Weberian insights on Values, Knowledge, and Science for the Post-Communist Transitions

Transcription

1 Weberian insights on Values, Knowledge, and Science for the Post-Communist Transitions Yoshiko M. Herrera Assistant Professor Government Department Harvard University Paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Boston, MA August 2002 Comments Welcome! Please direct to: Yoshiko M. Herrera:

2 Abstract: As we consider the successes and challenges of post-communist transitions in the establishment of democracy and capitalism, it is useful to revisit the question of the basis for models of political and economic systems and especially the questions of scientific understanding. Weber's analysis of science and objectivity speaks directly to these points. The paper will begin with Weber s analysis of the limitations and contributions of scientific analysis, and this will be closely followed by a consideration Weber s discussion of the situatedness of knowledge and relevance of values for empirical analysis. An examination of the ideal-type as a methodological tool should further illustrate this relationship between empirical analysis and values. Finally, a discussion of the presuppositions fundamental to Weber s own analysis should offer insight into his methodological claims and the characterization of those claims. Key Words: Max Weber, Transition, Post-Communist, Eastern Europe, Objectivity, Subjectivity, Scientific Knowledge, Values page 1

3 Post-communist transitions are fundamentally about change, essentially, moving from one model of politics and economy to another. Regardless of whether one takes the view that this is primarily a transformative or a transitional process, the course of change has encompassed a significant amount of borrowing, copying, learning, or at least consideration of other models. In making choices and changes, the notion not just of efficiency but scientific objectivity has figured prominently in this debate. That is, rather than being based on explicit value-laden or normative choices, arguments for new or adapted models have relied on assumptions regarding the objective or scientific merit of new models. This is especially true in regard to economic models, where the idea of normative economic models has been eschewed as inefficient and outdated. At first glance one might think that there is a normative or subjective element only in certain spheres, such as art, culture, etc., and that others, such as science, economics, demography, etc., are best treated without regard to normative or value-based concerns. But this, as I discuss below, is not quite right. For example, if one considers an objective scientific enterprise such as technical assistance in the transformation of state statistical agencies, one quickly observes that many of the choices for organizing Soviet-type statistics were inherently normative (such as the non-measurement of unemployment), and also that the choices for post-communist statistics are similarly value-based in the sense that the entire organizational structure of the statistical enterprise is deeply dependent on international models and norms, including the system of national accounts. Without an understanding of historical context and the normative basis of both the Soviet economy and capitalism one really cannot understand the debate over Value vs. Volume indicators. 1 The Soviets rejected Value indicators as capitalist, and instead worked in terms of physical volumes of goods. However, in order to join the world economy and construct indicies 1 Here I use the term "Value" in the sense of a figure which is based on market-determined prices rather than physical volume, not in the sense of normative or subjective values. page 2

4 such as GNP, Volume indicators had to scrapped in favor of Value indicators. Janos Kornai's Socialist System was spectacular in its appreciation of the systemic nature of the Soviet economy, as encompassing interactive social, political, and economic elements, and this point could also be applied to capitalist systems. But, to understand the interaction between politics, society, and the economy we have to return to the question of values and the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. Moreover, as we consider the successes and challenges of post-communist transitions in the establishment of democracy and capitalism, it is useful to revisit the question of the basis for models of political and economic systems and especially the questions of scientific understanding. Weber's analysis of science and objectivity speaks directly to these points. Weber's analysis rejects the tabula rasa metaphor, and helps us better understand the relationship between science and human beings who exist in a particular time and place. And, Weber explicitly makes permeable the boundary between objectivity and subjectivity in outlining the need for value-based science. The main point of this paper is to suggest ways in which Max Weber's writing on objectivity and scientific inquiry might provide insight into the essentially normative basis of social science. This is not to pass judgement on choices that East European states have made, but rather to better understand the basis for those choices by contextualizing models for politics and economics, and models for change. This essay will begin with Weber s analysis of the limitations and contributions of scientific analysis, and this will be closely followed by a consideration Weber s discussion of the situatedness of knowledge and relevance of values for empirical analysis. An examination of the ideal-type as a methodological tool should further illustrate this relationship between empirical analysis and values. Finally, a discussion of the presuppositions fundamental to Weber s own analysis should offer insight into his methodological claims and the characterization of those claims. In Weber s discussion of scientific knowledge, he makes it clear that science, the analysis of empirical reality, as a human enterprise is not only presently incomplete, but that the constantly expanding nature of knowledge makes any one individual s contribution both temporary and page 3

5 necessarily imperfect. Not only can the scientist no longer know everything, but except through specialization, one can hardly know anything. 2 Weber writes, one s own work must inevitably remain highly imperfect. Only by strict specialization can the scientific worker become fully conscious, for once and perhaps never again in this lifetime, that he has achieved something that will endure. 3 However, the endurance of scientific contributions is also limited by the fact that each achievement provides the foundation for new questions and problems which will frequently undermine the initial achievement; that is, as Weber writes, every scientific fulfilment raises new questions ; it asks to be surpassed and outdated. 4 Furthermore, Weber pessimistically notes, in science, each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years. That is the fate to which science is subjected. 5 Having accepted the provisional nature of scientific achievements, Weber nonetheless describes several positive contributions to be found via the analysis of empirical reality. He writes that first of all, science contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculating external objects as well as man s activities. 6 In addition, scientific analysis offers methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought. 7 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, science provides clarity; 8 which is to say that scientific analysis, can demonstrate the appropriateness of the means used in pursuit of a given end, and the consequences which result from the use of such means. 9 Such clarity not only assists in estimating the probability of attaining a given end using certain means, but it also provides, according to Weber, insight into the significance of the 2 Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Trans. and Ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press: New York, 1958, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Max Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, Trans. and Ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, The Free Press: New York, 1949, p page 4

6 desired object, 10 and it is the scientific analysis of value-judgments which leads to such insight. However, scientific analysis of value-judgments is not to be confused with attempts to claim a scientific basis for certain values or desired ends. Weber writes that scientific treatment of valuejudgments, can be not more than a formal logical judgment of historically given value judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according to the postulate of the internal consistency of the desired end. 11 Moreover, the scientific treatment of value-judgments is specifically concerned with the clarification of the presuppositions or ultimate standards of value which underlie the individual judgments. Weber writes, the elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete value-judgments, to the level of explicitness is the utmost that the scientific treatment of value-judgments can do without entering into the realm of speculation. 12 Weber emphasizes that scientific analysis of value-judgments ends with clarification. He writes, as to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge. 13 Furthermore, Weber states explicitly, an empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do - but rather what he can do - and under certain circumstances - what he wishes to do. 14 However, Weber s attempt here to separate empirical knowledge from matters of conscience must be understood in its limited context. It is not that empirical knowledge and matters of conscience are unrelated or ontologically separate; rather, in such a discussion, that is, a discussion related to what should be done, Weber is emphasizing the fact that scientific analysis simply does not ask the relevant questions, and is therefore incapable of providing an adequate answer. To illustrate this point Weber discusses the medical profession s treatment of those who might be terminally ill, suffering, or who for whatever reason no longer want to live. He writes, 10 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 54. page 5

7 the presuppositions of medicine, and the penal code, prevent the physician from relinquishing his therapeutic efforts. Whether life is worth while living and when - this question is not asked by medicine. Natural science gives us an answer to question of what we must do if we wish to master life technically. It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and do wish to master life technically and whether it ultimately makes sense to do so. 15 Moreover, it is not just in the field of medicine that Tolstoy s fundamental question of what should be done is eschewed. Weber notes for example that aesthetics does not ask whether there should be works of art, jurisprudence does not ask whether there should be law and whether one should establish just these rules, and similarly the historical and cultural sciences do not ask whether the existence of cultural phenomena have been and are worth while, let alone the question of whether it is worth the effort required to know them. 16 Although these disciplines presuppose a certain value in answering the questions to which they are themselves devoted, such value is only an assumption, which is according to Weber not at all self-evident. 17 The essential point is not that scientific analysis of empirical knowledge is unconnected to questions of values or ethical imperatives, but rather that scientific analysis, in presupposing certain fundamental value claims and thereby ignoring certain questions, is rendered incapable of providing answers to questions related to values. Somewhat ironically, it is Weber s rigorous (scientific) examination of empirical analysis which discloses the fact that science seems to be incapable of discovering meaning in the world, if it exists at all. Weber writes, The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us. 18 With this statement the relationship between scientific knowledge and values is turned about. In discussing the contributions of scientific analysis above, it was noted that Weber argued that 15 Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 57. page 6

8 science can provide clarity, thereby offering insight into the significance of a given end. However, after exploring the extent of such insight, Weber s analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that it is in fact values which inform the scientific project, in that the presumed justification, even for the project itself, stems from a particular weltanschauung. Furthermore, the claim that the analysis is guided only by empirical reality, and that the facts can speak for themselves, is, according to Weber, a result of naive self-deception on the part of the scientist. 19 Weber makes this point about the situatedness of knowledge and the role of evaluative ideas, not only in the interpretation of findings, but in the selection of the object or event of analysis itself, quite explicit, the choice of the object of investigation and the extent or depth to which this investigation attempts to penetrate into the infinite causal web, are determined by the evaluative ideas which dominate the investigator and his age. In the method of investigation, the guiding point of view is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth. 20 This passage makes clear that even the exact sciences are not exempt from the guiding influence of the evaluative ideas of the investigator and the society in which he or she lives. Indeed, Weber returns to earlier observations about the utter expansiveness of empirical knowledge, and makes the claim that evaluative ideas are not only present in scientific projects, but that it is only through the use of evaluative ideas that we can make sense of empirical reality. Weber writes that, because even a mere description of the smallest bit of empirical reality can never be exhaustive, and because there are an infinite number of causal explanations for any single event, an analysis without presuppositions, (if it were even possible), could only result in a chaos of existential judgments. 21 This chaos is avoided both consciously and unconsciously through the use of evaluative ideas. Weber writes, 19 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 78. page 7

9 Order is brought into this chaos only on the condition that in every case only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us, because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality. Only certain sides of the infinitely complex concrete phenomena, namely those to which we attribute a general cultural significance - are therefore worthwhile knowing. They alone are objects of causal explanation. 22 Weber s analysis of the consequence of evaluative ideas for causal explanations and the evidently inescapable situatedness of (even scientific) knowledge seems to reject the claim that values get in the way of science, and instead recognizes the power of evaluative ideas for scientific analysis. However, in emphasizing the connectedness of values and empirical analysis, Weber is attempting to make permeable the boundary, rather than erase it all together. He is neither reducing empirical analysis to a front for the irreconcilable struggle between warring gods, nor is he granting scientists perfect immunity from the influences of the times and places in which they live. It is not surprising then that he should speak strongly against value-less analysis, while strongly supporting efforts to separate, (as much as possible) in order to recognize and question, the presuppositions and values on which scientific analysis is based. Weber writes, the foregoing arguments are directed against this confusion [of the scientific discussion of facts and their evaluation], and not against the clear-cut introduction of one s own ideals into the discussion. An attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific objectivity. 23 On this same point, the capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and value-judgments, and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as well as the practical duty to stand up for our own ideals constitute the program to which we wish to adhere with ever increasing firmness. 24 This capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and value-judgments is then a goal, which does not call for the impossible, that is, value-less analysis, but rather has as its purpose the elucidation of the presuppositions underlying the analysis. In discussing the Archiv, 22 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 60. Emphasis in orginal. 24 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 58. page 8

10 Weber writes that the editors and contributors are not to be denied the expression of the ideals which motivate them. 25 However, along with this expression it is their duty to keep the readers and themselves sharply aware at every moment of the standards by which they judge reality and from which the value-judgment is derived. 26 This duty is shared by teachers as well, although the classroom, and specifically the relationship between the student and the professor, introduces further difficulties. In such a relationship, the professor s work and the value-judgments which underlie the analysis will frequently go unchallenged by the students. For this reason, the professor must himself or herself bring these presuppositions to light so that they may be honestly evaluated. As this is an individual burden, Weber considers success a moral achievement, 27 whereas upon failure the professor is then exposed to the sharpest criticism in the forum of his own conscience. 28 It is interesting to note that in singling out the classroom as a place where value-judgments should be made explicit, Weber seems to imply that outside of the classroom there is something approaching fair competition of evaluative ideas. Weber writes, to the prophet and the demagogue, it is said: Go your ways out into the streets and speak openly to the world, that is, speak where criticism is possible. 29 There doesn t seem to be any discussion of the possible limitations on criticism, either overt or subjective, which would hamper understanding or questioning of the presupposed evaluative claims. Nevertheless, the appropriateness and necessity of evaluative claims or value-judgments seems to vary depending, not only on the intended audience, but with respect to the intended project of the scientist as well. At this point an example of how exactly evaluative claims fit into scientific analysis might be helpful. Weber s discussion of ideal-type methodology illustrates this complex relationship. 25 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p page 9

11 The starting point of ideal-type methodology is an individual scientist who, for some value-based reason has an interest in explanation. The scientist or the scientific community then determine, according to their own evaluative claims the worthwhile-ness of studying a particular phenomenon. The scientist is then faced with an unintelligible, but delineated mass of empirical reality. Weber writes that the ideal-type then, serves as a harbor until one has learned to navigate safely in the vast sea of empirical facts. 30 The ideal-type is a construction; that is, it is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. 31 Weber describes the ideal-type as a conceptual pattern [which] brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality. 32 A crucial aspect of the scientific analysis takes place when the ideal-type construct is compared or related to empirical reality. Weber states that if some phenomenon which approaches the ideal-type is found to exist, certain characteristic features of that phenomenon can be made clear and understandable by reference to the ideal-type. 33 In this phase of the analysis, the scientist is attempting to sort through empirical data, using the comparison of the ideal-type to reality as a guide. It is perhaps in this phase and only in this phase that the analytical process is moved by logic rather values, although the ideal-type construct which is being compared is, of course, the result of value-judgments. Furthermore, no matter how close empirical reality is found to fit with the ideal-type construct, the ideal-type can never totally capture reality. Weber writes, For none of those systems of ideas [ideal-type constructions], which are absolutely indispensable in the understanding of those segments of reality which are meaningful at a particular moment, can exhaust its infinite richness. They are all attempts, on the basis of the present state of our knowledge and the available 30 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 90. page 10

12 conceptual patterns, to bring order into the chaos of those facts which we have drawn into the field circumscribed by our interest. 34 To restate, the ideal-type illustrates the relationship between values and empirical analysis. Values influence the basis for empirical analysis, by defining not only the relevance of the phenomenon of study, but also the characterization of that phenomenon, in the form of ideal-types. The comparison of ideal-types with empirical reality aspires toward judgment based on logic or truth rather than value claims, and finally the results of such analysis recall value-systems or worldviews in order to give meaning to the findings. However, Weber notes that even the distinction between value-judgments and empirical knowledge is based on the presupposition of the existence of an unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i.e., the analytical ordering of empirical social reality. 35 He admits that for those who do not seek explanation of empirical reality, the discussion of the idealtype or other types of methodology is of no use. That is, the presupposition has become the problem, in that one must first deem the project of explanation itself to be worthwhile in order for any of Weber s methodological writings to have any value. For example, he notes that it is impossible to scientifically prove his claims about the duty of the academic, 36 and in reference to the Archiv, he admits that there is a certain framework of scientific discussion to which one must adhere in order to have articles accepted for publication. 37 This self-recognition of limited worthwhile-ness of his own work leads to the conclusion that there is no absolute grounding not only for his own claims but for any claims. On the meaning of objectively valid truth in the social sciences he writes, The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. The means available to our science offer nothing to those persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered 34 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p. 61. page 11

13 that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man s original nature. 38 This statement makes clear that there is no absolute grounding for any claim, yet it does not deny the usefulness or appropriateness of making such claims. In fact the right to issue ethical imperatives may rest on this admission of the lack of absolute grounding for any particular claim, in that it negates not only the possibility for any absolute grounding of any particular claims, but also the necessity for such grounding. If an ultimate truth does not exist, then one need not base ethical imperatives upon an appeal to such truth. Weber writes, so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. 39 This is not however, a statement of the futility of evaluative claims. Rather, it justifies and necessitates their existence. Because life is interpreted in its own terms, or in other words, because we are judging our own game in the absence of ultimate truth, there can only be evaluative claims or value-judgments to guide human activity, and therefore values-judgments can not be eschewed. This sheds some light on the claim that Weber is value-neutral. It can readily be stated that in terms of Weber s position, value-neutrality does not mean moral indifference, nor some kind of value-less stance (were it even possible). Instead, value-neutrality is an admission of the lack of the existence of ultimate truth or absolute grounding for any particular evaluative claim, which rather than ruling out struggles over values, necessitates them as the only alternative, in that values make sense of the world in a way that empirical analysis cannot. It may require a great deal of endurance to appeal to the lack of a possible resolution as a basis for continuing the struggle. However, Weber s pessimism about the resolution of the struggle of evaluative claims is tempered by the assertion that nothing, including an irreconcilable struggle is granted eternal vitality. He writes, the light which emanates from those highest 38 Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p Weber, Science as a Vocation, p page 12

14 evaluative ideas always falls on an ever changing finite segment of the vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time Weber, Objectivity in Social Science, p page 13