respondent by the strength of his own argumentation, although he does not do so, and by which the respondent is able to resist the opponent so that the opponent neither defeats him nor appears to do so. The second part describes the art of sophistry, in accordance with which artful disputations come about, using sophistic argumentations, by means of which neither knowledge is obtained, nor opinion produced. Therefore,

2 --2 by means of a sophistic disputation sophists do not intend to become wise, but they do intend to appear to be wise. Now of these persons Aristotle says that for some it is more important to appear to be wise while not being so, than to be wise while not appearing to be so. 4 For they appear to be wise who appear to perform the works of the wise, while not doing so. There are, insofar as the present discussion is concerned, two works pertaining to the wise, as Aristotle says: not to lie, and to be able to expose a liar. 5 This means not putting forth a false position, but a true one, and being able to uphold that true position against one's opponents by solving their opposing arguments, while being able to disclose the liar, i.e., being able to refute a false position by proving the opposite truth. With respect to the first work, then, a respondent appears to be wise by means of the art of sophistry if he is able to solve the arguments of his opponent in such a manner that that opponent does not seem to defeat him; but with regard to the second work the opponent appears to be wise by means of the art of sophistry if by his sophistic and subtle arguments he seems to defeat the respondent, who is unable to solve those sophistic arguments; for in this way he seems to show that the respondent has put forward a false position. It is obvious, therefore, that sophistry is correctly described in terms of these two works, whereby it simulates wisdom, and by which in turn the sophist himself simulates the wise; and this is why Aristotle says that sophistry is apparent as opposed to real wisdom. There is some doubt, however, as to whether sophistry should truly and properly be called an art, as is laid down in the description given above. For it seems that it should not, given that sophistry is deceptive, and may state and lead us to a false conclusion, whereas art, prudence, knowledge, understanding, and wisdom are not deceptive but are intellectual virtues, by means of which one may not state something false, as is said in bk. 6 of the Ethics. 6 My reply is that if by 'sophistry' you wish to understand a habit of assent concerning conclusions acquired by sophistic argumentations, so that one believes that they are true argumentations because of an incapacity to solve them, then that habit, doubtless, is neither art, nor prudence, nor understanding, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, but an erroneous habit that is the opposite of some one of the intellectual virtues just mentioned. But if by 'sophistry' we understand a habit [habitus] on account of which we can aptly and promptly construct and also dissolve sophistic argumentations with subtlety concerning any subject, then that habit is without a doubt a beautiful and very useful art. It is so, in the first place, for the wise or for those who desire wisdom, lest they be impeded from the contemplation of truth by getting entangled in such argumentations; for, as Aristotle says, "experts and entirely knowledgeable persons are sometimes confounded even by ignorant persons who use such arguments." 7 Second, it is useful for fools who seek glory in apparent wisdom; for by this art they appear to be wise, although they are not wise. For this art is not wisdom but a part of logic; but it seems to be wisdom, because it has some similarity to wisdom, which is first philosophy, namely, metaphysics, insofar as they both deal with all the terms of all the sciences, but metaphysics by means of true demonstrations, and sophistry by means of sophistic argumentations, in the manner of speaking used by Aristotle in bk. 4 of the Metaphysics, when he says: "for dialectic and sophistry take on the same shape for the philosopher, since both sophistry and dialectic deal with the same genus as philosophy, namely, being in its total generality, but they differ; for sophistry, insofar as it teaches to construct and dissolve sophistic arguments, deceives nobody, and does not state falsity; however, insofar as it uses its artistic trickery, it is apt and able to deceive even the wise, should they not be well trained in this art." The description of disputation A disputation is an argumentative act of one [person] with another so as to obtain the end [finis] of the argumentation. The third part describes disputation, because that is what dialecticians and sophists are mostly engaged in. And 'act' is included in this description as the genus of disputation. And by 'argumentative' the instrument is indicated by which that act is exercised. And by 'one with another' the disputants are indicated, who should be at least two, namely, the opponent and the respondent, or the teacher and the student. And 'so as to obtain the end of the argumentation' is added because every agent, whether it acts by nature or by art, intends a definite end The genera of disputation (1) There are four kinds of disputation, namely, doctrinal, dialectic, examinatory, and litigious. (2) Doctrinal disputations are those that argue from the proper principles of each discipline; (3) dialectical disputations are those that settle contradictions [by arguing from] probable principles;

3 --3 (4) examinatory disputations are those that [argue from principles that] appear to the respondent [to be true] and that those who claim to have knowledge must know; (5) whereas litigious, or sophistic, disputations are those that syllogize from [principles] that appear to be, but are not, probable; thus speaks Aristotle. 9 In the fourth part the kinds of disputations are listed and described in five sections. The first enumerates the four kinds of disputation: for every disputation comes about either by probative or at least apparently probative argumentation; and every such argumentation is either a demonstration, in which case the disputation is doctrinal, or dialectical, in which case the disputation is dialectical, or examinatory, in which case the disputation is examinatory, or sophistic, in which case the disputation is sophistic, which Aristotle calls 'litigious'. 10 Now rhetorical argumentation is comprised within dialectical, whence rhetoric and poetics are parts of dialectic, as Aristotle says and so also rhetorical disputation is comprised within dialectical. These kinds of disputations differ in the diverse ends intended by the disputants. For a doctrinal disputation is directed toward generating knowledge in the student concerning the point to be established, and this is the aim of both disputants, namely, of the teacher and of the student. Dialectic, however, when applied in speculative [matters] or [utilized] in a speculative manner, is directed toward opinion; for both disputants aim at acquiring an opinion about the point of the discussion; they take contradictory stances, and each of them should produce probable arguments for his position, if he has any. He should also solve his opponents' arguments, if they also have probable solutions--and not in a litigious manner, just in order to win, but in order that both of them should assent, in agreement with each other, to the position that they have seen to have been supported in the disputation by more probable and less soluble arguments; and if they do otherwise, then they slip into a sophistic disputation, which often happens. Now there are other specific ends in rhetorical disputations, and these should be discussed in connection with the Rhetoric. The end of an examinatory disputation is to check on the knowledge or ignorance of the respondent. Finally, the end of a sophistic disputation was sufficiently characterized in the second part of the present chapter. Aristotle calls sophistic disputations 'litigious', 'pugnacious', 'competitive', and 'bellicose' because of their similarity to rhetorical disputations in lawsuits. For just as the accuser and the defendant intend contrary ends, namely, both their own profit and the condemnation of the other, and for this sake they start a fight with each other, and hostility and controversies, so also do those who dispute in a sophistic manner, for they intend contrary ends, each his own exaltation over the other and the suppression of the other, namely, to appear wiser than the other. The other four sections describe the aforementioned four kinds of disputations with reference to some of their properties. For it is a property of doctrinal disputations to proceed from proper principles [principia propria], insofar as the subject matter permits, because they use as powerful demonstrations as possible; but the most powerful demonstrations proceed from proper principles, as is clear from bk. 1 of the Posterior Analytics. 12 Again, it is a property of dialectical disputations that they syllogize from probable principles toward both parts of a contradiction, namely, one party toward one part and the other toward the other, as was said above; and this cannot happen in a demonstrative or doctrinal disputation. Again, it is a property of an examinatory disputation to dispute about things that appear true to the respondent, and about general principles, primarily, indeed, about the general principles because they must be presupposed in the art or science that is the subject matter of the examination. For although these can be known without knowing the specifics, still, if they are not known, then no more specific points can be known; whence, if the respondent is found not to know these, it is immediately obvious that he is not acquainted with the art. But if the respondent is doing well concerning such general principles, we should move on to more specific points, to check on whether he has [sufficient familiarity with] the art or science [to respond]; however, we should not move on to just any specific point, but only to those that appear true to the respondent; for it often happens that someone familiar with an art or science does not have on hand a prompt recollection of every particular conclusion. When, therefore, the respondent has claimed to have knowledge or recollection of a particular conclusion, we should see whether he knows how to demonstrate it from its proper principles, as well as how to eliminate the relevant objections and to solve the opposing arguments. For if he knows these, then we will have verified that he has sufficient knowledge of that art or science. But the examiner is allowed to move from one point to another, since gaining a thorough impression requires that this appear to be the case not only concerning a few points but concerning many. Thus it seems to me that an examinatory disputation is a sort of composite or aggregate of dialectical and demonstrative disputation, i.e., of dialectical disputation where common principles are concerned, to test for ignorance, but of demonstrative where proper principles are concerned, to test for knowledge. But Aristotle seems to place

4 --4 examinatory disputations under dialectical rather than under demonstrative disputations, since an examinatory disputation should start from general principles. The property of sophistic disputation is that it syllogizes from principles that are apparently but not really probable, as Aristotle says. 13 But it seems that this is in need of explanation, as has been said. For more often than not, sophistic argumentations apply probable premises, or perhaps even necessary and manifest ones, but they are not syllogistic, for they fall short of a syllogism in many respects. This is why it is necessary to attribute such apparent but not real probability not only to the premises of sophistic argument but also to the consequence and the contradiction [between the premises and the negation of the conclusion]. 14 A sophistic disputation therefore proceeds to the position of the respondent from premises, consequences, or contradictions that are apparently, but not really, true or probable. Further, we should not say that these are strictly speaking definitions of these kinds of disputation, but it is sufficient if they are taken to be descriptions of some of their properties The description of tactical goal [meta] The meta 15 in a sophistical disputation is the unacceptable [position] into which an opponent strives to drive the respondent but without striving to conclude against him. The fifth part describes the meta. Strictly, the meta is the end or termination of a road, a square, a street, a district, or the like. But figuratively, 'meta' signifies the end intended by a sophist to the disadvantage of the respondent. A single operation, however, often has several or many ends, of which some are subordinate to others, as Aristotle teaches in bk. 2 of the Physics. 16 The end principally and ultimately intended by the sophistic opponent is the glory of appearing to be wise, and for the sake of this he intends to appear to defeat the respondent in disputation, an appearance produced by driving him into an unacceptable position or concluding something unacceptable against him. 17 And thus the proximate end intended by the sophist is this, namely, to drive the respondent by the force of his arguments into a manifestly unacceptable position. Therefore the name meta is used to signify such an unacceptable position in a sophistic disputation, i.e., that into which the opponent intends to drive the respondent; and this accords with the definition The number of metas (1) There are five such metas, namely, refutation, falsehood, implausibility, solecism, and redundancy [nugatio]. (2) The meta of refutation is the denial of what was previously conceded, or the concession of what was previously denied, by force of argument in the same disputation. (3) The meta of falsehood is the concession of something obviously false. (4) The meta of implausibility is the concession of a position that goes against the common opinion of professors or against the opinion of some, or all, or several famous professors. (5) The meta of solecism is the concession of some faulty expression that breaches the rules of grammar. (6) The meta of redundancy is the concession of some redundant locution. (7) And you should add to the description of any of these metas the phrase: 'by force of argument'. The sixth part enumerates and describes the five metas of sophistic disputation. It has seven sections. The first is their enumeration, and is obvious. The second provides the description of the meta of refutation, which is the meta primarily and principally intended by the sophist, because it is the most evidently unacceptable position, given that the concession of contradictories goes directly against the first and firmest complex principle. Thus the phrase 'by force of argument' is added in the description, because otherwise no reward or glory would be ascribed to the opponent, whereas this is what he principally intends. So if the respondent spontaneously says: "I have sufficiently upheld this position, but now, for the sake of the disputation I wish to uphold the opposite position," he is not disproved. Also, 'in the same disputation' is added, because if some things were asserted elsewhere, those have already passed away, and they are not relevant to the present conflict; and the respondent is allowed to take now one position and then another, for the respondent acquires glory precisely if the opponent is unable to refute him in either position. The third section describes the meta of falsehood, and its description is clear. For not just any concession of falsehood is the meta of a sophistic disputation; indeed there are many probable false positions propounded and believed by many philosophers, and to propound and concede such positions is by no means something unacceptable

5 --5 to the respondent. But it is unacceptable and unseemly for the respondent if under the force of the argument he concedes some manifestly false position, and the same applies should he grant some falsehood the falsity of which the opponent can show to the disadvantage of the respondent. Now the meta of falsehood differs from the meta of refutation, for although it is necessary that one member of any contradiction be false, it is still possible that neither member should be manifestly false. The refuted party did not concede a conjunction consisting of contradictory propositions, since then he would have granted an obvious falsehood, but rather he conceded separately one member first, and the other member later; and if the member he conceded later by the force of the argument is manifestly false, then he was driven to two metas, namely, those of falsity and of refutation. The fourth section describes the meta of implausibility, and the description is obvious. For it is unseemly to concede by the force of the argument something contrary to the common opinion of all or of most or of the more renowned professors. But the respondent may evade this meta by saying that what he conceded is not implausible, for although such and such philosophers are of the contrary opinion, nevertheless others, namely, so and so, are of this opinion; but if he cannot say this, he is driven back to a meta, although to one that is not so unacceptable as the previous ones. The fifth section describes the meta of solecism, taking 'solecism' broadly for every kind of grammatically incorrect locution. It is in this way that some ancient philosophers incurred this meta when they denied the multitude of beings; it is of these that Aristotle tells us in bk. 1 of the Physics that some of them, in order that they would not be forced to say that one is many, eliminated [the copula] 'is' from their propositions, so that they did not say: 'A man is white', but rather 'A man white'; and others changed the locution and did not say: 'A man is white', but rather 'A man whites'. 18 The sixth section describes the meta of redundancy owing to 'superfluous locution'; this occurs when something is uselessly added to an otherwise complete proposition or expression. Now the most obvious case of redundancy, which is the one most aimed at by the sophist, occurs when the same word or phrase is uselessly repeated, as in 'A man man runs' or 'Socrates has a curved nose nose'. If, however, the same phrase is repeated on some reasonable grounds, then there will be neither superfluity nor uselessness, and, consequently, there will not be redundancy either, for example, when for the sake of emphasizing our praise we say 'Oh, God, my God!', or when, so as to strengthen our reproach, we say 'Oh, you scoundrel, you scoundrel!' The last section says that none of the aforementioned unacceptable positions is a meta in a sophistic disputation, unless it is conceded or appears to be conceded by the force of the opponent's argument, for otherwise the opponent would derive no glory from it. But the opponent arrives at his desired end either when the respondent concedes it or when he appears to concede it, or even when it is concluded or appears to be concluded by the opponent against the respondent and the respondent does not refute it, whether this is really so, or only apparently The description of fallacy (1) A fallacy, in the sense intended here, is the deception of someone unskilled in the art of sophistry by some sophistic argumentation. (2) Therefore, for each fallacy we have to provide its cause of illusion [causa apparentiae] and its cause of defectiveness [causa defectus]. The seventh part in its first section describes fallacies, insofar as the discussion of fallacies pertains to [that topic of] sophistic disputation, which is a part of the art of dialectic. And it provides a causal definition of the name 'fallacy', which signifies a certain act by means of names that signify its proper material and efficient causes. This definition gives 'deception' as the genus of 'fallacy'; for just as to fool someone is to deceive him, and to be fooled is to be deceived, so a fallacy, or [an act of] fooling [someone], is a deception, by the locus of conjugates, 19 and just as the act of a mover is the same as that of the thing moved, and is called 'motion', so the act of the one who fools someone is the same as that of the one being fooled, and is called 'fallacy'. Thus, just as motion is described as the act of the thing moved insofar it is moved and of the moving thing insofar as it is moving, and just as, more specifically, alteration is the act of the thing that can be altered insofar as it can be altered, and that of the thing doing the altering, insofar as it is doing the altering (as is determined in bk. 3 of the Physics), 20 so fallacy is described as the act of someone who can be fooled, insofar as he can be fooled, and the act of the one who fools, insofar as he fools, by which the one fooling actually fools and the one that can be fooled is actually fooled; and we have already said that this act is a deception, by means of which one deceives and the other is deceived. But, again, in order to reach something that is more evident, we have to see what it is that is appropriately called a fallacy and by virtue of what it is so called, and what is involved in being the one who can be fooled, and

6 --6 what is involved in being the one who fools. In connection with this it is obvious that it is not a man insofar as he is a man that is called someone who can be fooled, for someone skilled in the art of sophistry may not be fooled by such fallacies. Rather, someone can thus be fooled insofar as he is unskilled, and not in just any art or science, but in the art of sophistry. Therefore, in this causal definition, with respect to the matter, or proper subject [of the act of deception], it is correctly said that a fallacy is the deception of someone unskilled in the art of sophistry; and this is indicated by Aristotle, who says: "And this seems to be because of lack of skill." 21 Likewise also a man neither fools someone by these fallacies insofar as he is a man, nor indeed even insofar as he is a sophist (i.e., as someone who possesses the art of sophistry), although it is true that such a person knows better how to fool somebody and can do so better than someone who is not thus skilled; for Aristotle says: "It is true that by these fallacies the unskilled sometimes fool the skilled and those who know." 22 Rather, a man fools another or himself when either of them is unskilled and has adopted or constructed a sophistic argument, and this he does by means of such an argument. Therefore, with respect to the efficient cause, the definition correctly adds "by a sophistic argument." Some, however, concede this to be a correct definition of 'fooling', but they distinguish between 'fooling' [fallitio] and 'fallacy' [fallacia]. Therefore, they describe fallacy as a certain aptitude or propensity to deceive. And I do not reprove this opinion, for names signify at will [ad placitum], and one does not have to dispute about the meaning of a name [quid nominis]. For if they interpret 'to deceive' in the active sense, then the aptitude to deceive, properly speaking, is the sophistic argumentation itself, or its illusion and defectiveness, which, again, are nothing but the sophistic argumentation itself; therefore, a fallacy taken in this way would not be anything other than the sophistic argumentation itself, which we discussed earlier. But if they interpret 'to deceive' passively, then the liability to be deceived arises from inexperience, which is the inexperienced person himself. 23 The second section of this part draws an obvious corollary. For it has been said before that a sophistic refutation, or a sophistic argumentation, by means of which a fallacy comes about, involves illusion and defectiveness. 7.2 Chapter 2: On the Division of Fallacies The division of fallacies into those 'of words' [in dictione] and those 'apart from words' [extra dictionem] (1) There are two modes of arguing sophistically and deceptively: for some [such arguments] take place by means of [the use of] words, and some apart from [the use of] words; whence some fallacies are called [fallacies] 'of words' [in dictione], and some 'apart from words' [extra dictionem]. (2) A fallacy is called a fallacy of words if its cause of illusion pertains to the conventionally signifying words, (3) and a fallacy is called a fallacy apart from words if its cause of illusion pertains to the signified thing or intention. The second chapter is about the distinction and enumeration of fallacies. In this chapter the divisions, subdivisions, and enumerations of fallacies are given in five principal parts. The first part contains three sections. The first lays down the first division of fallacies in accordance with the division of sophistic argumentation that yields the types of arguments that Aristotle calls the sophistic modes of arguing. 24 He says, therefore, that some of them are of words and some are apart from words; and 'word' is not taken here as it is distinguished from 'expression', namely, for incomplex terms, but broadly, for any significative utterance, whether complex or incomplex; indeed, words in this sense include even writing, on account of the fact that writing is subordinated conventionally [ad placitum] to significative utterance, as is stated in bk. 1 of On Interpretation. 25 The two other sections clarify the members of this division. Now in this connection we should note that fallacies are not said to come about either from words or apart from words simply because the opponent, in some of his argumentations, uses significative utterances and in some he does not, for it is obvious that in a disputation significative utterances have to be used in all argumentations; but this has to be understood, as has been said elsewhere, 26 in such a way that to spoken terms, propositions, and argumentations there correspond in the mind signified intentions, which are mental terms, propositions, and argumentations. Thus, as those sections indicate, there are some spoken sophistic argumentations which are such that the intentions corresponding to them in the mind do not appear to be argumentations, if we exclude from consideration the significative utterances, and so it is obvious that the illusions generated by these argumentations derive from the [use of the] significative utterance; and the fallacies that come from such argumentations we call 'based on words'

7 --7 [secundum dictionem], i.e., 'based on significative utterances' [secundum vocem significativam]. There are also other spoken sophistic argumentations to which there correspond intentions in the mind such that even without the consideration of utterances they appear to be argumentations, and thus it is clear that their [illusory] appearance does not derive from significative utterances. Therefore, fallacies coming about in this manner are said to be [fallacies] apart from words, i.e., [ones coming about] without the consideration of significative utterances, having their [illusory] appearance in the mind. For example, let us construct a paralogism based on words [secundum dictionem], an instance of the fallacy of equivocation, thus: 'Every dog is an animal; a constellation is [a] dog; therefore, a constellation is an animal'; and let us construct another apart from words [extra dictionem], an instance of the fallacy of accident, thus: 'Every man is an animal; a donkey is an animal; therefore, a donkey is a man'. Both of these paralogisms appear to be [valid] syllogisms, because they have one middle term that connects the extremes by subjection and predication, which is required for a valid syllogism. But in the first paralogism the unity of the middle term, which is the cause of illusion, is merely the unity of the utterance, and this holds only with regard to the utterance, for to this [unity] there corresponds a diversity of intentions in the major and the minor [premises], insofar as they are true. Therefore, excluding the consideration of utterances, no unity of the middle term appears in the intentions; hence those intentions will not appear to constitute a syllogism. But in the second paralogism the middle term is the same both in the utterances and in the intentions; for the same intention corresponds to the utterance 'animal' both in the major and in the minor proposition, insofar as these propositions are true (although they are not true of the same things among those for which that intention supposits, but one [is true] of some of them and the other [is true] of others); therefore, even excluding the consideration of the utterance, the unity of the middle term remains in the intentions, wherefore those intentions still appear to constitute a syllogism. From all this you may conclude that in the first syllogism the defectiveness occurs more by reason of the variation of the middle term than it does in the second one. For in the first the middle term varies with respect to the signified intentions, but not in the second, where there is only variation with respect to the things of which the propositions are verified, the intention remaining the same in both (for 'animal' signifies both men and donkeys by means of the same intention). Therefore, in the first paralogism, if it is completely resolved, the middle term has to be distinguished, but not in the second one; in this case it is the consequence that has to be denied because of a defect of the syllogistic form, which will be explained later. But in connection with this you will ask: 'So can someone be deceived by fallacies based on words, if he is merely thinking by himself, and without uttering anything?' And I say that indeed, he can, but this is not without the consideration of significative utterances. For I can consider utterances and a spoken paralogism without uttering anything, and think that it has the same middle term, and on the basis of this identity I may believe that it is a valid syllogism, and that the one corresponding to it in the mind is also valid The general basis for distinguishing fallacies of words [in dictione] (1) Fallacies of words stem from the multiple signification of the same utterance. (2) Therefore, as Aristotle says, they come about in as many ways as the same names or expressions may signify not the same but several things. 27 (3) And the cause of illusion in them is the unity of the significative utterance, whereas the cause of defectiveness is the diversity of the signified intentions. The second part shows the general basis for distinguishing fallacies of words, and it has three sections. The first pinpoints the root from which fallacies of words stem and whence they are constructed; for they stem from the multiple significations of the same utterance, i.e., from the fact that the same utterance signifies diverse intentions in the soul. For we sometimes believe that a spoken argument is simply valid, in the same way as it would be if the utterance signified only one intention, but if this is not true, then we are deceived. It is on these grounds that the second section infers that sophistic argumentations, or fallacies, can come about in exactly as many ways as one name or one expression can signify not one, i.e., a single intention, but several. For a fallacy of words does not come about because the same utterance signifies several ultimate significates, in the way that 'man' signifies several men, and 'animal' several animals, provided that the intention signified immediately in the mind remains the same, just as does the utterance, for then there exists both in the mind and in the utterance the unity required for a syllogism. The third section pinpoints the common cause of illusion and the common cause of defectiveness in fallacies of words in accordance with what has been said. For the cause of illusion is the identity of the utterance

8 --8 required for true spoken argumentations, and this is present both in sophistic argumentations based on words and in true argumentations. The cause of defectiveness, on the other hand, is the diversity of the signified intentions, since a true argumentation requires not only identity of utterance but also identity of intention, the reason being that a spoken argumentation cannot be valid unless a valid mental one corresponds to it The three kinds of ambiguity [multiplicitas] of words (1) Since, therefore, a word or an expression is said to be ambiguous [multiplex] if while remaining the same it has many significations, the ambiguity [multiplicitas] of words or expressions used in distinguishing fallacies based on words is usually said to be threefold, namely, actual, potential, and imaginary. (2) Actual ambiguity occurs when a significative utterance that is one both in matter and in form has many significations, and this is how the fallacies of equivocation and amphiboly come about. (3) Potential ambiguity occurs when an utterance that is the same in matter but diverse in form has many significations, and this is how the fallacies of composition and division and of accent come about. (4) Imaginary ambiguity is said to occur when utterances that are diverse in matter but have some likeness in form have dissimilar significations or consignifications; and thus comes about the fallacy of the figure of words [figura dictionis]. On the basis of the above-stated foundation the third part presents the division of fallacies of words, and clarifies its members in four sections. The first provides a threefold classification of ambiguous words, the members of which are explained by the subsequent sections. Therefore, so as to help with the other three sections by explaining the names we use there and their conventional significations, we should now note that form is act and matter is potency, and that a thing is in actuality by form and in potentiality by matter, wherefore the authors called that ambiguity of an utterance 'actual' which preserves both the material and formal identity of the utterance simultaneously, and 'potential' that which preserves only the material identity of the utterance itself. But since imagination is sensory appearance, and often without the experience of real things, because it occurs in the absence of sense-objects (as is said in bk. 2 of On the Soul), 29 an apparent but not real ambiguity of an utterance is called an 'imaginary ambiguity'. Now this obtains when utterances that have diverse significations and are not the same either in form or in matter seem to be the same because of some similarity. In this way, then, the fallacies of equivocation and of amphiboly come about by an actual ambiguity of utterances, whereas the fallacies of composition and division and of accent come about by a potential ambiguity, and the fallacy of figure of words comes about by an imaginary ambiguity. Further, we should note that in the foregoing we call the 'matter' of a significative utterance the sounds and syllables that make up an incomplex word, or, in addition, the incomplex words of which a [complex] expression is composed. And we call 'form' the various modes of uttering, accenting, separating, or connecting the various words that occur in the utterance of an expression, or such things A sixfold subdivision of the members of the previous division, yielding the six fallacies of words (1) The fallacy of equivocation comes about by the actual ambiguity of an incomplex utterance, whereas the fallacy of amphiboly does so by the actual ambiguity of an expression. (2) Similarly, the fallacy of accent comes about by the potential ambiguity of an expression. (3) The fallacy of figure of words comes about by the imaginary ambiguity of a word or expression. (4) The fallacy of composition comes about if an expression is false in the composite sense and is believed to be true because of its truth in the divided sense, and the fallacy of division occurs in the other way round. (5) Thus, there are six fallacies of words, namely, the fallacies of equivocation, amphiboly, accent, figure of words, composition, and division. The fourth part provides a subdivision of the members of the foregoing division in five sections. The first section divides the actual ambiguity of utterances into that of incomplex utterances, by means of which the fallacy of equivocation comes about, and that of complex utterances, by means of which the fallacy of amphiboly comes about. In the same way, the second section divides the potential ambiguity of utterances, as is obvious. Again, the third section correctly indicates a similar division of imaginary ambiguity.

9 --9 But the question is raised as to why we do not posit diverse fallacies, but only one, where imaginary ambiguity is concerned, namely, one relating to incomplex words and one relating to expressions, as we did in the cases of the other ambiguities. And I reply that it is not unacceptable to posit diverse fallacies. But Aristotle, for the sake of brevity, did not care to distinguish them, for one can easily envisage their distinction as analogous with the distinctions he dealt with earlier in connection with the other ambiguities. The fourth section divides the potential ambiguity of expressions into two fallacies, namely, those of composition and of division, as is sufficiently clear. But then it is also queried why did he not similarly divide the actual ambiguity of expressions into two fallacies but posited only one, namely, the fallacy of amphiboly, and also why did he not divide the potential ambiguity of words into two fallacies, as he did with the potential ambiguity of expressions. For this is queried by many people. To the first of these queries one can reply that in actual ambiguity the expression is one in utterance, although it is many in intention, whereas in potential ambiguity the expression is not absolutely single in utterance, but diverse, although it is single in a certain respect, namely, in its matter. And this is what Aristotle wished to indicate by dividing potentially ambiguous expressions but not dividing actually ambiguous expressions. To the second I reply that it is not unacceptable to divide a potentially ambiguous incomplex word into two diverse words, just as a potentially ambiguous expression was divided. For just as on the basis of the truth of a composite expression we may believe the divided one to be true, so we can believe on the basis of the truth of an expression with a grave accent the truth of the same with an acute accent, and conversely. But Aristotle, for the sake of brevity, just as I said in connection with imaginary ambiguity in the preceding section, did not care to express that distinction either, since anyone can see that those divisions, and the diverse reasonings proceeding from the various accidents to each other, are analogous with those that are brought to bear concerning the reasonings proceeding from the composite to the divided expressions, and conversely. The fifth section concludes that the number of fallacies of words is six, in accordance with their abovedescribed divisions. And it would not be unacceptable if more were enumerated, if further subdivisions were introduced, as we noted in connection with the fallacy of figure of words and the fallacy of accent. Indeed, each of these fallacies, and the other seven that are posited apart from words, are usually divided into various modes, and these could be called the diverse species of the fallacies, just as the diverse species of quality are enumerated as being four, whereas there are many more if they are subdivided further into the most specific species The distinction of seven fallacies apart from words (1) With regard to fallacies apart from words, and given the definition of refutation, it is obvious that a defect can occur where a contradiction is concerned, and thus comes about the fallacy of ignorantia elenchi [ignorance of elenchus]; (2) second, it can occur where the inferred conclusion is concerned, and thus comes about the fallacy of petitio principii [begging the question]; (3) third, it may arise from a defect in an ostensive syllogism with respect to the inference, and thus comes about the fallacy of accident; (4) fourth, the fallacy of non-cause as cause stems from a defect in the regression from the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism ad impossibile. (5) Furthermore, since a refutation involves terms, propositions, and consequences, a fallacy can result from the relation of one term to another, and thus comes about the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter [with qualification and absolutely], (6) or from the relation of one proposition to another, and thus arises the fallacy of [treating] many questions as one, (7) or from the relation of one consequence to another, and thus comes about the fallacy of the consequent. (8) And so there are seven fallacies apart from words, as will be clear in more detail in the particular discussion of each. The fifth part enumerates and distinguishes seven fallacies apart from words by inspecting the defects that cause the diverse arguments in which they occur to fall short of being an elenchus while appearing to be one, even excluding the consideration of the utterance. So there are eight sections here, namely, seven for the distinction of the seven fallacies, and one that states their number. And it is not inappropriate if they are not listed in the same order as that in which Aristotle discusses them. The fallacy of ignorantia elenchi occurs when the argumentation is valid and correctly proves its conclusion, insofar as the conclusion appears to but does not actually contradict the position of the respondent. Thus the respondent appears to be refuted, which is sufficient for his sophistic opponent. This takes place if, for example,

10 --10 the respondent says that Socrates is not equal to Plato and the opponent, arguing against this, correctly demonstrates that they are equal in height, because they both measure seven feet. The fallacy of petitio principii occurs if the conclusion of the opponent does in fact contradict the conclusion of the respondent, and is validly inferred from its premises, but is not proved by them since they are not better known than the conclusion. Thus it does not amount to an elenchus, for an elenchus has to be a demonstrative syllogism. And such a syllogism is said to be defective in matter, though not in the matter of syllogism as such but in the matter of demonstrative syllogism insofar as it is demonstrative. The fallacy of accident occurs if the paralogism involves true premises that are better known than the conclusion but does not correctly infer the conclusion, for example, 'Every man is an animal; a donkey is an animal; therefore a donkey is a man', assuming that the respondent has said that no man is a donkey. Such a paralogism is said to be defective in form. Next, in the style of a syllogism ad impossibile, a fallacy occurs when we take what the respondent said and combine it with another premise or premises so as to infer an impossible conclusion, but, though the other premise or premises appear to be true, one of them is in fact impossible. Now although it was on the basis of the impossibility of this premise that the impossible conclusion followed, nevertheless we [fallaciously] return to what the respondent said, concluding that it is impossible, as though it were the impossibility of his position that yielded the impossible conclusion. And this is how the fallacy of non-cause as cause comes about. Fifth, there is the fallacy that arises from the fact that one term is somehow included in another, as a term taken absolutely is included in the same taken with qualification, namely, with some addition. Therefore, we think that the consequence from the term with qualification to the term taken absolutely is valid, there being also many cases in which we see such an inference to be valid. It is this that we call the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. Sixth, a fallacy also results from the relation of a proposition to a proposition, as when we believe that something has to hold in the case of many propositions analogously to what holds in the case of one, because in many cases this holds, although not in all. Thus, when this does not hold, then we are deceived, and we have [an instance of] the fallacy of [treating] many questions as one; for example, since someone blind is described as someone who should have [a] sight but does not have it, we believe that [several] blind [animals] should also be described as ones that should have [a] sight but do not have it. 30 Finally, a fallacy results from the relations of one consequence to another. Since many (but not all) consequences are convertible, if we believe that one consequence is convertible into another when it is in fact not convertible, then we are deceived, and the fallacy of the consequent occurs. The last section concludes from the foregoing that the number of fallacies apart from words is seven, and they are listed here by name, thus: the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, the fallacy of ignorantia elenchi, the fallacy of the consequent, the fallacy of petitio principii, the fallacy of non-cause as cause, and the fallacy of treating many questions as one: for it is obvious that these are the ways in which we can be deceived concerning a refutation, i.e., the ways in which we do not have a refutation, while appearing to have one. And there seem to be no other modes that are not reducible to these. For even if fallacies result from some other relations of a term to a term or of a proposition to a proposition or of a consequence to a consequence, nevertheless, the ones mentioned above, namely, the one secundum quid et simpliciter, that of treating many questions as one, and that of the consequent are those whence (in these three genera of fallacies) deceptions are more likely and more frequent to arise. And so, in the place of these three genera of fallacies their most principal or more frequent species should be named, so that in the enumeration of the seven fallacies apart from words one would be taken to result from the relation of one term to another, on account of which its most frequent species would be mentioned, i.e., the one that results from the relation of a term with qualification to a term taken absolutely, and likewise where the relations of proposition to proposition and of consequence to consequence are concerned. 7.3 Chapter 3: On Fallacies of Words The aim of the chapter To launch our discussion of each fallacy in particular, we shall describe the terms used to name a given fallacy, we shall determine its cause of illusion and its cause of defectiveness, and how it comes about; we shall also distinguish and clarify its various modes.

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