Yale-UN Oral History Project. Ambassador Jacques Leprette James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer 8 April, 1991 Paris, France

Transcription

1 ST/DPI ORAL HISTORY (02)/L3 Yale-UN Oral History Project Ambassador Jacques Leprette James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer 8 April, 1991 Paris, France NOTICE This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the United Nations. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word. RESTRICTIONS This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

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3 UN INTERVIEW AMBASSADOR JACQUES LEPRETTE PARIS, FRANCE APRIL 8, 1991 INTERVIEWER, JAMES SUTTERLIN Ambassador Leprette, I want to first thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this Yale Oral History Project on the United Nations and if we might I'd like to begin by discussing with you the procedure through which Secretaries-General of the United Nations are chosen. I believe that when Kurt Waldheim was selected as Secretary-General, you at that time were in the Foreign Ministry in Paris, is that correct? Yes. And what was your position at that time? I was in charge of the United Nations and International organizations in the French Foreign Office. And let me just start with a general question on that. In the French government - and particularly in the Quai is the selection of the Secretary-General of the united Nations considered an important matter? Yes, right or wrong. Right or wrong? And does it involve the highest levels of the French government? Yes So could you describe the situation as you saw it from the perspective of Paris at the time a new Secretary- 1

4 General needed to be elected to take U Thant's place? Yes, well the initiative came from the Austrian government. I remember that I was invited at a luncheon party by the Austrian ambassador in Paris who wanted me to meet with a candidate of their country by the name of Kurt Waldheim. We were in all something like twelve people around the table and not important people - I mean, people of my level - and discussions started with gentleman who was introduced to me and who was Kurt Waldheim. I think that Mr. Waldheim made a number of trips in Europe and elsewhere in the world. When the election day came the Austrian ambassador kept calling me on the phone after each tour de scrutin - how do you say that in English? - I don't remember how many ballots were cast but what struck me was that his question which was always the same - "You told me that France would vote for Mr. Waldheim - did I understand you correctly?" And my answer was "yes". Was France consistent then in supporting Waldheim' s candidacy from the beginning? Yes. Because there were a number of other candidates at that time. So what you are very clearly suggesting is that there was strong electioneering, you would say, in order to gain support for Waldheim - it was a real campaign. I have forgotten who were the others - but you might 2

5 remind me. Prince Sadruddin Khan was one. I believe he was vetoed, well, one doesn't know. I see. Well I don't remember exactly the criteria that were selected by France. Now in favoring Waldheim, what was this decision based on? Simply the approaches of the Austrians, or an analysis of the strength of the potential Secretary General? Well, in those days we felt that after somebody from Asia we would welcome a good professional coming from another section of the world and since there was a European, we had a tendency to favor a European. But that didn't mean at that time that we were against the others. And the inevitable question - was anything done in Paris to look into the background of Mr. Waldheim given the fact that it was known that he had been in the German army? I don't remember anything on that particular point. Waldheim had served in Paris, first during the war - we knew that. He never concealed that, that he had been an officer in Paris. Second, he had served as a diplomat in Paris and I think that was considered (having served in Paris) good credentials. As clearance Pardon? 3

6 From the French point of view then - perhaps it has changed now - what did you see and what did other people in the French government see as the desirable qualities of a Secretary-General? It is very difficult to answer. The position is a very difficult one and I had later on occasions to see that more closely. In France the united Nations is the world organization; everybody knows that all the miseries of the world, one day or another, are put forward to the United Nations, the Security Council, other organs, other bodies, and this is why we consider that it is indispensable to have a good professional. To that extent it seemed to us that Kurt Waldheim had the training of a diplomat and since he was a European, probably we came to the conclusion that he would serve as a good high civil servant to the organization. But we never considered that the Secretary-General of the United. Nations had the stature of a head of a state, for instance. He is what the Charter says - the most important official of the organization. I don't remember exactly the provisions of the Charter... The chief administrative officer, I think it says. But in the background of this question is what I believe to have been considerable dissatisfaction in France, at least on the part of General De Gaulle, with Dag Hammarskjold. Was there any sense when this new 4

7 opportunity to select a new Secretary-General came along, that France at least would not want another person of such strong and independent character as Dag Hammarskjold? When you use the word "strong" my reaction is, "What do you mean by 'strong'?" Because I'm afraid that Dag Hammarskjold, who was highly respected, very active, very able, very intelligent, highly cultivated, whom I remember I met within the OECD in those days - Dag Hammarskjold probably missed the occasion to enjoy the support of the most important members of the organization. And then he lost his strength. I don't know whether I make myself clear but what I am trying to say is that an active Secretary-General is somebody who dares to make reference to Article 99 of the Charter, for instance. They have to perform their duties, they have also to use their privileges when they are in that high position. But they have also to remember that, after all, they serve the countries, the member countries. When, due to an excess of activity, they lose the support of important quarters of the United Nations, they become weak - that's all. It's up to them to see where is the invisible line. So you're suggesting that really one important qualification for a Secretary-General is a man or a woman who can maintain tolerable relations, especially with the 5

8 Permanent Members of the Security council. It seems to me essential. Dag Hammarskjold, I am afraid, although he was a man of good faith and he wanted to do all in his power for the benefit for the community of nations lost, at a time, the trust of some members. They were difficult times, I remember it well, because in 1960 I was in the French Foreign Office in charge of African Affairs - that period when we were trying, not always successfully, to transfer independence to former colonies. It was such a delicate operation that we were not eager to see too many people interfere, and since you refer to General De Gaulle and his reluctance, first I must say that what has been reported, that General De Gaulle treated the United Nations as "Ie machin", has to be qualified and I am ready to say something about that. What I want to point out is that in some difficult political situations, when member states have lots of problems to solve, or are trying to solve them, the activity of an international organization may not be as welcome as some people think, that's all. But once the Algerian question was solved, once the African states became members of the organization, you will remember that General De Gaulle entertained good relations with U Thant. The United States also felt at times that the united Nations didn't live up to its reputation. That raises an interesting question, both from the past 6

9 and for the future. At the time of the choice of the next new Secretary-General, that is, Perez de Cuellar, if I'm not mistaken, you were in New York and you were the Permanent Representative of France and actually serving on the security Council..Before that there was the reelection of Waldheim in '76. That was relatively uncontroversial - did you find it necessary to make any decision? Well, on that particular instance we were faced with a decision to make which was a difficult one. Can you elaborate on that? No. (laughter on both sides). I'll tell you the story later on. Well, let's go ahead then. And then we come to '81. '81. And before going into some of the details there, I'd like to connect it with your previous comment which is an interesting one - and that is, the change between the period when decolonization was still taking place and when it had been completed. Would this suggest that from the French point of view then, in '81 or for that matter now, a candidate from the Third World, from the former colonial world, would be acceptable? I'm speaking personally. I have no official responsibility now and my answer is "yes" and I think that there are a number of well-qualified personalities 7

10 who could highly, fill the job. Going now to the election at the end of which Perez de CUellar was elected, could you describe how you saw that procedure, how did that work? I don't remember now how many ballots there were - maybe you can? I think there were quite a few, over 20. Over 20 - what I remember, is that at one time Kurt Waldheim passed me a message and told me that he wanted to have a private conversation on what was going on because the first ballots hadn't been favorable, although he had enjoyed the votes of four permanent members out of the five. And since there were intermissions from time to time between the ballots, I went to see him and his question was, "what kind of advice would you give me should I stay on, or what?" And of course I said, "I have no advice to offer because you have more information than I have. The French government has collected information on the chances of Mr. so-and-so, your chances and so forth and so. But we have just a limited point of view whereas I'm sure that with all your connections, and since you have been here for 10 years as Secretary General, you know much better than I." But he insisted, he insisted in such a way that I told him that I'm not speaking for the French government but as an individual. "My feeling is that one Permanent Member is voting 8

11 against you," and he interrupted me and said, "It is China". "This situation will go on," and he looked surprised and said to me, "but I don't follow you, I don't understand. What is the reason? I was invited by the Chinese last summer, I got a red carpet treatment. They were extremely friendly. They had no grievances, no reproach to make to me. This is why my conclusion is that they wanted, for a number of ballots, to vote "no", to show that they are not following necessarily the other big powers. They have their own judgment, but maybe not the next ballot, but the following one, they will just either abstain or vote in favor." I kept silent for a while, then answered, "This is not what I think, I'm sorry to say." And once more he looked surprised and wanted to know more, and I told him "the Chinese want to appear as the 'defendeur' and porte parole of the Third World. It is one occasion where they can send a message. But if they change their mind, they demonstrate nothing except their lack of will. What they want, according to our own analysis is to show to the outside world that there was one big country against the Europeans in favor of a representative of the Third World, that country was China". He said to me, "well, fine, maybe, I think you're wrong" and this is how our conversation ended. Looking back at that experience, do you feel that the President of the Security Council - Ambassador otunnu, 9

12 became the President during this, at this stage - can make a significant difference in the outcome of the selection of the Secretary-General? Was it your impression then, for example, that otunnu really made the difference in terms of the election? Mr. Otunnu was presiding over it? Yes. I don't think so, although through awkwardness, (Which was not the case because I hold Mr. Otunnu as a very good diplomat) or lack of expertise, a President may complicate the proceedings. I remember other occasions when a president of the Security Council, unfortunately following the advice of somebody else, made mistakes and regretted it, of course. A good president, knowing the procedure and keeping his "sangfroid", can carry the task without influencing one way or another the ballots. Because, as far as I know, members of the Security Council with few exceptions follow their instructions. Now there were May I Surely On another occasion, I remember that I felt it necessary to go to Paris to get the oral instructions of my Foreign Minister. I got them, I went back, On this question? Yes, a similar question - I went back to New York, 10

13 because I didn't want to embarrass my staff, amazing as it is. I trusted them all, they were perfect, very good assistants, but I knew that there is always a curiosity about how France is going to vote. I had arrived at the conclusion that my staff didn't know the position, they couldn't answer. And I remember that once the whole thing was over, I dictated a cable to Paris, "1 voted according to your instructions." Actually I spared mu assistants some embarrassment. They had to answer all those who were questioning them, the junior officers very often, "well, amazing as it is, I don't know". Well this is an interesting indication of the importance that France attributes to the election of the Secretary General. Indeed. Now, I think at this point when the Waldheim' s third term was being considered, there were quite a few informal consultations on. the part of members of the Security Council. My question here is, during these consultations, was there any real discussion of the qualifications of the various candidates? Sadruddin Khan was again a candidate, I think, and so was Salim Salim, as a matter of fact. Good, they had good credentials, good qualifications. But did the members of the Council in their informal consultations, sit down and say, "well, it appears that 11

14 from his curriculum vitae Sadruddin Khan may be a good administrator, a good manager and this is a plus in his case" or was it a far more informal political process? All considerations are taken into account, but there are things we don't know. Whether Mr. So and So is a good administrator or not for example. Some know but others don't. What I remember is that we always wanted to know whether the candidates had good political and diplomatic experience, whether they had traveled, whether they had been posted to Europe, for instance, things like that, which looks trivial, are of minor importance, but we feel that somebody who has lived in another country, who knows the languages, who has travelled a lot, who has had big responsibilities, will appear safer. And now that you have had the experience of observing the results and now with a new election approaching, would you still think that this is the important question to raise about a potential candidate - this diplomatic experience, the experience of having traveled, of knowing languages in your opinion is still a major qualification - perhaps the first qualification? It is very difficult to establish a hierarchy among all the criteria, and it is not because somebody would speak fluent French that I would necessarily say "he's the best", no. But... If I may just interpose here - suppose he didn't speak 12

15 fluent French - would that be a disqualification? Not for France only but for a number of countries, France, which consider that it's easier to express one's self in one's language and therefore to avoid misunderstandings. It is not only for, I would say, chauvinistic reasons that for instance, French representatives insist on this question of language. It is because the literature in English when received by a government which doesn't use English, this literature is not considered as seriously as it deserves. And that applies to France. Of course there are now a greater number of young people who speak the languages - more particularly, English - but it is a fact that if you sent a memo to a French administration, since there is a barrier of language the memo will not be considered. And then in New York they will wait for an answer and never get it. So if for all those practical reasons we feel that someone fluent in several languages - I don't insist upon French - but several languages, first has an "ouverture d'esprit", an open mind, and second, will be in a better position to make himself understood. It's alright to have a good translator, it's alright to have a good interpreter, but I have realized that in the caucus of francophone heads of state the conversation is much more lively, much easier, much simpler, goes to the point much more easily than [in a multilingual group]. 13

16 Just to continue with Perez de Cuellar, did you consider him first of all a candidate? Was he really a candidate? Perez de CUellar was not in New York but I remember very well the Peruvian delegation and the gentleman who was the head of this delegation and had been Permanent Representative of Peru carried on a very active campaign. I may say that several times a day he managed to have a talk with me and just made certain whether I knew who Mr. Perez de CUellar was, and of course I knew him very well, Perez de Cuellar having been the special representative of Kurt Waldheim on a number of occasions, and I had had many opportunities many occasions to talk with him on a variety of topics. So there was a very active Peruvian delegation which didn't lose a moment and which was eager to canvass the whole spectrum of the influential delegations. So would you say there has to be some campaigning for a person to have a chance at success? Yes, at least for one reason. A good candidate must not appear to be indifferent. In order not to appear indifferent you've got either to have a spokesman or to do the job yourself, whether in the lobbies or elsewhere. There are no written rules of procedure for the election, or for deciding on a recommendation in the Security Council for a Secretary-General. In your experience how were most of the candidacies put forward? Was it 14

17 possible.for a person to become a candidate without his government's support? I don't think so. But there are peculiar situations. There were, I remember, very good candidates who were considered as nationals of two countries, or who were considered as not having a specific nationality. It happens very rarely but it happens. That would have been the case with Sadruddin Khan. For instance, who was and is a very strong personality. I believe that there was a Filipino who became one of the candidates without the sponsorship of his government. He was the head of the Population Fund at that time. Yes, I remember. But it would be your view that it would be a very difficult disadvantage for anybody I think so. I have just one final question in this series and that is, from your experience and your wisdom, what do you think is a desirable procedure for selecting a secretary General, what could be better than the procedure which has been followed until now, the very informal procedure You mean, whether it could be improved? Yes I am hesitant, because there is nothing that really strikes me, I don't see any kind of measure or 15

18 initiative which would really improve the selection process. It's very difficult to say. Let me pose one specific question in that regard. Brian Urquhart, whom you know, has written some recommendations which have been receiving wide attention on the subject and one of these recommendations is that what we would call a search committee should be established by the Security Council well in advance. This committee should actually go out and search for persons who would be well qualified for the position and their names would then be put forward by such a committee. It seems to me a good suggestion. I don't know whether it would prove very efficient but I'm all in favor of anything which can offer the community of nations the largest amount of information. It is true that we don't know everybody and the French government never boasts of knowing well in advance who would be necessarily a good. Secretary-General. Maybe we don't know enough. If through that procedure of Brian Urquhart we could enlarge the information of the member countries then I think it would be good. And the really final question on this particular subject. In your experience, which was very closely the performances did you reach any conclusions - quite long in observing of secretaries-general, or for that matter, did the French government reach any conclusions - on changes 16

19 in the organization in the Secretariat or in other aspects of the organization - which could enhance the effectiveness of the secretary-general? Is there something lacking as far you have observed? Well, I'm a great supporter of the UN system and for that reason I always welcome suggestions for improvement of the organization. I think that much depends on personalities and this is where and why the selection is so important. With a small group of good people you can perform much better than with a bigger structure with less qualified assistants of the Secretary-General. On the other hand we all know that there must be a balance of representation within the system. This in itself doesn't mean that we have to welcome less qualified people but when you consider that there are only, on the one hand, two working languages and, on the other one, six official languages - you cannot expect, except for very brilliant agents, you cannot expect that those who are requested to work in another language than their own as well as the others. For that single reason there is a lack of balance which reflects the lack of balance of the international community. I think that we've got to live with that. I think that those who hold high responsibilities within the Secretariat have to perform, to make sure that everybody is qualified and working well. For that reason I think what is very important is 17

20 to recruit people who believe in the organization. Once you believe, once you accept that there are a number of shortcomings, that it is unavoidable, then you get the strength to perform your duty. Thank you now, I'd like to change the SUbject entirely. Very briefly, to just go to the Middle East War which began in October of Where were you in the French service at that particular time? I was in New York. I was a member of the French delegation to the GA and I remember very well, I was in the office when the Secretary-General called the ambassador, the French ambassador in those days, and told him that war had broken out and that he wanted to consult with him. This is how it started and there we were, as all our other colleagues, following the dispatches and the messages coming, I mean, during the whole week. I judge from what you say that, on the French side, like on most other sides, you had not really anticipated the outbreak of war at that time? No, we had not. Even though President Sadat had clearly indicated that he was thinking of it? Yes, which shows that one can be wrong, (laughter) along with many others. As the war developed very quickly, was there any inclination on the French side to take any initiative, or 18

21 was there (as there apparently was on the part of Waldheim) an inclination to let the Americans take the lead in dealing with the situation? Well, in that particular part of the world, we always feel that whenever the Middle East is concerned, France - the French people I would say - are interested. I mean, for one reason or another because probably of Lebanon, they feel that they cannot be indifferent, that something is happening, that something has to be done and so forth. And on the other hand we got the feeling that the Americans, whenever the Middle East is concerned, feel that they cannot be indifferent and they have to take the lead and to take some initiative. I think that the British are in the same situation for similar reasons and of course, the Soviets cannot get too far away. So in this question of leadership, I think that we would need another interview to develop this idea. But the US has demonstrated that when they wanted to take the lead, they can. I did want to pursue a related question there and that is the French attitude at that time (and for that matter, earlier) toward peacekeeping as a technique, followed by the UN. Just this afternoon Mr. Pineau was commenting to me that actually he had very early thought of the idea of a UN force and had suggested it to Dag Hammarskjold. Was the French support constant (if I may use that word) for 19

22 the concept of peacekeeping, including in 1973 when the war was finally brought to a ceasefire through a UN resolution? You mean a UN force? Yes. Well I have a distinct recollection (as far as this issue is concerned) which relates not necessarily to the events of 1973 but to developments which took place later on. In 1971 the President of the French Republic mentioned that if things in Lebanon became more difficult then France would consider helping militarily in Lebanon. In 1976 a new French president, Giscard d'estaing was making a trip in the US and somewhere (I think it was in New Orleans) he said vaguely, because the situation was not good in Lebanon, "if something happens in Lebanon France would consider sending military troops to the area." When I took over my position as ambassador I called in the Minister of Defense, our Secretary of Defense, and I told him, "Two French presidents have said that. Now I don't want to interfere but although no Permanent Member of the Security Council has sent troops as part of the peacekeeping forces of the UN in recent years (with the exception of the UK in Cyprus), our duty, considering the commitments of our heads of state, our duty is to envisage a possible involvement of France within such a UN action." The defense minister listened to me and said 20

23 "You've got to talk to our Joint Chiefs of Staff", which I did. In 1978, March, I was in Paris. We had a legislative election, and the second vote was due on March 18, or something like that, on a Sunday. I called on my foreign minister. The situation had been deteriorating after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces and I asked Mr. Louis de Guiringaud who had been my predecessor in New York and who was extremely open to everything coming from the UN, I asked him, "Do you think that we might be involved?" and he said "Yes, I'll give you an answer tomorrow, Sunday," (after the second ballot of the elections which shows that the government was working business as usual even under those circumstances). Back in New York, I went directly from the airport to the Security Council chambers. There my American colleague and my Lebanon colleague took me by the hand. In a remote place they told me, "Is France ready to send troops?" I looked astonished and said, "But this has never happened." They said "true, but the situation is different. It is different because we are expecting Mr. Begin on an official visit next Wednesday, and we want something to happen in between. We want this military move to stop and we don't know how to do it except through the UN." "Oh", I said, "well, this is new to me. II I turned to my assistants, who had attended the first speeches in the Security Council and I noticed that 21

24 my German colleague had taken the floor and said: "we support the idea of sending immediately peacekeeping forces to Lebanon, southern Lebanon. Of course those would be troops coming from non-permanent Members of the security council. II I turned to my American friends, "This is the true doctrine, he was right." He said, "no, we've got to correct that." Then I had a long talk with Waldheim who said to me, "The situation is now very serious. What we need is somebody to take initiative with the support of the Council and at the request of the Secretary-General. If you do that I trust that two or three contingents from other member countries of the UN might become unable??" Then I got in touch with my foreign minister: in the middle of the afternoon I knew that our answer would be, "We are ready to send a battalion provided that first we are not alone and second, it will be temporary." I remember that you were. present during those days: I don't want to rewrite the story but I want to add, to close on that matter, that I had suggested to my government to limit the presence of French troops to six months. I kept on that point until in September we had to, as we say in French, "couper la poire en deux." Instead of six months it was four months. Then I wrote to my government that we had accepted another four months, but that should be the last time because our mission, the one which was requested, 22

25 had been to send a contingent immediately, in order to facilitate the gathering of a stronger force. That now has been done." The situation is not perfect, but the situation is better and we should now, after having given a decent advance notice, withdraw. That would be in accordance with our commitment and that would save on embarrassing situation later on." When I gave my feelings to Waldheim he listened, didn't answer, flew to Paris, had a private conversation with our President and came back apparently reassured. The French contingent twelve years later - is still there. This is my confidential conclusion. That's interesting, but it does show that an initiative on the part of the Secretary-General can have an effect. Right, and that an ambassador plenipotentiary is not as powerful as the credentials say. Those are all the questions that I'm going to ask about the '73 War unless there's any other point that you wanted to make, that comes to your mind, in terms of the French attitude at that point. No, not particularly. I've been now away from New York and following what is happening, the new developments and the new life in the organization. I'm gratified at what is happening. I don't think that it is a new UN; it is a new environment. will stay on for a Let's hope that this new environment long time. 23

26 One thing that has happened just this past week that is relevant to what you were talking about is a decision of the five Permanent Members to participate in the observer mission in the Gulf. Yes, it's very interesting. I'm not against new initiatives provided that it serves the peace, safeguards the peace. Thank you very very much for participating. 24

27 Begin, Menachem Giscard, Valery d'estaning Guiringaud, Louis de Hammarskjold, Dag Khan, Sadruddin Aga Perez de Cuellar, Javier Pineau, Christian Sadat, Anwar Salim, Salim Thant, U Urquhart, Brian Waldheim, Kurt Name Index 2, , 20 4, 12, 13, 16 1, 8, 9, , , 8, 9, 12, 15, 20, 23, 24 25