SALAM FAYYAD Founder, Future for Palestine; Former Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority

Transcription

1 THE ASPEN INSTITUTE ASPEN IDEAS FESTIVAL 2014 PATHWAY TO A STATE: IS IT POSSIBLE? Doerr-Hosier Center, McNulty Room Aspen, Colorado Thursday, July 3, 2014 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS WALTER ISAACSON President and CEO, The Aspen Institute THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Foreign Affairs Columnist, The New York Times Author SALAM FAYYAD Founder, Future for Palestine; Former Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority * * * * *

2 PATHWAY TO A STATE: IS IT POSSIBLE? MR. ISAACSON: Hi, I am Walter Isaacson. And this is a very special panel for me, two old friends. Obviously, Tom Friedman has been here since the very beginning, helped us conceive the Ideas Festival. Has been a stalwart not only of the Aspen Ideas Festival, but the global ideas festival, meaning every new idea seems to emanate from Tom Friedman's columns, except for a few that he saves for his books. (Laughter) MR. ISAACSON: If you read his books, including From Beirut to Jerusalem, which was written 72 years ago, right? MR. FRIEDMAN: (Laughter) MR. ISAACSON: That's right, 1989, I am sorry, it is still, unfortunately, as relevant today as it was in And our good friend, Dr. Salam Fayyad, has many attributes, including being a graduate of the University of Texas. But since then, he has moved on to become the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority and thanks partly to a Steve Friedman column -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Tom Friedman column. MR. ISAACSON: Sorry, Tom Friedman column, his name became associated with a movement, "Fayyadism," which was and may still be the way out for Palestinian-Israeli peace. It's actually one of the most important ideas that has been expressed here. At some point, people like Salam Fayyad will figure out how we're going to get from what we know will be the peace. I do think that at the end, Dr. Fayyad told me that he is going to propose to Tom a couple of ideas including a few things we could do in Washington starting in the fall. So with that, let me turn it over to Tom Friedman and Dr. Salam Fayyad. (Applause)

3 MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. Walter, it's great to be here. Thank you very much. Salam, it's great to be here with you, the former Prime Minister of Palestine -- Palestinian Authority. I thought I'd begin this morning by asking, could we talk about something else? (Laughter) MR. FAYYAD: That's fine. There are some things -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Economics, Brazil, you know-- MR. FAYYAD: Yeah, there is a poster there. MR. FRIEDMAN: No, exactly. It does though feel at this moment that we gather here that, we are in a dark tunnel and the only light you see is the train coming at us. And so, it is impossible for me to start anywhere except with a question, how do we get out of here? MR. FAYYAD: I will try to address that, thank you very much, good morning everybody. Thank you Tom, thank you for doing this with me. MR. FRIEDMAN: Oh it's a pleasure. MR. FAYYAD: Second time we do it in five years -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes. MR. FAYYAD: Last time around. An opportunity for me to thank Walter Isaacson, Toni Verstandig, their colleagues at Aspen Institute for doing this. I remember when we met last time around here we talked about what then became so-called 3-year statehood plan or program. And was really, as far as I was concerned, continue to be concerned, a fully integrated political vision. Yes, it was about -- MR. FRIEDMAN: With a fully integrated vision of how to build a Palestinian state.

4 MR. FAYYAD: And to use the act of building to transform, both ourselves as well as our Israeli neighbors and to bring about and mobilize the international support necessary to make all of this happen. In other words, to deploy the necessary, the act of building the state in the form of competent strong institutions of the state and to use that very positive act of building as a power to transform. So we reduce the problem to occupation, period, not occupation but. MR. FRIEDMAN: Right. MR. FAYYAD: And use that whole process including the transformative dimension of it in order to really squarely put enough pressure on the political process, so-called top-down to produce -- to produce that which it was set up to produce in the first instance, and end Israeli occupation that began in 1967 and the emergence of a sovereign viable state of Palestine on the territory occupied in 1967 as solution to this conflict. MR. FRIEDMAN: So if I could rephrase it -- MR. FAYYAD: Yeah. MR. FRIEDMAN: Is that your -- what I call Fayyadism is really building institutions from the ground up and building leaders who won their legitimacy by how they performed not in resistance or anything else. What happened? How successful were you in that and sort of what happened? MR. FAYYAD: Yeah, at the core of it, it really was about good governance, which I view as absolutely essential. It's the right of the governed everywhere. And I would say, especially in the Palestinian context, especially given the misery of decades of nothingness and destruction and all kinds of problems, suffering, if it is through everywhere, and it's valid everywhere, especially in our context. The need for good governance in our context I never really viewed it as an add-on, something of a luxury. It's an essential component of delivering us freedom, to be able to live as free people in a country of our own, with dignity.

5 Taking advantage of the givens of the situation, as stipulated, we were in some instance a contributor to the givens. But in some important way, it all began around the time of the millennium, and famously, and the important landmark policy statement by then President of United States, George W. Bush, when he said June 23, 2002, that a solution to this conflict is two states living side by side in peace and security, one of which existed for some time, the other needed to emerge (inaudible). That's not all he said then. He said, in order for that to happen, such and such should happen on the Palestinian side in order for them to somehow qualify. You know, it not only was the case there were conditions attached to the right of any people anywhere to seek to fulfill their right to self determination. So there was, I think, a possibility for us to just complain about that and say, how unfair. That was not my attitude. My attitude was, let's be pragmatic, let's take that test and pass it. Let's offer our people what they deserve, a strong, competent, honest, responsive and responsible government. That's first and foremost a Palestinian interest. (Applause) MR. FAYYAD: Really, as a key component, not an add-on, it's a key element, and maybe that's what you called Fayyadism, I guess. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah, no, it is what I meant. Listening to you reminds me of something so -- I covered the last day of voting of the Egyptian election that elected Morsi. And I went to an all women's voting station in Shubra (phonetic), poorest neighborhood in Cairo, elementary school, dusty yard; you -- no one should ever want their kids to have to go to such a decrepit school. And I interviewed about 20 women as they came out, all were veiled, 19 voted for the Muslim Brotherhood and one for the Wafd. And I asked them, why did you vote for the Muslim Brotherhood. All they said, obvious, better security, better streetlights, better sidewalks, more regular electricity, jobs for my kids, better schools, there wasn't one who said, if I see another woman on a bikini on the beaches of Alexandria, I can't live another day, you know.

6 (Laughter) MR. FRIEDMAN: And it was all about governance. MR. FAYYAD: Yes, exactly. MR. FRIEDMAN: And we really forget that in the Arab context and that is what you brought back. And just to round this up, I remember once being with you in your office, and it was the first time I ever discussed waste water management with a Palestinian leader or maybe any Arab leader. MR. FAYYAD: Or trash collection. MR. FRIEDMAN: Trash collection, because you were going to inaugurate, I believe, a waste water facility. MR. FAYYAD: Yes. MR. FRIEDMAN: Talk about the institutions you try to build in that sector, in the infrastructure and on the security side? MR. FAYYAD: To me the challenge all along was to contribute to an effort that ultimately would lead to projecting the reality of Palestinian statehood on the ground. If that sounds familiar particularly to our Israel neighbors, it's true, that's how they actually built state of Israel. Mistakenly, a lot of people think that the state of Israel was established in 1948, it wasn't. Statehood was proclaimed in 1948, but the institutions of the state were there long before. And you know, since the emergence of a viable, strong, meaningful Palestinian state is an integral part of the solution. As far as we were concerned, I viewed it as our utmost responsibility to build our own state to project its reality on the ground. Now what does that mean? That we needed to have a government that actually paid attention to the importance of providing services to the governed. I mean, my view of good government is not for people to sort of really act in a way that pleases those who govern, but it's exactly the other way around.

7 Our region, there are many examples in other parts of the world where things were upside down, in terms of the role of government and who is supposed to serve whom, and at whose service one is performing what they are performing. So clearly, it was of utmost importance for us to do those things, to do that good governance we are supposed to do, to provide for the welfare of our people, education, health, infrastructure of all kinds. And yes, the technocracy that goes with that, the software of having good governance. In order to establish what I call a sense of oneness between those in leadership and those governed. Again this is very important, and this should be the goal of any politician in position of leadership. In the Palestinian context, it's not a luxury because ours is a political issue that needs political resolution. The economy, economic development, institutional capacity, building and the rest of it, all of these things are absolutely essential to really help get us there. But ultimately, it's an issue that requires political resolution with the support of, you know, building of this kind. So therefore, it was of utmost importance for us to pay attention to these things. In order to project first and foremost our own people, sense of functionality about how we Palestinians were managing our own affairs. Competent government is always important in the Palestinian context a must now. Finally on this issue, if you listen to our political speech, over decades of struggle you'll find from time to time our people have gone through hell essentially, being called up on time and again to persevere and withstand the adversity of oppression and occupation, the rest of it, all of which is important. I led with speeches of this kind. But without the architecture to support this, it all doesn't resonate at all and should -- one shouldn't expect it to. How can you expect people to stick around and persevere if they do not have good schools to send their kids to, if they do not have good, competent healthcare facilities, yes, if they do not have the infrastructure, and if they do not have a sense that they're governed by a competent government, yes. Importantly, concerned with providing good security, which first

8 and foremost a Palestinian interest, to be honest with you, plus all other services that good governments are supposed to offer. It's not -- again was not a luxury, was essential part of a national effort in -- at ending the occupation, at liberation, at freedom leading ultimately us being able to live as free people with dignity in a country of our own. A lot of things went wrong, some went right. Let me begin with the latter, you asked me to start with. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah. MR. FAYYAD: Subsequent to our conversation, actually a couple of months later, we rolled out what was to my knowledge anyway, first coherent Palestinian plan written by us in Arabic, subsequently translated into English, became famously known as the 2-year state building program. It was supposed to achieve sets of targets, but importantly it was intended to tell everybody, put everyone on notice in the most positive and constructive of ways, instead of saying, we Palestinians are tired of this occupation, it must end or else, we said we Palestinians believe we can be ready for a state or for a statehood in 2 years. Saying the same thing in an entirely different, but certainly decidedly positive way, to mobilize support for this cause. And importantly, pointing to the important need for the state to be a qualitative addition to the region in terms of its value content. What kind of state did we want? First and foremost, one that lived up to the aspirations of our people and worthy of the great many sacrifices made by them over decades of struggle. But importantly also, our neighbors and the international community with the latter expected to invest heavily, heavily in making this happen had the right to know what it is they were actually supporting. We felt then it was important for us to say in what was an overarching vision for this program that this is going to be progressive, is going to stand on foundation, principles that were nothing but those universally shared high human values of tolerance, non-discrimination, (inaudible), togetherness, being open to the brilliant contribution of other cultures' work, open, progressive in every possible sense of the word. That

9 was valid then, it is especially valid today, and this is an important task to keep in mind particularly against the backdrop of the incredibly unprecedented grotesque violence that's taking place in the region today -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah. MR. FAYYAD: Never happened before to this extent. So that was the idea, only said in 2 years we are going to be able to do it. So in an important sense, relative to that technocratic objective, we succeeded. A year and a half later, the world convened in Brussels in the forum someone's called Adhoc Liaison Committee, the highest form of aid mobilization for Palestinian Authority, meeting in Brussels, semiannual meeting, read and was informed by three important reports. One, by my former employer, the IMF; another by the World Bank, and the third by the United Nations. The three of them say, Palestinian Authority did cross the threshold of resilience for statehood. And that happened a year and a half, only a year and a half after we launched that program. So relative to that objective, yes, we succeeded. I think it was important. We conveyed the messages in a way that we in fact can do this. That was important. But of course it was not only about that, it was about ending the occupation. Obviously, we failed there. A lot of things happened. For one thing, we I think on our side spent too much time speculating as to what the motives were behind this great scheme. That was not very helpful. But part of political life, which in politics one learns is essential to sort of really manage. And there was a failure there, partly because on the other hand we didn't get the deliverables you know from the Israeli side that would have validated the important progress made particularly in security in a political sense. Let me give a very quick example of that because that was valid then, is valid today, relative to the need for us to go forward. Yes, if we like we can be as angry as hell about what has been happening, but we need to go forward. MR. FRIEDMAN: So let me just interject, just to frame this.

10 MR. FAYYAD: Yeah. MR. FRIEDMAN: Talk about, because you were essential to this, the building of the Palestinian security forces, how it started and how it evolve and where it is today. MR. FAYYAD: I thought then in fact that predated my term as prime minister. One thing that was important in the aftermath of Oslo was for there to be a Palestinian doctrine or the Palestinian side that made sense to Palestinians. Remember what this is about, you know, it's well and good to say refined audience like this, and I have the pleasure and privilege of sitting with many throughout my service, and I -- really I feel this way. But ultimately you have to appeal to your own people, you have to carry. There is just no way it was going to be possible for the Palestinian Authority to mean something meaningful to Palestinian people being viewed as an instrument, solely as an instrument of providing security to Israel. That's how it was defined early on. And I thought there was something not right about this. Of course a responsible security is important. That's more than understandable. And if peace is going to mean anything, and if the emergence of a state of Palestine is going to mean anything positive to our Israeli neighbors, it should mean, you know, peaceful security. That's perfectly understandable. But there is no way for that to be as a matter of fact understood or taken as meaningful enough a commitment on the Palestinian side, in my view, unless the Israeli side thought and believed that we Palestinians were doing what we're doing because it was in our best interest to do so. That was what was missing. A lot of people in security services did not feel right about them working in the security apparatus or establishment, whose main objective was to provide security. It may have meant something then given that we were talking about an interim period, for only 5 years. But certainly, it sees meaning that past May 1999, the presented date for end of the conflict and the rest of it, that needed to be addressed at this level, by telling our people that security first and foremost is a Palestinian interest. This is about building a state. And statehood and what I call security

11 pluralism did not go together. The state and its agencies had to be the address, and they had to have sole purview over legitimate use of force. This whole thing had to mean something meaningful to our people relative to our overriding objective of getting a state. That is the real message we have within the context of that program, as a matter of fact beginning 2007 onward. And that is supposed to make sense. Jordan -- MR. FRIEDMAN: And the United States fund the training and MR. FAYYAD: Absolutely. MR. FRIEDMAN: Talk about the detail, because people here probably aren't familiar. MR. FAYYAD: You know, to me the most important thing was this element. You really need to connect with people at this level. If you don't, you're not respectful enough of them, you're not going to succeed. That's very important. I mean that's how you govern this great country. That's how you manage your own affairs. And have -- that's how we should manage, to be honest with you. You need to really -- things need to make sense. That was most important. Get the doctrine right. Get people to believe truly that this is first and foremost Palestinians. I used to argue, especially with Israeli counterparts. I say, people get in transactions and commerce and they ask for a bank guarantee. Why is it that they ask for a bank guarantee? To ensure that transaction gets fulfilled. However, if one of the parties believes that the other party is doing what they are doing because they are doing it in their own best interest, they need no bank guarantee. That's the best bank guarantee you can possibly get. And you happened to be doing it in a context that's meaningful, powerful and one that people can relate to. Just as security is important to Israel, it is equally important to us, and we're doing no one else a favor with ourselves by building it up, that's important. That's the concept and that's important to government. But then how do you get there against the backdrop of totally decimated security services.

12 No headquarter left on the soil, not a single police officers on the streets in the aftermath and really in the years of the second Intifada, remember this. And it was my first ask, of our Israeli neighbors, after becoming prime minister, to allow us at that time of emergency, when Gaza have gone the way it did, after the violent takeover of power by Hamas in Gaza, there was nothing more important for us, just as you do in this country. You have something by way of disaster, you expect -- people expect to see the National Guard on the street, whatever it is they do. I thought it's important for psychological reasons for our people to see our own security in uniform on the street. I asked for, that was my first ask to the Israelis. And you know, I didn't you know succeed there, at least initially. Why? Because, it came against the backdrop of years of violence, and I was told without really getting to who told me what at the time, (inaudible) security is something that we the Israelis are taking care of and we are not going to really allow this to happen, because we're not going to go to September 20th positions, a reference in so-called roadmap to peace. I said that's not what's really on my mind. What's on my mind is to provide basic service, law and order to people. And you say, you are doing security, you are not doing security. You are getting in and out, an exercise which I objected to, and I told the most important subsequently to stop. But who is handling security when you are out, no one. You want to handle security, do it full time, and I would step aside. But if we are going to really build to the point we're able to relate to each other as two entities that care about a future that's bright for everybody, we definitely should be allowed to deploy. Several discussions and negotiations, et cetera, we started really actually putting people. It was very difficult very, very, very difficult. First time, we went into was Nablus, most important, most difficult, most challenging at the time. Really went through gradually difficult to find the numbers, the people, the uniform, basic things, and then training that was supported by the United States and Jordan. A process of rebuilding, not one that said, let's do away with everything that existed and start anew, that would have made no sense, to be honest with you. But doing the best we could with what we had and renew, and renew. Several

13 brigades later, we had enough, given you know our objective what we need to accomplish. People started to have a sense of normalcy, people started to have sense of confidence. Importantly, the most important accomplishment of all of this, and that's why I say it really is important to connect to people at this level. Most importantly, there was a decided shift in favor of nonviolence in the mindset of Palestinian people, it was most important whereas, it was a very difficult message for me as Prime Minster to carry to people early on, it became what people talked about; because then they saw that it laid a foundation for everything else, for building, investing, better educational services, health services and what have you. The whole thing started to make sense. I'll go back to what I was saying, what didn't happen to really make it click. That success needed to be validated in political terms. And that was the first important failure. You know, the thing made sense to people in terms of development, in terms of becoming better and stronger, better able, competent, and the rest of it. But people thought, but you know this is really not about improving conditions under the occupation and park it there. You told us this is about improving the lot of people as a step toward and an instrument of liberation. Given this and I understood it very well, the most important deliverable on the Israeli side, you know what it was, something that would have validated the progress of security, something which would have internalized in a very good and positive way this shift in the mindset of public in favor of non-violence and that thing was to stop what I called, military insurgence into so-called Area A. MR. FRIEDMAN: Explain that to people what it is. MR. FAYYAD: Area A is urban areas in the West Bank. MR. FRIEDMAN: Urban areas? MR. FAYYAD: Cities, urban areas. Urban areas, that's all. West Bank under Oslo II was kind of segregating, so-called Area A,

14 where full purview of the PIA security as well as administration. MR. FRIEDMAN: Total Palestinian security control. MR. FAYYAD: Total Palestinian control, yeah this is like Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, et cetera. Area B, where administration was for the PIA, security was kind of for Israel. Area C, which is little over 60 percent of the total complete jurisdiction for Israelis during the -- for a couple of years it was supposed to be, it's still there today. So all I asked for was for the military incursions which started to happen after the breakdown, actually after 7 years of Oslo -- during the first 7 years, there were no incursions. This started to happen after breakout of second Intifada. What I asked for, given the improvement of security, was for us to go to back to status quo. Why was that important? Again I just explained to you the importance of explaining to people and getting them to understand and relate to a fundamental proposition, namely the most important component of the state is its security. And if our people then saw the Israelis reciprocate and validate that success by stopping the incursions, the thing would have started to make sense politically. It would have begun to look like a state, not a state, it would have begun to look like a state. Yes, indeed we are making progress. After all security -- I mean, state is defined by what its security is. There was failure there. The issue was not pushed enough. It was not accepted by Israelis, and I regret, did not feature importantly in the discussions and intermediation at the international level. It was important then, it's important today. If there are things that need to be fixed, they should be fixed. But once they are I think it's very important for security to be validated in the sense I described. This is one failure. The other failure, I think it was significant. Over the period 2010, 2011, 2012, three successive years, the PIA rather paradoxically, ironically against the backdrop of vast improvement in governance, substantial improvement in the degree of self reliance, and therefore of a

15 progressive reduction of our deficit and need for foreign aid, there was a massive shortfall in foreign aid during that time period, 2010, '11 and '12, to the tune of one-third of what was pledged during those years. Year-after-year, month-after-month and year-after-year PIA -- my main preoccupation was whether or not we're going to be able to pay salaries. And guess what that coincided with? That coincided with the period around which we had promised readiness for a state. The tractors had been fielded. Oh, so this is you know what this guy was telling you about, Palestinian statehood and readiness for state and the whole world is saying yes, they are a different state, and guess what, it doesn't have money to pay salaries, devastating. I think you know the world could have done better to deal with the financial needs of the PIA at the time, given the very high sense of self responsibility with which we have put governance, reform, and with which we really -- with determination to reduce our deficit. Things like this matter then, they matter today. There is a lot else that happened. There was -- there were a couple of rounds of diplomacy, importantly one led by Senator Mitchell. People forgot about that in the aftermath of intensive diplomacy over the past year or so, led by Secretary Kerry. But here we are, we find ourselves in the situation where I think with good reason. Great deal of disappointment and I would say even concern can be expressed vis-à-vis where we are, particularly in view of the deterioration of security condition, violence. MR. FRIEDMAN: So, so -- MR. FAYYAD: But we should not give up, I mean that's -- MR. FRIEDMAN: That's what I wanted to ask. MR. FAYYAD: Yeah. MR. FRIEDMAN: So if you were advising President Obama, knowing everything you know, Martin Indyk yesterday detailed eloquently why things broke down and both sides certainly had a hand in it. How do you get things going any more? You know it's one thing -- you know,

16 I've always felt between Israelis and Palestinians that when you had war, you could root for peace, and when you had peace you could root for a final settlement. But when you have war after peace, that's the worst thing in the world. MR. FAYYAD: Yeah. MR. FRIEDMAN: It's like a -- to me it always reminded me of a couple having a very stormy relationship. And one day they say, let's get married, that will fix it. And they get married and then six months later they both cheat on each other, you know. And that marriage isn't -- it's really going to be hard to put back together. So what would you advise right now, we're in such a deep and dark hole. What is the way out? President? MR. FAYYAD: I would say -- if it is a conversation with the MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah. MR. FAYYAD: Very frankly and openly with all due respect, Mr. President, we need to get off of this pause idea. MR. FRIEDMAN: Pause? Pause. S-E. MR. FAYYAD: Pause, sorry, for the accent, yeah my it's -- P-A-U- MR. FRIEDMAN: P-A-U-S-E yeah. Mine is from Minnesota, yours is from Ramallah. (Laughter) MR. FAYYAD: We need to get off of whatever that is, you know what I am saying. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, right. MR. FAYYAD: That's very dangerous, that's first thing. First

17 order of business, let's get off of that. I mean I understand the frustration. Look, I mean this is not the first administration or president to say, we cannot want it more than the part we do, Tom Friedman is as guilty of that as anyone else. MR. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely. MR. FAYYAD: I mean, he repeatedly wrote. MR. FRIEDMAN: I actually coined. (Laughter) MR. FAYYAD: And you know I understand it, I understand it. The point can be made in a very deductible way, but I think we have a valid point too. There is great deal of stake -- at stake, at all levels. At the human level, suffering in the region, this means something. It cannot not mean something to the beacon of hope, in the words of the United States and civilized world, you know what was going on in the region, the violence and all. This question as to whether violence in border region is related to that, and that's a discussion for another day, that's not -- you know, I'm not going to spend time on it. But I think it's really part of a puzzle, and a rather serious challenge for all of us. I mean, certainly in the region first and foremost. And we should assume much greater degree of self responsibility, both sides, the principle for the conflict. But I don't think yet, you know, this is really going to help much by, you know, do it on your own and make up your mind and decide what you want and then let us know. However long or short that period of pause is, it is not a good concept because the world doesn't stay put in the -- particularly in the Middle East while you're pausing, P-A-U-S-I-N-G, you know what I am saying. Things happen. And in the Middle East, more often than not, bad things happen as has been happening. Weaknesses that has started to creep into the system begin to find expression in bad things happening on the ground. That change the subject dramatically. And all of a sudden, warrior takes over. Let's not

18 wait until, you know, we are kind of running scared, although in the nature of things humans, you know, perform best when they are running for their lives. But this is such moment. Before a total collapse, before the bottom falls off completely, we should all be running scared. We should not really -- MR. FRIEDMAN: So be specific, what then -- we can do the Kerry mission, you think or -- MR. FAYYAD: That's number one, I would say. What do we do? We tried this, we tried, you know, to really come and say, we have a gap to close and we are going to really put on the table ideas and the framework for resolutions, something that was tried before, actually for more than 20 years now. And it has not worked. What reason do you have to think that this time around we're going to be successful? I say, I don't have many reasons to think so, I have to be honest with you. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah. MR. FAYYAD: And honestly speaking, if it's going to be doing more of the same, it's not going to succeed. This conflict in terms of its management has gone through cycles and phases. Early on, although that was supposed to be the period of building in the '90s, it was short and I think at the time understandably shortly after Oslo, the breakthrough and the rest of it. We can do this. Five years is long enough time and all and people are ready and the rest of it. And it felt that way. But it was a fleeting moment of hope and justified sense of possibility. It didn't happen, you know, this way of sort of redoing it top down. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes. MR. FAYYAD: And then we had years of Intifada and lost time and devastation, catastrophe, tragedy at all levels. And then there was interest, and well, let's just really focus on building and all. All of this was reflected in the roadmap to peace in The two sides agreed to it by the way, in spring 2003, but didn't happen for many years. And then we went through turmoil on our side. The Gaza went away, the West Bank was not that far behind by the way in terms of lawlessness and chaos. It

19 was after 2007 we said, all right let's, you know, pay attention to this. I think I described that. I think what's really needed as first element, the two going hand in hand. You know no longer -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Bottom up and the top down. MR. FAYYAD: There has to be. Why do I say this? You know, over the past 20 years, if we define failure to agree to come to agreement, to terms of agreement, as the gap between the two sides in the form of the difference between the maximum on offer by Israel under successive governments and the minimum acceptable to us, I submit respectfully to you ladies and gentlemen and Tom, that this gap has grown wider over time. And what was you know probably acceptable 5, 10 years ago is not there, and it's a problem. So we need to do something that can bring about transformation. Top down by itself is not going to really happen, unless somebody is still out there fancying the notion that the United States will come and say, take it or leave, this really is going to happen. I just, you know, if somebody can convince me that this is like that, I'd say yeah -- MR. FRIEDMAN: Impose solution. MR. FAYYAD: Yeah, we would take -- it's not realistic. What is, what can work is for us to really engage again in a serious act of let's aim at bringing about the transformation necessary. And really pay attention to both, create a political context in which that, you know, bottom up start to make sense again. Thirdly, I think it also -- and I will be very specific on this. It's fair, it's right, and sense to reason. After 20 years of trying to solve this conflict with all the goodwill there is, and it was depth of it in all forms, on the part of all administrations, and congress as a matter of fact. When you look at the situation today and say we are in trouble, we need to really move forward, how do we do it? To argue that we can do it going back to the old notebook or cookbook without any changes, I think that's expecting too much. I think some adjustments are necessary, and I really choose my words carefully because that's my position, you know, on this. And I'm precise on it.

20 Let's look at what Oslo was about. Oslo, you know, was about the possibility of emergence of state of Palestine to, you know, basically solve this in the context of two-state solution, about ending the occupation. But importantly what people forgot about Oslo was that the whole thing was supposed to be interim, it's an important concept. Oslo was supposed to be an interim period. That's all of Oslo. That was not, you know, something short term, medium term, long term. Oslo was for a 5-year period, during which time the PIA was going to be formed, negotiations going to proceed on so-called permanent status issues both as refugees et cetera, et cetera, culminating in agreement, silent on statehood, but strongly implied statehood would happen by Things made sense in that context. The PIA being viewed as a security project, you know, from an Israeli point of view also could have been solved in that context. So this is after all a transitional period. But importantly, what Oslo meant and not many people you know gave the time necessary to think about, you know, how it happened and what the content of it was. For the first time, after 26 years then of occupation, we Palestinians formally by signing Oslo Accord in a formal way we accepted in a formal way continuation of Israeli occupation. Up until then, we could have claimed rightly that this is really basically enforced, this is forced on us and it is not our choice. By signing that instrument we signaled our willingness to accept the continuation of Israeli occupation for 5 more years ending in Once May 4th of 1999 came and passed by, what was interim became an open-ended interim period. This is an important conceptual adjustment that needs to be made. I'm not here to argue at all and I don't and I will not that, you know, I stand for ditching, you know, what Oslo was about in terms of it having been and continued to be two state solution. That was and remains my position, you know, on this. What I'm really saying, framework and methods of intervention that prevailed over the past 20 years but failed to produce, cannot be expected to produce without adjustments. Key amongst those is to bring about the notion of interim again. You know this cannot be open-ended. When we have been doing this in an open-ended way since 1999, 15

21 years, 15 years, and all the while the PIA was supposed to act like a state when in fact it isn't and fulfill security obligations toward the occupying power, not in the context that promises by edit of some kind an end to the occupation. That adjustment needs to be made. And I, you know, would approach this the reverse engineering. MR. FRIEDMAN: You need a -- Palestinians need a horizon. MR. FAYYAD: We need a horizon. You know, good thing this is sponsored by Booz Allen, I mean, we ask reverse engineering, what do we do? MR. FRIEDMAN: Right. MR. FAYYAD: What do we do? We go from the end. This is about ending the occupation, everybody agrees that. Let's start there. Let us agree, just as Oslo was, about a date certain for ending the occupation. And I say, agreed. You ask me as a person, you know, I'd say, yes, to them. But that's what Israelis are. Let's talk about this, pick a date. Pick a date and create international consensus around that and then, to be honest with you, that's a trip to New York I would like to take. We all go hand in hand, not unilaterally. The whole world, you know, goes to the locus of, and the custodian of international law, and actually operationalize it in a consensual way. And have a resolution issued by the Security Council of the United Nations enshrining this, we know then what the end game is. I'll tell you conceptually it was wrong with what exists today. MR. FRIEDMAN: Yeah. MR. FAYYAD: What exists today from the point of view of Palestinians, and I think it's important for the world to understand our mindset. We were not irrational, and we should not be viewed this way, to be honest with you. Where we look at today basically is the following, this is the landscape. Go negotiate with Israel, the occupying power; so long as you fail you're going to have to continue to be settled by the occupation. That can't -- I mean, Oslo was not like that. They said, go

22 negotiate, there's going to be something at the end. We need to address that by agreement, not unilaterally. We shouldn't, but by agreement, in a reasonable way, and have that as the linchpin of the effort going forward. So that becomes then the default of everything. That becomes the end game, it's clear to everybody. That would begin to provide us the assurance necessary that this is really going to be at long last freedom with dignity like everyone else in a country of our own. And that's what this is about from our point of view for things to begin to make sense. That's very important. Then we need to sit down and agree with Israel on a mutual agreed path for getting there. Negotiations then can proceed in that context. Last but not least, something very important. Occupation and all, our people have rights in addition to political rights. Basic as -- rights as basic as right to live with dignity, temporarily minus sovereignty on our land. Basic issues as access to drinking water were to exist. What if I were to tell you that that is the reality for many people in the Jordan Valley Palestinians, where drinking water exists but they do not have access to it. That shouldn't happen. People should not continue to live under the threat of being displaced or their homes demolished you know overnight, until we get to where we're going. All of this is absolutely important in order to give people sense of possibility, and yes, finally, with that, provide us with the most space, an enabling environment to make it possible for us to, in an unimpeded way, to continue -- get on with the task of really perfecting and strengthening our institution, and to be ready for that rendezvous with freedom, which is overdue. MR. FRIEDMAN: Very good. (Applause) MR. FRIEDMAN: So I mean we've got 15 minutes, I know there are many people in the audience who have questions, and if you don't mind, we'll begin --

23 MR. FAYYAD: No, no, sure. MR. FRIEDMAN: Great, please right over here. Yeah. SPEAKER: Hi, I think that everybody in the room pretty much agrees that a Palestinian state would be beneficial. The catch is the elephant in the room is the right to return, and the Palestinians were offered this with pretty much everything that you've been saying that you want, except that the Israelis don't -- will never allow the right to return, so what do we do about that? MR. FAYYAD: This is one of those permanent status issues that were agreed to be negotiated. And I will be precise. What it said was refugees, and Oslo also said refugees, they didn't say right to return. But right to return is something that is actually recognized by international law, the very same law that ultimately gave rise to the birth of state of Israel. And I do not think it can or should be ignored. But what I believe, just as we committed to it, this is something that should be negotiated and agreed mutually between the sides. This has been our position. You know, Israel can't say as it has done, you know, I don't want to really deal with this and I don't deal -- this is not acceptable, this is not -- we can for our side say the same thing. You know, this is not acceptable, this is not acceptable. But we know, by definition, (inaudible), you know, once we really get together, if this thing is not going to be derailed, those issues have to be agreed, and in a way that is convincing. I think that's really what I can tell you about this. I mean, this is an issue we are committed to a fair, open discussion on with Israelis with a view to agreeing it, because we know this is not going to be the solution that we all desire unless it is agreed. SPEAKER: And there have been formulae agreed on in the past that there is -- MR. FAYYAD: There is by the way. And the roadmap to peace, which we actually agreed to in April 2003 does have language in there and the Israeli government agreed to that addresses this issue, by invoking reference to something that Thomas Friedman was first to work

24 on, what was how the initiative, peace initiative, then subsequently becoming Arab peace initiative, including language in this particular issue. Look, I don't think ultimately, you know, this issue is going to be resolved, if this is going to be off the table, that's off the table. That's you know we understand, you know, when the Israelis are coming to -- you know, whether it's this issue or that issue. We are not in agreement because sometimes we (inaudible) ourselves. You know, Oslo was good about many things, but it was especially good in projecting sense of normalcy when we're still dealing with an issue that to this day, 20 years later, remains unresolved. So let's not pretend we agree on everything. But let's really be open to discussion, and really honor the fact that we have a difference of view. We actually have sharply different narratives; we should really go to the table with that in mind, open to discussion because we committed ourselves to it. And really committing ourselves in agreement, we can't really deal unilaterally. We cannot really get to where we're going, you know, unless we really manage to again convince Israel to get out. But you know we have this demand of Israel, we can't drop it, we agreed to discuss it. Imagine what that would do to Palestinian Authority today, with it having become as weak as it is today. I mean, how good is it, you know, if we are going to say yes for this, yes for that, yes to that thing before final agreement, before promise of delivery from our side, we're going to be too weak to accept anything, too weak to be a meaningful counterpart. So I think we should honor, you know, our differences, listen reasonably well to each other, understanding fully well, and this is the key requirement just as all of these other adjustments. And this may be the software of all of this, you know, at some point, at some point, we really need to bring about this, you know, notion or value of equality. Very important part of constellation of high universally shared human values. This conflict is going to be resolved one day. I firmly believe in this. No reason to give up, but in order for that to happen, I believe the needs, sensitivities, and concerns of both sides need to be -- to begin to be viewed on an equal footing. That's absolutely important.

25 It's something that I really feel essential, and in this sense therefore that act of transformation, I told you about, the building that brings it about or can help bring it about is important, because then, you know, there'll be some symmetry. There is no symmetry right now. We began to react each other as human beings. We have concerns, we don't agree, but we honor differences, we understand (inaudible), that's my submission, that's my appeal to our Israeli neighbors. there. MR. FREIDMAN: So going back, yeah, young lady back MS. PORGES: Hi, Shelly Porges (phonetic), Washington D.C. As an Israeli-born American, I really want to thank you for your vision, for your commitment to building institutions in Palestine that will make the state stronger. Having said that, the thing that's notable about this morning's conversation to me is there's been no reference to what's going on in the rest of the region and how that's going to impact the situation and the possibilities for peace between Israel and Palestine. Could you comment on that, please? Tom. MR. FAYYAD: Sure, although I'm inclined to turn that over to (Laughter) MR. FRIEDMAN: It was going to be my next question Shelly, but it's -- as somebody who is an Arab statesman, you know, knowing the neighborhood, what's going on? MR. FAYYAD: As I sort of really briefly commented, so this is an unprecedented state of violence, grotesque form of it, and widespread, all happening as part of this upheaval the whole region's going through. I had an opportunity on several occasions to analyze why that happened. To me, it was a delayed reaction to deep sense of injustice that was exploited by extremists and people on the fringe, and they're -- they are ruling today. That's what's happening. In a way --

26 MR. FRIEDMAN: Deep sense of -- we'll talk about that, what was that deep sense of injustice so they -- what was well springs? MR. FAYYAD: It's several, several factors, but you know, failed governance, failed governance to do exactly what you said. I mean, in a world that's so open, so globalized, very flat, as very, very flat -- MR. FRIEDMAN: It's a good book title. (Laughter) MR. FAYYAD: Flat as an even concept. You know, what I'm saying, people in the region were supposed to believe that life came from their rulers, rulers. That those rulers can supremely knew what was good for them. And their most important task in life was to obey. At the time when thanks to the world being so flat and Facebook and Twitter then the rest of it these days, people knew better. People knew better. Regimes did not understand this, and they were very slow to react; equally slow to react, I think, was the global west in my view. Regime after regime, without really getting to names, I get myself in trouble easily when I get to this habit, but you know, whatever, life is short. But come to places like Washington and guess what they are saying, not exactly the words, I was not there, support us. The case for me is a case against alternative, with the alternative in the '60s and '70s, part of '70s being communism and subsequently Muslim Brotherhood. And that's -- I mean, imagine, you know, we're supposed to rule and govern and what's going for us -- should be going for us, in our view, is that we beat from our people's point of view the alternative of them being governed by another ideology. That's not good enough reason to support anybody. So it's failure on our side, I would say, for decades, and I would say in other part of so-called third world, global south, if you will. And also failure to adequately respond on the path of international diplomacy, powers to be, and all of that. And with that, basically you've lost the masses, sense of injustice, we've aggrieved, a lot of injustice, no citizens right, deep sense of disenfranchisement, we don't matter for anything, and we're told everything is okay.