# What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames

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1 What is the Frege/Russell Analysis of Quantification? Scott Soames The Frege-Russell analysis of quantification was a fundamental advance in semantics and philosophical logic. Abstracting away from details idiosyncratic to each, the key idea is that quantifiers express higher level properties that are predicated of lower level properties. The two philosophers express this properties of properties analysis slightly differently. Whereas Russell talks of properties of propositional functions (which are functions from objects to structured propositions), Frege speaks of senses that present higher-level concepts that are predicated of lower-level concepts. Since the issues I will raise are neutral between these different frameworks, I will stick with property talk. 1 The analysis is illustrated by claims P1 C3 about sentence x Fx / Everything is F P1. The proposition expressed by (1) consists of two constituents the property being true of everything and the property being F the first of which is predicated of the second. P2. If a proposition p consists of two constituents being so-and-so and such-and-such, the first of which is predicated of the second, then p = the proposition that such and such is so-and-so. C1. The proposition expressed by (1) = the proposition that being F is true of everything. (Call this proposition Prop 1.) P3. Prop 1 is also expressed by sentence (1a). 1a. The property being F is true of everything. C2. So, (1) and (1a) express the same proposition. The first thing to notice about my illustration is that although I have called the account of quantification an analysis, the sentences used to specify the proposition expressed by 1 F is used as a schematic letter throughout both this argument and the rest of the text.

2 sentence (1) itself contains the universal quantifier being analyzed. That may seem strange. Indeed, it may seem worse than strange, as the following argument shows. P4. The expression is true of that occurs in sentence (1a) is a 2-place predicate that expresses the relation being true of, which holds between properties and objects. Since the quantifier everything stands in the second argument-place of this predicate, (1a) is a universally quantified sentence that expresses the same proposition as (1 ). 1. Everything is such that the property being F is true of it. ( x: the property being F is true of x.) P5. So, the Frege/Russell analysis of quantification applies to (1a/1 ), yielding a proposition that has two constituents the first of which being true of everything is predicated of the second being an object of which the property F is true. P6. This proposition (described in P5), is the proposition that the property being an object of which the property being F is true is true of everything. Call it Prop 2. C3. The proposition expressed by (1a/1 ) is Prop 2. C4. Since (1) and (1a) each express just one proposition, Prop 1 = Prop 2. The cycle can be repeated producing a hierarchy of propositions each of which is identified with all the others. Prop 1 The proposition that being F is true of everything. Prop 2 The proposition that being an object of which (being F) is true is true of everything. Prop 3 The proposition that being an object of which (being an object of which being F is true) is true is true of everything.... Is this result problematic? The propositions in the sequence are necessarily and apriori equivalent to one another. There is even some temptation to think that anyone who asserts or believes Prop 1 should be counted as also asserting or believing Prop 2. After all, it might be argued, anyone who explicitly accepted, and thereby believed, the former would be disposed to accept, and rightly be counted as believing, the latter. Even so, however, we don t get the needed result namely, that the propositions in the hierarchy are identical with one another. We don t even establish that any anyone who believes or asserts one of them 2

3 believes or asserts all the others. Although there is some justification for thinking that one who explicitly asserts or judges, and hence occurrently believes, p may be counted as implicitly asserting and believing obvious necessary and apriori consequences of p, this doesn t justify taking assertion and belief to be closed under obvious necessary and apriori consequence. Of course, if it is in the nature of propositions that those that are necessarily and apriori equivalent are identical, then the hierarchy I have generated is simply a harmless repetition of the same proposition over and over again. However, since Frege and Russell were proponents of structured propositions, this wouldn t have impressed them. Those like me who share their belief in structured propositions face a more serious problem. The constituents of Prop 1 are the properties being true of everything and being F. The constituents of Prop 2 are being true of everything, and being an object of which the property being F is true. Note, the property being F is itself a constituent of the property being an object of which the property being F is true, and so is a sub constituent of Prop 2. However, being F is not the predication target in Prop 2, as it is in Prop 1. In Prop 2, the target, of which being true of everything is predicated, is being an object of which the property being F is true. Since the predication target is being an x such that the property being F is true of x, identifying Props 1 and 2 would require identifying the simple property being F with a relational property of which it is merely a constituent. Since this is absurd, proponents of structured propositions must distinguish the two propositions, along with all others in the hierarchy. But this is intolerable; the unique proposition expressed (1) can t be identical with infinitely many different propositions. Consequently, the proponent of structured propositions can accept the Frege/Russell analysis only by rejecting the conclusion C4 that identifies Props 1 and 2. This, in turn, requires blocking the argument before it reaches C3 (which wrongly identifies them). How 3

4 did we land in this fix? We started off by accepting an analysis of quantification that identifies the proposition p expressed by an arbitrary sentence Everything is F with one that predicates being true of everything of the property F. However, since the analysis uses the very quantifier being analyzed, we were tempted to apply the analysis again to the sentences used to identify p. When we did this, we arrived at a new proposition p* different from p. This is intolerable if as we have been assuming sentence (1) expresses a single proposition. The challenge for the proponent of structured propositions is to explain why the Frege/ Russell analysis of quantification can t be applied to its own output. The natural thought is that we went wrong in using the quantifier everything in the analysis of sentences containing it. When Frege and Russell analyzed numerical concepts they were careful not to employ those concepts, but rather to define them in terms of what they took to be purely logical concepts. The same is true of Russell s analysis of descriptions. If his analysis of definite descriptions were correct, then someone who had mastered universal quantification, negation, and identity could acquire the definite article by being given its analysis. Russell seems to have understood his analysis of indefinite descriptions in the same way. His stock examples involve substitution of an adjective functioning as a predicate for the nominal in the description. Thus, I met a man is always said to express the proposition that for some x, I met x and x is human, not for some x, I met x and x is a man. This is noteworthy, since for many indefinite descriptions like a tiger and a large and rowdy man there is no corresponding adjectival form. There is, presumably, a reason he avoids examples like these, in which there is no obvious way of stating the analysis without using the expression being analyzed. They don t fit the conception of analysis he had in mind. This point is reinforced by his analysis of quantification, summarized by R. 4

5 R A sentence S E containing everything in a position capable of being occupied by a singular-term expresses the proposition that fs is always true where fs is the propositional function (from objects to propositions) designated by the formula that results from replacing everyone in S E with a free occurrence of the variable x. A sentence S containing something in a comparable position expresses a the proposition that it is not the case that fs is always false. The key point about Russell s formulation, which was surely no accident, is that it does not use the universal quantifier everything in specifying the constituent that quantifier contributes to propositions expressed by sentences containing it. Instead of employing the predicate is true of everything, he employs the adverbially modified predicate is always true, which is short for the more elaborate, but still putatively primitive predicate always assigns a true proposition to an argument. This predicate designates a genuine property of propositional functions that is a constituent of propositions expressed by universally quantified sentences. What then does the predicate is true of everything which is short for assigns a true proposition to every argument designate? The answer, I imagine, is that it is a Russellian incomplete symbol, and so doesn t designate anything. If so, then sentence (1) will express Prop 1 R, while sentences (1a/1 ) will express Prop 2 R. Prop 1 R : the proposition that being F is always true Prop 2 R : the proposition that being an object of which the property being F is true is always true (Here I revert to property rather than propositional function talk.) Although these propositions are different, no paradox results because the second is not generated from the analysis that produced the first. One can, of course, still generate a sequence of necessarily and apriori equivalent propositions, but the basis for identifying them has been eliminated. Russell extends his analysis to (2) Something is F by defining something in terms of the universal quantifier plus falsity and negation. This is fine when giving a system of logic. Since any choice of standard primitives plus the usual definitions yields the same 5

6 truth-preserving relations between sentences, one can adopt Russell s suggestions, or make different choices as one wishes. But since logical equivalence doesn t track identity of propositions expressed, and since there are often facts to be captured about which of the different but equivalent propositions an agent asserts or believes, semantic analyses of quantified propositions require more. For these purposes, we are better off identifying the proposition that something is F with the proposition that being F is sometimes true. But this is only the beginning. The Russellian analysis must be extended to all generalized quantifiers, including those in (3) and (4). 3a. Some F is G. b. Every F is G. c. No F is G. 4a. Most Fs are Gs. b. Exactly two Fs are Gs. c. At least seven Fs are Gs. d. Many Fs are Gs. e. Few Fs are Gs. The properties predicated of the propositional function (or property) G by the propositions expressed by the sentences in (3) are: being sometimes true of Fs, being always true of Fs, and never being true of Fs. Reductio by hierarchy is avoided as before. Reductio-Avoiding Explanation for the Examples in (3) The predicates is sometimes/always/never true of Fs stand for genuine properties that are predicated of lower-level properties in propositions expressed by quantified sentences. The predicates is true of some/every/no Fs, designate nothing, but rather are incomplete symbols to be eliminated by analysis. Though necessary and apriori equivalents, the propositions expressed by (5) and (6) are different, with the former being primary and grasped independently of the latter. 5. So and so is sometimes/always/never true of Fs. 6. So and so is true of some/every/no F. The quantifiers in (4) are treated similarly. The properties predicated of the propositional function (or property G) in (4a) and (4b) are being most times true of Fs and being exactly two times true of Fs. In the case of (4c) (4e) the quantificational properties 6

7 are being true at least seven times of Fs, being many times true of Fs, and being few times true of Fs. The reductio-avoiding explanation is the same as before. Although elaborating the Frege/Russell analysis of quantification in this way avoids the original reductio, I think it is a sham. Imagine being told, without benefit of the argument here, that Being G is a property that is few times true of Fs, or that The propositional function that assigns to any object o the proposition that o is G is few times truth-assigning for Fs. Far from being transparent, these remarks border on the bizarre. The natural reaction is to assimilate them to more familiar quantified forms. Oh, I see, one is inclined to think, You re saying that being G is a property that is true of few Fs, or You are saying that the propositional function that assigns to any object o the proposition that o is G assigns a true proposition to few Fs (or to few things that are F). The worry is not that the Russellian can t admit the speaker said this. The worry is that his explanation gets things backwards. According to him, the speaker implicitly said that being G is a property that is true of few F s or that the propositional function that assigns to any object o the proposition that o is G assigns a true proposition to few things that are Fs by virtue of having explicitly asserted the allegedly different, adverbially-expressed, proposition, of which the proposition implicitly asserted is a trivial consequence. Not so, one is inclined to object; it is our understanding of the Russellian adverbial formulations that is parasitic on our prior understanding of the quantificational locutions, not the other way around. Although I take this objection to be correct, it is stronger than needed. The adverbial strategy for avoiding the reductio requires the notions being every time true of F s, being at least one time true of F s, and being few (or most) times true of F s to be primitive, conceptually prior to, and used in the analysis of, being true of every F, being true of at least one F, and being true of few (or most) F s. Surely this is misguided. If one set of notions is 7

8 to be explained in terms of the other, the objector is right in taking the adverbial formulations to be derivative rather than primary. But we need not insist on this. It is enough to note that if the adverbially expressed notions can be taken to be primitive, then those expressed using the ordinary quantifiers every F, at least one F, and few Fs can too. With this I put aside the adverbial strategy for blocking the reductio, and return to the practice of using quantifiers undergoing analysis to specify the propositions expressed by sentences containing them. This involves accepting the original argument up to C2. P1. The proposition expressed by (1) consists of two constituents the property being true of everything and the property being F the first of which is predicated of the second. P2. If a proposition p consists of two constituents being so-and-so and such-and-such, the first of which is predicated of the latter, then p = the proposition that such and such is so-and-so. C1. The proposition expressed by (1) = the proposition that being F is true of everything. (Call this proposition Prop 1.) P3. Prop 1 is also expressed by sentence (1a). 1a. The property being F is true of everything. C2. So, (1) and (1a) express the same proposition. At this point, we need to find a new way of challenging P4, so as to block reductiogenerating conclusion C3. P4. The expression is true of that occurs in sentence (1a) is a 2-place predicate that expresses the relation being true of, which holds between properties and objects. Since the quantifier everything stands in the second argument-place of this predicate, (1a) is a universally quantified sentence that expresses the same proposition as (1 ). 1. Everything is such that the property being F is true of it. ( x: the property being F is true of x.) P5. So, the Frege/Russell analysis of quantification applies to (1a/1 ), yielding a proposition that has two constituents the first of which being true of everything is predicated of the second being an object of which the property F is true. P6. This proposition (described in P5), is the proposition that the property being an object of which the property being F is true is true of everything. Call it Prop 2. 8

9 C3. The proposition expressed by (1a/1 ) is Prop 2. To block this reasoning, we must prevent the analysis from reapplying to (1a) in the manner indicated by P4 and P5. We must either allow the analysis to apply in a different way that does not produce the original hierarchy, or explain why applying it again would be a mistake. Let s try the former. We ask, What is the property being true of everything? Suppose it is being a property P such that for every x, P is true of x i.e. λp (for every x: P is true of x). So understood, the proposition expressed by (1a) is not identical to that expressed by (1 ) as claimed by P4. The two are merely equivalent. On this new view, the predicate is true of everything is not an incomplete symbol; it expresses a genuine property that is predicated of being F. This is an improvement, which is squarely in line with the fundamental idea behind the Frege/Russell analysis, was not captured by taking (1 ) to express the proposition expressed by sentences (1) and (1a). On the present suggestion, these two sentences express the proposition given by (1aλ). 1aλ. λp [Every x: P is true of x] the property being F Being F is a property that is true of everything. With this change, the previous hierarchy is no longer generated. However, this doesn t help. Since (1aλ) contains every x we simply get a new and equally worrisome hierarchy. We start with (1), which we are told expresses the same proposition as (1a), which, by the route just taken, expresses the same proposition as (1aλ). 1. Every x: Fx. 1a. The property being F is true of everything. 1aλ λp [Every x: P is true of x] the property being F This is trouble. Because (1aλ) contains a quantified clause, it is structurally and computationally more complex than (1a), which is itself reason to doubt that the two 9

10 sentences express the same proposition. The case is strengthened by applying the analysis again inside the clause, which results in (1aλλ). 1aλλ λp [λq (Every x: Q is true of x) being an object of which P is true] the property being F The property being F is a property P such that the property being an object of which P is true is true of everything This proposition is even more complex, containing new and more complex constituents than proposition (1a)/(1aλ). Since it isn t identical with that proposition, we still have a reductio. The problem, I suggest, is that we have misconstrued the Frege/Russell analysis of quantification from the outset. The point of the analysis is not to define quantificational locutions like everything, at least seven Fs, and Most Fs in other terms. As we saw in pursuing the adverbial strategy, the proposed substitutes are no advance on the originals. Their only virtue is that because they don t contain the quantifiers under analysis, there is no temptation to reapply the analysis, and so generate a hierarchy. But surely, taking them to be primitive is no better than taking being true of everything, being true of at least seven Fs, being true of most Fs to be primitive. The correct way of understanding the Frege/Russell analysis is to see it as a theory of logical form. Instead of specifying the propositions expressed by every sentence containing quantificational locutions, it targets a subclass of these sentences to be explained using quantifier-containing sentences outside the class. The sentences outside the class are the analysis-giving ones. In these sentences, a quantifier Q occurs in a predicate is true of Q the argument of which is a term designating a property or propositional function applying to the entities over which Q ranges. Sentences of this form are antecedently intelligible without further analysis, and express propositions in which the property expressed by the predicate containing the quantifier is predicated of the property or propositional function designated 10

11 by its argument. The point of the analysis is not to analyze the contents of quantifiers, but to indicate the semantic role quantifiers play as constituents of higher-level predicates. This is a theory of logical form the goal of which is to reveal the structure of the propositions expressed by sentences containing quantifiers. The analysis tells us that even when a quantifier appears in a sentence in which no higher-level predication is explicit, the true logical form of the sentence is one in which the quantifier is used to predicate a higherlevel property of the property, or propositional function, designated by the formula that results from extracting the quantifier from the original sentence. When this is understood, the explanation of why the analysis doesn t reapply to the logical form of the original sentence is evident. It doesn t apply because, once we have arrived at the logical form of a sentence, there is nothing further to do. 11

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