Anthony Thorpe The Critical Thinking Skills Movement and its Implications for Religious Education

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1 Thorpe, A. (1997) The Critical Thinking Skills Movement and its Implications for Religious Education. Journal of Education and Christian Belief now International Journal of Christianity and Education Vol.1(2), pp doi: / Anthony Thorpe The Critical Thinking Skills Movement and its Implications for Religious Education INTRODUCTION The public s interest in the idea of philosophy and young people has been awakened with the success of Sophie s World by Jostein Gaarder (Phoenix House, 1995). How might this interest in philosophy form a link with the teaching of religious education? Historically the links between philosophy and religion have been great but many teachers have assumed that philosophy is something that young people are incapable of understanding let alone able to use as part of their learning. Arguments from Piaget s psychology of learning also suggest this but the Critical Thinking Skills Movement claims that these objections can be met. Could teachers be underselling the capabilities of their students? What then might be the implications for the teaching of religious education of a more philosophical approach that sought to develop critical thinking skills? It is also important to ask what the assumptions are behind these implications and whether they are acceptable from a Christian viewpoint. MATTHEW LIPMAN S PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN The Critical Thinking or Thinking Skills Movement refers to a wide group of approaches 1 many of which have been developed in American. As one academic has noted, More than a decade ago, many expected that the growing emphasis on critical thinking would be just another passing fad; however, at a scholarly level the emphasis today is at least as strong, and there appears to be a growing emphasis at the practitioner level. 2 Philosophy for Children is an example of a Critical Thinking Skills approach which has provoked great interest both in the United States and the United Kingdom. This has been developed by Matthew Lipman who, as a professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, became disillusioned with the thinking skills that his undergraduates displayed. He decided that it was in the elementary school that things were going wrong and that it was there that thinking needed be taught. So he gave up his post and established the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Claremount. 1

2 The Philosophy for Children approach is aimed at all children of school age and seeks to promote thought through specially written philosophical novels modelled upon Socratian dialogue. In the dialogues, children are represented as discussing issues sparked off by incidents that arise in their everyday lives. The texts make no direct reference to philosophers by name yet they do bring up arguments that would be identified by those in the know. An example of these references can be illustrated by the title of the first book he published of this type which was called Harry Stottlemiers Discovery! However, the dialogues form only the first stage of the process as, after reading a section from the book, the teacher then begins a discussion. The content of the discussion is generated by questions of the children arising from the text and the conduct of the discussion is structured to promote thinking. There is a manual which accompanies each book to help the teacher through the process. Lipman says that there is a link between learning to speak and learning to think. The argument runs that if students can be taught how or how not to use grammar, then teachers can teach the difference between sound and sloppy reasoning. Yet schools spend hardly any time consciously developing the ability to think in their students to the detriment of those children s educational development. Lipman has not produced any work directly linked to what is known as religious education in England and Wales which may be due to the non-existence of the subject in the American state system. There is a novel called Lisa which looks at ethical issues but not from a specifically religious perspective. Yet surely the philosophical approach which aims to develop students who will become more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate, and more reasonable individuals 3, can aid in the search for meaning which religious education is surely concerned with? This is a question that needs consideration. Some people might say that if it were such a good idea then we would be practising it already. However, it is possible to identify factors in the prevalent philosophies. OBJECTIONS FROM ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY In this country there is an estrangement between philosophy and teachers of religious education which inhibits a fruitful link between the two. This is due in part to a deep suspicion of educational philosophy which may be well founded. There is a strong tradition in British educational philosophy which dismisses religious education as unwarranted indoctrination and something that will disappear from the curriculum as rationality spreads. Such a negative view has been influenced by British analytical philosophy which again has had little time for religion per se. 4 Another outcome of the domination of twentieth century British philosophy by the analytical approach has been the creation of the feeling held by many teachers, in 2

3 common with the rest of the general public, that philosophy is not the sort of thing ordinary practical folk should be involved with. Philosophers are seen to live in the ivory towers of academia and are thus divorced from the real classroom situation. Philosophy is seen as something that is difficult and therefore way above what common people can cope with let alone our children s. Yet analytical philosophy is not the only form of philosophy. It is no coincidence that Lipman is from the United States and Jostien from Norway whose traditions are other than the analytical and assume that anybody ought to be capable of doing philosophy. Furthermore, educational philosophy does not have to be based solely on the analytical tradition nor does it have to necessarily hold a negative view of religious education. The American educational philosopher Israel Scheffler is a case in point. 5 OBJECTIONS FROM EDUCATION PSYCHOLOGY Another objection to a link between philosophy and religious education comes from educational psychology. Many teachers would say that their students were not capable of benefitting from the philosophical approach because they are just too young. This view is expressed by John Sealey when he is discussing epistemology and religious education. Of course we may not wish to discuss the questions of knowledge and truth-claims in the classroom, at least not with pupils much below the age of sixteen. 6 Yet Lipman would expect to discuss epistemology with six year olds! W. Hudson is equally scathing about philosophy for teachers as well as for their students when he says that, teachers of religious education should get on with teaching their subject and not be diverted into necessarily half-baked philosophical discussions about its presuppositions. The time will come for school children to philosophise about religion when they know what it is. 7 The source of inspiration for these statements is probably the work of Jean Piaget and Ronald Goldman. It was Goldman who applied Piaget to religious education and said that the understanding of religious concepts lagged behind the development of many other types of understanding. He put the development of the philosophical stage of thought at between sixteen and eighteen years old. This has led to philosophy being confined to A level courses. If the above findings are correct then the philosophical approach could not be used in religious education regardless of one s view of philosophy. However, there are those who have challenged both Piaget and Goldman. Jerome Bruner is seen by some to be the antidote to Piaget. Bruner says that anything can be taught to anyone as long as a suitably courteous translation can be found by the teacher. 14 This is a sentiment that Lipman would applaud as he believes that people have 3

4 misunderstood what the implications of Piaget s research actually are. For Lipman, Piaget was describing the situation he observed rather than speculating what was possible under different circumstances. We must distinguish mental development observed to hae taken place under conditions of minimal intervention from development resulting from deliberate efforts to stimulate and accelerate the mental growth of the child. 9 So the philosophical approach aims not for what is effortlessly possible but what it might be possible to achieve under the best conditions when teachers seek to challenge children and move their cognitive performance beyond the mediocre. A number of writers from the field of religious education such as Brenda Watson have questioned Goldman s interpretation of Piaget and his research techniques. 10 Yet Watson sees Goldman as still useful for pointing out that great care should be taken in introducing children to religious concepts and language but that this does not constitute a good reason for failing to teaching it to them at all. Children will never learn how to use theological language correctly, as they learn to use mathematical language or historical language, if they are not introduced to it. 11 If one applies Bruner, then complex religious language and concepts can be and should be taught to young people but that method of teaching needs to be appropriate. To sum, Lipman says that philosophy is possible for all, though like everything else, some people might be better at it than others. Yet even if there are counter objections to analytical philosophy and Piagetian psychology, why might many teachers still have reservation about it? Lipman identifies the problem as that of the teachers themselves lacking the philosophical and thinking skills so that a philosophical approach is dismissed: Not because of any inability on the part of children to learn the subject, but because of the inability of most teachers to teach it. And why are they unable to teach reasoning? Because they themselves were never taught it! 12 Such a view may place teachers on the defensive because many will take it as (yet another) criticism of their professional skills. It might also be seen as an argument against all those questions Lipman s approach along the line of if you don t agree with me it is because you don t understand me. However, the lack of philosophy even at graduate level in teacher education cannot be dismissed and perhaps to the question, How can philosophy improve teaching?, one could ask, How can the absence of philosophy help? WHAT CAN PHILOSOPHY BRING TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? 4

5 What benefits might a philosophical approach the teaching of religious education bring if the initial barriers discussed above can be overcome? It would be odd to embrace an approach which neither offered solutions to the problems presently faced in the classroom nor provide ways of attaining the educational aims we set ourselves as educators. It would also be unfortunate not to examine the assumptions and history that a new approach brings with it. A philosophical approach encourages systematic thinking and provides a basis for students to link together a curriculum in which there is otherwise a lack of unity in children s educational experience. The inquisitive nature of the philosophical approach provides the key for the child to unite things for him or herself. It empowers by developing resourcefulness and flexibility which can enable children to make the connections and put together the fragments. However, it is worth asking by what or whose system are the students to use in order to unify their experience? No approach is value free or without assumptions and this is something that the proponents of the approach have considered. If philosophical dialogue is about uncovering assumptions, then those of the approach itself must be examined too. In discussions on indoctrination one defence in a democratic and open society should be making people aware of the assumptions behind the actions people perform and statements they make. Writers on religious education have been keen to promote such an exploration and the approach helps the student in the task of identifying, understanding and examining other people s assumptions as well as their own, as Lipman says: Philosophy is a discipline that considers alternative ways of acting, creating and speaking. To discover these alternatives, philosophers persistently appraise and examine their own assumptions and presuppositions, question what other people normally take for granted, and speculate imaginatively concerning ever more comprehensive frames of reference. 13 Such a voyage of discovery could be equally used against secularism as much as any other form of indoctrination. This is because the approach would not seek to make children rational and encorage an anti-religious stance in the way a logical positivist might wish. For Lipman, the supporting of family faith is not ruled out because the aim of the approach: is not to change children s beliefs but to help them find better and more sufficient reasons for believing those things they choose, upon reflection, to believe in... (and)... to strengthen their understanding of the issues involved in their holding the beliefs they do hold. 14 However, the phrase better and more sufficient reasons raises a question as to whether or not the approach has already decided what are and are not suitable foundations. Furthermore, some might see the role of reason as being over played here against the role 5

6 of emotion and intuition. Are beliefs rational anyway and would such a dissection lead to scepticism and cynicism? Yet a key value behind Lipman s Socratic approach is that of the democracy society (though there are obviously differing conceptions of democracy) as for him this is the meeting point for people in the state school. For a democratic society to flourish it needs people with positive beliefs and values so the creation of radical sceptics is not Lipman s vision. Behind this view lies the American philosophical tradition of pragmatism developed by Pierce, James and Dewey. These writers had a variety of views about religion but were not hostile to it. However, such an uncovering of roots does go to show that there is no such thing as philosophy per se. Another benefit of the philosophical approach is that it encourages discussion of the sort of ultimate questions that children ask such as why are we alive? Philosophy discussion allows them to develop that totality and this is of benefit to religious education because religions and religious people look at things in totality. Their doctrines are systematic and interlinked. So the students must be able to cope with the concepts and process of a totalizing belief system in order to understand religion. Following on from the above, philosophy places a greater value upon understanding over information for its own sake, as Lipman says: The amount of information or knowledge children acquire is less essential to their philosophical education than the development of their intellectual judgement. 15 So Lipman s approach would act as a corrective to the criticism that religious education has become too contentful under the influence of the phenomenological approach to religious education. Yet is Lipman enforcing rational, linear and deductive criteria upon religion in which the role of intuition may be analysed out of the picture? To study belief systems as abstract wholes at the expense of understanding religious experience in concrete situations could leave the child with an unbalanced view of religion. The philosophical approach promotes active rather than passive learning because the approach aims to encourage children to see themselves as thinkers and enquirers, and not as passive recipients of a pre-determined body of knowledge. 16 This may be received positively by many educators but it does raise epistemological issues. Those who are of a traditional objectivist or realist standpoint will perhaps reject such a view as smacking of liberalism and pluralism. If there is a body of knowledge and understanding to be passed on then the task is to make the reception of that body successful and possibly enjoyable process. So is active learning giving a false view of truth to children by over emphasising their autonomy and promoting individualism and suggesting that the truth is a relativist free for all to be constructed at the individual s whim? 6

7 Lipman is keen to guard against rampant individualism through the central role that of the group, or the community of inquiry, as he refers to it. For him, the idea of learning in isolation is alien to the philosophical approach. This may be in line with progressive educational psychology, but philosophy claims it comes from Socrates! By the emphasis upon the community of inquiry the social and cultural as well as the cognitive aspects of learning are brought together so the approach unites elements of the implicit and explicit, phenomenological approaches to religious education. CONCLUSION Stuart McFarlane, a British academic who has written in support of Lipman s approach, has commented that: Many teachers of religious education, on learning of Lipman s methods, will respond that they already employ them and foster the same skills and attitudes in their existing practice. 17 Such an argument is perhaps comforting to those teachers who feel battered by what feels like a climate of constant change in education but might leave others asking why this approach needs to be considered if it is so similar to what is already done. I think that these views reflect a division amongst the proponents of Critical Thinking Skills with on the one hand those see the approach as augmenting existing practice whilst on the other hand there are those who see the approach as transforming existing practice. Lipman sees his approach in the latter category and perhaps there is less of a reason to be become interested in Critical Thinking Skills if it is only offering an alternative of what is being done already. If what happens in the United States tends to come over to the United Kingdom sooner or later, then there is a need to consider the implications of Critical Thinking Skills for education. This process should involve an uncovering of the assumptions of such an approach but I look forward to the extension of such an analysis to present approaches as I remain uneasy with these as well. With this in mind I do not view the Critical Thinking Skills movement as something to be resisted at all costs but instead I hope that it will provoke and promote educational debate both within and across traditional subject boundaries. Anthony Thorpe is a Senior Tutor at St. Brendan s Sixth Form College, Bristol and is engaged in doctoral research at the University of Exeter. Bibliography Barrow, R. and Woods, R. (1988) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, London: Routledge, 3rd Ed. Bruner, J. (1966) Towards a Theory of Instruction, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. 7

8 Donaldson, M. (1978) Children s Mind, London: Fontana, for criticisms of Piaget s experiments. Fisher, R. (1990) Teaching Children to Think, Oxford: Blackwell. Howkins, K. (1966) Religious Thinking and Religious Education, a critique of the research and conclusions of Goldman, London Tyndale Press. Hudson, W. (1987) Two Questions about Religious Education, in ed. Straghan, R. & Wilson, J. Philosophers on Education, London: MacMillan. Lipman, M. & Sharp, A.M. (1986) Wondering at the World, Lanham: University of America Press. Lipman, M. et al (1977) Philosophy in the Classroom, Claremont: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. Norris, S. (1995) Sustaining and Responding to Charges of Bias in Critical Thinking Educational Theory, Vol. 45, No. 2, 210. Scheffler, I. (1991) Cognitive Emotions, London: Routledge. Sealey, J. (1985) Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives, London: George Allen & Unwin. Slee, N. (1986) Goldman Yet Again: An Overview and critique of his contribution to research, British Journal of Religious Education, Spring Watson, B. (1987) Education and Belief, Oxford: Blackwell, 161. FOOTNOTES for The Critical Thinking Skills Movement and its implications for religious education. 1 A good resume of approaches can be found in Fisher, R. (1990) Teaching Children to Think, Oxford: Blackwell. 2 Norris, S. (1995) Sustaining and Responding to Charges of Bias in Critical Thinking Educational Theory, Vol. 45, No. 2, Fisher, R. (1990) Op. Cit., Barrow, R. and Woods, R. (1988) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, London: Routledge, 3rd Ed. 5 See for example Scheffler, I. (1991) Cognitive Emotions, London: Routledge. 6 Sealey, J. (1985) Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives, London: George Allen & Unwin, 9. 7 Hudson, W. (1987) Two Questions about Religious Education, in ed. Straghan, R. & Wilson, J. Philosophers on Education, London: MacMillan

9 8 See Bruner, J. (1966) Towards a Theory of Instruction, Massachusetts: Belknap Press and see Donaldson, M. (1978) Children s Mind, London: Fontana, for criticisms of Piaget s experiments. 9 Lipman, M. & Sharp, A.M. (1986) Wondering at the World, Lanham: University of America Press, See Howkins, K. (1966) Religious Thinking and Religious Education, a critique of the research and conclusions of Goldman, London Tyndale Press and Slee, N. (1986) Goldman Yet Again: An Overview and critique of his contribution to research, British Journal of Religious Education, Spring Watson, B. (1987) Education and Belief, Oxford: Blackwell, Lipman, M. et al (1977) Philosophy in the Classroom, Claremont: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, Lipman, M. et al (1977) ibid, Lipman, M. et al (1977) ibid, Lipman, M. et al (1977) ibid, MacFarlane, S. (1991) Footnotes to Play-Doh, British Journal of Religious Education, Spring 1991, MacFarlane, S. (1991) Loc. Cit., 106. NB this article was published as: Thorpe, A. (1997) The Critical Thinking Skills Movement and its Implications for Religious Education. Journal of Education and Christian Belief now International Journal of Christianity and Education Vol.1(2), pp Dr Anthony Thorpe School of Education University of Roehampton London SW15 5PJ a.thorpe@roehampton.ac.uk 9

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