BELIEF INTERNALISM. Danielle Bromwich. A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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1 BELIEF INTERNALISM by Danielle Bromwich A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Copyright by Danielle Bromwich (2008)

2 ABSTRACT Belief Internalism Danielle Bromwich Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2008 I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call belief internalism. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that moral belief entails motivation. But, while this internalist thesis captures the practical nature of morality, it is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation. In defence of this internalist it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid the temptation to defend this thesis in either of these flawed ways by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation. I avoid the first temptation by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. I start the defence by demonstrating that it is conceptually coherent ii

3 for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation, according to which unqualified normative cognition which includes moral cognition motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form I ought to ф, in other words, motivate the believer to ф. I avoid the second temptation by arguing that moral belief motivates simpliciter as opposed to ceteris paribus. There are, however, both commonsense and scientifically informed counterexamples which prima facie demonstrate that it is possible to both fully believe and fully understand one s first person cognitive moral judgement and yet not motivated by that judgement. I argue that the commonsense prima facie counterexamples are not decisive; and I argue that the scientifically informed prima facie counterexamples misinterpret the empirical research on salient psychological conditions. iii

4 For David iv

5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank a number of people who have supported me throughout the writing process. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Sergio Tenenbaum. In Sergio, I found the perfect supervisor: an intellectually generous, side-splittingly funny, incredibly caring man who is, quite frankly, one of the smartest philosophers I have yet to encounter. Sergio is responsible for much of what is good about this dissertation: either he tenaciously pressed me to revise problematic sections of the thesis over and over again or he was generous enough to make fruitful suggestions that would invariably lead to sound arguments. (I am, of course, fully responsible for all the errors that remain.) Second, I would like to thank my committee members: Phil Clark, Cheryl Misak and Tom Hurka. I could not have asked for a more supportive and thoughtful committee. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Tom who dedicated more time and intellectual energy to the project than was obligated. Third, I would like to thank others who have contributed to this thesis. In times of intellectual frustration, I turn to my friend, Joe Millum. The briefest philosophical conversation with Joe replaces dejection and confusion with optimism and clarity. Joe never fails me. Sincere thanks also go to: Kirstin Borgerson, Doug MacKay, Gurpreet Rattan, Mark van Roojen, Marika Warren, and Melissa Williams. v

6 I would especially like to thank my parents, Kitty and Hans Bromwich, for not suffocating me with their expectations but, rather, encouraging me to discover and develop my own interests. I would also like to thank the following family members for their enduring love and support: Toby Bromwich, Carole Elliott, Ray Elliott, Zoë Elliott and Steven Glaysher. I owe the greatest debt of all to my husband, David Elliott, whose faith in me has never wavered. I hope to partially repay the debt I owe David both by dedicating this dissertation to him and by not forcing him to read it! Danielle Bromwich Toronto, July vi

7 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v. CONTENTS vii. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING BELIEF INTERNALISM I. WHY COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM? 1 II. COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM: FEATURES AND VERSIONS 6 III. ARGUMENTS FOR COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 9 a. HUMEAN, DEFEASIBLE COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 10 b. ANTI-HUMEAN, CLASSIC COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 20 IV. BELIEF INTERNALISM: LESSONS, CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY 29 CHAPTER TWO: CLEARING CONCEPTUAL SPACE FOR BELIEF INTERNALISM INTRODUCTION 34 I. PROBLEMS WITH SMITH S DEFENCE OF THE HUMEAN THEORY OF MOTIVATION 35 II. DISPOSITIONALISM ABOUT BELIEF 42 III. THE TIE 46 IV. CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL TIEBREAKERS? 49 a. A CONCEPTUAL REASON TO FAVOUR THE HUMEAN THEORY OF 49 MOTIVATION? vii

8 b. A CONCEPTUAL REASON TO FAVOUR THE MINIMAL THESIS? 51 c. AN EMPIRICAL REASON TO FAVOUR THE MINIMAL THESIS? 54 V. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 63 a. IS THE DISAGREEMENT MERELY TERMINOLOGICAL? 64 b. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELIEF AND DESIRE? 65 c. HOW IS ASSENT AN INTENTIONAL ACTION ON THE BELIEF INTERNALIST S 67 ACCOUNT? d. CAN THE BEHAVIOURAL DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES COME APART FROM 69 BELIEF? CONCLUSION 71 CHAPTER THREE: BELIEF INTERNALISM INTRODUCTION 73 I. ANTI-HUMEANISMS 75 II. THE FIRST THESIS: COGNITIVE INTERNALISM 82 III. THE SECOND THESIS: UNQUALIFIED NORMATIVITY 109 CONCLUSION 130 viii

9 CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES TO BELIEF INTERNALISM: THE MOTIVATIONAL EXTERNALIST S COMMONSENSE COUNTEREXAMPLES INTRODUCTION 131 I. PRIMA FACIE COUNTEREXAMPLES: BRINK S AMORAL AGENT AND STOCKER S 133 APATHETIC AGENT II. RESPONSE TO THE PURPORTED COUNTEREXAMPLES 136 0III. 1SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF: JOYCE S PURE EVIL AGENT IV. 4RESPONSE TO THE PURPORTED COUNTEREXAMPLE V. 7SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF: SVAVARSDOTTIR S MORAL CYNIC VI. 10RESPONSE TO THE PURPORTED COUNTEREXAMPLE CONCLUSION 170 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES TO BELIEF INTERNALISM: THE MOTIVATIONAL EXTERNALIST S SCIENTIFICALLY INFORMED COUNTEREXAMPLES 12INTRODUCTION I. APATHY S EMPIRICAL COUNTERPART: CLINICAL DEPRESSION 174 II. CLINICAL DEPRESSION 178 a. MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS DEFINED: DSM-IV 178 b. THE CONTEMPORARY DEPRESSIVE: BROADLY COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED. 179 III. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 186 IV. AMORALISM S EMPIRICAL COUNTERPARTS: PYSCHOPATHY AND ACQUIRED 190 SOCIOPATHY ix

10 V. PSYCHOPATHY 197 a. PSYCHOPATHY DEFINED: PCL R AND THE FOUR FACTOR MODEL 198 b. CLECKLEY S PSYCHOPATH: EMOTIONAL AND SEMANTIC IMPAIRMENTS 201 c. THE CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOPATH: COGNITIVELY, EMOTIONALLY AND 206 LINGUISTICALLY IMPAIRED VI. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 215 CONCLUSION 220 BIBLIOGRAPHY 222 x

11 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING BELIEF INTERNALISM In this dissertation, I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism, which I call belief internalism. Cognitivist motivational internalism is (roughly speaking) the thesis that, if one believes that It is right that I φ 1 then one will be motivated to φ. I. WHY COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM? Cognitivist motivational internalism is an important meta-ethical thesis which has its roots in commonsense morality: we are pre-theoretically disposed to think that first-person moral judgements are both truth-apt beliefs about an objective state of affairs and the kinds of states that motivate those who make and understand them. The following example illustrates our pre-theoretical commitment to the cognitivist and motivational aspects of morality. Suppose that while out shopping I notice an affluent-looking woman stumble and spill the contents of her purse. Several passers-by stop to assist her, but she tersely shoos them away, informing them that she is quite capable of looking after herself. Several people, who have stopped to help, look slightly taken aback. But I notice one of them pocketing the mobile phone that fell out of her purse. I look around for other 1 First, the claim is that first person cognitive moral judgements are motivational. So any first person cognitive moral judgement could be substituted for It is right that I φ here. Second, φ stands for an intentional action.

12 2 witnesses, but I appear to be the only one who has noticed this. What, if anything, should I do? Suppose that I tell you what I witnessed. I try to shrug off the incident by arguing that such a rude woman deserves to be taught a lesson, adding that, by the looks of it, it is not as if she cannot afford another mobile phone anyway. Then I say, honestly, that I do not want to do anything about it because I hate causing a scene. Suppose you then look at me with disdain and say that regardless of how rude or indeed wealthy the woman is the passer-by should not have stolen her mobile phone. What I ought to do, you say, is report the thief. Intuitively we think that if I am genuinely engaged in figuring out what I ought to do, as opposed to figuring out what I want to do, I will be attentive to morally salient reasons for action. This is because the goal of moral inquiry is to figure out what ought to be done. This seems to involve assuming that: 2 (i) there is a correct answer to the question: What should I do? (ii) there is a correct answer because there are moral facts about the matter; and (iii) we can get the answer right because we have epistemic access to these facts. The practice of thinking and, indeed, even arguing about moral matters seems to require that moral judgements be truth-apt beliefs about an objective state of affairs. Let s return to the example. Suppose that you convince me that I ought to report the incident. I form the moral judgment: I ought to report the thief. However, after weighing the reasons and making the moral judgment, I simply express my relief at 2 These three assumptions, that is, make this intuition straightforwardly intelligible.

13 3 having sorted out what I ought to do and tell you, with that off my mind, I m off home. Surprised, you would probably ask me when I m going to report the incident. Suppose I reply that while I believe that I ought to report the incident, I simply do not see why that gives me any motive for action. This, it is fair to assume, would puzzle you. You have, after all, convinced me that I ought to report the thief, and we tend to think that the test of whether someone really judges an action to be right or to be done is whether that person is motivated to do it. So what could I mean when I say, I know that I ought to report it, but you haven t given me any motive to do so? The moral judgement is, by itself, the motive. Our pre-theoretical moral intuitions, then, suggest a commitment to cognitivist motivational internalism. But the problem is that this thesis is in tension with a dominantly held philosophical psychology known as the Humean theory of motivation. The Humean theory of motivation tells us that beliefs cannot motivate action alone; beliefs cannot, in fact, motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire (Sayre McCord, 1997: 56) that is neither entailed by the presence of, not partially constitutive of, any belief (van Roojen, 1995: 37-8). So, while cognitivist motivational internalism tells us that moral cognition entails motivation, the Humean theory of motivation tells us that moral cognition could not entail motivation because beliefs are motivationally inert. Our pre-theoretical moral commitments to cognitivism and practicality are, then, in tension with this widely held and intuitive philosophical psychology. We are committed to the following intuitive but inconsistent propositions:

14 4 1. Moral judgements are beliefs about an objective state of affairs Moral judgements are motivationally efficacious. 3. No belief is motivationally efficacious unless accompanied by a conceptually independent desire that is neither entailed by the presence of, not partially constitutive of, any belief. 4 Michael Smith (1994) who famously formulates a weaker version of this puzzle called The Moral Problem 5 claims that this is the central organising problem in meta-ethics. 3 My aim, in this dissertation, is ascertain whether first person cognitive moral judgments can motivate moral action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. So, for the purposes of this dissertation, I simply assume that moral judgements are cognitive states or beliefs. I do not, then, get embroiled in the cognitivism versus non-cognitivism debate. Now, since I do not defend moral cognitivism, the aim of this dissertation can be formulated more precisely as follows: I argued that, if moral judgements are cognitive states or beliefs, then moral judgements can motivate moral actions without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. 4 After all, as Van Roojen adds, if desire is partially constitutive of or entailed by belief, then belief will itself, together with the appropriate means-end belief, constitute a motivating reason. (van Roojen, 1995: 38) 5 Smith formulates the moral problem as follows: 1. Moral judgements of the form 'It is right that I φ' express a subject's beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do. 2. If someone judges that it is right that she φs then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to φ. 3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's terms, distinct existences. (Smith, 1994: 12) Take note of the way in which Smith formulates the second and third propositions of his moral problem. Smith tells us that moral judgements motivate ceteris paribus. However, above, I claim that moral judgements motivate simpliciter. Smith s formulation of the practicality of moral judgements is much weaker than my formulation: Smith just claims that moral judgements will motivate if all other things are equal; I claim that moral judgements will motivate even if all other things are not equal. Smith also tells us that belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. However, above, I claim that belief cannot motivate without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire that is neither entailed by nor constitutive of the belief in question. Smith s formulation of the Humean theory of motivation is much weaker than my formulation: Smith just claims that conceptually independent desire is necessary for motivation but he allows, in a way in which my formulation does not, that necessary desire could be entailed by the belief in question.

15 5 6 The problem is that while the first proposition tells us that a moral judgment is a belief, and the second tells us that a moral judgement is necessarily motivationally efficacious, the third proposition tells us that the motivation comes in the form of a desire. The propositions taken together entail a necessary connection between belief and desire that the third proposition denies. Cognitivist motivational internalism is, then, an attractive thesis but one that requires defence. The motivational thesis is a sort of Holy Grail of meta-ethics 7 (Noggle, 1997: 88): It offers us all we ever wanted from morality. The internalist claim gives morality the psychological "oomph" it needs to motivate action by itself, rather than having to hitch [a] motivational ride on pre-or non-moral motives. The realist thesis makes morality what it seems to be: a discourse about facts moral facts which we can discover, about which we can disagree, and of which we can often convince each other.' (Noggle, 1997: 88) Cognitivist motivational internalism is, in other words, both an important and intuitive moral thesis. But, given that this thesis is in direct tension with the dominant 6 To be more precise, Smith claims that this weaker formulation of the puzzle is the central organising problem in meta-ethics, but as I argue below it is clear that the stronger formulation of the puzzle is what motivates most in meta-ethics. 7 What I call cognitivist motivational internalism Noggle calls internalist moral realism. These theses are, however, constituted by the same two pre-theoretically intuitive claims: This theory unities two attractive claims. The first is the internalist claim that moral judgements are inherently motivating. The second is the realists claim that moral judgements assert propositions which have truth values in the same way that the contents of beliefs do. (Noggle, 1997: 88)

16 6 philosophical psychology of the Humean theory of motivation, it is also a deeply problematic ethical thesis. II. COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM: FEATURES AND VERSIONS. The label, internalism, is used liberally in ethics. Stephen Darwall remarks, the range of positions labelled internalist is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear. (Darwall, 1992: 155) Rachel Cohon points out that [r]ecent writers define the term internalism and its partner, externalism in a variety of overlapping yet incompatible ways. (Cohon, 1993: 266) Now it is not necessary, for the purposes of this dissertation, to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of ethical internalism; it is just necessary to get clear on what cognitivism motivational internalism is and the variety of ways in which it can be formulated. Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, roughly, first person cognitive moral judgements entail motivation. Two features of this motivational thesis are worthy of note. The first feature is that cognitivist motivational internalism is a thesis about the motivational efficacy of first-person cognitive moral judgements. As Antti Kauppinen (2008) astutely points out, getting to I morally ought to φ, from It is morally wrong not to φ may not seem like a long leap (the former is plausibly entailed by the latter), but insofar as these are distinct psychological states, there is a possibility of failure here, which internalism need not deny. (Kauppinen, 2008: 1 n. 1)

17 7 The second feature is that the connection between first-person cognitive moral judgements and motivation is a necessary one. It is not merely a contingent matter that people have motives to do what they think or sincerely say they should. (Darwall, 1992: 155) 8 And, notice, when the (cognitivist) motivational internalist claims that the conceptual connection between belief and motivation is necessary, she is claiming that motivation is internal, or built in, to the moral belief in question. 9 Cognitivist motivational internalism, then, is the thesis that, necessarily, first-person action-directed cognitive moral judgements constitute motivation to perform some action. Cognitivist motivational internalism can be formulated in three strengths: (i) decisive cognitivist motivational internalism; (ii) classic cognitivist motivational internalism and (iii) and defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism. The strongest version of this motivational thesis is decisive cognitivist motivational internalism. It tells us that, if one believes that I morally ought to φ, then one will φ (unless prevented by some external force). On this version there is a necessary conceptual connection between a first person cognitive moral judgement and action. After all, if one believes that I morally ought to φ, then the motivation, which is built 8 Darwall would classify cognitivist motivational internalism as judgment internalism. See Darwall (1992). 9 As Alfred Mele (1996) notes, cognitivist motivational internalism is internalism is internalist in two senses : first, believing oneself to be morally required to A metaphysically or conceptually (hence, internally, in a formal sense) guarantees that one has a motivation for Aing; second, what is guaranteed, more precisely, is that motivation for Aing is built into any belief that one is (oneself) morally required to A and is internal to belief of that kind in this sense. (Mele, 1996: 730)

18 8 into this moral judgement, decisively motivates one to φ. This motivation will override any competing motivation. The traditional version of this motivational thesis is classic cognitivist motivational internalism. It tells us that, if one believes that I morally ought to φ then one is motivated to φ and, if all else is equal, one will φ. On this version there is a necessary conceptual connection between a first person cognitive moral judgement and defeasible motivation. That is, if one believes that I morally ought to φ, then the motivation, which is built into this moral judgement, provides one with some, but not necessarily overriding, motivation to φ. If all things are equal that is, if this defeasible motivation is not defeated then one will φ. The weakest version of this motivational thesis is defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism. It tells us that, if one believes that I morally ought to φ and if all else is equal, then one will be motivated to φ and, if all else is equal, one will φ. On this version there is a defeasible necessary conceptual connection between a cognitive moral judgement and defeasible motivation. That is, if one believes that I morally ought to φ and if all else is equal, then one has some, but not necessarily overriding, motivation to φ. If all things are equal again that is, if this defeasible motivation is not defeated then one will φ. Notice that it is not entirely clear that the motivation in question is built into or is internal to the moral judgment in question. I will return to this point presently.

19 9 III. ARGUMENTS FOR COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM. The challenge is to defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism that is both morally and psychologically plausible. The problem, as we will see, is that metaethicists tend either to succeed in providing a psychologically plausible thesis but fail in providing a morally plausible thesis or succeed in providing a morally plausible thesis but fail in providing a psychologically plausible thesis. And, as a result, current defences of the thesis are unsatisfactory. It is worth noting, before critically engaging with the literature on cognitivist motivational internalism, that decisive cognitivist motivational internalism is unpopular. Decisive cognitivist motivational internalism is generally considered to be an implausible version of the thesis. It is not clear, first of all, that this version of the thesis is psychologically plausible. It precludes the possibility of weakness of will; it precludes the possibility that a subject could judge that I morally ought to report the thief but ultimately fail to report the thief (when not prevented by an external force). The motivation, which is built into all cognitive moral judgements, supposedly overrides all other possible competing motivations. But the strength of decisive cognitivist motivational internalism flies in the face of everyday moral experience: it seems all too common that one s sincere moral motives are overridden by competing considerations. What morality requires of us is often hard and we frequently buckle under the pressure. It is not clear, second of all, that by denying that moral motivation is decisive one is forced to accept a version of the motivational thesis which lacks moral plausibility. After all, if we think back to the example with which we started, then we can see that what is

20 10 puzzling is not the fact that the subject in question fails to report the thief, but rather the fact that the subject in question fails to be motivated to report the thief. a. HUMEAN, DEFEASIBLE COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM. It is tempting to resolve the tension between the traditional version of cognitivist motivational internalism and the Humean theory of motivation 10 by simply accepting weaker versions of each thesis. In fact, if one just accepts defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism, then the aforementioned theses are not necessarily incompatible. Defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism tells us that, if one believes that I morally ought to φ and if all other things are equal, then one will be motivated to φ. What might be required, in order to make all other things equal, is a conceptually independent desire one, that is, that is neither partly constitutive of nor entailed by the moral belief in question. And, if that is right, then cognitivist motivational internalism is not necessarily in tension with the Humean theory of motivation. Now, while this argumentative strategy would resolve the tension between the theses, it is not clear how it would preserve the internalist condition that motivation must be internal, or built in, to the moral belief in question. That is, in order to be a cognitivist motivational internalist account, motivation must be internal to the moral belief; in this case, however, the necessary component for motivation is a conceptually independent desire that is external to the moral belief. Michael Smith (1994), who holds both a defeasible version of 10 My Humean opponent is a cognitivist and not a non-cognitivist. A non-cognitivist would not accept that moral judgements are beliefs. And so, when I refer to the Humean theory of motivation, I am always referring to a cognitivist version of the Humean theory of motivation.

21 11 cognitivist motivational internalism and a weak version of the Humean theory of motivation (weaker, that is, than (3) above), claims that he can preserve this internalist intuition and, thereby, resolve the tension between the theses. Let us, then, briefly explore Smith s version of defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism. Smith argues that defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism is both the most morally and psychological plausible version of the thesis. The problem with stronger versions of the thesis, Smith claims, is that that they deny a commonplace feature of both human psychology and ordinary moral experience; 11 stronger versions of the thesis deny that various kinds of conditions or depressions as Michael Stocker (1979) calls them are capable of completely destroying our motivation while leaving our cognition and evaluative outlook unmarred. It is commonly thought that a subject suffering from clinical depression, for instance, is both adept at making a sincere first-person cognitive moral judgement and is able to fully understand the content of that judgement but is left completely cold by the judgement in virtue of the mood disorder. Smith thinks, then, just as decisive cognitivist motivational internalism is implausible because it precludes the possibility of weakness of will, so both decisive and classic cognitivist motivational internalism are implausible because each motivational thesis precludes the possibility of such depressions, which remove all motivation but leave our evaluative outlook intact Smith goes as far as to categorise this possibility as fact of ordinary moral experience (Smith, 1994: 120) 12 See Smith (1994: 61; ). Smith actually calls these depressions or practical irrationalities weakness of will.

22 12 Smith, following Christine Korsgaard (1986), claims that the more plausible idea behind cognitivist motivational internalism is this: though there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and the will, the connection involved is the following defeasible one. 13 If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational. In other words, agents who judge it right to act in various ways are so motivated, and necessarily so, absent the distorting influences of weakness of the will and other similar forms of practical unreason on their motivations. (Smith, 1994: 61) Any plausible version of cognitivist motivational internalism, then, must make room for the possibility of practical irrationalities/ depressions. Only the defeasible version of the motivational thesis has a gap between moral belief and motivation that allows one to take this purported commonplace feature of human psychology and ordinary moral experience into account. And so, Smith contends, the only plausible version of cognitivist motivational internalism is a defeasible one. Smith s version, more specifically, is this: if one believes that It is right that I φ and if one is practically rational, then one will be motivated to φ and, if all else is equal, one will φ. Why should we accept that one is either motivated by one s moral belief or one is practically irrational? Smith responds as follows: It is a platitude that an agent has a reason to act in a certain way just in case she would be motivated to act in that way if she were rational (Korsgaard, 1986). 13 Smith claims to be following Blackburn (1984), Johnson (1989) and Pettit and Smith (1993) here.

23 13 And it is a consequence of this platitude that an agent who judges herself to have a reason to act in a certain way who judges that she would be so motivated if she were rational is practically irrational if she is not motivated to act accordingly. For if she is not motivated accordingly then she fails to be rational by her own lights (Smith, 1992). (Smith, 1994: 62) What this suggests, then, is that first-person cognitive moral judgements are actually judgements about what one takes oneself to have reason to do, and, Smith claims, acting contrary to what one takes oneself to have reason to do is irrational. So, either one acts in accordance with one s judgement about what one has reason to do, or one is irrational. Smith s distinction between two kinds of reasons for action motivating reasons and normative reasons makes this latter point vivid. Motivating reasons are psychological states that teleologically, and perhaps causally, explain behaviour. (Smith, 2004: 1) Now, as a Humean about motivation, Smith must hold and does hold that motivating reasons are constituted by belief/desire pairs. And so what is necessary (on Smith s account) for a subject to have a motivating reason to, say, drink a beer is for that subject want to drink a beer and for that subject to believe that by drinking a beer he will satisfy his desire to drink a beer. Normative reasons are propositions whose truth would justify acting in a certain way: they are (roughly speaking) facts about the desirability of so acting. (Smith, 2004: 1) Now, as an anti- Humean about normativity, Smith must hold and does hold that normative reasons are facts about the desirability of action. And so what is necessary (on Smith s account) for a subject to have normative reason to, say, drink a beer is for it to be a fact that

24 14 drinking a beer is desirable. Now, when we relate this distinction to morality, we see that on Smith s account first-person cognitive moral judgements are beliefs about normative reasons which motivate an agent to act insofar as that agent is rational; such judgements, that is, can purportedly produce behaviour and yet are composed of propositions about what one ought to do whose truth would justify one s behaviour. The question, then, is the following: since Smith holds that first-person moral judgements are both beliefs and practical, how can he also hold that belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire? The answer is revealed in Smith s analysis of normative reasons: The core idea is that facts about our normative reasons for action that is, facts about what it is desirable for us to do are facts about what we would advise ourselves to do if we were perfectly placed to give ourselves advice. (Smith, 1997: 88) So, for instance, suppose that we say that Kitty has a normative reason to buy fair trade bananas (in a situation in which she has an opportunity to do so). Smith tells us that what we are saying, when we say that Kitty has the normative reason in question, is that there is a possible world in which a fully rational 14 Kitty who has desires that are 14 With regards to the conception of full rationality (or fully rational ) that Smith uses in this analysis of normative reasons, he says: My suggestion is that to be fully rational an agent must be suffering from the effects of any physical or emotional disturbance, she must have no false beliefs, she must have all relevant true beliefs, and she must have a systematically justifiable set of desires, that is, a set of desires that is maximally coherent and unified. Furthermore, I argue that it is part of what we mean when we say that a set of desires is systematically justifiable that the desires that are elements in that set are desires that other people would have if they had a systematically justifiable set of desires. Fully rational agents

25 15 completely beyond reproach, from the point of view of reasoned criticism (Smith, 1997: 88) would advise less than fully rational Kitty to buy fair trade bananas (in a situation in which she has an opportunity to do so). Now, Smith thinks, it is clear how cognitive moral judgements are practical. Kitty believes that she has a normative reason to buy fair trade bananas (when she has the opportunity to do so). The foregoing analysis of normative reasons tells us that what this means is that Kitty believes that a fully rational version of herself a version that has desires that are completely beyond reproach, from the point of view of reasoned criticism would advise a less than fully rational version of herself to buy fair trade bananas (in a situation in which she has an opportunity to do so). And, Smith tells us, [b]eliefs about normative reasons, when combined with an agent s tendency to have a coherent psychology, can thus cause agents to have matching desires. (Smith, 1997: 100; also see Smith, 1994: 179) Kitty s belief about what she has normative reason to do, then, causes her to want to buy fair trade bananas when she has a disposition towards a rational psychology. Moreover, Smith argues, this motivational thesis is compatible with Humeanism about motivation. After all, what is necessary for motivation is a conceptually independent desire, which converge in the desires that they have, and converge by definition, because it is part of what we mean by the rational justification of our desires that people who have such desires have a justification for them that other people also could see to be a justification. A justification for one agent to adopt a desire to act in a certain circumstances is justification for another to adopt a desire to act in that way in those circumstances as well. (Smith, 1997: 89) See Copp (1997) and Sayre McCord (1997) for criticism of Smith on full rationality.

26 16 Kitty could fail to have if she were practically irrational. 15 And so, Smith concludes, Kitty is either motivated by her first person cognitive moral judgement or she is irrational by her own lights. (Smith, 1994: 62) There are, now, two questions for Smith. First: why think that depressions only impair one s motivation as opposed to also impairing one s cognition or evaluative outlook? Notice that, if Smith is right in his interpretation of these depressions, then he is also right that both the stronger versions of cognitivist motivational internalism are implausible; each, after all, denies the possibility of his interpretation of such depressions. But, if his interpretation is wrong or even dubitable, then his main argument for accepting a defeasible version of cognitivist motivational internalism is unsound. Second: how does this defeasible version of cognitivist motivational internalism preserve the internalist condition that motivation must be internal, or built in, to the moral belief in question? Consider the second objection first. The general concern with defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism is that once the ceteris paribus clause is inserted between moral belief and motivation it is no longer clear that motivation is internal to moral belief. Factors external to the moral belief are necessary for motivation. But notice that Smith has a novel way of preserving this essential feature of cognitivist motivational internalism while at the same time defending a defeasible version of the thesis. David Copp (1997) explains Smith s delicate manoeuvre nicely: 15 This is a weak version of the Humean theory of motivation. Humeans about motivation ordinarily would deny that belief could cause desire. See Hurka (1995) and Lenman (1998) for criticism on Smith on the Humean theory of motivation.

27 17 Smith agrees with the internalist that the connection between a person s judgement that she would be right to do φ and her being motivated to φ is due to something internal to the judgement. After all, the agent s judgement, which of course, as an objectivist, Smith takes to be an ordinary belief, is that she would be right to do φ. It is this fact about the content of the belief that accounts for its ability to explain her doing φ. The fact that the belief can explain the agent s action is due, in other words, to the belief s content, which is essential to it, or internal to it. This is the core internalist intuition. (Copp, 1997: 36-7) The belief about normative reason causes the desire which, in combination with the belief, motivates action. Many cognitivist motivational internalists, however, may be suspicious of the fact that connection between moral belief and motivation is necessarily mediated by practical rationality. Sigrun Svavarsdottir, a cognitivist motivational externalist, sums up the concern that she believes all internalists should have with Smith s version of the motivational thesis: the introduction of the practicality requirement condition opens up a can of worms. The question becomes, What is built into that constraint? That is to say, what sort of notion of practical rationality is being used? We need a more informative formulation of this condition before evaluating an internalist thesis that incorporates it. Indeed, motivational internalists should be very cautious in accepting this vague qualification of their thesis if they want to use the

28 18 internalist thesis as a constraint on an account of moral thought. For once the rationality condition is introduced, it may be argued that the internalist constraint has no bearing on what sorts of mental acts a moral judgement is, but rather reveals some of the norms or requirements of rationality. (Svavarsdottir, 1999:164-5) Svavarsdottir s final point is a forceful one. One might suspect that Smith s version of cognitivist motivational internalism tells us more about the requirements of rationality than it does about the motivational efficacy of first person cognitive moral judgements. The concern is that, on Smith s account, one can fully understand the content of one s first person cognitive moral judgement and be completely unmoved by that judgement. But, if Smith is right about this, then how is it that first person cognitive moral judgements are really motivationally efficacious after all? Let me put this concern another way. Smith claims that if a subject has a belief about a normative reason, and if that subject has a disposition towards a rational psychology, then the belief about a normative reason will cause that subject to have a desire to act in accordance with her first person cognitive moral judgment. What this tells us, then, is that a subject can fully believe and fully understand the content of her first person cognitive moral judgement and not be motivated to act in accordance with that moral judgement simply because this subject lacks a tendency towards a coherent psychology. Smith points out that, if one lacks a tendency toward a coherent psychology, then one is irrational. But, from the cognitivist motivational internalist s point of view, whether or not the subject is irrational is beside the point. The problem,

29 19 from the cognitivist motivational internalist s point of view, is that without this nonmoral tendency towards a coherent psychology moral cognition is motivationally inert. It is not, after all, the subject s understanding of the content of her first person moral judgement that causes the desire to act in accordance with that moral judgement; it is, rather, the freestanding non-moral tendency towards a coherent or rational psychology that causes the desire to act in accordance with that moral judgement. It is difficult to see, then, how Smith really does the preserve idea that motivation must be built into the cognitive moral judgement. Now consider the first objection: why should we think that Smith is right that depressions only impair one s motivation as opposed to also impairing one s evaluative outlook? According to Smith s interpretation, if one is clinically depressed, then one may fully believe and fully understand the content of one s first person cognitive moral judgement but simply be left motivationally cold by that judgement just in virtue being in a depressive mood state. And, if Smith has the correct interpretation of such depressions, then he is right that defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism is the only plausible version of this motivational thesis; it is, after all, the only version that allows for such depressions. But, as I argue in chapters two, four and five, Smith both fails to argue for this interpretation and is wrong to interpret depression as impairing one s motivation and yet leaving one s cognition intact. The empirical literature on clinical depression reveals that depressive mood states are reliably accompanied by irrational cognition. And, since Smith is wrong in his interpretation of such

30 20 depressions, he is also wrong in claiming that defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism is the only plausible version of this motivational thesis. Smith presents a sophisticated version of defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism. But there are lingering doubts about whether even Smith s version does justice to the internalist intuition that motivation must be built into moral belief. The worry is that, since cognitive moral motivation is mediated by practical rationality, Smith s version of this motivational thesis tells us more about the requirements for practical rationality and less about the practicality of moral cognition. b. ANTI-HUMEAN, CLASSIC COGNITIVIST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM. Cognitivist motivational internalism is not traditionally formulated in a defeasible or a decisive way. It is traditionally held that there is a conceptual connection between a (cognitive) moral judgement and motivation but a defeasible conceptual connection between that moral motivation and action. David Brink, in response to Smith s argument in The Moral Problem, points this out nicely: Though it is unlikely that any interpretation of internalism will be faithful to everything every party to debates about moral motivation has claimed, our interpretations should be guided at least in part by what central figures in the debate have claimed, including what they have claimed about the mutual relations among cognitivism, internalism and desire-base views of motivation. First, I think that many parties to debates about moral motivation have in fact

31 21 accepted and relied on my stronger formulation of internalism 16 [nondefeasible motivational internalism]. This certainly seems to be true of the noncognitivists. Second, only the stronger version of internalism makes the puzzle genuinely inconsistent; because Smith s formulation of the problem employs a weaker version of internalism, his triad is not genuinely inconsistent. (Brink, 1997: 8) Brink notes at the end here as I did in the last section that the tension between (cognitivist) motivational internalism and the Humean theory of motivation 17 is only genuine insofar as a decisive or a classic version of the motivational thesis is accepted. Given this point, and given the problems with Smith s defeasible version of the motivational thesis, it is tempting to resolve the tension between classic cognitivist motivational internalism and the Humean theory of motivation by simply rejecting the 16 Compare When we are conscious that an action is fit to be done, or that it ought to be done, it is not conceivable that we can remain uninfluenced, or want a motive to action [Price, 1974:186] Goodness must have, so to speak, magnetism. A person who recognizes X to be good must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favour than he otherwise would have had..[stevenson, 1963: 13] To think that you ought to do something is to be motivated to do it. To think that it would be wrong to do something is to be motivated not to do it. [Harman, 1977: 33] But it is also held that just knowing them [objective values] or seeing them will not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations. [Mackie, 1977: 23] It seems to be a conceptual truth that to regard something as good is to feel a pull towards promoting or choosing it [Blackburn, 1984: 188] Though Blackburn uses this interpretation of internalism to motivate his expressivist view, he goes on to mention some reasons for thinking this version of internalism is too strong [Blackburn, 1984: ]. Unfortunately, he does not explain how this argument for expressivism survives a weakening of the internalist premise. (Brink, 1997: n 4) Notice that the quote from Mackie actually outlines decisive and not classic cognitivist motivational internalism. But, even so, Brink s point remains: traditionally, both non-cognitivist and cognitivist version of this motivationally version have been formulated with a non-defeasible conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation, and not a defeasible one. 17 Once again, I am just referring to a cognitivist version of the Humean theory of motivation; non-cognitivist versions of this motivational thesis are in tension with all versions of cognitivist motivational internalism.

32 22 latter thesis and maintaining that normative cognition can motivate action unassisted by a conceptually independent desire. Neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation like those offered by John McDowell (1978, 1979, 1981), Mark Platts (1979), David McNaughton (1988) and Margaret Olivia Little (1997) favour this argumentative strategy. Let us, then, briefly explore McDowell s version of classic cognitivist motivational internalism with some elucidation from Margaret Olivia Little (1997). McDowell s account of the virtuous person s moral motivation provides a good illustration of non-defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism. The virtuous person, McDowell tells us, is reliably sensitive to features of a situation that command a particular course of action. 18 The virtuous person, in other words, appreciates or sees any given situation in special light. This appreciation enables the virtuous person to recognise and see in a favourable light the morally salient features of a situation that point to a particular course of action. Little elucidates this well: saying that the virtuous person has a special way of perceiving the situation is to say that the virtuous person takes in saliences aright, taking in all and only relevant features of the situation as relevant, and accurately taking them to have the moral shape that they together form. This gestalt represents the clearest and most complete vision one that is most true to what is there to be apprehended in moral reality; and this accurate gestalt, it is claimed, is identical to or necessarily entails the practical orientation of taking those 18 For McDowell reliable sensitivity is a necessary condition for the possession of virtue (1998: 52).

33 23 features as constituting overriding, and perhaps, silencing, reasons for action. (Little, 1997: 74) The virtuous person s experience, then, of seeing moral reality in the right way is both a cognitive and a practical state. The way in which the virtuous person sees the situation puts her in a cognitive state that provides her with her one and only motivation for action. Two points require further clarification here. First of all, the virtuous person is decisively motivated, and so while this is an example of non-defeasible cognitivist motivational internalism this is not an example of the classic version of the motivational thesis. When the virtuous person sees a situation in a special light, she apprehends moral reality correctly, and in doing so she does not weigh reasons for or against a particular course of action. Non-relevant features of a situation are not weighed out in deliberation because these features do not figure in the virtuous person s view of the situation at all. These non-relevant features are, to use McDowell s language, silenced. Notice, however, that not all agents who are morally motivated are virtuous agents. Non-virtuous agents, then, are motivated by their first person cognitive moral judgements; however, because these agents are not in the same cognitive state as the virtuous person, these agents are not decisively morally motivated.

34 24 Second of all, the neo-aristotelian tells us that while the virtuous person is in a cognitive state, that state is not reducible to a particular proposition or set of propositions. 19 Again, Little expresses this point well, The virtuous and non-virtuous person can alike believe that cruelty is bad, or conclude that some particular action is now called for. The virtuous person, however, holds the belief as part and parcel of the broad, uncodifiable, practical conception of how to live, while the non-virtuous person holds it without so subsuming it. The two differ, if you like, in their conceptual gestalts of the situation Virtue theory, then, does indeed claim that the virtuous person is in a cognitive state that guarantees moral motivation. But the guarantee is not located in any particular belief or piece of propositional knowledge. It is, instead, located in a way of conceiving a situation under the auspices of a broad conception of how to live. (Little, 1997: 75) It is not the case, then, that the mere belief that I morally ought to φ will guarantee decisive moral motivation; in order to be decisively motivated one has to be in the virtuous person s cognitive state and, thereby, appreciate moral reality in the way in which the virtuous person does. 19 For this reason, then, moral knowledge cannot be fully translated into or reduced to easy-tofollow moral principles: There need be no possibility of reducing virtuous behaviour to rules. In moral upbringing what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of conduct, but to see situations in a special light, as constituting reason for action; this perceptual capacity, once acquired, can be exercised in complex novel circumstances, not necessarily capable of being foreseen and legislated for by a codifier of the conduct required by virtue, however wise and thoughtful he might be. (McDowell, 1998: 85)

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