Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό τόμος 4, 2015

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1 The Ethics of Must as political presuppose: The case of Rational Europe and Impulsive Greece PANOS ELIOPOULOS, Ph.D. of Philosophy, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Adjunct Lecturer in the University of Peloponnese, Hellas ISSN: Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 Thessaloniki 2015

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3 The Ethics of Must as political presuppose: The case of Rational Europe and Impulsive Greece PANOS ELIOPOULOS A politician s perception must not differ from that of the artist. And the artist s perception of the struggle is no more than struggle for right expression. Ulysses Elytis, The Public and the Private, Ikarus, Athens, 1997, p. 34. In moral philosophy we can detect an opposition between theories on morality of virtue and those of morality of what must be done. Both recognize the elements of origin of moral action focusing on selecting specific means as well as specific goals. The ascertained difference between ethics and politics begins from a absolute superiority of morality of what must a man do, especially in modern Europe, primarily a legacy of Kantian rationalism 1 and the focus on a universality of values of a doubtful power. As a result the European South, particularly Greece, are blamed for not committing to the ethical rules that run over every reasonable and uninterrupted financial and political activity. Due to this, Europe that seeks an easygoing economic stability, mainly the representatives of the Northern countries, is considered as rational, the countries that ask for a solution to the economic matter of Greece, whereas Greece appears to be the country that functions impulsively, the country of money waste, that tends to steal the wealth of the Euro zone in order to continue its luxurious way of living. Contrary to this policy of the Euro zone, Greece refrains from doing what many, even interiors, consider, sine conditionibus, as its absolute duty. So why is Greece considered as the spoiled child of a Europe that tries to assist Greece, implementing with just rage the awaited, which is an agreement with which the country itself has complied? This announcement will investigate the relations between the political action and the ethical theories of must and virtue and will attempt to discover the causes of the present political issue within Europe. In addition, we shall investigate how the different readings of rational 2 can be considered as imaginaries and how they are meant to be stable institutions within the political and ethical ration. The differentiation between ethics and politics, between ethics of must and ethics of virtue, between rational Europe and impulsive Greece are the two sides of the coin regarding the honour of truth of the current political pragmatism. According to Kastoriades, those issues usually begin when someone attempts to insert rationalism, their rationalism, in order for this rationalism to be accepted in general. The same goes when examining the civilization of some other place, a specific element of their world view is considered an imaginary, neglecting to specify the precise objective 3. The hazard of a considered sobriety and a final opinion on the political and economic reality, assisted by the harshness to conquer a common moral language, is a major moral issue, a grey zone where the moral misunderstanding about what needs to be done is a major problem and af 1 Wood Allen, Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Michael Moore, Objectivity in Ethics and Law, Ashgate, Aldershot 2004, passim. 3 Kastoriades K., The imaginary institution of society, 13 th ed., Kedros, Athens, 1975, p

4 fects Europe in total. Such a moral misunderstanding is the cause for the violation of fundamental European principles, those of solidarity, freedom and Democracy. In order to comprehend the relationship, we must keep in mind that the end of Democracy, from an Aristotelian perspective is freedom. Democracy as the ultimate level of developments of the society accounts for universal freedom in all forms, that is private, social and political. Each system that does not comply with that differentiates itself from democracy and finds itself to the opposite of democracy. Moreover a fundamental factor of democracy is autonomy, according to the society s perception of dealing with their lives and issues, without the involvement of a third party. On the contrary, complying with eteronomy constitutes an acceptance of this false system 4. In an attempt to comprehend the fundamental aspects of such a report we will have to explain the related understanding of two philosophers, who represent the ethics of must and the ethics of virtue, German Immanuel Kant and the Macedonian master Aristotle. According to the Kantian ethical theory, the law that defines will is more than a simple subjective principle Maxime. For instance, when I declare that I do not intend to leave an insult unavenged, I express a fundamental principle for myself alone, which does not necessarily apply to anyone else. This private or subjective principle lacks the element of a universal prestige that characterizes the moral law. A principle of universal prestige, on the other hand, is a form of applied, objective and technical principle 5. The moral law Sittengesetz is a universal command. Kant distinguishes the universal command from the hypothetical command. When a demand applies to a specific term, the non recognition of the term deconstructs the hypothetical command. In this case experience and fortune sneak in and jeopardize the universal necessity of the moral law. If, for instance, someone claimed that common good is the fundamental duty as purpose of our will, then the universal Command would be transformed to hypothetical Command subjected to the accomplish of specific goals. On the contrary, the categorical Command must indicate the simple form of the moral law 6. For Kant the fundamental declaration of the categorical command focuses on universality and is concluded to this: Act so that the subjective principle of your will can be of universal feature of the law 7. In short, when I manage to act in such way that my moral principle acquires a prestige for all rational beings, then I have the right to claim that I have acted morally. In this case my deed is not characterized by an emotional or temporary play of my soul, but rather has its place in a universally accepted principle. This is the only way to bring accordance and reliability to the moral relations among people. If, for example, I attempt to introduce a moral principle and rely on the fact that anyone can give a false promise when in trouble as I intend to get out of this difficult situation, I instantly realize, the German philosopher claims, that I may wish to lie, but not as a universal law, since according to that no promise can be made. Thus my subjective principle is self abolished 8. The demand for a universal application of the law is the unbroken commitment for the law to be put in practice 9. That means that we cannot seek lie, deception, murder 4 Kontogeorgis G., Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Patakis, Athens, 2014, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, X XII. 7 Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, ΧΙΙΙ. 9 Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, XII. 104

5 or stealing as universally applied behaviours within the society. If lie, deception or stealing were the universal law of the society, that would mean the the end of property, honesty and trust. Thus, it is not allowed, nor possible for someone to lie and at the same time demand to be told the truth. The oppositions of someone who wishes this are as disapproved as the oppositions of Notion. In this background of the ideal of a ecumenical humanity, Kant is obviously interested in whether will is of a universal character, if it is possible for everyone, if it free of antithesis. The above principles are fulfilled by the a priori, in Kant s Morality, allowing the feature of autonomy. The determination through external rules abolishes the responsibility of actions by rational and moral beings and leads to dependency on ethical masters. In reality it questions the right to self realization 10. Kant recognizes the dual character of the sense of duty. On the one hand the human being is satisfied with its high position and on the other its impulses and desires are oppressed. It is a self inflicted force that constitutes respect to the law. This is why moral actions are those imposed by respect to the law, rather than a simple tendency. This austerity Rigorismus of Kant s opinions highlights the meaning of duty 11. The Kantian ethics places Must over Being, the duty over the immediate accustomed principle. For the German philosopher each person is moral, when fulfilling his duty and by this participating to the ideal society of wills, within which everyone desires what others are obliged to desire 12. Kant s categorical command has an a priori power and commits the subjects regardless the accustomed terms and conditions. It s a priori power is immediate: Du kannst den du sollst, translated as you can, because you must. According to this no limitations can be recognized for the act, except the unquestioned superiority of the moral law, which acquires a technical potential and opens, claims Kant, a perspective of entering an imaginary world mundus intelligibilis, different from sensible one. The sensible feature of man with all its tendencies, impulses and emotions must, according to Kant s ethical theory, obey the imaginary feature of man 13. The absolute form of duty requires the absolute ability to execute this duty: my moral duty forces me and thus I must be able to 14. In Kant s writings on moral action, freedom is the ration of Being ratio essendi of the moral law, as we possess the insight of knowledge towards the fulfillment of the moral law in the sensible world, whereas at the same time the moral law is the ration of knowledge ratio cognoscendi of freddom 15. However, the fact that although free will is recognized as realization of self determination of cause, Kant consents to that the human being is internally obliged towards the moral law and constitutes a morality of deed/must where the human substance acquires some degree of freedom exclusively related to the choice of an ultimate and imaginary moral value, the universality of which depends on its a priori power as objective necessity and understanding of the Reason Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, XV. 11 Pflicht! Du erhabener, grosser Name, Oh duty! You, the great and magnificent name. 12 Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, XIX XX. 13 Wood Allen, Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, Introduction, XXI. 15 Allison Henry, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Allison Henry, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

6 Against this placement we have to give out the virtue related approach of the Stageiritian philosopher. According to Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, one of the many definitions of virtue, the perfection of the human being, is that virtue constitutes a medium between exaggeration and lack; a medium of cognitive character. This means that moderation acquires a cognitive character and indeed this calls for some sort of special knowledge, which is the presence of the self 17. A special report in Aristotle is reserved for the notion of proairesis, for which the Macedonian philosopher specifies that is closer to virtue and that it constitutes a more accurate criterion for man s quality that his actions themselves 18. The Aristotelian proairesis is apparently different to Kant s will. For Aristotle the will may also refer to those impossible to occur and is related to actions that may not at all depend on us, so it is primarily associated to the goal. On the contrary proairesis is associated with the means; the means will lead us to the goal and thus it is associated to those depending on us 19. In morality of virtue the goal is not indifferent or vague, it is the humane 20. The Stageiritian philosopher is clear: «ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχή τῶν πράξεων ἡ δέ βουλή περί τῶν αὑτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ δέ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα» man is the principle of his actions the will is related to those he is capable of and as for the actions those take place for reason others that the actions themselves 21. In morality of virtue, as situational ethics, in contrast to the ethics of must, man as the doer and as the holder of prudence is the main issue 22 and his moral judgment is superior to hollow rules and standard musts. The ethics of virtue, in this respect, is not a typology, but ethics of the content 23. Since man is the principle of the action, the responsibility is on his backs 24, having constituting his ethics on the virtue of prudence and not on the moral conscience, Aristotle differs from Kant as far the superiority of human decision is concerned as for what is morally acceptable regarding the definition of must as higher than the human moral law. Man of reason, the prudent man, manages to go descend in the depths of morality. In addition, the Macedonian thinker understands the weaknesses of the strictly typological legal system and at the same he depicts the potential of the natural world. Another important matter is that of political friendship. According to Aristotle «τῆς τε πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καί τήν ἀρετήν διά τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον οὐ γάρ ἐνδέχεσθαι φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὐς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ ἀλλήλων» the art of politics creates friendship and it is said that this is how virtue is useful, since it cannot be that people are friends and not be just 25. Political friendship, of which Aristotle speaks, is the cornerstone for the existence of the republic, that solidarity all people desire and all are willing to contribute for. Political friendship not only foresees, but also encourages the oppositions. It cannot overcome the common belief that this solidarity is necessary for eudemonia. Political friendship is superior even to justice and is based on true equality, since it is related not only to the what there is to earn ἡ δε πολιτική συνέστηκε κατά τό χρήσιμον, but also to 17 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, B, 1109a, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, C, 1111b, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, C, 1111b, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A a, 23 & A 1094b Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, C, 1112b, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, B, 1106b, 36 & 1107a,2. 23 Koutras D., Aristotle s practical philosophy, AE, Athens, 2002, p Simpson Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill Aristotle, Eudemean Ethics, H, 1234b,

7 the quality of the persons 26. However, the demand for political friendship is the demand for justice τό δέ κοινόν πᾶν διά τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, since it is not only a simple connection of people, but a connection of personalities based on moral and legal demanding, strongly claims Aristotle. The law assures a minimum of morality to the member of the state, through the penalty or in advance, whereas morality is based on proairesis and the free will of friendship 27. Thus, the political friendship is based on an agreement of vital importance and moral friendship on proairesis 28. For Aristotle this is much more just and this is where the justice of friendship and its balance is based on. Virtue, moral friendship, the common and flawless goal is not a luxury or a useless tactic in the society, but the cornerstone of the society. Friendship presupposes justice, but it is superior to that as it is of higher quality. In Aristotelian way of thought accordance does not necessarily mean a complete agreement, but it is vital that the parts agree to what constitutes common living together and to what must be done from both sides 29. In this respect accordance is the political friendship. The fundamental principle in political theory of Aristotle is that «ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δέ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης» the city is a society of alikes for the best way of living. Aristotle disapproves of any form of democracy that questions equality among people and against the law: «τό δέ μή ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καί τό μή ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρά φύσιν» not to be equal amongst equal and same amongst the same, is unnatural 30. By the term same Aristotle indicates the citizens not just under equal obligations, but also with equal rights, in both the legal and moral background of the city 31. Since states use different means of succeeding the eudemonia, different types of everyday life are used 32. This is very important as the states have different methods of succeeding it. For Aristotle political multiculturalism and the synthetic unification of the parts should discard the uniculturalism and unimorality as totality 33 According to Ludwig Wittgenstein and the linguistic analysis theory, being certain and knowing are two different things 34. Knowing means to be capable of proving the objective, whereas certainty is part of the subjective. In this respect quote often moral language is the cause of a wide misunderstanding in multilingual Europe. This occurs when we do not understand the spirit Geist of a nation in depth and the perception of its conscience. The seriousness of this was highlighted by the American pragmatist William James during a lecture he delivered at Harvard in 1906 on The Present Dilemma in Philosophy: being aware of someone s philosophy is the most significant thing philosophy is not a technicality it is the idea of what is life and reality 35. I do not mean that the Germans are not familiar with Aristotle or that the Greeks do not fully understand Kant. On the contrary I focus of the fact that those two nations, such as others, for instance those who belong to the fade unity of the advanced North against the financially underdeveloped South within this unorganized economic and non 26 Aristotle, Eudemean Ethics, H, 1239a, 4 5 & 1242a. 27 Koutras D., Aristotle s practical philosophy, AE, Athens, 2002, p Aristotle, Eudemean Ethics, H, 1243a, Aristotle, Eudemean Ethics, H, 1241a, Aristotle, Politics, H, 1325b, Simpson Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill Aristotle, Politics, Η 1328 a b Aristotle, Politics, Η 1324 b Ludwig Wittgenstein, On certainty, Tr. by Constantinos Voudouris, Athens Philosophical Library, Athens, 1989, fr. 243 & William James, Pragmatism and Other Writings, Penguin, New York, 2000, p

8 political union of Europe, fail to comprehend the spirit, the deeper, internal values of their public and private presumptions, although the latter are not to be marginalized. Among those values a one sided and negative morality of must and its obligations, seems to be covering any sense of moral evaluation and an ethics of common struggle 36. Within democratic Europe, it seems that it is a matter of give and take, rather than democracy, as the principles are imposed like a symbolic and philosophical imperialism, a punishing superiority of the economically stronger against the weak. Modern crisis could offer the opportunity to found trust and fidelity of the political friendship itself. The marginalization within a potentially different principles background in Greece does not mean the return to the phenomenon of Greekism 37, but brings to the surface the Greek manner as universality functioning as supervalue for the European institutions. The political identity in the EU must not break the anthropocentric system, but rather to focus on the political evaluation as anthropocentric liberation of man as social being marking man as part of the political system 38 The march towards the anthropocentric fulfillment is depended upon the state primarily and to the world eventually 39. Understanding this we must also understand that the economic systems do not work on their own and should not have their own fulfillment as target, but they are to be understood as means towards freedom, the other side of the coin of autonomy and most tangible aspect of democracy 40. Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason observes that when the will of the people does not share a common objective and the individual has his own idea of wellbeing, the those wills cannot be the preoccupations for the formation of the universal law. The law can only be related to the reason, so it is not part of the senses of the phenomena 41. In addition he recognizes that virtue is the highest value to be given by the limited practical reason, but the security for this can never be certain owing to the connection of the free will Willkür to the desire and the egoism. On the contrary this subjective belief may even become extremely dangerous 42. Lastly, he claims that since free will is the only principle of moral laws and the related duties, every autonomy of personal freedom is not for granted 43. As a result a practical law can never include a technical empiric term. In that case the objective necessity would result in natural necessity 44. Regarding the dilemma on hot to compromise the subjective principle of my will with that of the rest, Kant replies with symmetry in the sense that the universality will be decided upon the principle of egoism including the subjective principle of the eudemonia of the others 45. The ethics of what must be done has sneaked into Europe without any democratic consensus as a rather sine qua non political principle making it much harder for people of rational Europe and impulsive Greece to communicate both politically and morally resulting to the continuous disapproval of Greece. The acceptance of such a political determinism and the recognition of a political orthodoxy threaten with the status quo of a moral totaliarilism 36 Kraut Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford Kontogeorgis G., Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Patakis, Athens, 2014, p Kontogeorgis G., Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Patakis, Athens, 2014, p Kontogeorgis G., Economic systems and liberty, Patakis, Athens, 2014, p Kontogeorgis G., Economic systems and liberty, Patakis, Athens, 2014, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004, p

9 and the radical cause of a political and financial hoax. By disturbing the relations of autonomy that every political community could develop as a state, the heterodox impose of a policy of a moral must within united Europe, a policy of the monarchy of the rules of the most powerful nations, could only act as the security of racism and self anaphoric approach of the wrongful. For the Greeks, who are forced to leave behind fundamental features of their self ruling in order to meet the terms of their financial obligations, Aristotle could, possibly, give the answer: «τά γάρ αἴσχισθ ὑπομεῖναι ἐπί μηδενί καλῶ ἤ μετρῖῳ φαύλου» only a man of lower quality could tolerate being treated in the worst manner without any profit whatsoever 46. On the contrary for the Germans and the developed countries of the North what perfectly matches is the impressively diachronic apothegm of Wittgestein: «I shall do this, as nothing can persuade me of the opposite» Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Γ 1110a Ludwig Wittgenstein, On certainty, Tr. by Constantinos Voudouris, Athens Philosophical Library, Athens, 1989, fr

10 Bibliography Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Zitros, Thessaloniki, 2006 Aristotle, Eudemean Ethics, Cactus, Athens, 1993 Aristotle, Politics, Zitros, Thessaloniki, 2005 Allison Henry, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge James William, Pragmatism and Other Writings, Penguin, New York Kastoriades K., The imaginary institution of society, 13 th ed., Kedros, Athens, 1975 Kontogeorgis G., Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Patakis, Athens, 2014 Kontogeorgis G., Economic systems and liberty, Patakis, Athens, 2014 Koutras D., Aristotle s practical philosophy, AE, Athens, 2002 Kant I., Critique of Practical reason, intr. trans. remarks, M. F. Demetrakopoulos, AE, Athens, 2004 Kraut Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford Moore Michael, Objectivity in Ethics and Law, Ashgate, Aldershot Simpson Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill Ludwig Wittgenstein, On certainty, Tr. by Constantinos Voudouris, Athens Philosophical Library, Athens, 1989 Wood Allen, Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge