Today s Lecture. René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke

Transcription

1 Today s Lecture René Descartes W.K. Clifford Preliminary comments on Locke

2 René Descartes: The First There are two motivations for his method of doubt that Descartes mentions in the first paragraph of this (FP, p.147). (1) He had believed many falsehoods in his childhood, and this raised legitimate doubts about the truth of the beliefs he now held (as they were acquired cumulatively and taken to be true in part because of their relation to his earlier beliefs), and (2) a stable and lasting science requires foundations that are free of reasonable doubt.

3 René Descartes: The First Descartes method of doubt is designed to demolish his beliefs about himself and the world and leave no belief, judgment or principle that can be reasonably doubted. It accomplishes this by a series of reflections that successively undercut possible resistance to doubt.

4 René Descartes: The First First stage of doubt (see FP, p.148): (1) I will regard as false any belief for which I can generate any doubt. (2) In the past I have regarded beliefs based on or through the use of the senses as most true. (3) I have, however, been deceived by my senses. (4) It is best to hold at least some mistrust of that which, or those who, have deceived us even once. (5) Given (1) through (4), I will regard beliefs based on or acquired through the use of the senses as false.

5 René Descartes: The First He concedes that we will find the scope of this argument too broad to be plausible. Descartes supposes that we will want to distinguish empirical claims based on evidence acquired by our senses at the very limits of their capacities from empirical claims that are made well within the accepted parameters of our faculties reliability (see second full paragraph on page 148 of your FP).

6 René Descartes: The First Second stage of doubt (see FP, p.148): (1) I will regard as false any belief for which I can generate any doubt. (2) I believe that I am xing, where xing is a common action undertaken in my daily affairs and the evidence for my xing is not derived from the use of my senses at the limits of their capacities.

7 René Descartes: The First (3) I have been asleep and dreamt much the same thing as I am now perceiving. (4) I cannot be certain that at this moment I am not dreaming. (5) If I am dreaming at this moment, then my present perceptions are false. (6) Given (1) through (5), I will regard such beliefs as this false.

8 René Descartes: The First This, according to Descartes, is still not enough to demolish all our beliefs. After all, though we may doubt the veracity of experience, there are certain general properties of objects that we cannot merely think or imagine into existence. They, at least, must have their origins elsewhere than our imaginations. Also, there are putative truths (e.g. in the mathematical sciences) that are themselves held to be true a priori (FP, p.148).

9 René Descartes: The First Third stage of doubt (see FP, p.149): (1) I will regard as false any belief for which I can generate any doubt. (2) I have a belief in an omnipotent divine Creator who is capable of manipulating my experience such that I perceive that which does not exist. (3) This omnipotent divine Creator is also capable of interfering with my reasoning faculties in such a way that I never discover a priori truths.

10 René Descartes: The First (4) I cannot rule out the possibility that such an omnipotent divine Creator has not so manipulated my experience or interfered with my reasoning faculties. (5) Given (1) through (4), I will regard my perceptions or what seems true by the light of my reason as false.

11 René Descartes: The First Descartes amends this scenario so that it includes a reference to an omnipotent malicious demon rather than God. This, contends Descartes, is in deference to the view that God is incapable of deception or malice (FP, p.149). Note another indication that Descartes is not a skeptic about our knowledge of the world. The method of doubt is now ready to be applied.

12 René Descartes: The Second The Second begins with Descartes now applying his method of doubt in the hopes of finding some certain truth. Note that if this truth is to be found it must be a priori in nature. Why?

13 René Descartes: The Second The third stage of doubt demolishes all beliefs except the belief that I exist. On the one hand, even if I convince myself that nothing exists or my a priori reflections are false, I must exist to be so convinced. On the other hand, even if my very idea that I have so convinced myself is an effect of the omnipotent and malicious demon doing his dastardly best, I must still exist to be so deceived (FP, p.150).

14 René Descartes: The Second So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind (FP, p.150). Is Descartes right here?

15 René Descartes: The Second Descartes warns against moving too fast here. Even if the proposition I am, I exist is necessarily true when it is conceived in my mind, I know nothing yet about who or what this I is. Descartes suggests that in order to know anything about this I a priori, and at this stage that is all that is open to us, we should apply the method of doubt to our common conception of ourselves and look for any truth that survives the process.

16 René Descartes: The Second He suggests that his pre-reflective view of himself was of an individual made up of a body and a soul. He admits that his view of the nature of his soul was vague, but not his view of his body (FP, pp ).

17 René Descartes: The Second Applying the method of doubt Descartes contends that a belief that he has a body (and all that that entails) must be regarded as false since it is something that can be doubted to exist under the scenario where he is being deceived by an omnipotent malicious demon. Applying the method of doubt to his belief about a soul he contends that all that cannot be doubted is that there are thoughts (after all the doubts considered as thoughts must exist) (FP, p.151).

18 René Descartes: The Second All that I can know a priori and with certainty about my soul is that when I think there are thoughts and a thinker. Thus when I think, I must exist. When I exist, I do so as a thinking thing (FP, p.151). Is he right? At the bottom of page 151 and top of page 152 in your FP Descartes seems to claim that the view that the thoughts that must be admitted to exist even at this stage of doubt are unified in an I or thinker (i.e. thinking thing) is self-evident. Is he right?

19 René Descartes: The Second Note he does not deny that he may be more than this. He does not deny that he may be embodied. He just can t claim it as known at the present stage of doubt.

20 René Descartes: The Second This I is Descartes first example of a clear and distinct idea. His second suggested clear and distinct idea falls out of analyzing a piece of bees wax (FP, p.152). This analysis does triple duty here. (i) He is trying to highlight the faculty by which he, and we, can know the I which must exist, when there is thought. (ii) He is showing how we can generate clear and distinct ideas of things other than our soul. (iii) He is showing that our knowledge of other bodies is less certain than our knowledge that we exist.

21 René Descartes: The Second He asks you to imagine the wax as he describes it fresh from the honeycomb. Then he asks you to imagine it after it melts when placed close to a nearby fire. We are, in this scenario, still inclined to talk of the melted wax as the same thing that had wholly other sensible qualities before it was placed near the fire.

22 René Descartes: The Second Descartes suggests that this tells us that the wax as a body, and the referent for our term, is not to be identified with the sensible qualities before or after it was melted by the nearby fire. (Nor is it to be identified with both sets of qualities.) What s more, as the wax as a body does not consist of any sensible qualities, our belief that it is a body does not arise from our senses. What can we know of this body from this experiment? That it is extended (has shape), is flexible and that it can change (FP, p.152).

23 René Descartes: The Second Our belief about these properties cannot, Descartes argues, be the product of our imagination. We cannot, after all, imagine all the changes this body is capable of, though we can intellectually grasp its potential to so change. This points to the mind or reason as the origin of the perception of wax as a body, extended, flexible and capable of change. It is the result of purely mental scrutiny (FP, p.153).

24 René Descartes: The Second He concludes this by pointing out that knowledge of the wax as a body must still be predicated on my perception of it. Even if my perception of it as a body, as clear as it now is, turns out to be false (because I do not perceive anything at all), I cannot doubt that I seem to be perceiving it. From this I cannot, at that moment, doubt

25 René Descartes: The Second Even if my perception of it is veridical, the same is still true. A veridical perception of another body also testifies to my own existence as a thinking, or perceiving thing. Once again, my existence as a thinking thing enjoys more certainty (FP, p.153).

26 Some preliminary remarks about W.K. Clifford He was born in 1845 and died in Clifford was an English mathematician. Your reading represents his attempt to defend the claim that we all have a duty of belief, namely that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. This is a version of evidentialism, the view that our beliefs are justified if and only if they are supported by evidence in our possession. The notion of justification for Clifford carries moral import. (Not all evidentialists would agree.)

27 Clifford: The stories of the irresponsible ship owner and the slandering agitators Purpose of these stories: To elicit your judgment that we have a duty not to believe on insufficient evidence, or by unreliable means. They involve, according to Clifford, immoral believing on the part of the relevant actors in the stories. Clifford thinks that (1) we will agree that the individuals concerned believed wrongly, and that (2) this implies a duty of belief.

28 Clifford: The stories of the irresponsible ship owner and the slandering agitators Do note that Clifford is not trying to get you to commit to a particular moral theory of right or wrong, though he will introduce consequential considerations for why belief on insufficient evidence is wrong.

29 Clifford: The story of the irresponsible ship owner Some elements of the story of the irresponsible ship owner to note: (1) He has evidence that undermines the reasonableness of a belief that the ship is safe or sea worthy. (2) This evidence generates doubts about the safety or sea worthiness of the ship. (3) He overcomes his doubts through an appeal to various reasons. (4) The ship, not surprisingly, sinks.

30 Clifford: The story of the irresponsible ship owner Clifford thinks that the ship owner goes wrong by stiffling his doubts using reasons that are insufficient to justify the belief that the ship is safe or sea worthy. The ship owner has no right to believe on such evidence as was before him (CP, 2). Do note that Clifford thinks that this judgment about the ship owner s ill gained belief would not change even if it were the case that the ship, in this and subsequent trips, didn t sink (see CP, p.2). Is he right?

31 Clifford: The story of the slandering agitators Some of the elements of the story of the slandering agitators to note: (1) There were widespread rumors regarding the immoral actions of teachers and members of a local heretical religious movement. (2) These rumors are believed by outside members of the community. (3) A society is formed to agitate the government into action against this religious movement.

32 Clifford: The story of the slandering agitators (4) They publicly make grave accusations against respected members of this movement. (5) A Government Commission is struck to investigate the accusations. (6) The accusations are false. (7) The truth about the religious movement could have been easily discovered by those in society of agitators. (8) Consequently, these agitators lose their respectability in the community.

33 Clifford: The story of the slandering agitators Clifford thinks that where the slandering agitators go wrong is in being epistemically lazy. Their sincerity of belief was ill-gained. Sincerity alone, then, is not good enough in matters of belief. Clifford thinks that if the story is changed, so that the agitators were accidentally right, we would still judge them wrong to believe on the grounds before them (see CP, p.2).

34 Clifford on why it is not merely the action which is to be blamed Clifford considers the possibility that it is the actions which we are judging negatively rather than the beliefs. It may be thought that regardless of your beliefs (and your lack of control over [some of] them) you have a duty to ensure you are right about x, before acting on the basis of one or more of your beliefs about x.

35 Clifford on why it is not merely the action which is to be blamed Clifford responds in two ways: (1) You cannot sufficiently separate any given belief S may hold from her accompanying actions. The reprehensibility, or praise, of S s actions also attach to the beliefs that give rise to the actions. (2) This will be an insufficient analysis of our duty because we cannot fairly or openly evaluate, or remain open to the evaluations of, beliefs we have already adopted (CP, pp.2-3).

36 Clifford on reasons for why we have a duty of belief Clifford provides the following reasons for why we have duties of belief. (1) Beliefs formed on insufficient grounds will have their toll on your subsequent choices and actions. This is because beliefs have what we might christen behavioral import. Ill gained beliefs will give rise to, or contribute to, poor choices in action (CP, p.3).

37 Clifford on reasons for why we have a duty of belief (2) By not properly investigating our beliefs we risk not only acting immorally in the future, but we make it easier for ourselves to form bad intellectual habits (CP, p.3-4). (3) Your judgments are not merely a private matter. Those beliefs you form are eventually manifested in the public sphere, either in speech or action/inaction. Subsequently, you have some (perhaps a great deal) of influence on the beliefs that others form, and their subsequent actions (CP, p.3).

38 Clifford on reasons for why we have a duty of belief (4) In the light of (2) and (3), we run the risk of our own self-created credulity spreading to the greater human community (CP, p.4). (5) This lack of care in believing, when it becomes public, may also backfire against our long-term intellectual and physical welfare (or that of our progeny). In encouraging those around us to have as little care as ourselves in their believing we risk creating a society of liars or exaggerators. Alternatively, by placing ill gained beliefs in the public arena we may mislead others to their own detriment (or the detriment of their and our progeny) (CP, p.4).