Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism

Transcription

1 Forthcoming in Synthese DOI: /s x Please quote only from the published version Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism Gabriele Contessa Department of Philosophy Carleton University Abstract. In this paper, I distinguish between two varieties of actualism hardcore actualism and softcore actualism and I critically discuss Ross Cameron s recent arguments for preferring a softcore actualist account of the truthmakers for modal truths over hardcore actualist ones. In the process, I offer some arguments for preferring the hardcore actualist account of modal truthmakers over the softcore actualist one. 1. Introduction Actualists can be roughly divided into two camps. Softcore actualists agree with possibilists that some variation on the Leibnizian biconditionals (i.e. <It is possible that p> is true if and only if at some possible world <p> is true and <It is necessary that p> is true if and only if at all possible worlds <p> is true) provide us with the correct analysis of modality and that this (together with some highly plausible assumptions) commits us to the existence of possible worlds other than the actual world. Their main disagreement with possibilists concerns the nature of such possible worlds, which according to softcore actualists are ultimately actual abstract objects (e.g. maximally consistent sets of proposition, maximal states of affairs, etc.). Hardcore actualists, on the other hand, disagree with both possiblists and softcore actualists in taking talk of possible worlds no 1

2 more seriously than a (very useful) fiction and reject any analysis of modality based on the Leibnizian biconditional. Hardcore actualists think that what makes modal propositions true are irreducibly modal features of the actual world (such as laws of nature, dispositions, or essences). In a very interesting paper that appeared recently in this journal, Ross Cameron (2008) argues that, contrary to what is often assumed, modal truths are no less in need of truthmakers than non-modal truths and then proceeds to defend the view that ersatz possible worlds are the truthmakers for such truths. Whereas I am somewhat sympathetic to Cameron s actualist inclinations, I am not particularly sympathetic to the specific brand of actualism Cameron opts for. My disagreement with Cameron boils down to the disagreement between what I have called hardcore and softcore actualists. In this paper, I only touch briefly on my reasons for preferring hardcore actualism over its softcore alternative and I shall rather focus on Cameron s reasons for preferring the softcore actualism over the hardcore actualism ( 2) and on the specific brand of softcore actualism Cameron espouses ( 3) finding them both wanting. I conclude ( 4) with some general remarks about the prospects of using ersatz possible worlds as truthmakers for modal truths. 2. Hardcore Actualism Cameron s arguments against hardcore actualism are based on the charge that specific brands of hardcore actualism are unable to identify suitable truthmakers for certain (alleged) modal truths. To illustrate the problem and the suggested solution, I will examine one of Cameron s specific arguments, which is aimed at a version of hardcore 2

3 actualism that I will call dispositionalism, and outline what I take to be the best response to this strategy, as an instance of a general strategy for hardcore actualists to deal with problematic cases such as the one suggested by Cameron. Dispositionalists roughly maintain that, if some object has a dispositional property or a power 1 whose manifestation includes p, then it is possible that p. 2 So, for example, this porcelain teacup could break because it is fragile (where fragility is countenanced as a dispositional property of the teacup) and the teacup s possible breaking is a manifestation of its actual fragility. So, it seems natural for a dispositionalist who is also a truthmaker theorist to believe that <The teacup could break> is made true by something along the lines of the states of affairs the teacup s being fragile or the teacup s being made of porcelain (assuming that its being made of porcelain is the causal basis of its fragility). But can dispositionalists account for all modal truths in this way? Cameron suggests they can t. One of the cases on which Cameron focuses is the proposition (a) <It is possible that none of the actual contingent beings existed>. Cameron writes: Intuitively, I am a contingent being I might not have existed. What, for the [dispositionalist], grounds this possibility? Presumably, it is my parents; for just as it was within their power to beget me, it was also within their power not to, and had they 1 Although I think that we should distinguish carefully between dispositional property, disposition, and power, for the purposes of this paper I will ignore the distinctions between these terms and use them interchangeably. 2 A version of dispositionalism has been recently developed in some detail by Andrea Borghini and Neil Williams (2008). Personally, I think there still are substantial problems for a satisfactory account of modality along these lines and I am more sympathetic to other brands of hardcore actualism, but elaborating and defending my views on the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 3

4 exercised the latter power I would not have existed. And the truthmaker for the truth that my parents might not have existed is, in turn, their parents. But what about the highly intuitive possibility that none of the actual contingently existing substances existed what is the truthmaker for the truth that this situation is possible? It can t be any of the actual contingently existing beings, for none of these beings has the capacity to bring it about that it itself never existed. (Cameron 2008, 273) How should the dispositionalist meet Cameron s challenge? A first obvious strategy would be to argue that some necessary being(s) have brought about the existence of some contingent beings and that any other contingent being has been brought into existence by either some of the original contingent beings or their descendants and that the necessary beings that brought about the existence of the original contingent beings also had the power not to bring about their existence (a power which they actually have but did not actually exercise) and it is their having this power that makes (a) true. 3 So, if, for example, the world was created in seven days by an omnipotent God, that God would seem also to have the power to create a world that does not contain any of the actual contingent beings or that of creating not world at all (independently of whether or not such God would or could exercise that power). This reply however might not seem to be very effective, as it would seem to be a bizarre consequence of dispositionalism that it commits one to such a strong metaphysical thesis. 3 Note that this thesis distinct from the thesis discussed by Cameron according to which, for every proposition <p>, the truthmaker for <It is possible that p> (if any) is God s having the power to create a world at which <p> is true. According to the proposal I am currently considering only propositions such as <Adam could have not existed> (where Adam is one of the original contingent beings created by God) are made true by God s power not to bring Adam into existence. Propositions such as <This porcelain teacup could break> are still made true by the teacup s being fragile. Most of Cameron s arguments against the stronger thesis he discusses do not seem to be effective against this much weaker thesis. 4

5 Another way would be to simply reject truthmaker maximalism and claim that that particular truth does not need a truthmaker, but, like Cameron, I am inclined to believe that, if you are a truthmaker theorist at all, you d better be a truthmaker maximalist and believe that every true proposition needs a truthmaker if some do. A third way would be to reject truthmaker theory altogether, but that s not a satisfactory option for meeting Cameron s challenge for there would seem to be no reason to think that a dispositionalist cannot be a truthmaker theorist and, in any case, doing so would amount to taking her ball and going home. So, how can the dispositionalist respond? I think that taking a second look at the first strategy might help us. Assume, if only for the sake of the argument, that there can be a dispositionalist truthmaker for if and only if the following proposition is true: (b) There is some necessary being(s) whose powers brought about the existence of some of the actual contingent beings but that also has the power not to bring about the existence of any of those beings. Does this mean that the acceptance of dispositionalism in and of itself commits one to the truth of controversial (b)? Of course it does not what the acceptance of dispositionalism commits them to at most is the conditional thesis: If (a) is true, then (b) is true. So, the dispositionalist would seem to be in trouble only if there are good reasons to believe that (a) can be true even if (b) is false. More precisely, the dispositionalist should claim, that, unless there are good reasons to believe that (a) is true, there are no good reasons to think that the dispositionalist inability to produce a truthmaker for that proposition is due to anything other than (a) s being false. So, let s assume that (b) is false and see if there any good reasons to think that (a) is true. 5

6 The only direct reason for a truthmaker theorist to believe that a proposition is true is presumably to have good reasons to believe that there is a truthmaker for it. For example, a direct reason for believing that <Socrates exist> is true is that one has good reasons to believe that Socrates exists (assuming Socrates is a truthmaker for <Socrates exist>). But in the case we are considering whether or not there are good reasons to believe there is a truthmaker for (a) seems to crucially hinge on what a suitable truthmaker for (a) would be, which is exactly what is at issue here. So, are there any indirect reasons for thinking that (a) is true (even if (b) is false)? Of course, the dispositionalist could easily concede that a situation in which (a) is true seems to be prima facie conceivable independently of whether or not (b) is true, but this seems only to establish the truth of <It is conceivable that none of the actual contingent beings existed> (whose truthmaker(s) are likely to be certain dispositions of normal human minds or brains) not that of (a). Are there any strong reasons for thinking that <It is possible that none of the actual contingent beings existed> (as opposed to <It is conceivable that none of the actual contingent beings existed>) is true independently of whether or not (b) is true? One possible reason could be that it is part and parcel of what it is for a being to be a contingent being that it could have possibly not existed. However, this is not sufficient to establish the truth of (a), for all this entail is the truth of <It is possible that each of the actual contingent beings did not exist>, which, as Cameron points out, does not entail <It is possible that none of the actual contingent beings existed>. It might well be the case 6

7 that it is possible, for some or even most actual contingent beings, that they might not have existed 4 without it being the case that none of them might have existed. But, if some or even most actual contingent beings could have not existed, why could it not be the case that all actual contingent beings might have not existed? How could the possible non-existence of some contingent beings make the non-existence of other contingent impossible? Call the thesis that the possible non-existence of some contingent beings cannot necessitate the existence of other contingent beings the non-necessitation principle. 5 So, the argument we are now considering suggests that the dispositionalist who questions the truth of (a) (or more precisely of (a) and not (b)) violates the nonnecessitation principle. But suppose that (a) is true and (b) false. This entails that either it is possible that (i) there are no contingent beings or that (ii) there are aliens (i.e. contingent beings whose existence is completely unrelated to that of any actual being). It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether either (i) or (ii) are genuinely possible. However, many are unsure as to whether (i) is genuinely possible (Cameron himself seems to be agnostic as to the possibility of (i) (Cameron 2006)). In particular, since the possibility of (i) has sometimes been used as a premise in arguments for the existence of God, philosophers seem to assume, if (b) is false (as we are assuming now), then (i) is not genuinely possible But, if (i) is not genuinely possible, then, if (a) is to be true, the non-existence of some 4 As the passage above suggests, Cameron himself does not seem to doubt the dispositionalist might have a plausible truthmaker for a truth like this. 5 Since writing this, I discovered that this principled was explicitly used in (Baldwin 1996 cited in Cameron 2006) as part of an argument for the possibility of (i) and is explicitly rejected by Cameron (2006). 7

8 contingent beings (i.e. the actual ones) would seem to have to necessitate the existence of other contingent beings (i.e. the aliens), which violates the very principle the dispositionalists were accused of violating. So, one cannot avoid violating the nonnecessitation principle unless they accept that (i) is genuinely possible and most seem to assume that it can only be possible if (b) is true. Another possible reason to believe that (a) must be true (independently of whether or not (b) is true) could be that, since (a) is a modal truth, if true at all, (a) is necessarily true. So, how could its truth depend on the truth of (b) which, if true, would seem to be only contingently true? First, note that (b) does not need to be contingently true or false. In fact it is likely to be necessarily true or false. Suppose, for example, that (b) is true because an (essentially) omnipotent God has created the world in seven days. In that case, (b) would seem to be necessarily true. Second, even in the unlikely case that (b) is contingently true, then it is also contingently true that it is possible that none of the actual contingent beings might have existed. If (b) is contingently true, it must be because the necessary beings do not have the power not to bring about the existence of any of those being are not be essential to them (the contingent truth of (b) cannot be due to the contingent existence of the beings in question for their existence is necessary). But, in this case, one would expect (a) to be only contingently true. In the counterfactual circumstances in which the necessary beings in question do not have the power not to create any of the actual contingent beings, it simply wouldn t have been possible for there to be none of the actually contingent beings. What the discussion so far shows is that there seem to be no good reasons to think that (a) is true no matter what. Note that this does not commit the dispositionalist to 8

9 denying that (a) is true but only to suspending judgement on the truth of (a). From a hardcore actualist perspective, however, that (a) might be false (where the might here is epistemic) does not seem so implausible. According to the hardcore actualist, what could be the case depends on what is the case and whether or not it could be the case that none of the actual contingent beings could have existed depends on whether or not something along the lines of (b) is true. But this agnostic chance towards (a) appears much less radical when one realizes that, whereas we seem to be able to make sense of the possible non-existence of, say, Adolf Hitler or even of that of anyone actually alive today, it is not clear if we can make sense of the idea of none of the actual contingent beings nonexisting. Of course, we seem to be able to conceive of there being no contingent beings (I think I do so by visualizing something that could be described as a dark empty space), but whether there could have genuinely been nothing does not seem to be a question that can be settled solely through such an armchair exercise of our imagination. 3. Softcore Actualism I shall now move on to examining Cameron s positive proposal. According to one of the two Leibnizian biconditionals, <It is possible that p> is true if and only if there is a possible world at which p. So, if one believes in truthmakers and takes the Leibnizian biconditionals seriously, it is almost inevitable for one to read this conditional as suggesting that, if <It is possible that p> is true, its truthmakers are the possible worlds at which <p> is (represented as being) true and, of course, if one is also an actualist, one will take this to mean that ersatz possible worlds at which p are the truthmakers of <It is possible that p>. But are the ersatz possible worlds up to the task? 9

10 There is a notorious problem for ersatz possible worlds. The problem is that, in order for ersatz possible worlds to be up to the task, the actualist has to be able to distinguish them from impossible worlds. So, for example, if, like Cameron, one follows Robert Adams in taking possible worlds to be certain sets of propositions, one has to be able to specify which sets of propositions are possible worlds, for clearly not all sets of propositions will do. And, as Lewis used to remark, there seems to be no way to do so in a manner that is neither circular nor inadequate (see, e.g., (Lewis 1973: 85)). So, for example, in accordance with Adams s original suggestion (Adams 1974), one can construe possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions. This proposal would, however, seem to be inadequate, for some such sets could include propositions such as <John is a bachelor> and <John is not married> or <Fido is a dog> and <Fido is a cat>. Moreover, the very notion of a consistent set of propositions seems to be covertly modal (because a set is consistent if no contradiction can be derived from it) and, therefore, the analysis seems to be circular. 6 According to Cameron (2008: 277), however, softcore actualists have an effective way to dissolve the problem. This consists in rejecting the assumption that the distinction between possible and impossible worlds is a natural distinction or, in other words, to maintain that no (sparse) property corresponding to the predicate x is a possible world. There is nothing more to a world s being a possible world [ ] other than that it represents the actual laws of logic, the actual mathematical truths, the actual natural kind identities, etc, as being true, and that it doesn t represent as true anything that here. 6 Of course, as always in philosophy, both charges could be resisted, but I will not explore how to do so 10

11 contradicts any of these truths. In that case, to account for the fact that some world w is a possible world, we need only account for the fact that the actual truths concerning logic/mathematics/natural kind identity etc are represented as being true by w, and that nothing that is incompatible with any of these truths is represented as being true by w. (Cameron 2008: 277) But clearly, if accounts like Adam s are open to the charge of being circular, Cameron s account would seem to be even less subtly so. According to Cameron, a world is possible if and only if it represents the actual laws of logic, the actual mathematical truths, the actual natural kind identities, etc, as being true. But what makes those truths special? Why it is these actual truths that need to be true at all worlds that aspire to be called possible and not, say, all the truths about George W. Bush s presidency or the evolutionary history of the platypus? The only plausible answer that I can see is that what makes that one set of truths special and not the other is that only the former set contains necessary truths. So, we have gone a full circle. <It is necessary that p> is true only if <p> is true at all possible worlds and each world is possible only if <p> is true at it. At this point, Cameron would probably deny that the story needs to go that far. All actualists were looking for was a truthmaker for <It is possible that p> and Cameron s proposal provides them with one i.e. a possible world at which <p> is true. Cameron also provide an answer to the thorny question of what makes a world possible i.e. a world is possible if and only if a certain set of propositions are true at it. And then, when asked what is special about those propositions, Cameron just shrugs off the question. But, if the whole story is to work and the impression of circularity is to be effectively dispelled, the question cannot be 11

12 shrugged off so easily. Who or what determines which truths need to be true at a world for it to be a possible world if it is not the necessity of those truths? I do not doubt there is a variety of possible answers to this question. As far as I can see, however, not many of them are plausible and, certainly, no answer is not a plausible answer. Cameron s less guarded remarks on the topic seem to suggest that his answer would ultimately be us! (Cameron forthcoming). But if this is the case, then the distinction between possible and impossible worlds could seem to be contingent on our existence and our actual inclinations to pick one set of truths over another and this seems to go against some of the most deep-seated intuitions about modality. Most of us seem to assume that, if <It is necessary that p> and <It is possible that p> are true, then they are necessarily so. But if the distinction between possible and impossible worlds is contingent on our existence and our inclinations, what would have happened to the truth of actually true propositions of the form <It is necessary that p> and <It is possible that p> had there been no humans? In those counterfactual circumstances, I assume there would still have been propositions and worlds (construed as sets of propositions), but there would have been no one to draw the wholly unnatural distinction between possible worlds and impossible worlds (or at least let s assume that those are the counterfactual circumstances we are considering and not the ones in which a race of intelligent beings draws such a distinction). Would it then be the case that <It is necessary that p> is true? And, if so, what would make it true? Cameron seems to have the following options: (1) <It is possible that p> would have had no truthmaker, 12

13 (2) <It is possible that p> would have had a world (independently of whether or not such a world is possible according to our unnatural distinction) as its truthmaker, (3) <It is possible that p> would have had one of the worlds that are possible according to our unnatural distinction as its truthmaker, (4) <It is possible that p> would have had something other than a world as its truthmaker. These possibilities seem to be exhaustive but they seem to be either implausible or at odds with Cameron s account. (1) seems to imply that <It is possible that p> is only contingently true and, since the same considerations seem to apply to <It is necessary that p>, it too would be contingently true. (2) seems to imply that had we not existed, for every proposition <p>, the propositions <It is necessary that p> and <It is possible that p> would have been true. (3) seems to require that, even if we had never existed, our unnatural distinction between possible and impossible worlds would have carried metaphysical weight nevertheless, which seems to be highly implausible if nothing other than our inclinations underlies our distinction between possible and impossible worlds. (4) seems to suggest that something other than a world could have been the truthmaker for <It is possible that p> in these counterfactual circumstances, but, if this is the case, why not assume that something other than a world is the truthmaker for <It is possible that p> in the actual circumstances? One might be tempted to reply that counterfactuals of the form If it were the case that there are no human beings, then are to be evaluated in terms of the closest possible world at which there are no human beings and at those possible worlds <It is necessary that p> is true as it is at our world. Let me first note that, this would simply be 13

14 wrong if taken as a claim about what is true at a world in the sense of what the world represent as being true. All possible worlds are such that <p> is true at them not <It is necessary that p>. One could still maintain that, if true, <It is necessary that p> and <It is possible that p> are necessarily true and, therefore, true at all possible worlds and, a fortiori, true at all of the closest possible worlds at which there are no humans. So, it is simply untrue that our non-existence could affect the truth of <It is necessary that p> and <It is possible that p>. But, I think that there is a pre-theoretical sense in which it is clear that, if the existence of something (be it the teacup, New York City, the border between Italy and France, the British monarchy, or the unnatural distinction between possible and impossible worlds) depends on us, the thing in question wouldn t have existed had we not existed. If a theory of counterfactuals contradicts this basic intuition, then so much the worse for the theory. Even if Cameron could find a way to successfully maintain that the truth of modal sentences is not contingent on our existence, another worry lurks in the background. The worry stems from the observation that there is no general consensus among us as to which truths should belong to the set of truths that need to be represented as true by a world in order for it to be possible. For example, some of us believe laws of nature to be necessary and others believe them to be contingent. However, if Cameron was right, this debate would not seem to be more constructive than the one between those who like chocolate ice-cream and those who don t. If all it takes for laws of nature to be necessary is that enough people are persuaded to decide to include the propositions describing the actual laws among the set of truths that a world needs to represent as true in order for it 14

15 to be considered a possible world, the whole debate would rest on a huge mistake, for both sides seem to assume that there is a fact of the matter as to which side is right, while, in fact, there is no fact of the matter (or, at least, there is not one until a consensus is reached and the way to draw the distinction between worlds is agreed upon). Maybe the truths that need to be true at a world for it to be possible do not owe their special status to us. But if they do not owe their special status to us nor to their necessity what do they owe it to? I do not see any plausible answer to this question and, in lack of one, the suspicion is that Cameron s account is circular lingers on. 4. Actualism and Truthmakers But even if there was an adequate and substantive account of what it is for an ersatz world to be a possible one, I think it would still be strongly counterintuitive to think of ersatz possible worlds as the truthmakers for modal truths. Consider again the teacup on my desk (and let s use The teacup as a name or rigid designator for it). As far as I can see, <The teacup is made of porcelain> and <The teacup could break> are both true and I would be happy to concede that something in the actual world makes both of them true. But the question is what in the world makes each of them true? Most truthmaker theorists would think that the truthmaker for <The teacup is made of porcelain> is something along the lines of the state of affairs the teacup s being made of porcelain. In any case, it seems natural to think that the truthmaker for <The teacup is made of porcelain> somehow involves the teacup. The teacup is a component (not just 15

16 a part) of the state of affairs the teacup s being made of porcelain 7 and the porcelain trope somehow makes up the teacup. 8 Even those who (like Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming)) think that the truthmaker of <The teacup is made of porcelain> is the whole world would, I think, be ready to admit that the teacup is part of it (they only deny that such parts have ontological priority over the whole). Consider now <The teacup could break>. It seems reasonable to think that, if such a proposition has a truthmaker, its truthmaker(s), like the truthmaker for <The teacup is made of porcelain>, should somehow involve the teacup. So, for example, a hardcore actualist would think that its truthmaker is something along the lines of the state of affairs the teacup s being fragile, or the state of affairs the teacup s being made of porcelain (assuming that its being made of porcelain is the causal basis of its fragility) or a (nontransferable) dispositional trope, 9 or. Independently of how they fill the details of the story in, hardcore actualists agree that the truth of <The teacup could break> is no less rooted in the way the teacup actually is than the truth of <The teacup is made of porcelain>. As far as I can see, the pull of this intuition is one the main reasons behind hardcore actualism (and, I suspect, that denying this intuition was one of the main reasons why Lewis was so often treated to the incredulous stare). Truths about how the world could possibly be are no less grounded in the concrete, actual world than truths 7 At least if you believe in Armstrong-style states of affairs (as opposed to Plantiga-style ones, which are not truthmakers anyway). 8 I leave it to the trope theorist to fill out the details of the story. 9 At the time of (Mumford 1998), Stephen Mumford seemed to believe in something very close to dispositional tropes (or, at any rate, it is tempting to think he did). 16

17 about how the world actually is. And a hardcore actualist believes that thinking otherwise amounts to eating the possibilist s poisoned pawn. 10 But, even if hardcore actualists were wrong about this last point (and I doubt they are), there is still something strikingly implausible in thinking otherwise and, in particular, in thinking that truthmakers for <The teacup could break> unlike the ones for <The teacup is made of porcelain> have nothing to do with the teacup but are rather ersatz possible worlds. To see why, let me focus on Cameron s preferred version of ersatzism. If Cameron is right, what makes <The teacup could break> proposition true is the existence of a set of propositions containing the proposition <The teacup is broken>. And this strikes me as a highly implausible claim. It strikes me as implausible not because I don t believe in propositions or sets; nor does it strike me as implausible because sets of propositions are not appropriate candidates for truthmaker (after all, the truthmakers of propositions about the existence of sets of propositions would seem to have to be sets of propositions). What makes the proposal implausible is that, unlike the proposal that sets of propositions can be the truthmakers of propositions about sets of propositions (which conforms with the intuition that if a proposition about x is made true at all it is made true by something that involves x), it runs counter to the intuition that a proposition about x is made true by something that involves x. To put what might be the same point differently, minimally, the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of the propositions for which it is a truthmaker. But 10 The chess metaphor is obviously homage to Mondadori and Morton s classic defense of hardcore actualism (Mondadori and Morton 1976). 17

18 how is the existence of a certain set of proposition supposed to necessitate that it is true that the teacup could break (if not in the most trivial sense that this proposition is necessarily true and so everything is a truthmaker for it)? An ersatz modal realist would probably try to resist all this by denying that the set of propositions in question is unrelated to the teacup after all, the set of propositions represents the teacup as breaking. But, without getting too much into the detail of how the supposed representational relation works, how can the fact that something represents x as being such-and-such makes it genuinely possible for x to be such-and-such? A cartoonist may represent George W. Bush as a chimpanzee but that does not seem to make it possible for George W. Bush to be a chimpanzee (at least if you agree that it is metaphysically impossible for it to be the case). So, what is about the way a set of propositions represents that the teacup as breaking that endows the set with the power of necessitating that <The teacup could break> is true? To paraphrase Lewis s argument against Armstrong s necessitation relation, simply calling a set of propositions a possible world does not seem to endow it with such a magic power more than calling someone Armstrong gives them mighty biceps. (Interestingly enough, Lewis never made this argument against ersatzism and, I suspect, the main deterrent was that he knew too well that such an argument would cut both ways.) An ersatzer, however, might simply deny the general applicability of the intuition that the truthmaker for a proposition must involve the object that proposition is about. In many cases, they might point out, this does not seem to be the case. The truthmaker for <Al Gore has been written about in the New York Times>, for example, does not seem to involve Al Gore anymore than the truthmaker for <Al Gore is represented as being the 18

19 43 rd President of the United States by some possible world> does. The former presumably contains only things about the issues of the New York Times in which Al Gore has been written about and the latter only some (ersatz) counterpart for Al Gore. 11 As tempting as it might seem, I think that the view that the truthmaker for <Al Gore has been written about in the New York Times> does not involve Al Gore, however, is mistaken. That Al Gore does not need to be involved in the truthmaker for that proposition would entail that it could be true that the a New York Times journalist wrote about Al Gore even if Al Gore did not exist. Now, of course, it seems to be true that, even if Al Gore did not exist, the words Al Gore might somehow end up being printed on the New York Times, but this hardly seems to be a case in which Al Gore has been written about in the New York Times. In other words, one cannot write about Al Gore unless Al Gore (somehow) exists and so Al Gore is involved in the truthmaker for all propositions about him insofar as the truth of any proposition requires his existence. 12 So, if you believe states of affairs are good candidates for truthmakers, you should probably believe that the truthmaker for <Al Gore has been written about in the New York Times> is nothing other than the state of affairs Al Gore s being written about in the New York Times (although, of course, you do not need to deny that such a state of affairs is simply a supervenient state of affairs). 11 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possible reply. 12 This obviously does not mean that one cannot write about Madame Bovary, only that, if one can write about Madame Bovary, then Madame Bovary must somehow exist. Most philosophical accounts of the ontology of fiction would seem to accept this much the controversy concerns whether the conditional is true because the antecedent is false or because the consequent is true. 19

20 At this point, one could maintain the same of <The teacup is represented as being the broken by some possible world>--i.e. they could maintain that that proposition is made true by the state of affairs the teacup s being represented as being the broken by some possible world (note though that this would no longer be Cameron s proposal). My reply here would not be that there is no such state of affairs as the teacup s being represented as being broken by some possible world, nor would it be that such a state of affairs does not involve, respectively, the teacup when there are more suitable candidates such as the teacup s being fragile or the teacup s being made of porcelain) available for the job, it would seem highly implausible to maintain that it is the states of affairs the teacup s being represented as being broken by some possible world that makes it true that the teacup could break. But why are those more suitable candidates? First, truthmaker theorists are likely to be already committed to some of them in order to account for the truth of propositions such as <The teacup is fragile> or <The teacup is made of porcelain>. Suppose, for example, one accepts that the truthmaker for <The teacup is made of porcelain> is the state of affairs the teacup s being made of porcelain. If one thinks that the teacup cannot be made of porcelain without being fragile, then the teacup s being made of porcelain can also double as a truthmaker for <The teacup is fragile> and, since something cannot be fragile unless it could break, the teacup s being made of porcelain can also act as a truthmaker for <The teacup could break>. At this point why would one need to postulate the existence of a second truthmaker for <The teacup could break>? But suppose that one believes that the teacup can be made of porcelain without being fragile, as a softcore actualist presumably does. They will still need a truthmaker for <The teacup is fragile>. So, where can this truthmaker be found? Couldn t this be the fact that 20

21 the teacup is represented as being broken by some possible world? No, because, if x s being represented as broken by some possible world could be a truthmaker for <x is fragile>, this it would also be true that the head of this sledge hammer is fragile, for certainly it is represented as being broken at some possible world. But maybe something along the lines of the teacup s being represented as broken at t by some possible world at which x is represented as being hit with an appropriate amount of force at t-1 could be a suitable truthmaker for <The teacup is fragile>, but certainly there are possible worlds at which the head of this this sledge hammer is represented as being struck with the appropriate amount of force at t-1 and is represented as being broken at t and this would seem to suggest that it is also true that it is also fragile. Before considering any more complex proposals, I think, softcore actualists should be ready to accept that what makes <The teacup is fragile> true is something along the lines of the state of affairs The teacup s being fragile (which may well supervene on other more fundamental states of affairs). But once one accepts the existence of such a state of affairs one no longer seem to need an additional truthmaker for <The teacup could break>, for, it is part of what it is for it to be true that the teacup is fragile that it is also true that it could break in the appropriate circumstances. So, why would ersatz possible world need to enter the scene at all? 5. Conclusions If one takes truthmakers (or even just good, ol truthmaking) seriously enough, I think it seems fair to say that, at best, the story of how ersatz possible worlds make modal propositions true is not particularly persuasive as it is and much work seems to be needed 21

22 to get it off the ground. As far as I can see, the work does not have much to do with the old issue of distinguishing possible ersatz worlds from impossible ones but with just how ersatz possible worlds can make modal propositions true in any interesting sense. Personally, however, I tend to be more pessimistic about the prospect of ersatz possible worlds as truthmakers for modal truths, for I suspect that no amount of work will be sufficient. But, frankly, I don t know if I think so because I believe hardcore actualism to be true or if I believe hardcore actualism to be true at least in part because I think so. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Ross Cameron and an anonymous referee for this journal for their very helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. References Adams, Robert M. (1974). Theories of Actuality, Noûs, 8: Baldwin, Thomas (1996). There Might Be Nothing, Analysis, 56: Borghini, Andrea and Williams, Neil (2008). A Dispositional Theory of Possibility, Dialectica, 62: Cameron, Ross (2006). Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism, Erkenntnis 64: Cameron, Ross (2008). Truthmakers and Modality, Synthese, 164: Cameron, Ross (forthcoming). On the Source of Necessity, in B. Hale, R. Cameron and A. Hoffman (eds.), The Logic, Epistemology, and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. 22

23 Mondadori, Fabrizio and Morton, Adam (1976). Modal Realism: The Poisoned Pawn, Philosophical Review, 85: 3 20 Mumford, Stephen (1998). Dispositions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schaffer, Jonathan (forthcoming) The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker, The Philosophical Quarterly. 23