Duty Based Ethics. Ethics unit 3

Transcription

1 Duty Based Ethics Ethics unit 3

2 Divine command as a source of duty Stems from the monotheistic (Judeo/Christian/ Islamic) tradition An act is good if it is commanded by God, bad if it is forbidden by God. This duty is acting in accord with the will of God. The Ten Commandments or Decalogue:

3 The Ten Commandments or Decalogue Exodus 20: I am the Lord thy god, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. 2. Thou shalt have no other gods before Me. 3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. 4. Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. 5. Honor thy father and thy mother. 6. Thou shalt not murder. 7. Thou shalt not commit adultery. 8. Thou shalt not steal. 9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against they neighbor. 10.Thou shalt not covet anything that belongs to thy neighbor.

4 The duty of charity from the Koran 9.60 Alms are only for the poor and the needy, and the officials (appointed) over them, and those whose hearts are made to incline (to truth) and the (ransoming of) captives and those in debts and in the way of Allah and the wayfarer; an ordinance from Allah; and Allah is knowing, Wise.

5 Key Concepts from What is Enlightenment? Freedom/Autonomy/Reason Obeying duty Dignity Freedom/autonomy/Reason - To reason means to be free. Think of Descartes animals/machines that move by disposition of their organs - the motion is necessary. To be rational means to be capable of choice - to choose to act based on reason rather than what emotion or instinct impels (as animals must). This makes reasonable beings autonomous. But the only reasonable choice for rational beings is to choose what is rational (2+2=4). Thus autonomy means the freedom to act on the commands of reason. Obeying duty - Kant alludes at the end of the document to the idea that freedom and obeying are consistent. How can this be so? A person free is free to choose what is rational. Thus a free person is bound to obey the dictates of reason. Free people are thus self limiting. Dignity - Man has dignity because he is a subject not simply an object. Subjects act. Man s reason allows him to act and not simply be acted upon. Thus the sources of man s dignity is his freedom which is made possible by reason. Dignity means that man must always be treated as a subject and not simply an object. Note last line of WiE

6 Immanuel Kant s Duty Based Ethics Biography Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me. Neither of them need I seek and merely suspect as if shrouded in obscurity or rapture beyond my own horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with my existence. Born in 1724 to a pietist family (the pietists were strongly committed to religious experience, bible reading and public morality) Kant took a doctoral degree in 1755 from the university of Konigsberg and became a professor at that university in In 1781 he published The Critique of Pure Reason which argued that the world could be known through reason apart from experience. In 1785 he published The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals which contained his ethical ideas that we will be studying. In 1788 he published the Critique of Practical Reason in which he explores the nature of Freedom and further refined his ethical ideas. In 1790 Kant published The Critique of Judgment - in which he laid the foundations for modern aesthetics Kant s attitude toward philosophy and life can perhaps best be expressed by two sources, the first is at the end of Critique of Practical Reason where he writes: Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me. Neither of them need I seek and merely suspect as if shrouded in obscurity or rapture beyond my own horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with my existence. Knowledge of what is and what we ought to do is thus not a mystery, but immediately available for us through the powers of our own reason. The second is a brief essay called What is Enlightenment? Published in Kant Died in 1804.

7 Questions for What is Enlightenment? 1.What is nonage? How and why is nonage perpetuated? (there are multiple reasons) 2.Why does Kant say Sapere aude... Is the motto of the Enlightenment? 3.What is essential for Enlightenment to occur? Why does this make Enlightenment almost inevitable? What does this assertion reveal about Kant s philosophy? 4.What does Kant mean when he writes Caesar non supra grammaticos/ The ruler has no authority over the grammarians? 5. What is the paradox Kant writes of in the last paragraph? 6.What connections can you make between this document and Taylor chapter 1? Explain.

8 Overview of Kant s key ethical ideas Rejection of relativism Reason as the basis for ethics Non-consequentialism Human dignity Kant absolutely rejected relativism Kant argued that reason must be the basis for any non-relativist ethical system Kant maintained that an action s consequences have nothing to do with its moral worth - his ethical system is non-consequentialist Kant sees reason as the source of human dignity. To reject reason is to deny the basis for this dignity

9 The categorical imperative and the role of reason in Kant s system Act only according to the maxim (rule) by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant 13). Act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only (Kant 45). Kant suggests that reason allows us to determine our duty a priori - prior to experience This is done by applying the categorical imperative, which Kant states in two different ways Act only according to the maxim (rule) by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant 13). Act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only (Kant 45).

10 What is important here is that the question of whether or not an action is ethical or not can be determined through reason alone. One could be in a box, in a cave, deep underground and be able to determine right and wrong completely independent of experience.

11 Analysis of Metaphysics of Morals 1. The centrality of intent Will Inclination Will Kant defines an act of will as a kind of internal command in the form of: Let me now do A! that is not done because one wants to, or on a whim or for no reason at all, but rather result from a process of rational deliberation. Kant argues that will is just reason in its practical employment Inclination An internal command not resulting from a rational process. Animals thus have inclinations, but only a rational being can have a will. To put this in terms of Descartes, an action based on the disposition of organs is an inclination. Kant will argue that the process of reason will lead to actions that are imperatives - only one possible outcome. Whereas inclinations can lead to a variety of outcomes. This is the key to the objectivity of his ethical system. Because reason commands, and the commands of reason do not vary from person to person, reason reveals objective ethical truths.

12 Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good (Kant paragraph 16)

13 Analysis of Metaphysics of Morals 1. The centrality of intent Will Inclination Intrinsic v. instrumental value The good will Intrinsic v. instrumental value Something is instrumentally valuable when it is useful to achieve a given end. The classic example is money. Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable in and of itself regardless of potential usefulness. This is a very important distinction for Kant and relates also to his conception of persons as ends which is the basis of our dignity. The good will Kant starts his quest for the Supreme Principle by asking the question Is there anything at all that could be considered good without qualification? Kant maintains that many of the things that we consider good are only good in a qualified sense: Kant Argues that the only thing that can be said to be good in an unqualified sense is the good will. Kant s idea of the good will revolves very much around intent - not the result or the consequences of the good will. This is why his ethical ideas are called nonconsequentialist ethics.

14 Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. (Kant, paragraph 1)

15 A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects,not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself (Kant paragraph 3).

16 Degrees of moral praiseworthiness Category 1 - Actions that are inconsistent with duty - These actions are ethically wrong (Kant 4 top) Category 2 - Category 2 - Actions consistent with duty but motivated by self interest from a selfish view (Kant 4 later) These actions are not wrong, but neither are they morally praiseworthy. Category 3 - Actions consistent with duty but motivated by inclination (Kant 5 beginning) It is a duty to maintain one s life; and,... everyone has a direct inclination to do so These actions are not wrong, but neither are they morally praiseworthy Category 4 - Actions consistent with duty and motivated by duty (Kant 6 end) These actions are morally praiseworthy

17 Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty... Unquestionably, it is just in this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty. (Kant 6)

18 2.Duty Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law (Not in packet). The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result (Kant paragraph 10). Duty, or the law, is comprehensible to us by virtue of our reason Thus the ability to comprehend the moral law is a faculty inherent to any rational creature. Note again Kant s rejection of consequences as a standard for duty. Knowledge of the good is within us! The Question that remains is - What defines duty

19 3. The categorical imperative (the moral law) I am never to act otherwise than so I could also will that my maxim should become universal law (Kant 11). The Law is that which can be universalized without contradiction - the categorical imperative. This is Kant s sorting rule.

20 Example - A lying promise Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself (Kant, paragraph 11 middle) Kant s example of the lying promise: Should I make a false promise when it is to my advantage? When this is universalized it results in all promises being false, which destroys the concept of a promise. Promise =!promise think 1 =!1 This represents a logical contradiction - a concept that cannot be conceived, like a square circle. This inconceivability is what Kant means when he says the maxim would necessarily destroy itself. Note that that we don t universalize to see if the consequences would be bad, we universalize to check for logical consistency.

21 Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt, common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision (Kant paragraph 12 end). Kant argues that the strength of this system of ethics is its intuitive nature - one only need possess reason to understand the boundaries between right and wrong. What Kant has arrived at systematically is really nothing but the common sense notion that one should do unto others what we would have done to ourselves - the golden rule!

22 Categorical v. hypothetical imperatives If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical (Kant 17). Hypothetical imperatives are a means to achieve an end. Thus if the end is not desired, the hypothetical imperative can be ignored. Hypothetical imperatives are purely instrumental (see Kant paragraphs and Palmer pp ). Conversely, categorical imperatives command not to achieve another ends, but as ends in themselves. Thus a key aspect of Kant s moral thinking is the idea that everything cannot be reduced to instrumental reason. Morality is not simply a cost benefit trade off, and, by extension, neither is it relative to circumstance.

23 4. Perfect and imperfect duties I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. (Kant 11) Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature. (Not in packet) Note the subtle differences in the above two statements of the categorical imperative. The first forbids actions, while the second seems to make a recommendation. The distinction here is between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are absolute. If universalizing an action result in a logical contradiction it is forbidden. Imperfect duties are less absolute. If universalizing an action is not logically impossible, but results in a state of affairs that no rational being would will, it results in a material contradiction. It is not forbidden, but also not morally praiseworthy

24 Kant s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) [perfect] duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious)[imperfect] duty. (paragraph 24)

25 From The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Kant's first formulation of the CI states that you are to act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.... this formulation in effect... summarizes a decision procedure for moral reasoning... : First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible. If your maxim fails the third step, you have a perfect duty admitting of no exception in favor of inclination to refrain from acting on it. If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an imperfect duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions.... So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others. (accessed on at

26 Kant s examples of perfect and imperfect duties (paragraphs 36-41) 1. Suicide to avoid despair (20) Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself It is a perfect duty not to commit suicide for because one is in despair 2. Making a lying promise (21) For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible It is a perfect duty not to make a lying promise

27 3. Choosing a life of pleasure over the development of one s talents (22) A system of nature could indeed subsist [without contradiction] with such a universal law [where] men... should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes. It is an imperfect duty to develop one s talents 4. Not helping others (23) Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist... But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires. It is an imperfect duty to help other when they are in need

28 Person s as ends - the second version of the categorical imperative The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives. (not in packet) Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative (Kant, paragraphs 25) Recall the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Kant makes a very clear distinction between ends and means. This distinction is important for the second version of the categorical imperative

29 Person s as ends - the third version of the categorical imperative Man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end (Kant paragraph 25). The second form of the categorical imperative relies on an important distinction between people and things. This distinction is that people (rational beings) exist as ends in themselves The basis for this claim is the capacity of man to act on good will. The good will has no instrumental value and is valuable only as an end in itself. Since man, through reason, can choose to act from good will, and that choice has no instrumental value, then man himself possesses value as an ends not simply as a means. On the other hand, the value of things is always conditional, in essence, things are always tools - a means to our ends. When we use things to further our own ends, this is appropriate, because things have no ends of their own. Human dignity (the demand to be treated as an ends) is founded on our ability to act from good will which in turn is founded on our ability to rationally comprehend duty.

30 Person s as ends - the third version of the categorical imperative Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings [things] whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things (Kant 25). On the other hand, the value of things is always conditional, in essence, things are always tools - a means to our ends. When we use things to further our own ends, this is appropriate, because things have no ends of their own. Human dignity (the demand to be treated as an ends) is founded on our ability to act from good will which in turn is founded on our ability to rationally comprehend duty.

31 Rationality The ability to perceive duty (the commands of reason) Acting from the good will (Actions possessing no instrumental value) Dignity

32 The second form of the categorical imperative relies on an important distinction between people and things. This distinction is that people (rational beings) exist as ends in themselves Man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end (Kant paragraph 25). The basis for this claim is the capacity of man to act on good will. The good will has no instrumental value and is valuable only as an end in itself. Since man, through reason, can choose to act from good will, and that choice has no instrumental value, then man himself possesses value as an ends not simply as a means. On the other hand, the value of things is always conditional, in essence, things are always tools - a means to our ends. When we use things to further our own ends, this is appropriate, because things have no ends of their own. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings [things] whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things (Kant 25). Human dignity (the demand to be treated as an ends) is founded on our ability to act from good will which in turn is founded on our ability to rationally comprehend duty and act on the commands of this rational comprehension.

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34 The practical implications of the second version of the categorical imperative Suicide is wrong because it treats the self as a means (Kant paragraph 29) Lying promises are wrong because they treat others as a means to our ends (Kant paragraph 30) Denying people s freedom is wrong because it treats others as a means to our ends (Kant paragraph 31) Furthering the ends of others (helping others) is a duty because to ignore their needs is to treat them as only conditionally valuable - as a means only (Kant paragraph 32)

35 Characteristics of things Considered Ends The good will Reason Categorical imperative Personhood Objective value Choice/free will Characteristics of things considered Means Conditional goods (money, fame, courage etc) Inclination Hypothetical imperatives Things Subjective or relative value No choice/free will The basis for human dignity is that our reason is an end in itself. It allows us to choose the good for no other reason but that it is good. Dignity is that which demands respect - that which must be treated as an end in and of itself. Thus persons thus must be treated as ends in and of themselves - they possess dignity and value that cannot be taken away. Human value is thus absolute and never relative.