1 Philosophy Philosophy of science Science

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1 CHRISTIAN KRIJNEN 13 1 Philosophy Philosophy of science Science Contents 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Philosophy Philosophy is the science of totality Philosophy is the science of presuppositions Philosophy is the science of validity Philosophy as reflection 1.3 Philosophy and the philosophy of science Perspectives on science from the special sciences Philosophical perspectives on science Why science? 1.4 Philosophy of science and science The purpose of the philosophy of science The theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science Objects of knowing and knowing of objects Methodological retrospective The scientific character of science 1.5 Summary 1.6 Test and assignments 1.7 Suggested reading

2 14 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES 1.1 Introduction Why should undergraduates or graduate students reading economics or business administration occupy themselves with philosophy? What is philosophy? What is philosophy of science? What do philosophy and philosophy of science have to do with science? And what is science? Is looking for the answers to these questions just a pastime for dreary, lonesome Sunday afternoons, or is it an essential part of the education of economists and students of business administration, regardless of their mood and position? These are the main questions discussed in this chapter. Even though whole libraries have been filled with proposed answers to most of these questions, it is not my purpose to take a historical tour past the answers philosophers have given to these questions. Rather than taking on too much historical baggage, I will attempt to elab orate, in a philosophical way, a systematic framework for the interpretation of the phenomenon of science and the role philosophy has to play within this framework (thus in contrast to a framework oriented towards the history of philosophy, we will focus on the theme under discussion). Obviously philosophers have had different views on the topics discussed in this text (just as scientists have differed over topics in their subjects). Since it is my goal to develop a systematic framework of interpretation I shall refrain as much as possible from explicitly arguing with these different views. 1 The reader will be introduced to philosophizing about science in the following way. First of all I will clarify what philosophy is about. Secondly I will discuss the relationship between philosophy and philosophy of science, and thirdly, the relationship between philosophy of science and science. A summary, a set of questions on the topics treated and a short bibliography conclude this chapter. 1.2 Philosophy The simplest answer to the question Why do we need philosophy? is: To answer this question. For any answer to this question presupposes knowledge of what philosophy is. How could we seriously know why we need philosophy if we have no idea what philosophy is? The question as to what philosophy is, however, is itself a philosophical question; as a consequence we need philosophy in order to answer the question why we need philosophy (or why we don t)! 1 This interpretation framework provides a perspective from which we can consider these different views. Discussion of these other views might highlight the framework, as well as make them more transparent by placing them in the framework. On this issue see also chapter 2,

3 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 15 The answer to the question Why do we need philosophy? presupposes even more. If we don t want to take an arbitrary, irresponsible decision on the question under review, but seriously wish to know what is the case, then the answer must be a theoretically valid answer, a true answer. So we encounter yet another set of presuppositions, which we need to answer the question: What is knowledge? What is validity? What is truth? On top of that comes the question as to why what we shall be saying about these presuppositions is itself true and valid knowledge. By what criteria do we judge our statements about knowledge, validity and truth? What I have just said about knowledge, truth and validity holds good for many concepts. Speaking very generally we can say that everyone at least implicitly has views on the meaning of being human, the nature of reality and human s place in the world. Philosophy, or philosophical thought, begins when such fundamental ideas become problematic for some reason (if we find ourselves in an identity crisis, for example, or in times of political turmoil). What has always been taken for granted is now a topic of discussion. If and when these fundamental ideas are at stake, they explicitly become themes of our thinking. To conceive of such ideas conceptually in an accountable way is to think philosophically, is philosophy. This is only a very general determination of what philosophy is. It leads to further questions, especially to this one: What do we mean by fundamental ideas that concern the world and ourselves, that are said to be the theme of philosophy? To answer this question, it makes sense to determine the theme of philosophy more precisely in three ways; in so doing we shall not only specify our general determination of philosophy, but also make clear, from three different perspectives, why we need philosophy: 1. Philosophy is the science of totality ( 1.2.1) 2. Philosophy is the science of presuppositions ( 1.2.2) 3. Philosophy is the science of validity ( 1.2.3). These three determinations of the theme of philosophy are not separate but belong together. I will show that they elucidate the theme of philosophy from different perspectives. Philosophy cannot be determined by its thematic focus alone: it is also determined by a method of its own: Philosophy is reflection, which makes for the fourth determination of philosophy ( 2.4) Philosophy is the science of totality Philosophy is the science of totality. This means too that the other, non-philosophical, sciences are not sciences of totality. We could hold that these other sciences thematize certain aspects of reality. They are special sciences. As such, they thematize parts of the whole or the totality (which is reality). The natural sciences, for example, investigate nature. The cultural sciences (the humanities) investigate culture. Within the domain of natural science some inves-

4 16 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES tigate that which is physical, others that which is chemical. Again, within chemistry some investigate chemical-organic, others chemical-anorganic nature. Within the domain of the cultural sciences, one scientist may be interested in art, visual art or architecture (ancient, modern, etc), while another practises linguistics, for example language typology or computational linguistics. What is philosophy s task from this point of view? Unlike the special sciences, philosophy doesn t investigate part of the whole, it investigates the whole itself: philosophy asks about the coherence or unity of the parts. It doesn t add up the parts of knowledge we obtain from the various sciences: it does not ask about totality as the sum of its parts. Rather, philosophy seeks to know, to use a quotation from the German poet Goethe: was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält. This is the case, since it is through such a conception of the whole, in terms of the way in which its parts relate to one another, that the different parts of the whole have their own particular meaning. We could say that the topic of a philosophical investigation is what the object of a certain science is as an object (that which makes up the objectivity of the object) and what scientific knowledge is as scientific knowledge (what makes it scientific and what its character of knowledge consists in). This is rather abstract, hence the following three examples. a. The game of chess. In chess we can distinguish individual positions and the internal rules pertaining to those positions (opening, middle and endgame rules) from the rules that characterize the game of chess as the game of chess (the rules that distinguish it from, for instance, the game of football). Positions and internal rules pertaining to those positions presuppose general rules which characterize the game of chess as such. Generally speaking, we can distinguish rules which circumscribe, define, constitute the domain of a phenomenon (such as chess) from the investigation of the content of such a phenomenon (e.g. the different positions you can take in a game). What does this imply with respect to the empirical sciences ( experiential sciences )? The empirical sciences in their own way play a game too to be more precise, they play a game which is specific for a particular science. As empirical sciences they investigate the content of reality: the natural sciences investigate the content of nature (e.g. physics or chemistry), while the cultural sciences investigate the content of culture (e.g. art history or linguistics). b. Buckingham Palace. If a member of the British royal family were to ask an economist, a business administration expert, a sociologist, an architect, an engineer, a chemist, an art historian and an artist to answer the question What is Buckingham Palace?, he or she would receive different answers regarding the same object. How can this be? Clearly, different specialists play different games. They operate with different research methods and they employ different concepts, even different fundamental concepts. In short, they play according to different rules, which give meaning and a sense of direction to their actions, but also distinguish these actions. Which rules are

5 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 17 we concerned with here? Are these rules valid? How do they relate to one another? What do they mean for the real world? Is this real world only the sum of knowledge yielded by the empirical sciences? To ask the question with respect to a specific part of the whole: is an interdisciplinary science such as business administration merely the sum total of (aspects of) the social sciences, economics, business studies and engineering, or does a coherent whole come about which adds something to the parts and makes up the specific nature of business administration? Insight into the parts of business administration, their differences and the way they interrelate is a necessary condition for a proper understanding of such an interdisciplinary science. c. These two examples not only give us the opportunity to further elucidate a number of ideas (such as presupposing ), but they also introduce an opportunity to illustrate the relationship between part and whole on a more abstract level, namely by means of the concept of a function prescription (in a broad sense, the relationship between variables). This is not to say that philosophical questions can be reduced to mathematical questions, but that the structure of a function prescription can clarify the relationship between part and whole. Through this we shall gain a better understanding of what it means to say that philosophy is the science of totality. We can distinguish the function f(x) = y from function variables. These variables have their place and meaning as variables within a series only because of the function prescription: the function is not the sum of its parts (e.g. the sum of a series of numbers), but instead makes the parts interrelate. A function is not only a function of variables; as a function, it is remarkably enough the way function and variables interrelate, the way function of and variables of a function relate to one another. The concept of a function means that a function is a function of variables and variables are the variables of a function. The function makes up this way of fitting together. A function, as a function of, always pertains to variables, while variables are always variables of a function. They are what they are (as variables) only through the function; without it, they together may make up chaos but they certainly cannot be variables. What can we learn from this somewhat abstract illustration, if we want to better understand what it means to say that totality is the theme of philosophy? We can at least learn this: the whole that philosophy thematizes is not general in a sense that would divorce it from the special parts (nature, culture, economics, art, etc). On the contrary, part and whole are interrelated like function and function variables are interrelated. The whole makes up the foundation of the parts as parts (of the whole). If we say of philosophy that it investigates that which is general, this is true only in this sense. Having said this, we move on to the second determination of the nature of philosophy! Philosophy is the science of presuppositions The whole makes up the foundation of its parts. If the whole, which philosophy thema-

6 18 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES tizes, makes up the foundation of its parts, which are thematized by the special sciences, then philosophy apparently provides the foundation for the special sciences. What does it mean to say that philosophy provides a foundation for the special sciences? The example of chess provides us with a first clue. We have said that the individual positions within a game of chess presuppose the general rules which make up the game as such. In what sense do the parts, which are the themes of the special sciences, presuppose the whole as the theme of philosophy? The special sciences presuppose it conceptually: the concept of a part is inconceivable without the concept of the whole, since both concepts have meaning only in relation to each other. This is why the problem of the totality is necessarily connected to thinking within the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences, after all, think in terms of parts of reality. If we say that these sciences investigate part of reality economic reality for instance then this always (at least implicitly) presupposes a notion of totality, a notion of totality of which economic reality is a part. What kind of notion is this? In any event it will be clear that philosophy is not involved in a competition with the special sciences, for philosophy tries to determine what concept of totality these sciences as special sciences always presuppose. Philosophy seeks to know how a whole arises out of these various disciplines (however much they encompass), a whole which is the world we live in. Again we see that philosophy doesn t thematize the sum but the function of the parts (the sum would itself be a part instead of a unity as the way the parts interrelate). It conceives of parts as parts of a totality and of totality as a totality of parts. In brief, philosophy and the special sciences cannot do without each other; they are intrinsically related. What does this abstract discourse on totality and parts mean concretely? If philosophy tries to provide foundations for the special sciences, it doesn t aim for something outside these sciences; rather it aims for something contained within the special sciences themselves, something which makes up the unity of the sciences. Let s look back once again to the example of the game of chess. Just as in a game of chess the delimiting rules are presupposed, so the foundations and the fundamental concepts of a science are presupposed when practising science. If philosophy tries to grasp the unity of science, then it tries to grasp the foundations and fundamental concepts which play a role within this science. These make up the foundation of a certain science, in the same way that the constitutive rules of the game of chess make up the foundation of chess, since these determine chess as chess. But just as these rules are presupposed in playing chess, so the rules of science are presupposed in the practice of science: they are presupposed in their determinacy (which rules they are, what they mean) and they are presupposed to be valid (their validity is presupposed). If we think back again to the example of Buckingham Palace, it stands to reason that economists and students of business administration employ a conceptual framework different from the one employed by physicists and chemists; the way they investigate their objects also differs from the way mathematicians investigate theirs (the optimal structure of an organization is founded differently from Pythagoras theorem).

7 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 19 Without such a conceptual framework regarding content and method, we couldn t talk about specific sciences with their specific objects at all. Philosophy thematizes this framework: in philosophy we want to know what kind of framework it is and whether or not it is valid. It might be illuminating to discuss a number of fundamental concepts by way of example, before further analysing the issue of the presupposed conceptual framework. a. Physics uses the concept of velocity and defines this concept as the quotient of distance and time: v = d/t. However, the concept of velocity can count as defined only if its defining concepts (quotient, time, distance) have themselves been defined. In the case of quotient as part of the definition v = d/t for instance, a certain quantitative ratio of variables (d, t) is at issue. This means that the definition v = d/t presupposes the definitions of the quantitative relation as such, of trajectory as such, of spatial trajectory ( distance ) and temporal trajectory ( time ). The presupposed definitions of these concepts presuppose even more general concepts: the concept of a temporal trajectory cannot be defined without the concept of time. The concept trajectory cannot be defined without the concepts dimension, extension, continuity, discreteness, and so on. This shows us the following: the definition from physics v = d/t yields a whole set of questions regarding definitions. The concept of velocity (d) is fully determined only if these questions have been resolved, only if, to put it formally, the determining concepts themselves have been determined. What is the point of this example from physics? From a certain level up, physics itself does not provide the required definitions, but rather presupposes the definitions of a number of its concepts, such as space as such, time as such, motion as such, change as such and dimension as such. Insofar as physicists themselves consider questions of this kind, their considerations stay within the limits of the scientific thought of physicists, that is to say it stays within the presupposed conceptual framework and the problem of presuppositions thus remains unresolved. b. The discipline of history seeks to give answers about historical events. History asks for example whether the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance was a continual process of decay, or whether the Middle Ages suddenly disappeared. Regarding this historical question philosophy asks: what fundamental concepts are presupposed by questions of this kind? Apparently some of these presupposed concepts are historical process, process as such, culture, cultural unity, continuity as such, discreteness as such, cultural continuity, historical continuity, and so on. What theoretical worth can a historian s analysis have, if the validity and definition of the concepts this analysis presupposes are not discussed? c. Philosophy explicitly makes the validity and definition of such fundamental concepts the subject of its research. Of course this not only holds for the fundamental concepts of physics and history, but for the fundamental concepts of the other sciences as well. The example of physics can easily be extended to business administration: Business administration investigates so-called problems of transport with respect to

8 20 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES operational management. In this case concepts such as speed, time and distance play a role. Economics, however, is concerned with cyclical phenomena, so notions such as processuality, continuity and discreteness have foundational roles; these are notions which require further explication and philosophy Philosophy is the science of validity Having discussed some examples of fundamental concepts, we now resume the detailed analysis of the issue of the presupposed conceptual framework. This brings us to the third determination of philosophy: philosophy is not only the science of totality and the science of presuppositions, it is the science of validity as well. This determination too is in line with the insights reached thus far. For we are not just interested in finding out about the kind of conceptual framework scientists use, we also want to know whether this framework is valid. Why do we set so much store by the question of validity? Because our research is set within this conceptual framework! If this framework, or some fundamental concepts within it, were not valid, any knowledge we obtain within this framework or by means of these concepts would not be valid either; just as in chess we can make good moves or less good moves, and moves which are invalid because they have no basis in the rules of the game. Put formally, the validity of a science s presuppositions is a condition for the validity of the knowledge that science has. Researchers produce knowledge (judgements, concepts, conclusions, theories, etc), or at least they mean to. Knowledge is not something which is straightforwardly given; it is something which is produced by cognizing subjects. What does the character of being a produced entity imply from the point of view of the theory of validity? One fact we all regularly find ourselves confronted with is that we have made a mistake. What we had thought turned out not to be an adequate determination of the object of our thinking: our thought is not valid with respect to its object; it is not true (= theoretically valid). In our attempts to produce knowledge we are concerned, as cognizing subjects, with truth, we are concerned with theoretical validity, but the knowledge product we have brought into being is not true only because we produced it. Rather this product is possibly false, possibly true, possibly (theoretically) valid, possibly (theoretically) invalid. We are, as philosophers sometimes put it, finite subjects. Like our other cultural products, the cultural product knowledge also claims to be valid. 2 Obviously there are a great many notions for which this is true. Brohm problematizes the notion of fact (what is a fact?) in chapter 3, Zinkstok the notion of causality (what is a cause?) in chapter 6, Heldring the notion of the value of an enterprise in chapter 7, while Kee problematizes the notion of control in his chapter on accountancy (chapter 8) and Krijnen problematizes that of method in chapter 9, and so on.

9 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 21 The fact of this claim does not of itself by any stretch of the imagination make the claim valid. Our cognitive achievement is possibly valid, which implies that it is in principle fallible (our claim may fail to be true) and revisable (we may have to reconsider our claim). Knowledge is characterized by validity. Knowledge is determined by being concerned with validity. Through this concern the cultural product knowledge obtains a theoretical value: if it is true or valid knowledge it obtains a positive value, if it is false or invalid knowledge it obtains a negative value. Moreover, the theoretical value which characterizes knowledge is an alternative value, that is to say, knowledge is necessarily either valid or invalid (or partially valid or invalid). Knowledge, we may say, is validity-different: it is something which always pertains to validity and is characterized by an alternative value. While knowledge is a validity-different phenomenon, natural processes are validity-indifferent; it doesn t make sense to ask if rain is valid but it makes sense to ask if the statement it is raining is valid. The validity difference of our knowledge is an intriguing issue, which puts extraordinary pressure on us both as human beings and as scientists. For how do we conduct ourselves in the face of the validity difference of knowledge? Is it all the same to us if our statements are valid or not? On the contrary. After all, we claim that things are the way we say they are. And for us a validity-different statement alone will not do. Rather, we try to justify our knowledge claims: we advance reasons, bases and foundations for our statements; we provide foundations for our knowledge. Founding knowledge is nothing else than justifying it. In a sense the problem of foundations is the central problem of philosophy. This isn t just true of systematic philosophy, it holds for the history of philosophy as well. As long ago as the times of ancient Greece philosophers looked for rational arguments, justifications and foundations for our thoughts and actions, with respect not only to knowledge, but also to other areas of culture, such as morals, politics, art and religion. This search for foundations itself may be justified by taking a closer look at our attempt to gather knowledge. Philosophers such as Socrates ( B.C.), Plato ( B.C.) and Aristotle (384/3-322/1 B.C.) distinguished between scientific knowledge and extra-scientific opinion. This distinction has an important corollary in the insight that the concept of scientific knowledge is inextricably bound up with concepts such as ground and foundation. Science doesn t merely ask about the that, it also and particularly asks about the why of being : it seeks to know why something is the way it is. A scientific claim to truth always means that this claim is not only capable of being founded (in the way an opinion could be founded too), but is actually founded as scientific knowledge. Scientists justify their claim to knowledge by answering the why-question in a methodologically sound way. Scientific knowledge doesn t merely like other knowledge have to confront the question about its validity, it also provides a justification for its knowledge. Scientific knowledge is well-founded knowledge. Very generally speaking the scientific character of scientific knowledge lies in the pursuit of the provision of foundations: science tries to found the validity of its

10 22 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES statements (whether or not this foundation works out is irrelevant to the pursuit itself). Speaking very generally once more, with a view to a very general meaning of method this time, we may therefore say that the giving of scientific foundations is the method of science. To give an example: in ancient times too, some people were of the opinion that the sun doesn t revolve round the earth, but that the earth revolves round the sun. However, Copernicus was able to turn this opinion into scientific knowledge, since he succeeded in justifying this opinion in a methodologically accountable way (we will discuss below what it means to be methodologically accountable ). Science is not satisfied at least as far as its claims to knowledge are concerned with opinions, myths, religious beliefs or utterances of will. The relationship scientific knowledge has to foundation may be illuminated further if we consider what we have said above regarding presuppositions and the relationship wholes and parts have to each other. For concomitant with the scientific requirement of founding our statements, there arises the problem of the foundations of validity and, as a corollary, the problem of the validity conditions of scientific knowledge. Let us take a closer look at the problem of foundations and the problem of validity conditions! The why-question may be put in such a way that the knowledge the sciences have of natural and cultural reality is ultimately confronted with the question regarding the presupposed concepts of knowledge and truth. To that end we only need to place our examples from the disciplines of physics, history, business administration and economics in a somewhat brighter spotlight by drawing attention to the following point. Scientists not only found their statements (about the velocity with which particles fall, historical processes, transportation issues, cyclical phenomena, etc); all kinds of presuppositions are at work in this activity of founding whose specific character and validity remain implicit. Their judgements, theorems, theories and so on rest on this presupposed foundation. A conclusion for example is, strictly speaking, nothing other than the foundation of the validity of a statement on the basis of a number of premises which together are considered to be sufficient reason for this conclusion s validity. To give an example: Premise 1: when it rains the streets get wet Premise 2: it is raining Conclusion: the streets are getting wet. Generally speaking the validity of a statement can be justified only by showing how this statement has its basis in other statements. This foundational regress, that is to say this retreating movement from one statement to the other, eventually leads to a why-question concerning foundations, presuppositions, grounds of scientific knowledge as such: what is knowledge?, what is truth? Oddly enough the sciences which in the first instance pursue only knowledge of empirical reality, of parts of reality (events, processes, states, relations, laws and so on) in a finite number of steps find themselves considering knowledge and truth itself to be problematic they find themselves involved in philosophy.

11 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 23 If we want to know why special scientists ought to be interested in philosophy, then the foundational regress I have just sketched is exceedingly important. The relationship between philosophy and empirical science can also be made clear by taking into account the foundation of structure of knowledge. If we want to know what knowledge is, we soon discover that it involves all kinds of linguistic, economic, psychological and even physical aspects. 3 We must distinguish this type of aspect from another type: the structure of sense or meaning which knowledge has, the logical structure of knowledge. In this case the adjective logical implies that this aspect of knowledge is distinct from its linguistic aspects (knowledge is always knowledge within a certain language, which means it is subject to linguistic conditions), its social aspects (knowledge is always knowledge within a social context, so it is subject to social conditions), its economic aspects, etc. If that is so, then what is at issue where this logical structure is concerned? The structure of thought is at issue. A thought is a thought about an object. For a long time philosophers considered the structure of a thought about an object to be the same as the structure of a judgement : knowledge always has the structure of a judgement. In that case humans are mortal is tantamount to saying that: the subject concept humans is characterized by the predicate concept mortal in the judgement humans are mortal. Humans are what is contained within the determination of the concept mortal. Generally speaking the subject concept in a judgement is determined by the predicate concept as the thing it is ( the predicate concept is valid with respect to the subject concept ). Does this insight into the fundamental structure of knowledge enable us to better understand the relationship between philosophy and empirical science? Indeed it does, since this structure throws light on the presuppositional structure of knowledge. If the concept to be determined (the subject concept) is conceived through the determining concept (the predicate concept) as determined (the subject concept is the predicate concept, the predicate concept is valid for the subject concept), then it follows that the determinacy of the determining concept is presupposed by each characterization. Our example presupposes the determinacy of the concept mortal in the determination of humans as mortal. 4 (We could also make this predicate concept an explicit theme of our thinking ( mortal is ) and thus place it in the position of the subject con- 3 On the social context of knowledge, see Metselaar, chapter 5. On non-philosophical perspectives, see of the present chapter. 4 For an example from business administration, see Heldring (chapter 7), where the meaning of an enterprise s market value is considered problematic. Kee gives a nice example for accountancy in chapter 8; see the discussion of the concept of assets or an annual account.

12 24 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES cept and have it determined by other predicate concepts, which can again be qualified by their own determinacy, and so on). The interesting point about this constellation, moreover, is that our example not only presupposes the determinacy of empirical concepts (like the concept mortal in the above example or the concept of profit if we hold that an enterprise is an organization whose aim is to make profit), it also presupposes the determinacy of a variety of formal concepts, which found such empirical concepts, such as the determinacy of the concept of predicate concept or of the concept concept. Indeed, even if we say that something is the case, that it is a fact, if we make a true statement, if we have obtained true knowledge of reality or at least claim to have done so, then we have always already presupposed the determinacy of the concepts of knowledge, truth and reality! What is knowledge? What is truth? What is reality? To put it briefly, although the special sciences determine parts of reality and even indicate the basis for their determinations of the parts, they eventually encounter the question as to the original determinacy of knowledge and truth themselves as the ultimate determining concepts of all our claims to truth and knowledge. It has become clear through the discussions of the relationship between part and whole and the theme of presuppositions and the validity problem that philosophy investigates the foundations of science. Philosophy seeks to know what these foundations are and to what extent they are valid. This is a question about principles. Whether some particular scientific statement is true or not (say, whether the velocity of circulation increases if interest rates go up, or an enterprise s human resource management can contribute to its market position, etc) is not the first concern of philosophy: these issues are primarily questions for the special sciences themselves. Philosophy investigates something different: the presuppositions of the special sciences as the framework or conceptual scheme from which these special sciences derive their validity. Philosophy investigates the principles which are presupposed to be unproblematic in the day-to-day practice of the sciences, although they constitute the foundations of the validity of scientific knowledge. On the one hand this knowledge of knowledge is distinguished from every knowledge of parts of reality, but on the other it is not completely separate from it. It is concerned with knowledge of these parts, for it constitutes the foundation for every claim to knowledge it is the ground of validity of the fact that something is knowledge or is not knowledge. Philosophy asks about the validity principles of the special sciences Philosophy as reflection So far we have seen that philosophy: is the science of totality is the science of presuppositions is the science of validity.

13 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 25 Philosophy, then, is not something else than science; it is simply not a special science. If the business of philosophy is totality, presuppositions or validity, then we must also say that the special sciences don t thematize such notions, or at least that they don t thematize them adequately. Why can t the special sciences do this? Of course the reason is not that scientists either lack intelligence or have bad intentions. Rather it lies in the matter itself, namely the method of research of the special sciences. Is the game of chess not played differently from the game of investigating the rules of chess? Knowledge concerning parts of reality has a different methodological structure than knowledge aimed at finding out what the knowledge of these parts presupposes. It is of considerable importance to train our sights on this difference between how the special sciences view reality and how philosophy does. Whereas up to now we have primarily been concerned with philosophy s theme, which of course already includes aspects of method, we will now concern ourselves explicitly with philosophy s method. We will further attempt to determine this method as contrasted with the method of the special sciences. By way of example let us consider how the question of validity is treated, for we know that philosophy asks about the validity principles of the special sciences. But if philosophy thematizes validity adequately, then this must pertain to a different issue from the question as to how the various sciences go about their research. Such an investigation of the way the sciences in fact go about their business is in any case conducted on the basis of these validity principles, which should be thematized precisely in terms of validity. In no way does the philosophical question about validity seek to determine validity in terms of some actual consensus among scientists about any theory. Is consensus a sufficient reason for considering something to be valid? Is what the majority think therefore true? Nor can generalizations from empirical observations be at issue in the philosophical question about validity, for truth does not follow from them (just as having observed a thousand white swans doesn t rule out that the thousand-andfirst swan might be black, or doesn t imply that no swan is any colour other than white). Research into deviations from some empirical norm or other also leaves unanswered the philosophical question about validity. In attempts such as these, some concept of validity is presupposed, which enables us to proclaim that consensus is validity, cognitive processes are valid cognitive processes, and the empirical norm is a valid norm. This becomes clear when we take a look at economics and ethnology. How would economists determine what validity is? By way of which method would they do so? It stands to reason that economists will characterize validity in terms of a utility function, but how do they argue for the identification of validity with utility? Has it instead not been presupposed that validity is a function of utility with a view to giving a further determination of this function? How would ethnologists determine what truth is? Perhaps they draw conclusions about cultural differences regarding truth from observations, interviews, question-

14 26 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES naires, experiments, etc, but is truth merely a subjective qualification? Does not science qua science (ethnology in this case) look for the objective truth about a certain state of affairs? This research into the various conceptions of truth in various cultures purports to be (objectively) true itself. If so, what concept of truth does the ethnologist presuppose? And is this concept a valid one? Why is it valid? Does ethnologists own research not show that there is no such thing as a uniform concept of truth? In what sense, then, could they be entitled to use it to determine different views as different views on truth? To answer the question about validity and in doing so characterize the foundational concepts, the principles of validity, philosophy needs to follow a method different from that of the special sciences. Although the problems of philosophy are internally related to those of these sciences, and although without doubt the special sciences must depend on philosophy for the clarification of their foundations, philosophical knowledge is nonetheless a different type of scientific knowledge from knowledge in the special sciences. The special sciences may be characterized by saying they have a direct relation to their object, whereas philosophy has an indirect relation to the object of the special sciences. The special sciences investigate their objects within an unproblematically presupposed conceptual framework; philosophy investigates this framework itself. Philosophy is not knowledge starting from the principles of knowledge of the special sciences; it is knowledge of those principles. Whereas the special sciences found knowledge as scientific knowledge, philosophy founds knowledge and scientific knowledge itself. Philosophy is not forced on the special sciences for reasons external to those sciences; rather philosophy responds to the foundational urge of the special sciences and tries to continue and complete it in its own way. How is this done? What does this indirect relationship to the object of the special sciences mean? We could describe this indirect relationship as a reflexive attitude: the method of philosophy is the method of reflection. Since we already know that philosophy ultimately thematizes the validity of a conceptual framework, this reflection as such is a validity reflection. Reflection literally means something like to bounce back ( to re-flect ). In our perspective reflection means that thinking, which as scientific thinking in the first instance concerns things, states of affairs, processes and so on in the world, in the second instance returns to itself: thinking considers thinking qua thinking. If thinking distances itself from its natural (direct) concern with objects and concerns itself with itself (as the thinking of objects), it realizes that it implicitly uses a whole variety of fundamental concepts, such as equality, difference, identity, relation, quantity, quality, cause and effect or thing and property to determine the objects of investigation. Thinking then asks itself: what do these concepts actually mean? In so asking it aims to make such concepts, the way they relate to one another and their validity the explicit theme of investigation: thinking thinks about itself, it thinks about its doings if and when it thinks about objects, in a logical sense (in the sense of what it has always presup-

15 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 27 posed). So thinking takes a step back from things in the world to itself. It takes this step back because it knows that it has always presupposed its own fundamental or principal determinacy in every concrete knowledge activity. This is not just true in the case of the fundamental concepts just mentioned, which determine the objects of empirical investigation as such; it has become clear above that this is also true of many more specific concepts, such as the fundamental concepts of the various special sciences. These are presupposed in the knowledge activities of these sciences Things in the world. 2. Determination of things in the world. Result: judgements, theories and so on concerning Reflection on the determination of things in the world. Result: judgements, theories and so on concerning 2, hence concerning 1, and hence concerning the relationship between 1 and 2. Remarkably, thinking sees fairly quickly that thinking is thinking something, about something by somebody. It is thinking of a thinking subject which produces, through cognitive acts, thoughts about an object. There is a great deal to be said about these notions and their relations to each other. It is certainly striking that the day-to-day conception of thinking as well as the conception of thinking of the special sciences the so-called natural attitude concerning knowledge turns out to be at the very least problematic when subjected to philosophical scrutiny. According to the natural attitude, thinking and reality are separate entities: knowing is a process in which thinking thinks about a world which is independent of thinking; knowledge means that thinking and a reality which doesn t depend on thinking correspond to each other. That independent reality is the source of (or the criterion for) the validity of knowledge: knowledge which corresponds to reality is true. 6 There are many reasons for calling this natural attitude naïve. Perhaps the following will suffice. The relationship between thinking and reality is in no way a theme for investigation in the special sciences. According to the figure above the special sciences think about things (1 2), not about the relationship between things and reality (3). If we were to think about this relationship, we would quickly come to the conclusion that subject and object are by no means completely independent of each other. Thinking itself (qua thinking of objects) at a deeply fundamental level of its own 5 See footnote 2 to this chapter. 6 On this so-called correspondence theory of truth, see Metselaar (chapter 5), Zinkstok (chapter 6) and Krijnen (chapters 9 and 10).

16 28 PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION STUDIES determinacy, at a deeply fundamental level of its own structure, appears to differentiate itself in terms of subject, thought and object that is, in terms that are completely meaningless if not related to each other. 7 Nothing can be thought independently of thinking and thinking is always thinking of something. Strictly speaking, the unthinkable cannot even be ; to be able to say meaningfully, intelligibly and comprehensibly that something is, that which is at least has to be thinkable. How else can we know what is being said? Being thinkable, thinking is therefore a condition for anything to be. This intriguing phenomenon, however, need not detain us long here. 8 It is more important to us at present that the type of reflection we have just sketched is validity reflection. Reflection on knowledge is self-knowledge, knowledge of knowledge qua knowledge. All knowledge implies a claim to validity. This claim to validity urges us to reflect, for we want to know whether our claim to validity is right or not. We therefore look for grounds for the validity of the claim made. If thinking thinks about itself, it primarily thinks about itself in terms of its claim to validity. This is what reflection on validity is. In reflecting on validity, thinking determines the meaning of its own activity: 9 the validity determinacy of knowledge is made into a theme. As a corollary the concept of knowledge which all specific knowledge presupposes is determined in terms of validity conditions. These validity conditions define so to speak knowledge as knowledge. We get to know about this through reflection. Reflection yields self-knowledge: knowledge of the foundations of our cognitive concern with ourselves and the world. It goes without saying that reflection on validity is not limited to scientists claims to truth, and the concomitant responsibility to reflect on their own science. In other areas of culture too such relations have a role to play: within the spheres of law, politics, morality, art, religion and so on, we also reflect on the value of our concerns, on the validity of the rules which determine what we do or don t do. 10 Here too the philosophical question about presupposed fundamental concepts such as justice or beauty is unavoidable; such concepts underlie all our claims to justice and beauty, just as the concept of knowledge underlies all claims to knowledge. Which minimal methodological condition should be fulfilled by such reflection on those fundamental concepts which we always presuppose? Let us consider once again the foundational urge that is characteristic of scientific knowledge. If scientific knowledge is 7 On the relationship between thinking and reality, see Zinkstok (chapter 6) and, in more detail, Krijnen (chapter 10). 8 See Krijnen (chapter 10) on realism. 9 Thus philosophy is also the science of meaning. With respect to this determination of philosophy, see Krijnen, chapter 2, See Krijnen, chapter 2, 2.2.

17 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE 29 characterized by this foundational urge, then, as a matter of principle, every why-question pertaining to knowledge claims ( why is this so? ) can be answered, for if it were any other way, science s foundational urge would be neglected. This has important ramifications for the method of reflection on validity. As we have previously seen, the foundation of knowledge refers to other knowledge. This foundational regress leads to increasingly general and more fundamental knowledge, which functions as a ground for knowledge founded on it (e.g. knowledge that if the price of petrol doubles its use will decrease presupposes the validity of the knowledge that things have causes ; if things had no causes, price increases certainly wouldn t cause a drop in demand). It has been said that the search for reasons for reasons ultimately leads to a number of axioms (foundational theses) which don t admit of further justification, as they are the beginnings of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, however, we have seen that science, qua science, must demand that even such original notions be founded, since science would in any other event not do what it, qua science, should do where the problem of the foundation of all knowledge is concerned namely, to found its claims to knowledge. As long as science abides by its own foundational urge, the presuppositions of science will remain scientific presuppositions and science takes care for its own scientific character. But why should anyone think that the most fundamental judgements, foundations or axioms of knowledge cannot themselves be founded? Apparently because the foundation of knowledge is conceived differently from the way we have outlined above: solely as the foundation of knowledge in other knowledge, of one judgement in other judgements, of one presupposition in other presuppositions, and so on. Such a foundational structure does indeed ultimately lead the foundational urge of science into: an infinite regress, since we can ask, for every judgement which serves as a ground for a claim to knowledge, for another judgement to serve as a ground for that ground, or a halt to the foundational regress at some axiomatic point or other, which is to serve as the basis for everything else and is thus dogmatically presupposed, so a halt that is arbitrary from a scientific point of view (reasons to motivate a stop of this kind are extra-scientific reasons, such as religious beliefs), or a circular foundational process, because that which is to be founded will have to function as a ground for the foundation: that which is to be founded is conceived of as something which has already been founded, whereas it ought actually to be founded itself. Thus conceived foundation is a pointless exercise. Is it? Indeed there is a conceivable solution to the problems that have just been pointed out: the foundation of foundational knowledge is not a foundation of knowledge in other knowledge, but foundation in that which knowledge itself is, in knowledge itself. Generally speaking, presuppositions, knowledge of foundations, principles of validity are not founded by tracing them back to something other than knowledge. If we are able to prove that (and in what way) those