Exploitation and Rational Choice: Transitivity as a Moral Ideal
|
|
- Arthur Garrett
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Exploitation and Rational Choice: Transitivity as a Moral Ideal Loren A. King June 2004 These very brief remarks are a fledgling first attempt to bring together a class of philosophical debates about the foundations of decision and game theory, on the one hand, and a distinctive concern of normative political theory, on the other. I begin with a very general outline of the debate surrounding what we loosely refer to as rational choice approaches in the social sciences. I then lay out again very roughly the beginnings of what I hope may be a plausible normative defense of transitivity, an axiom often presented as integral to rational choice approaches. This line of defense emphasizes how a unifying theme in much political theory the avoidance of exploitation lets us interpret the transitivity axiom in a way that has considerable normative appeal. The term rational choice theory is an informal designation encompassing several related approaches to the study of human behaviour and social phenomena, including (most obviously) game theory, public choice, and positive political economy. What these approaches share, roughly, is a sense that we can best explain social practices and institutions by looking to the motivations of individual agents, and these motivations will generally reflect the needs and preferences broadly speaking, the interests of these agents. Interests needn t be narrowly conceived, but they are, on this view, ultimately grounded in agents themselves, not in the groups they form. Certainly we may sometimes speak of a group having interests, but what we really mean is that group members share some interests in common. And while we may often care deeply about what others think of us, and assess our needs and desires in light of our commitments to family, friends, community, and nation, these are nonetheless our interests, our desires, our aspirations. Some of the more zealous advocates of the rational choice approach have hoped that we can ultimately explain most, perhaps all social outcomes in terms of personal motives, and not the other way around. The individual agent is, on this view, the explanatory primitive in the social sciences. These agents can be described as having coherent preferences over states of the world; they are assumed to be able to order these preferences, and calculate utilities associated with actions and expected consequences; and they can, it is assumed, make informed estimates about the world around them, including the motives and likely actions of other agents. Prepared for presentation to the 2004 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. Comments welcomed. Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA. After July 1st: Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada ( lorenking@alum.mit.edu). 1
2 Critics charge that this individualistic stance, emphasizing preference satisfaction and utility maximization, is too often unrealistic and unhelpful in explaining human behaviour. Our choices are generally made within a tapestry of meanings and associations that give sense to our needs and aspirations, and that condition our beliefs and expectations. That is, our embeddedness in this rich tapestry may shape our beliefs no only about what ends are worth pursuing, but as importantly about likely outcomes in the world around us, and these latter sorts of contextual beliefs may not be satisfactorily described by the axioms and derivations of probability theory central to the decision-theoretic roots of rational choice approaches. Our preferences and judgements are, these critics suspect, irreducibly social and historical, best understood by interpreting the narratives of our lives, rather than by deriving utility functions and calculating core points in games. To imagine that our choices can be understood in terms of complete and transitive orderings over well-defined options, and given degrees of belief about the world is to badly misunderstand what is interesting about human behavior and social phenomena, namely its richly historical and meaningful character. Advocates reply that if our choices do not reflect some underlying coherence to our preferences, and if our beliefs about the world do not reliably conform to the dictates of probability theory, then we are unlikely to be successful in many facets of our lives: we will make self-defeating choices and be vulnerable to exploitation by those who discover our incoherent beliefs and systematic errors in judgement. In an evolutionary setting, our beliefs and strategies for dealing with the world would be of little use to us or anyone else, and so would be unlikely to persist over time. Critics rejoin that the plausibility of our beliefs and attractiveness of choices are not merely functions of strategic encounters among self-interested utility maximizers, but are instead dictated by the norms and traditions that we have been raised into. Our social context determines what beliefs and strategies are desirable, and so the effort to frame explanations in terms of individual desires and degrees of belief about the world inevitably depends upon understanding the social context within which those attributes and expectations were formed, and against which they have meaning for their bearers. And so the argument goes, back and forth, with myriad iterations and variations. My chief interest here, however, is not the explanatory hopes of rational choice advocates (whether they may succeed, say, in using their assumptions and methods to account for apparently self-defeating choices, or seemingly irrational cultural norms; I myself am rather optimistic on this point, but that is another matter). Rather, I am curious about the normative promise of the rational choice approach, although I will focus on a very limited portion of the overarching framework. Even if the complaints levied against rational choice assumptions are damning, we might still find some of the classical rational choice assumptions attractive, if they lead to persuasive claims about how we ought to behave in some, perhaps many situations. What would such claims look like? No doubt the general structure is familiar to most of us. If I assert a desire to achieve some goal, yet then self-consciously act in a way that is obviously contrary to my stated aim, then surely you would have grounds for condemning my actions as irrational. How could matters be otherwise? And yet this simple consistency criterion does not seem to exhaust our intuitive sense of what rationality is. Were you confronted with the situation just described, I suspect you would look for 2
3 factors that give sense to my apparently self-defeating behavior. Perhaps I have misunderstood certain key facts about the world? I am not irrational, but insufficiently nimble of mind, and so in spite of my best efforts my reasoning is mired in error. Or perhaps I am sufficiently informed and able to reason correctly, but my will is extraordinarily weak, due to a drug addiction or some other infirmity of character (acquired or inherited). If so, then I am not an irrational actor but a tragic figure, able to affirm my deepest aspirations and to formulate plausible plans to achieve them, but doomed never to succeed. Or I may be entirely rational, informed, and competent, but you have misunderstood my utterances: I may have spoken metaphorically, and you lack familiarity with the narratives required to make sense of my worldview. Or, finally, it is possible that I was being sarcastic or deceptive, concealing my true desires and intentions, thus making me either obscure or deceitful, but not necessarily irrational. Now in a sense these complications mirror the form of the debate I ve just rehearsed about the explanatory limits of conventional rational choice approaches: rationality is, in our intellectual tradition, bound up with theoretical understanding, as Charles Taylor explains nicely: we have a rational grasp of something when we can articulate it, that means, distinguish and lay out the different features of the matter in perspicuous order (1982, 90). But prevalent rational choice approaches in the social sciences do not seem to capture this richer sense of rationality in their definition, instead referring to preference orderings, utility maximization, and probability distributions that capture our degrees of belief about features of the world that might influence the outcomes associated with our actions. Nowhere in such axiomatic formulations can we find the richly deliberative and dialogical features of how we actually reason through problems in the world we share with others. Or so critics charge. This doesn t seem to me to be a debilitating critique, and indeed much recent work in the social sciences has been sensitive to the richness of rationality, especially how our reasoning reflects, and is importantly constrained by, historically durable norms. Of particular interest is ongoing experimental work in economics and social psychology, combined with theoretical advances in evolutionary game theory. These efforts seem to go some considerable distance in explaining how strategies may persist, even while violating some of the dictates of classical decision and game theory. Consider, for instance, the ultimatum game, in which one player will receive some considerable award, but only on the condition that she successfully negotiate with a second player to receive some share of the award. If the second player refuses the offer, then the award is withdrawn and both players leave empty-handed. The dominant strategy in this game is to offer the other player the smallest possible increment if you are player one, and to accept any positive offer if you are player two. Any other strategy is weakly dominated, in the sense that there is another strategy ( offer the smallest increment possible, accept any positive offer ) that will perform at least as well as alternative strategies. Yet in repeated experiments the dominant strategy is almost never chosen, and when it is adopted by first players, second players will often accept considerable losses to punish what they perceive to be objectionably greedy offers. That is, in experimental settings many players prefer to leave this game empty-handed, rather than let a rational player walk away with the bulk of the prize. In a highly readable review of this experimental literature 3
4 and summary of his own findings, Bryan Skyrms (1996, ch. 2) details a computer simulation of repeated ultimatum exchanges among a population of players adopting a variety of strategies. In such evolutionary models there are reproduction and transmission rules for the players, whereby strategies can be passed on to offspring, or adopted by other players, as a function of their success over time. In several runs of Skyrms s model, weakly dominated fair strategies ( offer somewhere near half the prize if player one, accept only similar offers if player two ) can persist, and indeed prosper, under not-implausible assumptions about the other strategies at play in the population, and the likelihood of fair players encountering each other in repeated exchanges. 1 As tempting as it is to go into more detail about these and other fascinating advances in evolutionary approaches to strategic behavior and collective action, I have slipped from normative to explanatory concerns, and it is the former I really want to explore. Richer formulations of decision and game theory, and especially evolutionary approaches to strategies and norms, do seem to give some real explanatory purchase to the study of strategic behavior and collective action, but they do not seem to have straightforward normative implications. It is one thing, for example, to make the case that weakly dominated fair strategies may persist as viable solutions to certain classes of social interactions. But it is quite another matter to endorse fair strategies as normatively appealing merely by virtue of our being able to explain them in this way to say, that is, that one ought to be fair in these sorts of exchanges just because one can be fair without inevitably facing repeated losses at the hands of more conventionally rational players. More generally, we might plausibly explain violations of rational choice assumptions as reasonable given the historical working of certain selection and transmission mechanisms (evolved psychological responses to risk, punishment norms, formative cultural institutions), but this is not an argument for how things ought to be. To be sure, if we think that ought implies can then we may be pleased to discover that we can in fact do what we ought to do, in spite of violating apparently sensible axioms of rational decision-making, but we still need to argue in favor of that ought claim! So, having laid out this debate in very general terms, the question I now want tentatively to explore is whether one of the axioms in the classical approach to rational choosing might have some normative appeal, without reference to its explanatory utility. To do this, let me sketch in somewhat more detail a small and, for my purposes, especially interesting patch of the intellectual landscape I ve just outlined. Rational choice approaches are grounded in an account of subjective expected utility (SEU), given axiomatic formulations by Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti, John von Neumann and Oskar Mor- 1 To see that fairness is weakly dominated, consider Skyrms s easy rider strategy ( ask for roughly half the award as first player, but accept whatever is offered as second player ). This strategy always yields positive returns against itself and against fair players (in both cases getting half the award as either first or second player), and also against strictly rational players (half of the prize as first player, some small amount as second player). In contrast, fair players do as well as easy rider against both easy rider and other fair players, but when fair players meet rational players, the former only gain half the award as first player, and nothing as second player. Thus easy riders always do at least as well as fair players, and sometimes they do better (for instance, against strictly rational players). A curious strategy that turns out to be important in several of Skyrms s simulations is one he calls mad dog, which demands as much as possible as first player, but also expects the same amount as second player, thus punishing both fair, easygoing, and rational players for their offers! 4
5 ganstern, and Leonard Savage (for an excellent review see Anand 1996, ch. 1). When critics challenge the assumptions of rational choice approaches, it is likely unease with one or more of the axioms of SEU that is lurking behind their complaints. And not without justification: decades of experimental work has revealed that several of these axioms are at best exceedingly poor assumptions about actual human behaviour. Three axioms in particular stand out in the experimental, theoretical, and philosophical literatures on decision theory, economics, and psychology: these are completeness, transitivity, and independence. Completeness requires that, for options a and b, we either prefer a over b, b over a, or are indifferent between the two options. Transitivity requires that if we prefer option a over b and b over c, then we also prefer a over c. Independence admits of several formal definitions, but it is roughly a requirement that our decisions not respond to features of a choice situation that are irrelevant to our preferences. For instance, consider the situation in Table 1, modeled after a famous experiment by Maurice Allais in 1953 (once again, on this experiment, the Ellsberg result reported further below, and other relevant experimental findings, an able survey is Anand 1996, ch. 2). In this table, s 1, s 2, and s 3 are states of the world that will obtain with probabilities 0.01, 0.10 and 0.89 respectively. Given this, we are faced with two sets of two lotteries. In each of the two scenarios, which lottery should we prefer? Table 1 s 1 s 2 s 3 p = 0.01 p = 0.10 p = 0.89 E(L) Lottery A Lottery B Lottery A Lottery B Notice that the choices facing us in the two scenarios offered are essentially the same in terms of expected relative gains: lotteries A and A promise the highest expected return across the three possible states of the world that may obtain, and the only difference between the two sets of lotteries is the overwhelming likelihood (89% odds) that in the first scenario we will come away with $10, and that in the second that we will come away empty-handed. Independence requires that, if we prefer A over B, then we also prefer A over B. I dwell on this third axiom to introduce one of the more interesting early challenges to SEU: in Allais s experiment, many respondents in fact claimed to prefer B over A and A over B. Nor, as both Anand (1996, 75) and Weber (1998) suggest, does this seem to be a ridiculous stance, in 5
6 spite of violating independence: in the first scenario, we might feel especially foolish gambling for a 1/10 shot at $100 and being unlucky enough to hit instead upon the 1/100 chance of winning nothing, this when we are certain to win $10 by playing lottery B instead. In the second scenario, there is no such certainty, so why not take the 1/10 chance, knowing that we are most likely to win nothing anyway? Why is it irrational to be sensitive to guaranteed gains, and also to the frustration (humiliation?) we would feel if, upon foregoing a sure thing, we had a stroke of bad luck and came away with nothing? Nor, for that matter, does it seem unreasonable to be similarly sensitive to profound uncertainty: another early experiment, conducted by Daniel Ellsberg, presented a similar choice situation as the Allais experiment, but for which some of the probabilities were not known by the players. Many of Ellsberg s subjects would violate independence, but apparently out of an aversion to uncertainty, as distinct from risk. (The distinction is due to Frank Knight: risk reflects objective probabilities, such as the outcome of fair coin toss. Uncertainty, in contrast, reflects lack of knowledge about the probabilities involved in a given choice situation.) Later work summarized by Anand (1996, 34-36) seems to confirm this interpretation of Ellsberg s results. 2 What I want to take away from these results is not the point that SEU does not accurately describe choice behavior, but the implied normative puzzle: in some plausible situations, violations of SEU do not seem to warrant the charge of irrationality, because we can tell a story that makes sense of these choices, in terms that we think of as reasonable. And yet they are choices that go against what seems to be a rather objective set of facts about the world: for example, perhaps we do not want to accuse lottery players of being irrational, but do we really want to bequeath the laurel of rationality upon such ridiculously improbable aspirations? Put more generally: on the one hand, would we want a prescriptive theory of choice that counseled us to ignore our preferences for certainty and social acceptance, say, or the simple acts of whimsy and culturally acquired tastes ( but I like the casino it s fun! ) that give our lives their richness? But on the other hand, would we want a prescriptive theory of choice that, while descriptively accurate and thus sensitive to the complexities of our (socially constituted) identities, could nonetheless offer little more by way of counsel than do what seems appropriate, given who you are and how you feel? If we want an expressly normative account of rational choosing, then we may have to forgo some of the descriptive richness that we expect from an explanatory theory of rational choice. Anand (1996, chs. 8-9) offers what seems to me to be a very sensible set of alternative axioms for this purpose, which capture features we intuitively think of as essential to the idea of rationality: for instance, our deliberative faculties that attend to the reasons for and against a course of action, as well as our intentional stance with respect to what we desire. And in place of strong restrictions such as independence and transitivity, Anand offers the weaker requirement of dominance: we ought to choose from the set of options that we definitely prefer over others, however we rank (or fail to rank) the contents of that set. But in making his case, Anand rejects, as without useful normative content, the axiom of transitivity. By way of conclusion, I want to press him on this point, with an eye to perhaps recovering some of the intuitive appeal of this axiom by reexamining one of the 2 Other experimental results, such as the famous preference reversals discovered by David Tversky, point similarly to the psychological vagaries of choice under risk and uncertainty, and suggest that, whatever motivates us in these situations, SEU does not seem to describe our actual choice behavior; yet again, see Anand (1996). 6
7 arguments he rejects, in light of an abiding concern in political theory. Central to Anand s critique of transitivity is the complaint that a transitive ordering is critically sensitive to how we define the objects over which our ranking obtains, and this in turn seems to suggest that the appeal of transitivity as a maxim guiding our evaluations of rationality depends on the space over which we are ranking options. In some cases, preference really might be analogous to, say, length of height: if I prefer more oranges to fewer, then I cannot consistently rank three oranges as preferable to two, two preferable to one, and one preferable to three. This simply violates the definition I have assigned to my preference relation (i.e. more than ). But Anand asks us to consider this relation: plays better than. It is not inconsistent to rank chess players according to whether they play better than their opponents, and yet transitivity would surely not apply to my preference to select the better chess players in the following case: suppose a player who lost out in an early round of a tournament returns to beat a contender in the final. My desire to see this comeback kid crowned tournament champion is surely not irrational, although it seems arguably to violate transitivity. But here is an argument for transitivity as a maxim that I think is more persuasive than others, at the very least for an important range of concerns. In the famous money pump argument, a consumer with intransitive preferences is vulnerable to loss in the following way. Suppose I have the following preferences over three commodities: P ab, P bc, and P ca, where P denotes a binary preference relation over objects a, b, and c. Now as Anand correctly notes, there is nothing on the face of it inconsistent with this set of binary preferences unless we add the further requirement that all of our binary preferences ought to map into consistent ternary or higher relations, i.e. that the set P ab, P bc must entail the a ternary relation T of the following form: T abc. But assuming this is really to assume a form of independence: 3 removing one item from the choice set should not alter our binary preference structures, so that removing b from consideration should leave a binary preference relation P ac, not P ca. But now imagine that I have gone to market with my binary preferences P ab, P bc, and P ca. A clever fellow has observed me for several months, and has inferred my preferences correctly. He now offers to trade me my c for b. I gladly accept. Later, he approaches me elsewhere in the market with another offer: he will trade me my b for an a. Again, I gladly accept. Later still, he again approaches me, this time offering his c for my a. I accept, given my preference for c over a. I am now back where I began, with c. These trades continue over the course the morning, afternoon, and into early evening, when finally I return home, content with my c. The catch? Each of these transactions involved a small fee, which, given my preferences in each case, I was happy to pay. I am at home in the same position I was in that morning, possessing c, but I am now several dollars poorer! Now as Anand notes, we ought not to infer that, because of my binary preferences, I will inevitably enter into the sequence of exchanges just described. More likely, if I am aware of my intransitive preferences, I will simply refuse to enter into the sequence of exchanges described: I will not go to market or, being at the market, I will refuse to enter into the sorts of exchanges just 3 More precisely, it is an assumption of contraction consistency, as Anand (1996, 57) notes; see also Binmore and Voorhoeves (2003, 279 n.12). 7
8 described. But this doesn t seem to me to address the normative implications of the example. Suppose that we do not understand the intransitive form of our preferences over some options. In this case, we are vulnerable to exploitation in just the way suggested by the money pump scenario. Some intriguing work is being done suggesting that, at equilibrium and with no restrictions on market entry, transaction costs will approach zero as enterprising sellers attempt to exploit unwitting bearers of intransitive preferences. 4 But if we concede this point, it seems perverse to deny the conclusion that, without intransitive preferences, we would not have to rely on any such equilibrium result to ensure our financial well-being! Now suppose instead that we did understand the intransitive structure of our preference ordering over the hypothesized options. A similar conclusion seems to follow: certainly we could avoid exploitation by avoiding trades that leave us in the same position vis-a-vis preference satisfaction, yet cost us some positive amount of money (or time, or some other exchangeable good or service we have command over). But the maxim intransitive preferences over options are acceptable so long as you avoid exchanges of these options with transaction costs seems a strange piece of advice to offer a decision-maker in need of guidance. After all, these are still our preferences, and if, upon reflection, we accept them, it seems unhelpful to prescribe that we must not enter into an institution contractual exchange in a market designed to facilitate satisfaction of our desires, guided by our preferences. 5 To be sure, we might, upon reflection, suspect that intransitivity is lurking in a decision problem involving extraordinarily complex and confusing options. Perhaps we cannot find intransitivities in our preference ordering, but we would not be surprised if, upon sorting through the complexities of the decision problem and weighing the subtle costs and benefits of each option, we found intransitivity. But in such cases, concerns about intransitivity seem particularly pronounced in just those cases where the options are being presented to us by someone who stands to benefit from our involvement in the decision at hand. Think, for instance, of confidence schemes that rely on the promise of short-term gains from risky long-term investments in real estate. We might also think that similar tradeoffs between short-term satisfaction and long-term costs are behind the surge in offers of cheap personal credit in the United States. In these and similar cases, the possibility of ex- 4 This remark is based on as-yet-unpublished work by David Laibson (Harvard and National Bureau of Economic Research) and Leaat Yariv (UCLA). 5 Upon reflection, we might, of course, find that our choices suggest intransitive preferences, not by some brute fact of our needs and tastes, but rather because the different options reflect different choice contexts. For example, as Anand suggests, a child might prefer oranges to apples and larger fruit to smaller fruit, and other things being equal, she may prefer an orange to a small apple, but a large apple to a small orange. Yet surely we would not fault her reasoning if, in deference to habits of politeness taught by her parents, she accepted a small over a large apple, if these the only options available. A more difficult case arises when the goods we are ranking are difficult or impossible to compare. Anand presents the example of selecting among policies that seem to demand different evaluative criteria, such as weighing the costs of disease prevention, through either medicine or water management, against differing levels of food production. So there are contexts in which transitivity seems to be symptomatic of the choice situation, and not necessarily our preferences per se. But even in these cases, the maxim accept intransitive outcomes when contexts force them upon you seems to demand further argument, at the very least to explain why the intransitivities in these cases are not problematic, and such arguments will appeal to the constraints themselves for instance, the virtues of upholding politeness as a norm, or the necessity of choosing a policy involving multiple services when some good will come of whatever choice is made, regardless of intransitivity with respect to our preferences over the outcomes associated with particular services. 8
9 ploitation at the hands of another gives normative weight to the concern that transitivity may make us vulnerable to costs that, upon sufficient information and reflection, we would rather not bear. This is not to say that such tradeoffs will necessarily reveal intransitive preferences. For instance, I agree with Binmore and Voorhoeve (2003) that efforts to find intransitivity in balancing problems involving pains of strikingly different intensities and durations (Temkin 1996; Rachels 1998) are really just instances of difficult decisions of minimizing pain along two important dimensions, and do not lead to intransitivities. But suppose such difficult tradeoffs between unbearable pain from sudden injury, on the one hand, and modest but persistent pain over the course of one s life from lack of treatment for a chronic condition, on the other were offered to us by an insurance salesman trying to persuade us to buy a limited policy. If there are transitivities to be found or even if not, but if the potential for mistaken judgements and subsequent regret seems significant then our concern is that this salesman is exploiting us by taking our money for reasons mostly his own, for gains enjoyed chiefly by him, and for reasons the terms of which we would find unpersuasive, upon having better and more complete information and the time, skills, and resources needed to reflect carefully upon it. These sorts of concerns that is, about exploitation, understood as costs that don t track our interests and which are not justified by reasons we d accept clearly echo Anand s in formulating his alternative axioms of rational choice that better capture the deliberative, intensional, and justificatory character of rationality. And yet even accepting this move, it seems that worries about exploitation lead us to value transitivity as an axiom just because it renders us less vulnerable exploitation by others. Exploitation (broadly understood, as above) is an abiding concern of political theorists: marxists of course are unrelentingly critical of exploitation in labor markets, and liberals of various stripes worry that the lucky might exploit their good fortune, securing their favorable prospects at the expense of those less fortunate (for instance, Rawls 1971). When civic republicans (for instance, Pettit 1997) talk about freedom as the absence of domination, it is not a big stretch to conclude that what they mean by freedom from the arbitrary will of another is something like avoiding situations where someone else can exploit us, in the sense of using us simply to achieve their goals, irrespective of our needs and interests. And if this broad definition of exploitation holds up, then many feminists, and indeed, many Kantians are arguably on board as well: systematic biases, in attitudes and institutions, that reflect and reproduce male advantage are objectionable because they permit men to use women as means to their own ends. And the language I ve used here is, of course, roughly Kantian: to use others merely as a means to one s own ends violates the categorical imperative. The modest defense I ve offered here for the transitivity axiom that it is given not only sense, but also normative force by one of the distinctive concerns of political theory: the avoidance of exploitation may seem a strange concession to ask of rational choice advocates, because it seems to suggest that rationality is bound up not simply with utility maximization and judgements about states of the world, but more importantly with our character, specifically, with our being the sorts of persons who are not easily exploited by others. Taking a stand on desirable character traits is not something most decision and game theorists spend much time doing! But some normative 9
10 political theorists must also make a concession here, even if their initial inclination is to criticize rational choice approaches: if you think exploitation is a bad thing, ethically speaking, then it is hard to resist the conclusion that you should also find transitivity to be an attractive maxim for governing our reflections on what we desire and how we mean to satisfy those desires. In settings where decisions are complex and uncertain, intransitivity makes us vulnerable to being used by others in ways that, upon informed and careful reflection, we would not freely accept. References Anand, Paul Foundations of Rational Choice under Risk. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Binmore, Ken and Alex Voorhoeve Defending Transitivity against Zeno s Paradox. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31: Pettit, Philip Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rachels, Stuart Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: Rawls, John A Theory of Justice. Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press, Skyrms, Brian Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Charles Rationality, in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds. Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press): Temkin, Larry A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: Weber, Michael The Resilience of the Allais Paradox. Ethics 109:
The Rightness Error: An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism
An Evaluation of Normative Ethics in the Absence of Moral Realism Mathais Sarrazin J.L. Mackie s Error Theory postulates that all normative claims are false. It does this based upon his denial of moral
More informationThe Prospective View of Obligation
The Prospective View of Obligation Please do not cite or quote without permission. 8-17-09 In an important new work, Living with Uncertainty, Michael Zimmerman seeks to provide an account of the conditions
More informationRawls s veil of ignorance excludes all knowledge of likelihoods regarding the social
Rawls s veil of ignorance excludes all knowledge of likelihoods regarding the social position one ends up occupying, while John Harsanyi s version of the veil tells contractors that they are equally likely
More informationSUNK COSTS. Robert Bass Department of Philosophy Coastal Carolina University Conway, SC
SUNK COSTS Robert Bass Department of Philosophy Coastal Carolina University Conway, SC 29528 rbass@coastal.edu ABSTRACT Decision theorists generally object to honoring sunk costs that is, treating the
More informationChapter 2: Commitment
Chapter 2: Commitment Outline A. Modular rationality (the Gianni Schicchi test). Its conflict with commitment. B. Puzzle: our behaviour in the ultimatum game (more generally: our norms of fairness) violate
More informationPhilosophical Perspectives, 16, Language and Mind, 2002 THE AIM OF BELIEF 1. Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, Oxford
Philosophical Perspectives, 16, Language and Mind, 2002 THE AIM OF BELIEF 1 Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, Oxford 0. Introduction It is often claimed that beliefs aim at the truth. Indeed, this claim has
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher September 4, 2008 ABSTRACT. Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be
More informationPerspectives on Imitation
Perspectives on Imitation 402 Mark Greenberg on Sugden l a point," as Evelyn Waugh might have put it). To the extent that they have, there has certainly been nothing inevitable about this, as Sugden's
More informationResponses to Respondents RESPONSE #1 Why I Reject Exegetical Conservatism
Responses to Respondents RESPONSE #1 Why I Reject Exegetical Conservatism I think all of us can agree that the following exegetical principle, found frequently in fundamentalistic circles, is a mistake:
More informationChapter 3 PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS AND BUSINESS CHAPTER OBJECTIVES. After exploring this chapter, you will be able to:
Chapter 3 PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS AND BUSINESS MGT604 CHAPTER OBJECTIVES After exploring this chapter, you will be able to: 1. Explain the ethical framework of utilitarianism. 2. Describe how utilitarian
More informationScanlon on Double Effect
Scanlon on Double Effect RALPH WEDGWOOD Merton College, University of Oxford In this new book Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon (2008) explores the ethical significance of the intentions and motives with
More informationClass #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism
Philosophy 405: Knowledge, Truth and Mathematics Fall 2010 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism I. The Continuum Hypothesis and Its Independence The continuum problem
More informationA Case against Subjectivism: A Reply to Sobel
A Case against Subjectivism: A Reply to Sobel Abstract Subjectivists are committed to the claim that desires provide us with reasons for action. Derek Parfit argues that subjectivists cannot account for
More informationDEONTOLOGY AND ECONOMICS. John Broome
DEONTOLOGY AND ECONOMICS John Broome I am very grateful to Shelly Kagan for extremely penetrating comments. Abstract. In The Moral Dimension, Amitai Etzioni claims that people often act for moral motives,
More informationEvidential arguments from evil
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48: 1 10, 2000. 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 1 Evidential arguments from evil RICHARD OTTE University of California at Santa
More informationMoral Argumentation from a Rhetorical Point of View
Chapter 98 Moral Argumentation from a Rhetorical Point of View Lars Leeten Universität Hildesheim Practical thinking is a tricky business. Its aim will never be fulfilled unless influence on practical
More informationChoosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a
More informationThe view that all of our actions are done in self-interest is called psychological egoism.
Egoism For the last two classes, we have been discussing the question of whether any actions are really objectively right or wrong, independently of the standards of any person or group, and whether any
More informationRawls, rationality, and responsibility: Why we should not treat our endowments as morally arbitrary
Rawls, rationality, and responsibility: Why we should not treat our endowments as morally arbitrary OLIVER DUROSE Abstract John Rawls is primarily known for providing his own argument for how political
More informationBOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid s Theory of Action
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of 2005 BOOK REVIEW: Gideon Yaffee, Manifest Activity:
More information8 Internal and external reasons
ioo Rawls and Pascal's wager out how under-powered the supposed rational choice under ignorance is. Rawls' theory tries, in effect, to link politics with morality, and morality (or at least the relevant
More informationA Review on What Is This Thing Called Ethics? by Christopher Bennett * ** 1
310 Book Review Book Review ISSN (Print) 1225-4924, ISSN (Online) 2508-3104 Catholic Theology and Thought, Vol. 79, July 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.21731/ctat.2017.79.310 A Review on What Is This Thing
More informationWhat is the "Social" in "Social Coherence?" Commentary on Nelson Tebbe's Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development Volume 31 Issue 1 Volume 31, Summer 2018, Issue 1 Article 5 June 2018 What is the "Social" in "Social Coherence?" Commentary on Nelson Tebbe's Religious
More informationKANTIAN ETHICS (Dan Gaskill)
KANTIAN ETHICS (Dan Gaskill) German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was an opponent of utilitarianism. Basic Summary: Kant, unlike Mill, believed that certain types of actions (including murder,
More informationBayesian Probability
Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign November 24, 2007 ABSTRACT. Bayesian probability here means the concept of probability used in Bayesian decision theory. It
More informationNICHOLAS J.J. SMITH. Let s begin with the storage hypothesis, which is introduced as follows: 1
DOUBTS ABOUT UNCERTAINTY WITHOUT ALL THE DOUBT NICHOLAS J.J. SMITH Norby s paper is divided into three main sections in which he introduces the storage hypothesis, gives reasons for rejecting it and then
More information1 Introduction. Cambridge University Press Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice Andrés Perea Excerpt More information
1 Introduction One thing I learned from Pop was to try to think as people around you think. And on that basis, anything s possible. Al Pacino alias Michael Corleone in The Godfather Part II What is this
More informationCRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS
CRUCIAL TOPICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL REASONS By MARANATHA JOY HAYES A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
More informationSidgwick on Practical Reason
Sidgwick on Practical Reason ONORA O NEILL 1. How many methods? IN THE METHODS OF ETHICS Henry Sidgwick distinguishes three methods of ethics but (he claims) only two conceptions of practical reason. This
More informationMark Schroeder. Slaves of the Passions. Melissa Barry Hume Studies Volume 36, Number 2 (2010), 225-228. Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES Terms and Conditions
More informationDISCUSSION THE GUISE OF A REASON
NADEEM J.Z. HUSSAIN DISCUSSION THE GUISE OF A REASON The articles collected in David Velleman s The Possibility of Practical Reason are a snapshot or rather a film-strip of part of a philosophical endeavour
More informationFrom: Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (2005)
From: Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (2005) 214 L rsmkv!rs ks syxssm! finds Sally funny, but later decides he was mistaken about her funniness when the audience merely groans.) It seems, then, that
More informationThe St. Petersburg paradox & the two envelope paradox
The St. Petersburg paradox & the two envelope paradox Consider the following bet: The St. Petersburg I am going to flip a fair coin until it comes up heads. If the first time it comes up heads is on the
More informationAttraction, Description, and the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Welfare
Attraction, Description, and the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Welfare The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says that what is basically good for a subject what benefits him in the most fundamental,
More informationUtilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp Reprinted in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981).
Draft of 3-21- 13 PHIL 202: Core Ethics; Winter 2013 Core Sequence in the History of Ethics, 2011-2013 IV: 19 th and 20 th Century Moral Philosophy David O. Brink Handout #14: Williams, Internalism, and
More informationNo Love for Singer: The Inability of Preference Utilitarianism to Justify Partial Relationships
No Love for Singer: The Inability of Preference Utilitarianism to Justify Partial Relationships In his book Practical Ethics, Peter Singer advocates preference utilitarianism, which holds that the right
More informationJustifying Rational Choice The Role of Success * Bruno Verbeek
Philosophy Science Scientific Philosophy Proceedings of GAP.5, Bielefeld 22. 26.09.2003 1. Introduction Justifying Rational Choice The Role of Success * Bruno Verbeek The theory of rational choice can
More informationLucky to Know? the nature and extent of human knowledge and rational belief. We ordinarily take ourselves to
Lucky to Know? The Problem Epistemology is the field of philosophy interested in principled answers to questions regarding the nature and extent of human knowledge and rational belief. We ordinarily take
More informationTHE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP by Lars Bergström
From: Who Owns Our Genes?, Proceedings of an international conference, October 1999, Tallin, Estonia, The Nordic Committee on Bioethics, 2000. THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP by Lars Bergström I shall be mainly
More informationWhat Lurks Beneath the Integrity Objection. Bernard Williams s alienation and integrity arguments against consequentialism have
What Lurks Beneath the Integrity Objection Bernard Williams s alienation and integrity arguments against consequentialism have served as the point of departure for much of the most interesting work that
More informationDeontology, Rationality, and Agent-Centered Restrictions
Florida Philosophical Review Volume X, Issue 1, Summer 2010 75 Deontology, Rationality, and Agent-Centered Restrictions Brandon Hogan, University of Pittsburgh I. Introduction Deontological ethical theories
More informationTWO APPROACHES TO INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
TWO APPROACHES TO INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND BELIEF CONSISTENCY BY JOHN BRUNERO JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 1, NO. 1 APRIL 2005 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JOHN BRUNERO 2005 I N SPEAKING
More informationLet us begin by first locating our fields in relation to other fields that study ethics. Consider the following taxonomy: Kinds of ethical inquiries
ON NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES: SOME BASICS From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the
More informationwhat makes reasons sufficient?
Mark Schroeder University of Southern California August 2, 2010 what makes reasons sufficient? This paper addresses the question: what makes reasons sufficient? and offers the answer, being at least as
More informationSUMMARIES AND TEST QUESTIONS UNIT 6
SUMMARIES AND TEST QUESTIONS UNIT 6 Textbook: Louis P. Pojman, Editor. Philosophy: The quest for truth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN-10: 0199697310; ISBN-13: 9780199697311 (6th Edition)
More informationKNOWLEDGE ON AFFECTIVE TRUST. Arnon Keren
Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE VI, pp. 33 46, 2012 KNOWLEDGE ON AFFECTIVE TRUST Arnon Keren Epistemologists of testimony widely agree on the fact that our reliance on other people's testimony is extensive. However,
More informationNOTES ON WILLIAMSON: CHAPTER 11 ASSERTION Constitutive Rules
NOTES ON WILLIAMSON: CHAPTER 11 ASSERTION 11.1 Constitutive Rules Chapter 11 is not a general scrutiny of all of the norms governing assertion. Assertions may be subject to many different norms. Some norms
More informationFinal Paper. May 13, 2015
24.221 Final Paper May 13, 2015 Determinism states the following: given the state of the universe at time t 0, denoted S 0, and the conjunction of the laws of nature, L, the state of the universe S at
More informationJudith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson s Normativity Gilbert Harman June 28, 2010 Normativity is a careful, rigorous account of the meanings of basic normative terms like good, virtue, correct, ought, should, and must.
More informationRationality in Action. By John Searle. Cambridge: MIT Press, pages, ISBN Hardback $35.00.
106 AUSLEGUNG Rationality in Action. By John Searle. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 303 pages, ISBN 0-262-19463-5. Hardback $35.00. Curran F. Douglass University of Kansas John Searle's Rationality in Action
More informationOPEN Moral Luck Abstract:
OPEN 4 Moral Luck Abstract: The concept of moral luck appears to be an oxymoron, since it indicates that the right- or wrongness of a particular action can depend on the agent s good or bad luck. That
More informationHåkan Salwén. Hume s Law: An Essay on Moral Reasoning Lorraine Besser-Jones Volume 31, Number 1, (2005) 177-180. Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUME STUDIES Terms and
More informationWarrant, Proper Function, and the Great Pumpkin Objection
Warrant, Proper Function, and the Great Pumpkin Objection A lvin Plantinga claims that belief in God can be taken as properly basic, without appealing to arguments or relying on faith. Traditionally, any
More informationNoncognitivism in Ethics, by Mark Schroeder. London: Routledge, 251 pp.
Noncognitivism in Ethics, by Mark Schroeder. London: Routledge, 251 pp. Noncognitivism in Ethics is Mark Schroeder s third book in four years. That is very impressive. What is even more impressive is that
More informationPHIL%13:%Ethics;%Fall%2012% David%O.%Brink;%UCSD% Syllabus% Part%I:%Challenges%to%Moral%Theory 1.%Relativism%and%Tolerance.
Draftof8)27)12 PHIL%13:%Ethics;%Fall%2012% David%O.%Brink;%UCSD% Syllabus% Hereisalistoftopicsandreadings.Withinatopic,dothereadingsintheorderinwhich theyarelisted.readingsaredrawnfromthethreemaintexts
More informationTWO ACCOUNTS OF THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY
DISCUSSION NOTE BY JONATHAN WAY JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE DECEMBER 2009 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT JONATHAN WAY 2009 Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality RATIONALITY
More informationCan Christianity be Reduced to Morality? Ted Di Maria, Philosophy, Gonzaga University Gonzaga Socratic Club, April 18, 2008
Can Christianity be Reduced to Morality? Ted Di Maria, Philosophy, Gonzaga University Gonzaga Socratic Club, April 18, 2008 As one of the world s great religions, Christianity has been one of the supreme
More informationMoral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently published a series of articles where they
Moral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently published a series of articles where they attack the new moral realism as developed by Richard Boyd. 1 The new moral
More informationDEFEASIBLE A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION: A REPLY TO THUROW
The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 231 April 2008 ISSN 0031 8094 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.512.x DEFEASIBLE A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION: A REPLY TO THUROW BY ALBERT CASULLO Joshua Thurow offers a
More informationCritical Reasoning and Moral theory day 3
Critical Reasoning and Moral theory day 3 CS 340 Fall 2015 Ethics and Moral Theories Differences of opinion based caused by different value set Deontology Virtue Religious and Divine Command Utilitarian
More informationThe fact that some action, A, is part of a valuable and eligible pattern of action, P, is a reason to perform A. 1
The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act Consequentialism Christopher Woodard RoME 2009 1. My thesis is that Kantian ethics and Act Consequentialism share a common structure, since both can be well understood
More informationAre Humans Always Selfish? OR Is Altruism Possible?
Are Humans Always Selfish? OR Is Altruism Possible? This debate concerns the question as to whether all human actions are selfish actions or whether some human actions are done specifically to benefit
More informationOn Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University
On Searle on Human Rights, Again! J. Angelo Corlett, San Diego State University With regard to my article Searle on Human Rights (Corlett 2016), I have been accused of misunderstanding John Searle s conception
More informationAN ACTUAL-SEQUENCE THEORY OF PROMOTION
BY D. JUSTIN COATES JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE JANUARY 2014 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT D. JUSTIN COATES 2014 An Actual-Sequence Theory of Promotion ACCORDING TO HUMEAN THEORIES,
More informationCommon Morality: Deciding What to Do 1
Common Morality: Deciding What to Do 1 By Bernard Gert (1934-2011) [Page 15] Analogy between Morality and Grammar Common morality is complex, but it is less complex than the grammar of a language. Just
More informationBehavioural Finance & Pensions. Con Keating PIA February
Behavioural Finance & Pensions Con Keating PIA February 22 2017 In economics, rationality is a very limited concept. It refers merely to the pre-existence of a particular ordering of preferences. This
More informationUncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes
Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes Robin Hanson Department of Economics George Mason University July 2006, First Version June 2001 Abstract In standard belief models, priors are always common knowledge.
More informationAre There Reasons to Be Rational?
Are There Reasons to Be Rational? Olav Gjelsvik, University of Oslo The thesis. Among people writing about rationality, few people are more rational than Wlodek Rabinowicz. But are there reasons for being
More informationALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI
ALTERNATIVE SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI Michael HUEMER ABSTRACT: I address Moti Mizrahi s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends
More informationGS SCORE ETHICS - A - Z. Notes
ETHICS - A - Z Absolutism Act-utilitarianism Agent-centred consideration Agent-neutral considerations : This is the view, with regard to a moral principle or claim, that it holds everywhere and is never
More information32. Deliberation and Decision
Page 1 of 7 32. Deliberation and Decision PHILIP PETTIT Subject DOI: Philosophy 10.1111/b.9781405187350.2010.00034.x Sections The Decision-Theoretic Picture The Decision-plus-Deliberation Picture A Common
More informationNote: This is the penultimate draft of an article the final and definitive version of which is
The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to Stump Note: This is the penultimate draft of an article the final and definitive version of which is scheduled to appear in an upcoming issue The Journal of Ethics. That
More informationKant and his Successors
Kant and his Successors G. J. Mattey Winter, 2011 / Philosophy 151 The Sorry State of Metaphysics Kant s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was an attempt to put metaphysics on a scientific basis. Metaphysics
More informationSummary of Kant s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Summary of Kant s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Version 1.1 Richard Baron 2 October 2016 1 Contents 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Availability and licence............ 3 2 Definitions of key terms 4 3
More informationDEMOCRACY, DELIBERATION, AND RATIONALITY Guido Pincione & Fernando R. Tesón
1 Copyright 2005 Guido Pincione and Fernando R. Tesón DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATION, AND RATIONALITY Guido Pincione & Fernando R. Tesón Cambridge University Press, forthcoming CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION CONTENTS
More informationPHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW FREGE JONNY MCINTOSH 1. FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF LOGIC
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE JONNY MCINTOSH 1. FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF LOGIC OVERVIEW These lectures cover material for paper 108, Philosophy of Logic and Language. They will focus on issues in philosophy
More informationA lonelier contractualism A. J. Julius, UCLA, January
A lonelier contractualism A. J. Julius, UCLA, January 15 2008 1. A definition A theory of some normative domain is contractualist if, having said what it is for a person to accept a principle in that domain,
More informationMULTI-PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE PREFACE PARADOX. Kenneth Boyce and Allan Hazlett
MULTI-PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE PREFACE PARADOX Kenneth Boyce and Allan Hazlett Abstract The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 Pn
More informationEpistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies
Philosophia (2017) 45:987 993 DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0 Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies James Andow 1 Received: 7 October 2015 / Accepted: 27 March 2017 / Published online:
More informationI assume some of our justification is immediate. (Plausible examples: That is experienced, I am aware of something, 2 > 0, There is light ahead.
The Merits of Incoherence jim.pryor@nyu.edu July 2013 Munich 1. Introducing the Problem Immediate justification: justification to Φ that s not even in part constituted by having justification to Ψ I assume
More informationAction in Special Contexts
Part III Action in Special Contexts c36.indd 283 c36.indd 284 36 Rationality john broome Rationality as a Property and Rationality as a Source of Requirements The word rationality often refers to a property
More informationWhat God Could Have Made
1 What God Could Have Made By Heimir Geirsson and Michael Losonsky I. Introduction Atheists have argued that if there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, then God would have made
More informationAn Alternate Possibility for the Compatibility of Divine. Foreknowledge and Free Will. Alex Cavender. Ringstad Paper Junior/Senior Division
An Alternate Possibility for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will Alex Cavender Ringstad Paper Junior/Senior Division 1 An Alternate Possibility for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge
More informationEpistemic Risk and Relativism
Acta anal. (2008) 23:1 8 DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0020-6 Epistemic Risk and Relativism Wayne D. Riggs Received: 23 December 2007 / Revised: 30 January 2008 / Accepted: 1 February 2008 / Published online:
More informationAn Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori. Ralph Wedgwood
An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori Ralph Wedgwood When philosophers explain the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, they usually characterize the a priori negatively, as involving
More informationChapter 2 Ethical Concepts and Ethical Theories: Establishing and Justifying a Moral System
Chapter 2 Ethical Concepts and Ethical Theories: Establishing and Justifying a Moral System Ethics and Morality Ethics: greek ethos, study of morality What is Morality? Morality: system of rules for guiding
More informationThe London School of Economics and Political Science. Reasons, Rationality and Preferences
The London School of Economics and Political Science Reasons, Rationality and Preferences Stuart Yasgur A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method of the London School
More informationPhil Aristotle. Instructor: Jason Sheley
Phil 290 - Aristotle Instructor: Jason Sheley To sum up the method 1) Human beings are naturally curious. 2) We need a place to begin our inquiry. 3) The best place to start is with commonly held beliefs.
More informationA solution to the problem of hijacked experience
A solution to the problem of hijacked experience Jill is not sure what Jack s current mood is, but she fears that he is angry with her. Then Jack steps into the room. Jill gets a good look at his face.
More informationWhy economics needs ethical theory
Why economics needs ethical theory by John Broome, University of Oxford In Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honour of Amartya Sen. Volume 1 edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, Oxford University
More informationZAGZEBSKI ON RATIONALITY
ZAGZEBSKI ON RATIONALITY DUNCAN PRITCHARD & SHANE RYAN University of Edinburgh Soochow University, Taipei INTRODUCTION 1 This paper examines Linda Zagzebski s (2012) account of rationality, as set out
More informationPROSPECTS FOR A JAMESIAN EXPRESSIVISM 1 JEFF KASSER
PROSPECTS FOR A JAMESIAN EXPRESSIVISM 1 JEFF KASSER In order to take advantage of Michael Slater s presence as commentator, I want to display, as efficiently as I am able, some major similarities and differences
More informationSTEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION
FILOZOFIA Roč. 66, 2011, č. 4 STEWART COHEN AND THE CONTEXTUALIST THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION AHMAD REZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), School of Analytic Philosophy,
More informationIn Defense of The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle. Simon Rippon
In Defense of The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle Simon Rippon Suppose that people always have reason to take the means to the ends that they intend. 1 Then it would appear that people s intentions to
More informationWorld without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Natural- ism , by Michael C. Rea.
Book reviews World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, by Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, viii + 245 pp., $24.95. This is a splendid book. Its ideas are bold and
More informationSome questions about Adams conditionals
Some questions about Adams conditionals PATRICK SUPPES I have liked, since it was first published, Ernest Adams book on conditionals (Adams, 1975). There is much about his probabilistic approach that is
More informationSpectrum Arguments: Objections and Replies Part II. Vagueness and Indeterminacy, Zeno s Paradox, Heuristics and Similarity Arguments
10 Spectrum Arguments: Objections and Replies Part II Vagueness and Indeterminacy, Zeno s Paradox, Heuristics and Similarity Arguments In this chapter, I continue my examination of the main objections
More informationCOMPARING CONTEXTUALISM AND INVARIANTISM ON THE CORRECTNESS OF CONTEXTUALIST INTUITIONS. Jessica BROWN University of Bristol
Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (2005), xx yy. COMPARING CONTEXTUALISM AND INVARIANTISM ON THE CORRECTNESS OF CONTEXTUALIST INTUITIONS Jessica BROWN University of Bristol Summary Contextualism is motivated
More informationSaying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul
Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul Umeå University BIBLID [0873-626X (2013) 35; pp. 81-91] 1 Introduction You are going to Paul
More informationWell-Being, Time, and Dementia. Jennifer Hawkins. University of Toronto
Well-Being, Time, and Dementia Jennifer Hawkins University of Toronto Philosophers often discuss what makes a life as a whole good. More significantly, it is sometimes assumed that beneficence, which is
More information