Monday, September 26, The Cosmological Argument

Transcription

1 The Cosmological Argument

2 God?

3

4 Classical Theism Classical conception of God: God is Eternal: everlasting Omnipotent: all-powerful Transcendent: beyond the world Omnipresent: everywhere Compassionate: caring Omniscient: all-knowing

5 Dissident conceptions Via negativa-- the negative way -- We can know only what God is not Deism: God created the world, but has no further interaction with it; no miracles Pantheism God is everything Panentheism God includes everything

6 God A Posteriori Arguments

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8 The Cosmological Argument Aristotle: God is the prime mover of the universe Aquinas: God is the first cause Avicenna: God is the Necessary Being

9 Nyaya-Vaisesika Argument The earth is an effect (like a pot) Therefore, it has a cause

10 Aquinas s Argument The second way is based on the nature of causation. In the observable world, causes are to be found ordered in series; we never observe, or even could observe, something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is impossible.

11 Aquinas s Argument Such a series of causes, however, must stop somewhere. For in all series of causes, an earlier member causes an intermediate, and the intermediate a last (whether the intermediate be one or many). If you eliminate a cause you also eliminate its effects. Therefore there can be neither a last nor an intermediate cause unless there is a first. But if the series of causes goes on to infinity, and there is no first cause, there would be neither intermediate causes nor a final effect, which is patently false.

12 Aquinas s Argument It is therefore necessary to posit a first cause, which all call 'God'.

13 Aquinas s Argument Let a be the current state of the world It was caused, as was its cause, etc.... < e < d < c < b < a This can t go on to infinity, or we d never have reached a So, there must be a first cause, God God <... < c < b < a

14 Aquinas s Argument Issues: Why can t this go on to infinity? What s the argument against a backwards infinite chain?... < e < d < c < b < a Suppose there is a first cause. Why call it God?

15 Avicenna ( )... there is in being a being which has no reason for its being....that which is contingent cannot enter upon being except for some reason which sways the scales in favour of its being and against its not-being. If the reason is also contingent, there is then a chain of contingents linked one to the other, and there is no being at all; for this being which is the subject of our hypothesis cannot enter into being so long as it is not preceded by an infinite succession of beings, which is absurd. Therefore contingent beings end in a Necessary Being.

16 Avicenna Something has a reason for its existence iff it is contingent Suppose everything were contingent There would be one linked to another in a chain infinitely long But then infinitely many beings would have had to occur before any given one could come into existence Therefore, nothing would exist So, something is necessary, having no reason for its being

17 Two Necesary Beings? Suppose there were two The distinction between them would have to be essential or accidental But accidents are contingent If the distinction were accidental, one or both would be contingent If it's essential, they are compounds, and thus caused, so, contingent

18 Al-Ghazali ( ) The cosmological argument depends on the impossibility of a backwards infinite chain of causes But why is that impossible?

19 Al-Ghazali Argument would have to be a priori or a posteriori It can't be a priori, for there's no contradiction in the idea Can it be a posteriori? No---the necessary being could just be the backwards infinite causal series, made up of contingent beings!.... < e < d < c < b < a

20 Averroes ( ) There are two kinds of agent: (1) [Causation] the agent to which the object which proceeds from it is only attached during the process of its becoming; once this process is finished, the object is not any more in need of it for instance, the coming into existence of a house through the builder; (2) [Dependence] the agent from which nothing proceeds but an act which has no other existence than its dependence on it.

21 Averroes We need to distinguish two sense of causal dependence Efficient cause: builder to house Dependence: act and object are inseparable Let's call that inseparable dependence grounding

22 Averroes Al-Ghazali is right about efficient causation The being without an efficient cause could just be the total chain But the argument works for inseparable dependence, that is, grounding

23 Averroes.... < e < d < c < b < a G1 G2 G3....

24 Averroes There could not be an infinite descending grounding series Could the ungrounded thing just be the descending series? No: an infinite descending grounding series couldn't ground anything

25 Averroes.... < e < d < c < b < a G1 G2 G3... God

26 Locke on Substance So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied something, he knew not what.

27 Turtles All the Way Down

28 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ( )

29 Principle of Sufficient Reason Principle of Sufficient Reason: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason. So the universe the whole series of contingent causes must have a sufficient reason for its existence: Something which is its own sufficient reason for existing: God

30 Issues Why can t there be an infinite regress of grounds? Because: Turtles all the way down donʼt ground anything. Why call the something, I know not what at the bottom God? Because, the ultimate ground is self-grounding, is its own sufficient reason for existing. Nothing other than God could be like that.

31 Paul (5? 67?)

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33 Paul s Argument from the Part 1. Everything natural has a cause. 2. Causes are metaphysically distinct from their effects. 3. Everything natural overlaps the natural world. 4. The natural world as a whole is natural. 5. Therefore, the natural world has a cause that is not itself natural. (That is, transcendent.)

34 The Natural World Transcendent Cause

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36 Causes Paul seems to apply Aristotle s four causes to get different versions of the argument The natural world has a transcendent efficient cause, a Creator; a transcendent formal cause, the Logos; and a transcendent final cause, toward which it is directed.

37 Four Causes

38 Four Causes of a House Efficient Cause: Final Cause: Formal Cause: Material Cause:

39 Four Causes of a House

40 Four Causes of the Universe

41 Four Causes of the Universe

42 Four Causes of the Universe

43 One God? Why think these are the same being? It s the simplest, most ontologically parsimonious explanation Argument from independence: if there are many gods, they depend on one another to achieve their aims. But God is independent, not needing anything or anyone else.