Advanced Topics in Metaphysics (L6/7) Alex Grzankowski Autumn 2016
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1 Advanced Topics in Metaphysics (L6/7) Alex Grzankowski Autumn 2016 Class Meetings: Thursdays 18:00 Office: Dept. of Philosophy, room Russell Square Description: This instalment of Advanced Topics in Metaphysics will be a focused study of the metaphysics of intentionality and the metaphysics of intentional objects. When we think, we think about things. But what are the things about which we think? Some seem to be ordinary objects such as the Prime Minister but some seem to be extraordinary. We sometimes think about things that don t exist such as Pegasus or about possible but non-actual things such as a golden mountain. Some of our acts of thinking seem to be directed upon propositions I might think that it will rain tomorrow. In this module we will take up three main topics. First, the nature of what are apparently intentional relations. If to think is to enter into a relation with what we think about, we require relata for the relation. We, then, may need to countenance an array of intentional objects. Or, despite first appearances, perhaps to think about something isn t to enter into a relation with something. Second, we will consider the nature of potential candidates for being intentional objects such as Meinongian objects, merely possible objects, and fictional objects. Finally, we will consider the nature of propositions. Are there any propositions? If there are, are they representational entities? Can they be reduced to any other category such as sets or properties or are they perhaps sui generis entities? Assessment: One essay of around 3500 words, with a maximum of 3700 words (excluding bibliographies) Suggested Preliminary Reading: Crane, T. (2012). The Objects of Thought. OUP. Chapter 1 Hanks, P. (2015). Propositional Content. OUP. Chapters 1 and 2 Schedule: Primary readings will be posted on Moodle. Readings listed as additional are suggestions for those writing papers on the topic or for the enthusiast. Lectures will focus on the primary readings. It will be much too demanding if you try to read all of the primary and suggested readings every week. In some cases the additional readings are entire books. Please focus on the primary readings. 1 of 5
2 Meeting 1: Intentionality And The Objects Of Thought Chapters 1 and 4: Crane, Tim (2013). The Objects of Thought. Oxford University Press. Chapters 1 and 4 of: Crane, Tim (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. Pierre Jacob s SEP entry on Intentionality: Meeting 2: Meinongianism and Nonexistent Objects Parsons, T. (1982). Are There Nonexistent Objects? American Philosophical Quarterly, 19: Chapter 3: Sainsbury, R. M. (2009). Fiction and Fictionalism. Routledge. Russell, B. (2005). On Denoting. Mind 114 (456): (Originally published 1905) Meinong, A. (1960). On the Theory of Objects, in Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, [German original first published in Meinong 1904.] Priest, G., 2005, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Clarendon. Meeting 3: Adverbialism/Non-Relationalism Kriegel, U. (2008). The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects. Philosophical Studies 141: Kriegel, U. (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): Ducasse, C. J. (1940). Propositions, Opinions, Sentences, and Facts. Journal of Philosophy 37 (26): of 5
3 Goldstein, L. (1982). The Adverbial Theory of Conceptual Thought. The Monist 65 (3): Rapaport, W. J. (1979). An Adverbial Meinongian Theory. Analysis 39 (March): Meeting 4: Propositionalism Montague, M. (2007). Against Propositionalism. Nous 41 (3): Sainsbury, R. M. (2010). Intentionality without Exotica, in R. Jeshion (ed.) Singular Thought: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Grzankowski, A. (2013). Non-Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): Merricks, T. (2009) Propositional Attitudes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 109: Meeting 5: Intentional Identity and Dependent Abstracta Geach, P. (1967). Intentional Identity. Journal of Philosophy. 64: Salmon, N. (2002) Mythical Objects, in J. Campbell, M. O Rourke, and D. Shier, eds., Meaning and Truth, Proceedings of the Eastern Washington University and the University of Idaho Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Meaning (Seven Bridges Press, 2002), pp Thomasson, A. L. (1996). Fiction, Modality and Dependent Abstracta. Philosophical Studies, 84: Chapter 5: Sainsbury, R. M. (2009). Fiction and Fictionalism. Routledge. Schiffer, S. (1996). Language-Created Language-Independent Entities. Philosophical Topics 24 (1): Thomasson, A. L. (1999). Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press. Friend, S. (2007). Fictional Characters. Philosophy Compass 2: of 5
4 Meeting 6: Propositional Attitude Relations King, J.C. (2002). Designating Propositions. Philosophical Review 111 (3): Chapter 1: Speaks, J. (2015). The Phenomenal and the Representational. Oxford University Press Uk. Moffett, M. (2003). Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift. Philosophical Studies 115 (1): Moltmann, F. (2003). Propositional attitudes without propositions. Synthese 135 (1): Forbes, G. (forthcoming). Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions. In Grzankowski and Montague (eds.), Non-propositional Intentionality. Grzankowski, A. (2014). Attitudes Towards Objects. Noûs 50 (1): Meeting 7: Propositional Content and Possible Worlds Propositions Chapter 1: Hanks, P. (2015). Propositional Content. Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, R. (1976), Propositions, in A.F. MacKay and D. D. Merrill (eds.), Issues in the Philosophy of Language, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp Stalnaker, R. (1984), Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Meeting 8: Structures Propositions and Gappy Propositions Soames, S. (1987). Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content, Philosophical Topics 15: Braun, D. (1993). Empty names. Noûs 27 (4): of 5
5 Everett, A. (2003). Empty names and gappy propositions. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):1-36. Mousavian, S. N. (2011). Gappy propositions? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): Walters, L. (2011). Braun Defended. The Reasoner 5 (8): Meeting 9: The Unity of the Proposition Chapter 2: Hanks, P. (2015). Propositional Content. Oxford University Press. Soames, S. (2014). Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions Can't be Correct in King, Jeffrey C. ; Soames, Scott & Speaks, Jeff (2014). New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press. Keller, L. (2014). The Metaphysics of Propositional Constituency. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6): King, Jeffrey C. (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press. Meeting 10: Propositions as Properties Richard, M. (2014). What are Propositions?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6): Speaks, J. (2014). Propositions are Properties of Everything of Nothing. In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott & Speaks, Jeff (2014). New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press. 5 of 5
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