MALFORMATION OF BELONGING: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

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1 TALLINN UNIVERSITY ESTONIAN INSTITUTE OF HUMANITIES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY JAANIKA PUUSALU MALFORMATION OF BELONGING: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION MASTER S THESIS SUPERVISOR: Dr. Siobhan Kattago Tallinn 2012

2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis without doubt owes greatly to many fruitful conversations, for which I am deeply indebted to a number of special people with whom I have been honoured to study, work with or make the acquaintance of over the past two years. First and foremost I am grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Siobhan Kattago, whose dedication in assisting me with creating a suitable framework for research, understanding the thoughts of many difficult authors and shaping my reflections into a thesis, I could not have done without. Great help was also provided me by the professors and co-students of Nordplus project: Joint Master s Programme Practical Philosophy, who introduced to me several authors and concepts that were to be deeply influential on my writing the thesis. Special mention must be given to University of Helsinki professor Olli Luokola who, during a brief conversation regarding my future thesis, advised me to pay attention to the concept of alienation. That comment, as is now clear, became the turning point in the course of my thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the professors, doctoral and masters students of my home department in Tallinn University Estonian Institute of Humanities, for their interest, comments and critical feedback on my work-in-progress as it has been presented in research seminars, all of which have been of invaluable aid in the development of my research. Last but not least I want to express my gratitude to my partner, parents and friends whose patience, care and faith in me provided the much necessary support in those times when the feeling of being alienated form oneself, others, one s product i.e. this research and the world in general threatened to consume. I can say without hesitation that others are needed to find one s belonging. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... 2 INTRODUCTION... 4 I PROLOGUE G. W. F. Hegel Lord-Bondsman Relation: Rise of Alienation Ludwig Feuerbach and a First Reaction to Hegel II KARL MARX: SOCIAL ALIENATION Marx and Hegelian Thought Ludwig Feuerbach s Influences on Marx Marx s Dialectical Method The Nature of Man Theory of Alienation Explicit Discussion of Alienation Capitalist Society: Hotbed of Alienation Overcoming Alienation: Revolution III EXISTENTIALISM: SELF-ALIENATION Søren Aabye Kierkegaard Nature of Man: The Self Appearance of Alienation: Despair Overcoming Alienation: Leap to Faith Martin Heidegger Nature of Man: Dasein Appearance of Alienation Falling Homelessness Overcoming Inauthenticity or Alienation IV HANNAH ARENDT: LOVE OF THE WORLD Nature of Man: Human Condition Appearance of Alienation: Rise of the Social Overcoming Alienation: Love of the World CONCLUSION KOKKUVÕTE REFERENCES

4 INTRODUCTION Background and Aim The notion of belonging could surely be traced to the beginning of human history ancient myths and the Old Testament. Adam and Eve are nothing other than expressions of man s need for belonging, a need that has faithfully accompanied human society throughout its development. Likewise, the question of self-realization has been an ideal within state creation from ancient philosophy on, consider Plato s Kallipolis in which citizens all are engaged with the work most suitable to them. Yet, whilst idealistic political philosophy has been confined to thought and never been truly brought to life, so the relation between social order and self-fulfilment remains a topic of necessary investigation. Just as both the need to belong somewhere and self-realization are issues explicitly discussed prior to modernity, so too should the notion of alienation be treated as timeless. And while this research limits itself to the thread of theory following from Hegel s introduction of the term, one should bear in mind that these are neither questions new to humanity, nor exclusive to the thinkers discussed here, but are as timeless as the phenomena that they seek to address. Adapted from Hegel s social philosophy, the concept of alienation first coalesces in Marx s critique, as an inevitable part of capitalist society s production process, by which the worker is considered to have lost (all) the qualities necessary for a self-fulfilling existence. The term alienation itself appears explicitly only in the writings of the young Marx, and the presence of the notion in his mature work remains the subject of scholarly debate. Yet both concept and term resurface in social theory following the Second World War as principally New Left critics such as Marcuse, Fromm and Bauman employ it in differing ways to explain the disturbing developments of (liberal) capitalist society following the war. Furthermore, their contemporaries within sociology also adapted the term to explain the changes taking place under modernity. The continuing and constant development of society, however, forced a further adaptation of the term and the creation of complex terminology predicated upon an attempt to explain occurrences ever more specific and ever further from its origins. 4

5 In contrast to the sociological development, Existentialism develops the analysis of alienation along individualistic lines. Rather than considering social conditions as the determining force of man s alienation, for existentialists the phenomenon is understood as a psychological malaise that may, but need not, be related to modernity. Of particular note within the existential treatment of the concept, more in line with its Hegelian origins than the Marxist social treatments, is that this state is often considered by existentialists to be an essential part of the human condition. (Sayers, 2011, p. 2) This great variation of analysis, both of use and connotation, has led to a situation where the term alienation has been considered best left aside. Instead ever more specific terms are used to explain developments in the modern era and the word alienation is relegated only to research explicitly upon existentialist or Marxist writings even in which there is no consensus of interpretation. According to the position forwarded in this thesis there are two grave mistakes on display in this tendency: firstly to fragment the concept of alienation and secondly, as a result of difficulties arising from the initial mistake, to push the concept of alienation aside entirely. Rather it is necessary to recognise that alienation is both a topic fundamental to social discussion and that it is one with a unified and essential nature regardless of the variety of approaches toward analysis of that nature. With these developments in mind, the current thesis has two aims. First, the thesis attempts to re-evaluate the concept of alienation and its importance in the discussion of modern social relations. Secondly, the thesis attempts to trace the essence of alienation from its roots and through its developments, to show that whether explicitly discussed or not, alienation is an outcome of human behaviour that can occur whenever criteria of selfrealization are not met. With regard to this second goal this research aims first to identify the core characteristics of the notions of alienation and secondly to shed light upon why it is so important that the phenomenon was identified in the first place. The list of thinkers under review, and of their treatments of alienation, is hardly an exhaustive one, but follows one specific line of interpreting Hegel, to whom both the Existentialists and Marx can be seen to be replying the former arguing that alienation is an essential aspect of man s existence, whilst the latter asserts it to be socially determined. 5

6 These discussions come together with Arendt, who in contrast to her predecessors is convinced that there is a way out from alienation returning the discussion of alienation to the manner in which Hegel began with a positive attitude towards human kind. But where, for Hegel, belonging has been reached through development, for Arendt the possibility has always been there. Although the subject of this thesis is not as such a comparison between Hegel and his predecessors a brief discussion of Hegel precedes the main analysis to illuminate this relationship. An analysis of alienation is of course nothing new, but these have tended to concentrate either upon existentialist or social approaches to alienation (Stewart, 2010), or upon specific discussions of particular authors (Broudi, 1971; Ollman, 1976). Even where both approaches have been considered together (Pappenheim, 1959; Schacht, 1971) the tendency has been to reduce one to the other, rather than identify common denominators between the two whilst allowing that they are nonetheless distinct approaches. Furthermore, none of these surveys has properly recognised the contribution of Hannah Arendt and her introduction of the notion of love towards the world to the line of discussion of which the thinkers considered here are a part. This thesis, thus, attempts to address both these gaps. Argument The thesis shall argue that the notion of alienation, whether appearing in social relations or considered as an individual malaise, is not a phenomenon that occurs because of external and unknown reasons, but in contrast, is a malformation of man s need to belong. Through historical analysis the aim is to investigate two assumptions: a. Authors who are explicitly arguing for the phenomena of alienation consider this to be a negative feeling or state of man. If so, then man must have a corresponding positive state - this is surely related to belonging. b. That positive state, i.e. feeling of belonging, is bound to man s self-realization, whilst the feeling of alienation is connected to man s inability to fully realize oneself. 6

7 In order to affirm the relation of alienation and belonging, three questions are posed to all the thinkers under investigation: 1. What is human nature and, how should self-realization thus be achieved? 2. What are the social and/or personal conditions that lead to alienation and how are the characteristics of alienation presented? 3. Whether and how it is possible to overcome alienation? Structure A brief summary of the contents of each section follow: Prologue In the prologue Hegel s discussion of the lord-bondsman relationship that leads to an alienated self is addressed. Hegel s discussion of the lord-bondsman relationship can be seen as the origin of the concept of alienation, and so the approaches to that concept considered within this thesis can be seen in some manner as responses to Hegel. In a similar manner and of similar import, this section also discusses Hegel s dialectical method and historical understanding of the nature of the human being, as well as a first response to and criticism of Hegel from Feuerbach. The Main Argument The thesis proper is divided into three principal chapters, examining the most influential replies to Hegel and corresponding to the historical development of the concept of alienation according to three approaches: social alienation, self-alienation and love of the world. Chapter 1: Marx and Social Alienation The first chapter discusses Karl Marx s reaction to Hegel s philosophy in the form of his critique of the capitalist economic system and the distorted development of human nature that such a greed driven and commodity fetishizing society begets. Whilst Marx endorses and adopts Hegel s dialectical approach and concern for alienation, following Feuerbach s criticism he regards Hegel s discussion as too abstract and thus reconceives the concept within the context of his own materialist analysis. In the context of Marx s work the term alienation (Entfremdung) thus refers to social alienation, man alienated from his product, a state that is determined by social conditions. Despite its social origins, however, the 7

8 concept of alienation within Marx is bound to one s inability to realize oneself through (creative) work essential for engagement with world and other men. This chapter also addresses the disappearance of explicit discussion of alienation within Marx s mature work, suggesting that despite this lacuna, the concept remains an essential one, whether explicit or implicit, throughout the body of his work. Chapter 2: Existentialism and Self-Alienation The two thinkers discussed in Chapter 2 conceive of alienation in a manner superficially at least in strong contrast to that of Marx. These existentialist readings of alienation as selfalienation can further be distinguished by Kierkegaard s religious reading and Heidegger s ontological one. As opposed to Marx s understanding of alienation as socially determined, for both of these thinkers, alienation is a result of the general human condition, in which one is driven from or prevented from reaching one s authentic stage of being in everyday life. Søren Kierkegaard s analysis provides a religious approach to self-alienation, in which the concept of despair (Fortvivlelse) represents the struggle of man to become himself. The phenomenon of despair, the inauthentic state of man, is equivalent to alienation. On Kierkegaard s analysis man has lost his faith, ruling out the possibility to become one with God: although one may be able to carry on everyday life, the feeling of despair remains. Nevertheless, the proof for faith is truly personal and so no one is able to mediate relations with God, rather everyone must take the difficult decisions to prove ones faith alone. With such enormous responsibility on their shoulders, it is understandable that men are consumed by anxiety (Angest): for though every act is free, every act should answer to God. Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, conceives self-alienation as ontological. Man (Dasein), who is being-in-the-world (in-der-welt-sein), is with everyday appearance inauthentic. Man is determined to seek his true being, but it rarely appears. Nevertheless, man is subject to different moods and future possibilities, principal amongst which is a universal dread concerning being-towards-death (sein-zum-tode). Furthermore, other people, the They (das Man) cause man s fall and stuckness in the world inauthentic being. Heidegger s alienation, therefore, must be understood through the concepts of falling (Verfall) and homelessness (Unheimlich), which represent the feeling of not belonging. The overcoming of this state, authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), is possible only in 8

9 solitude, removed from others, and is realised in the feeling of anxiety (Angst) arising from the realization that one does not feel at home in the world. True being can be found only in language, mediated by the world, and does not provide a stable state, but can be experienced only for short period of time. Chapter 3: Arendt and Love of the World. Whilst adopting aspects of Heidegger s analysis, Hannah Arendt s concept of alienation differs notably from her existentialist predecessors. In common with Marx, Arendt argues that it is modernity (or some aspect of it) that engenders alienation, to which she adds also an optimism reminiscent of Hegel. Yet, she is convinced that world-alienation is the hallmark of the modern era. In sharp contrast to the existentialists, in Arendt s understanding men are originally driven by love of the world and thus it is impossible that the state of alienation could be a permanent one. So, although Arendt follows Heidegger in assigning language a crucial role, she presents it as a necessary tool for belonging to society discourse creates the realm of self-realization emphasizing the creative nature that men have as the possibility for a new beginning and so rejecting Heidegger s view of an individual struggle to authenticity. Methodological notes Concepts The core terms and notions within the thesis belonging, alienation, human nature and self-realization are not used in the general text to explicitly refer to certain thinkers. Instead, as the aim of current thesis is to shed light upon the nature of these concepts, these words should be taken as umbrella terms, the specific nature of which shall be discussed throughout the analysis. Concepts particular to certain thinkers, however, follow the common usage in reference to that thinker. The terms belonging and alienation, used by the author, stand in this text for active processes, which occur continuously. Neither alienation nor belonging are finite or stable states, but rather both persist only through constant effort or involvement. Corresponding to these two active stages are their two outcomes: lasting and abiding states from which there is no turning back. Corresponding to alienation, which stands for active struggle or resistance, is the end state estrangement. Corresponding to belonging, which stands for active engagement, is a realised (hermetic) end state. 9

10 This thesis does not, therefore, follow the common usage of the terms alienation and estrangement as interchangeable. However, the words estrangement and alienation may appear as synonyms in those quotations in which the translator has not made the same systematic distinction between the two 1 terms as is made in the body of this thesis. 1 The analysis uses T.B.Bottomore s translation of Karl Marx s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 where the translator has: translated both Entäusserung and Entfremdung as alienation (or sometimes as estrangement ) since Marx indicates no systematic distinction between them. (Bottomore, 2004, p. 74) 10

11 I PROLOGUE Even whilst the principal topic of this research is the development of the concept of alienation from Marx through existentialism to Arendt, such discussion cannot begin without first addressing the influence of Hegelian thought upon the philosophical tradition. For it is in Hegel that the notion of alienation first appears and it is as a response to this that the accounts of all four thinkers under consideration can be framed. 1. G. W. F. Hegel Perhaps most directly relevant of all Hegel s thought to the subsequent tradition of alienation is his discussion of the lord-bondsman relationship. As with all of his thought, however, this examination is framed within the two core concepts of Hegel s philosophical methodology both of which play significant roles in the post-hegelian discussion in their own rights. First of the methodological principles, is Hegel s conception of man s being as historical being: one who is conscious about one s past and open to the future. As such, man does not live in isolation, but is surrounded with others and is determined by the social order: The concrete person, who as particular is an end to himself, is a totality of wants and a mixture of necessity and caprice. As such he is one of the principles of the civic community. But the particular person is essentially connected with others. (Hegel, 2001b, p. 154) From this first principle, the understanding emerges that one is not determined by nature, but rather, one s actual surroundings are a significant influence upon one s development. That is to say, man is a social being. The second principle is Hegel s dialectical method, which forms the framework for several of his works: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, the Philosophy of Spirit and Phenomenology of Spirit, and by which Hegel systematically explains all forms of reality. The dialectical method is conceived as the investigation of development across three stages abstract-negative-concrete based upon a notion of development (movement) towards the absolute. The starting point of this movement and any application of the dialectical method is an abstract one not experience subsequently, in becoming absolute one has to go through mediation and a negative state. As Forster explains: 11

12 It is a method of exposition in which each category in turn is shown to be implicitly self-contradictory and to develop necessarily into the next (thus forming a continuously connected hierarchical series culminating in an all-embracing category that Hegel calls the Absolute Idea). (Forster, 1993, p. 132) This sheds light also upon another key term in Hegel s thought sublation which represents an important aspect of this movement: becoming absolute demands negation of negation. Sublation likewise illustrates the important role that existence in plurality plays in the dialectical process, i.e. one has to have an other to reflect upon. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. (Hegel, 1974, p. 69) One through negation becomes the other, the absolute state combines these both. Hegel s dialectical method as such provides an account of man as a transcendent being who, to reach the absolute, must go through change and it is this same view that applies to the whole of human history, for as Hegel states in The Philosophy of History The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness to Freedom. (Hegel, 2001, p. 33) 1.1 Lord-Bondsman Relation: Rise of Alienation Hegel s discussion of the (land)lord-bondsman relationship 2, (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) is often discussed in the context of its usage in passages in Phenomenology of Mind, where it has an illustrative meaning in explaining selfconsciousness s struggle to reach freedom. Using these passages as a key to the core of this very specific relation is, however, slightly misleading. Hegel s more common usage of relations in the feudal era, within which the lord-bondsman relationship is an aspect, is to explain the historical development of society in its usage within the analysis of selfconsciousness it is thus torn out from this more common framework. For Hegel, however, social and spiritual realms are closely related, in the context of which the example of lord and bondsman relationship is able to serve the two purposes at once. On one hand, the example presents the self s inner struggle between I and the other selfconsciousness becoming self-conscious through the relationship with an external other, as 2 There has been a continuously mistranslating: it should be (land)lord and bondsman and not master and slave. [ ] It is indeed the lord/serf or lord/bondsman dialectic, and these feudal terms confirm Hegel s interest in feudal forms of possession in the Phenomenology of Spirit. (Cole, 2004, p. 581) 12

13 Hegel explains: Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized. (Hegel, 1974, p. 70) On the other hand, Hegel s broader social ambitions are on display, as he seeks to present the relations between men in different social orders and to explain their development towards freedom. The lord-bondsman relationship thus provides a dialectical approach toward both the development of self the development of mind towards absolute knowledge and world history from orderless state to liberalism. Self-consciousness reaches its goal with three developmental stages: a. Immediate self-consciousness: The object of I s self-consciousness is only I, not yet I=I. In other words, individual self-consciousness is simply identical with itself, and at the same time is related to an external object. Hence it is free only for us, not for itself, is not yet aware of its freedom, and has only basis of freedom in itself, but not genuinely actual freedom. (Hegel, 2010, p ) b. Recognizant self-consciousness: objective I acquires the determination of another I. Thus the relationship arises of one self-consciousness to another selfconsciousness. c. Universal self-consciousness: otherness of selves confronting each other sublates itself and these become identical with each other. (Hegel, 2010, p. 154) When the same developmental scheme is applied to the social order, the following occurs: a. State of Nature: driven predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings. (Hegel, 2001, p. 56) b. Feudal state order: It is a long period of division, fragmentation and alienation, but even this state is not purely negative, as for and through this process individuality, subjectivity and freedom grow and develop. (Sayers, 2011, p. 4) c. Liberal (i.e. capitalist) state: the free and self-conscious individual at last finds reconciliation with the natural and social world. As Singer points out, this is both self and social development conceived in the best tradition of love-hate relationships, with desire at its heart. (Singer, 2001, p. 76) In Hegel s words: The unity [of self-consciousness with itself] becomes essential to selfconsciousness as self-consciousness is in the state of Desire. (Hegel, 1974, p. 65) This lends the relationship something of an obsessive quality, as MacIntrye further explains: 13

14 The relationship of master to serf or bondsman is one of unfreedom and domination, but yet a relationship that generates freedom. It is a relationship of oppression, but one that generates equality. For in a despotic society all men are equal, equal before their master, equal in their dependence upon him. But the master too is dependent, dependent on his serfs. This dependence forces him to recognize them as beings, on whom he is dependent, as beings with a life of their own. Hence the logic of slavery is such that it leads from the estrangement of men to their mutual recognition. History is a path from un-freedom to freedom. (MacIntyre, 1953, p. 12) It is this lord-bondsman relationship that serves as the basis for Marx s class divided capitalist society model, in which the worker s relationship to the factory owner recalls the bondsman s relation to his feudal landlord, i.e. it is a dependence, according to which the bondsman is just a means for production, in Marx analysis, or protection, as in the feudal society. From this oppressive relation, both in Hegel and Marx, the notion of alienation rises. Whilst similar concepts are used prior to Hegel, it is with him that the concept as discussed here first appears. For Hegel, the history of man was equivalent to the process of man s alienation, whilst individual alienation, which can be seen as an adaptation of Christian doctrine 3, may be considered as the inevitable process of Spirit s (Geist) growth. This development may, furthermore, occur in both theoretical and practical spheres (Sayers, 2011, p. 3), and it is on account of this dual nature that discussion of both self and societies development may be seen to be haunted by alienation. Alienation qua Hegel is a process internal to human beings and which can be associated with Spirit s dualistic being. On the one hand, Spirit has in itself a capacity or potentiality by which it strives to self-realization. On the other hand, Spirit is enchanted by consciousness and will, and thus, aims to realize itself in merely natural life. Hence, the self is constantly determined by inner struggle. As stated in The Philosophy of History: What Spirit really strives for is the realization of its Ideal being; but in doing so, it hides 3 What Hegel has done in forming these concepts is to take over certain aspects of Christian doctrine. St. Paul speaks of men being alienated in their thinking, and Hegel concentrates on this feature of man's condition as a fallen being rather than on other aspects of the fall. To be at one with one's self and other men is, in biblical terms, part of that atonement which Jesus brought. (MacIntyre, 1953, p. 9) 14

15 that goal from its own vision, and is proud and well satisfied in this alienation from it. (Hegel, 2001a, p. 71) Hegel s concept of alienation is, thus, based upon a distinction between essence and existence, more specifically, on the fact that man s existence is alienated from his essence, so that man in reality is not the same as his potentiality would allow him to be. In Erich Fromm s words: He is not what he ought to be, and ought to be that which he could be. (Fromm, 2004, p. 39) Spirits (inner) struggle and development to pure self-realization is further divided into three processes: alienation, objectification and coming to one s own 4. And, since the self is determined to reach self-fulfilment, progression through the three-staged process is inevitable. All three phases have characteristics that cannot be mistaken, and none can be skipped or simulated. Self-estrangement or alienation indicates man s fallen state, in which men are in conflict with themselves and their fellows. Division is seen both within man s thought and in the conflicts between man and man. One does not obey the moral laws that he has made himself: the moral law is set over against him and is external to him. As a result of his failure, alongside his inability to live up to the social standards he himself makes, he has bad conscience. Society, although created by individual men, is seen in opposition to him. Society, just as law, is external. Objectification is the externalization of what man has produced. The term refers specifically to external objects which are in fact part of man s own being, the false treatment of people and social institutions as things. This reification of the human world is a symptom of the estrangement of object and subject. Coming to one s own or appropriation is the process of overcoming one s selfestrangement, which starts when one recognizes that one is alienated, i.e. a stranger to the world that one has created, and continues along the path back to self-knowledge and to being at one with oneself: i.e. appropriation. 4 This analysis follows the terms that Alasdair MacIntyre has taken over from George Lukasc`s to explain the phenomenon. (MacIntyre, 1953, p. 7) 15

16 Hegel s understanding of these developments is of a positive character: it is simply an illustration of the process that Spirit has to go through to become a whole to be fully realized and at the process end to be at home with itself. (Sayers, 2011, p. 5) [B]ut what Spirit is it has always been essentially; distinctions are only the development of this essential nature. The life of ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments. (Hegel, 2001a, p. 96) In emphasising the importance of the role of society i.e. man s socially determined nature, Hegel s suggestion seems to be that social relations and institutions do necessarily create limitations and restrict freedom, but nonetheless cultivate the qualities necessary to overcoming alienation. In fact, one can reach self-realization only by participating in the social world. The self has a developmental nature that is both social and historical. It is in regards to this nature that human history is considered to be subject to the same progressive development after losing its immediate harmony by breaking down the poleis and being long troubled by fragmentation and alienation, in the modern liberal state, humanity has finally overcome alienation and finally found appropriation in both natural and social worlds. (Sayers, 2011, p. 4) It is in light of this development that Hegel considers the German Empire to be the spirit of the world in its absolute state, where spirit has reconciled with objectivity to create a world of established reality. (Hegel, 2001b, p. 270) By means of it objective truth is reconciled with freedom, and that, too, inside of self-consciousness and subjectivity. This new basis, infinite and yet positive, it has been charged upon the northern principle of the Germanic nations to bring to completion. (Hegel, 2001b, p. 271) Though Hegel was well aware of the development of his contemporary society into capitalism, which he considered to provide the possibilities for liberalism to come into being and was well capable of critique towards it, he did not indicate that these developments indicated anything other than that society s appropriation had been achieved. The aspects of his contemporary society that Hegel critiqued were, in his eyes, merely abnormalities. This idealistic view towards society, however, both Marx and the existentialists, in different ways, will pick up and reject, as will be shown in the following chapters. 16

17 Overall, Hegel s attempt to overcome the Enlightenment idea of man being whole, introduces the crucial notion that men are affected by social order. Furthermore, the only possibility to reach self-realisation, i.e. freedom, is to overcome the other (either abstract I or actual person) and not be oppressed by one s own creation, society, but rather the converse to become one with it. Thus two different processes of alienation are introduced: social alienation from one s own created society and spiritual alienation from oneself. And whilst Hegel s own positive assessment of society s completion of this process may have later been rejected as premature, by introduction of the two processes he set the stage for those who followed to more thoroughly investigate the relationship between man and society. 1.2 Ludwig Feuerbach and a First Reaction to Hegel Although Hegel s discourse changing thought was of enormous influence, even amidst his students and followers there was dissent and disagreement with the values that he presented. One of the first, and within the context of this research, most influential responses came from his student, Ludwig Feuerbach. Unconvinced by Hegel s idealism concerning the absolute stage of being, Feuerbach declared this to be a fatal misinterpretation, overlooking as it does the specific character of culture, religion, etc. Hence, Feuerbach s thinking is driven by the same idea that Marx is to later express Hegel s abstract theory must be applied to the world. As he states, introducing the grounds of his research: [T]he Idea is to me only faith in the historical future, in the triumph of truth and virtue; it has for me only a political and moral significance; for in the sphere of strictly theoretical philosophy, I attach myself, in direct opposition to the Hegelian philosophy, only to realism. (Feuerbach, 2008, p. xiv) Highly critical of Hegel s attempt to reduce man s essence to self-consciousness, Feuerbach takes his goal to be to connect philosophical idealism and religion. Hegel is a realist, Feuerbach states, but an abstract realist, who has no intention to capture things in reality but only in the thought of the thing, to be outside of thought, but still remain within thought it is here that the difficulty lies in grasping Hegel s concept A being that only thinks and thinks abstractly, has no idea at all of what being, existence, and reality are. Thought is bounded by being, being qua being is not an 17

18 object of philosophy, at least not of abstract and absolute philosophy. Speculative philosophy itself expresses this indirectly in so far as it equates being with nonbeing, that is, nothing. But nothing cannot be an object of thought. (Feuerbach, 1843, para. 26) There is no excuse for using theoretical language to explain practical things, such as the question of being, thus Feuerbach struggles to establish a practical standpoint from which to deal with these matters. Being cannot be reliant upon verbal or logical matters, but always real, non-verbal ones. That is to say, one can owe one s existence to actual bread but not to abstract bread i.e. if being is grounded in actual things, then it can be only an actual thing in itself. Feuerbach, thus, emphasizes the purely biological nature of being and argues that essence and being cannot be separated in a natural way. He illustrates this thought with the example of fish s being as it s being in water, and states, referring to Hegel, that being cannot be separated from things, as it is one with these. Essence and being are one, and you cannot postulate being as simply self-identical, distinct from essence that varies. (Feuerbach, 1843, para. 27) Feuerbach replaces the vague abstract reason of man with the concrete reasoning of man: Hegel s abstract subject and object are replaced with concrete I and Thou. In addition he emphasizes the role of social relations and the engagement that the thinker has with her surroundings. Thus, he argues, firstly, every thought is a representation of the world outside from the thinker itself. And secondly, all of these thoughts interact with each other and these interactions represent communication between men. The true dialectic is nowise a dialogue of the solitary thinker with himself, it is a dialogue between the I and the Thou. Man, then, is a material being. Man is what he eats. But equally, man is formed by his relations with other men. (MacIntyre, 1953, p. 25) Feuerbach argues further, that existence precedes man s thought which must be encountered by experience, before it can become the matter of one s thought. The Hegelian unity of subject and object is simply man as subject apprehending the world as object. The world as object includes other subjects. The I encounters the 18

19 Thou. From the subjective point of view this is a spiritual encounter, from the objective a material. (MacIntyre, 1953, p ) As Feuerbach saw his goal to be to re-establish God, in the light of previous critique, God could clearly have nothing else than the qualities of a real entity, even if just ideated entity as set up in man s thoughts, which as a non-sensuous entity is at the same time a sensuous being, and which as a theoretical object is at the same time a practical object. The existence of this being, God, Feuerbach explains as follows: What is the highest, the One, is known equally through non-cognition and ignorance like that which is the lowest matter. This means that being that is only ideated and abstract, that is, only non-sensuous and super-sensuous, is at the same time a sensuous and really existing being. (Feuerbach, 1843, para. 29) Hence, Feuerbach is arguing that: as men start to worship God as something external to them, they enter the path of alienation by mistakenly presenting God to have features and powers that are actually in themselves. Rather, man s notion of himself should be identical to his notion of God what God is to man that is man s own spirit, man s own soul; what is man s spirit, soul, and heart: that is his God. (Feuerbach, 2008, p ) In this light, Christianity is nothing but a means to alienation from human essence. The question remains, however, whether Feuerbach could be accused of using the same method to build his arguments that he accuses Hegel of. Although his aim is to bring discussion from vague abstraction to reality, from theory to practice, Feuerbach fails to maintain the criteria that he himself sets. Indeed, despite the contra-hegelian intention to bring the discussion down to earth, stating that essence and nature cannot be separated and the question of one s being is an actual question, the manner in which Feuerbach answers these questions remains purely theoretical. It makes little difference, whether the things theorized about are abstract or real, so long as the problems arising are intended to be solved by mere theory, no actual difference is made. The conclusion of Karl Marx s Thesis on Feuerbach is thus, no surprise: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. (Marx, 1978, p. 145) 19

20 II KARL MARX: SOCIAL ALIENATION As stated in the preceding sections, the investigation of the development of the concept of alienation (Entfremdung) in this thesis is motivated by the importance of the framework through which the term has been introduced and developed as important as the concept itself. As was discussed in the previous section, Hegel s dialectics forms the starting point for the discussion of alienation as presently considered and so the discussions of alienation which appear subsequently, in some sense, all answer to or critique Hegel s position. The earliest of those under review, and perhaps the most influential of all, is Karl Marx s dialectical materialism, through which the theory of alienated labour is introduced. 1. Marx and Hegelian Thought Hegel s work, especially his social philosophy, was one of the primary influences upon Karl Marx and the development of his theory of class struggle driven capitalist society. Hegel s rejection of atomistic Enlightenment, his understanding that man s essence is predetermined and his notion of Spirit s social and historical being is continued in Marx s work. A youthful fascination with Hegel, though giving ground to Marx s mature thought and growing scepticism towards the young Hegelians of his period, cannot be overlooked nor underestimated as a central theme within Marx thought. Indeed, despite his numerous attempts to shrug off a Hegelian influence, specifically the aspects of Hegel s thought intended to embody the positive content of Christianity, Marx s efforts were doomed to failure. Marx remained Hegelian to the last; his development was rather embedded in the recognition that philosophy is not enough to bring change to light, that Hegel s theory was only valuable if converted into practice. Despite Marx s numerous attempts to put Hegel s theory into practice, his work still fails to shed light upon the essence of original notions. Furthermore, obvious discrepancies appear as soon as the two are juxtaposed Hegel s attitude towards his contemporary society was positive, believing change to be possible, whilst Marx identified the on-going oppression that capitalism begets. Mere similarity in word usage unfortunately does not lead directly to an understanding of Marx through Hegel or vice versa Marx may rely on his predecessors terminology, but he adapts those with a number of new definitions. 20

21 Marx s debt to Hegel is most evident in two particular features of his investigation, his focus upon the historical nature of man and his method of investigation i.e. the dialectical method, both borrowed from Hegel and, as Bertell Ollman suggests (Ollman, 1976, p. 66), both core concepts of Marx s thinking. But, with the aim to adapt Hegel s abstract thinking to the real world, Marx s explanation places emphasis upon the social relations of modernity and the relations within the society that he lived in. 1.1 Ludwig Feuerbach s Influences on Marx Although the largest influence upon Marx s thought is often considered to be Hegel, the Young Hegelian movement of his contemporaries in Germany should not be overlooked. As an active critic of his contemporaries it would be difficult to claim that Marx was entirely free of their influence and as such some commentators have argued that rather than Hegel s vocabulary that Marx adapts for his aims, it is from the neo-hegelians, Feuerbach in particular, that he borrows: Feuerbach was both witness to and actor in the crisis in the theoretical development of the Young Hegelian movement. [ ] [T]his reveals the extent to which Marx s early works are impregnated with Feuerbach s thought. Not only is Marx s terminology from 1842 and 1845 Feuerbachian (alienation, species being, total being, invention of subject and predicate, etc.) but, what is probably more important, so is the basic philosophical problematic. [...] Naturally, Marx s themes go beyond Feuerbach s immediate preoccupations, but the theoretical schemata and problematic are the same. (Althusser, 1999, p. 45) In fact, it is not just the vocabulary that can be found to be remarkably similar, Althusser was also convinced that a comparison of Feuerbach s Manifestos and Marx s early works would show that within a two or three year period Marx not only espoused Feuerbach s problematic, but profoundly identified himself with it. (Althusser, 1999, p. 46) Regardless of Althusser s radical critique that Marx impudently assimilated Feuerbach s concepts and the fact that both Marx and Engels were highly critical of him, Feuerbach can certainly be seen as a bridge between Hegel and Marx. Feuerbach himself began as a Hegelian, before his development into Left Hegelianism, and turning finally to be a materialist or more specifically a humanist. Thus, the Hegelian terms that he picked up early in his career undergo tremendous development within his own 21

22 work. The goal throughout this development was to secularize a Christian understanding through the realm of history. He outlined his own intellectual history in the aphorism: God was my first thought; reason, my second; and man, my third and last. (Vondey, 2004, p. xiv) Feuerbach s development, as such, can be seen to offer a model for Marx s response to Hegel along two lines: first for his atheism and second and most profoundly as a significant influence upon the development of dialectical materialism. 1.2 Marx s Dialectical Method Although Marx adopts the Hegelian method of inquiry, he is unsatisfied with the theory resulting from his predecessor s application of that method, colourfully suggesting that Hegel was standing on his head when he argued that the interconnections he sees in the material world are mere copies of relations existing between ideas. Marx s claim was thus to correct the errors of his predecessor through his own dialectic. And while the vocabulary of dialectic and its modes of expression (e.g moment, movement, contradiction, mediation, determination, etc.) are a preference of his early writings, neither the notion of development nor the concern for existing relations disappears from Marx s mature writing. (Ollman, 1976, p. 52) Rather it develops into a complex investigation of relationships between entity, itself and other entities. That is to say, Marx s dialectic provides the possibility to follow man s development throughout time (past-presentfuture), whilst also showing his growth in, with, and through other things. The dialectical method of inquiry is best described as research into the manifold way in which entities are internally related. It is a voyage of exploration that has the whole world for its objects, but a world which is conceived of as relationally contained in each if its parts. (Ollman, 1976, p. 61) The aim of Marx s research was to bring to light the essential connections or relations of capitalism and, whilst never able to completely escape abstraction, this was done to provide tools for the bigger picture, i.e. the reconstruction of society. Fundamental to this aim, was thus Marx s attempt to provide an explanation of modernity (capitalist society) through the clarification of its relationships and the presentation of its mirror image. For Marx, reality is created by relations - not by the objects themselves as he states in The German Ideology: 22

23 The fact is that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. [ ] The social structures and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, of those individuals as they actually are, as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits. (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 41) Hegel s three-part process of the dialectical method, therefore, supplied Marx with a powerful tool, but only in relation to his primary aim: to explain real world relations. At the same time, however, he is rigorously trying to avoid explanation through superfluous abstractions. He does so by examining the development of relations in the society which have and will occur. Whereas Hegel`s aim was to explain the development of truth as the product of Spiritoriginated history, Marx emphasizes that history is the product of class-struggle driven society and that history must therefore be seen as having materialistic origins. And, although Marx himself never explains the method as such, it is this view which gives rise to the concept: dialectical materialism. 5 Whilst the total of Marx s work could be characterized as an exercise of dialectical materialism, however, the aim of this chapter is not to give an exhaustive overview of Marx s critique of capitalism, but rather to concentrate on the particular notion of alienation that Marx explores within that broader context. Furthermore, this chapter aims to show that with the introduction of man s species being, alienated relations and Marx s positive approach to overcoming this oppression the concept of alienation, whilst discussed in full depth only in his early works, should be a key element for any further understanding of Marx s attitude towards the modern economic system. Nonetheless, as the only text in which Marx explicitly discusses the concept, the core text of any analysis of alienation within Marx must be The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of The Nature of Man In addition to the influence upon his dialectical method, Marx s concept of man according to which he argues that the self is a social and historical creation is also 5 Marx never uses the term historical materialism or dialectic materialism ; he did speak of his own dialectical method in contrast with that of Hegel and if its materialistic basis, by which he simply referred to fundamental conditions of human existence. (Fromm, 2004, p. 9) Furthermore, the term was explicitly used by Marx s contemporaries, Engels included, but never Marx himself, so describing his position by reference to this term is slightly misleading. 23

24 directly inherited from Hegel. Furthermore, following Hegel and disagreeing with his contemporaries in physiology and sociology, Marx was convinced that man has an essential nature one does not come to life as a tabula rasa and stated that man qua man is a recognizable and ascertainable entity. That is to say, man qua man can be distinguished biologically, anatomically, physiologically and most importantly, psychologically. (Fromm, 2004, p. 23) According to Marx s concept, human nature in general is possessing of certain powers and needs, with the former conceived as functions, but with the inherent possibility of becoming more than it already is. By needs, Marx refers to the desire one feels for something, usually something that is not immediately available. (Ollman, 1976, p. 75) In Marx s usage, need, which is inherent and constant within man, is synonymous with drives and wants, ever-present but which implications, and the intellectual efforts required to satisfy them most efficiently, are seldom realised. These powers and needs, naturally possessed by all, are distinguished by two further categories natural and species. Natural powers and needs are on the one hand, shared by man with all other living entities. Capacities and the want of species, on the other, are unique to man s nature. Natural needs and powers are related to one s immediate physical needs, i.e. the actions that all living creatures undertake in order to stay alive. These are one s animal functions that indicate man s being a living part of nature. These basic needs are not historical phenomena, but are universal and relatively unchanging features of the human condition resulting from our biological conditions. These are universal and trans-historical, relatively unchanging characteristics, in other words: a universal human nature. (Sayers, 1998, p. 151) Although Marx does not present an exhaustive list of man s natural powers, labour, eating, drinking and procreation as he often refers to them man s animal functions (Marx, 2004, p. 82) are examples commonly cited to emphasise the natural as the most basic state of human beings. Such animal needs have two characteristic qualities: firstly, they exist in humans as tendencies and abilities, i.e. as impulses; secondly, the fulfilment of these is found in objects outside one s body. The act of eating, for example could be categorised as an 24