ASIA FERRIN Curriculum Vitae

Transcription

1 ASIA FERRIN Curriculum Vitae Fall Siegel Hall 3301 S. Dearborn Chicago, IL EDUCATION Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle Expected June 2015 M.A. Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle June 2009 B.A. Summa Cum Laude, Philosophy, Westminster College, Salt Lake City May 2007 RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Moral Psychology, Feminist Philosophy, Ethics AREAS OF COMPETENCE Social and Political Philosophy, Bioethics, Philosophy of Implicit Bias DISSERTATION Intelligent Automaticity in Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. Committee: Alison Wylie (chair), Nancy Snow (external reader), Sara Goering, Carole Lee, William Talbott AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Sawyier Predoctoral Teaching Fellowship, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago 2012 Melvin Rader Grant for Teaching Development, Philosophy Department, University of Washington Teaching Excellence Award, Philosophy Department, University of Washington Ronald E. McNair Graduate Fellowship, University of Washington RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS REFEREED 2015 Good Moral Judgment and Decision-Making Without Deliberation Central APA, Main Program. St. Louis, MI. Upcoming 2013 Modified Moral Rationalism as a Theory of Moral Judgment: A Critique of Horgan and Timmons Morphological Rationalism. Conference on Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning. Center for Cognition and Neuroethics. Flint, Michigan. October Page 1 of 5

2 2013 Also presented at the 65 th Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference. Pacific University, Forest Grove, OR. October It Just Feels Right: Exploring Automaticity in Moral Judgment. Poster Presentation, Pacific APA, San Francisco. March INVITED 2013 Comments on Implicit Bias, Context and Character, by Michael Brownstein. 39 th Annual Meeting for the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Brown University, Providence, RI. June It Just Feels Right: Exploring Automaticity in Moral Judgment. Graduate Seminar: Social Psychology and Philosophy, UC Berkeley. Invited by Instructor (Alex Madva). April 2. COURSES TAUGHT AND SCHEDULED AS PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR Illinois Institute of Technology That s Wrong! Moral Judgment and Decision-Making Scheduled Spring 2015 Oppression, Privilege, & Resistance (Humanities Course) Fall 2014, Scheduled Spring 2015 Feminist Philosophy Fall 2014 Bellevue College Introduction to Philosophy (Hybrid Course) Fall 2013 University of Washington Seminar on Teaching Philosophy Fall 2013, Spring 2014 Introduction to Medical Ethics Summer 2013 Introduction to Contemporary Moral Problems Summer 2011 AS TEACHING ASSISTANT (UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON) Introduction to Contemporary Moral Problems Spring 2011 Introduction to Logic Winter 2011 Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2010 Introduction to Ethical Theory Spring 2009 Introduction to Medical Ethics Winter 2009 OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Philosophy Teaching and Learning Coordinator, University of Washington Managing Editor, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy Editorial Assistant, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy Page 2 of 5

3 ADDITIONAL TEACHING AND MENTORING EXPERIENCE MENTORING Bioethics Bowl Team Founder and Coach, University of Washington. National Competition at Loyola University, April Mentor to Katrina England, McNair Scholar, Westminster College 2012 Graduate Assistant, Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI), Rock Ethics Institute, Pennsylvania State University Mentor to first-year philosophy graduate students, UW. Alicia Intriago ( ), Michelle Pham ( ), Julio Covarrubias ( ) Ethics Bowl Team Captain and Coach, Westminster College and UW. 2 nd Place, 2007 National Championship. PRESENTATIONS 2014 Working with ELL/ESL Writers in the Philosophy Classroom, Spring Teaching and Learning Workshop, Presented with Philosophy Writing Center Tutors, University of Washington Philosophy Department 2013 Service Learning in the Philosophy Classroom, Fall Teaching and Learning Workshop, University of Washington Philosophy Department 2013 Dealing With Difficult Classroom Situations, UW Annual Teaching and Research Assistant Conference 2010 Teaching as a Woman in Philosophy, Presented with Amy Reed-Sandoval and Elizabeth Scarborough. Philosophy Teaching Seminar, UW DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE AND WORKGROUPS CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION Organizer, Interdisciplinary Symposium on Moral Judgment and Moral Education. Illinois Institute of Technology. Planning in Progress (Scheduled April 2015). Co-Organizer, University of Washington Philosophy Graduate Student Conference on Moral Responsibility (February 10 11, 2012) COMMITTEES Committee on Implicit Bias and Departmental Climate Graduate Colloquium Committee Stice Lecture Committee (Spring 2013 Stice Lecturer: Sally Haslanger) Graduate Student Conference Committee Curriculum Committee READING/WORKING GROUPS 2013 Latin American Philosophy Reading Group 2013 Talkin' Up to the White Woman: Indigenous Women and Feminism Reading Group Feminist Philosophy Reading Group 2012 Delusions of Gender Reading Group Page 3 of 5

4 Queer Pedagogical Performance Work Group, Simpson Center for the Humanities 2011 Rationality and Heuristics Reading Group (Co-Organizer) 2011 Moral Psychology Reading and Work Group (Organizer) PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Philosophical Association Association for Practical and Professional Ethics Society for Women in Philosophy Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory American Association for Philosophy Teachers REFERENCES RESEARCH Alison Wylie, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (206) Nancy Snow, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Marquette University (414) William Talbott, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (206) Sara Goering, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (206) Carole Lee, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (206) TEACHING AND MENTORING Ellen Feder, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, American University (202) Ann Baker, Principal Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington (206) Maureen Flanagan, Chair, Department of Humanities, Illinois Institute of Technology (312) Page 4 of 5

5 DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Intelligent Automaticity in Moral Judgment and Decision-Making Are conscious reflection and an appeal to moral principles necessary for good moral judgment and decision-making? An explosion of empirical work in moral psychology has led to significant philosophical attention to this question in the last decade. Some argue that conscious reflection and moral principles are necessary features of good moral judgment and decision-making, while others argue more modestly that either conscious reflection or moral principles are necessary. I argue that neither is a necessary feature, and propose a non-traditional normative standard of moral judgment and decision-making. In the first chapter, I begin with a summary of the challenge to the traditional view of moral judgment and decision-making that has received the most philosophical attention in the last decade (Jonathan Haidt The Emotional Dog and the Rational Tail (2001)). Haidt argues that moral-judgments diverge drastically from models of moral judgment and decision-making in philosophy and psychology. While many theorists think of moral judgment and decision-making as deliberative, Haidt argues that it is actually more reactive: an individual has a gut response to a moral situation and immediately forms a judgment from that intuition. We typically utilize reasoning or reflection, Haidt argues, only when asked to justify our judgments after the fact. I explore three kinds of responses to Haidt s work: 1. Haidt s challenge fails because it is descriptively or empirically false. Haidt s data do not show that we fail to make moral judgments that involve reflection or moral principles. 2. Haidt s empirical data do not matter. As long as it is still possible for us to involve reflection and moral principles in our judgment and decision-making, we should continue to strive for that ideal. Haidt has only shown that it is very difficult to reach this standard, which is so much the worse for us. 3. Haidt s data do show that we need a new normative standard of moral judgment and decision-making. The data imply that we diverge significantly from traditional norms of moral judgment and decision-making, suggesting we ought to re-evaluate the standard itself. The three central dissertation chapters are an exploration of each of these responses to Haidt s work. In Chapter Two, I present various arguments for the claim that Haidt s challenge fails at the empirical level. In Chapter Three, I review arguments for the claim that Haidt s challenge does not necessitate a need to revise normative ideals. I argue that both kinds of responses fail. This, then, makes possible an exploration of the idea that the normative theory needs to be revised. In chapter four, I evaluate an attempt to describe a standard of moral judgment and decision-making that diverges entirely from moral rationalism. I argue that this particular attempt to describe moral judgment and decision-making fails. This opens up, then, a space for me to defend my own account of moral judgment and decision-making that avoids the pitfalls present in the account discussed in chapters two through four. I do this in the fifth, and final, chapter of the dissertation. Building upon work by theorists like Nomy Arpaly, Nancy Snow, and Dacia Narvaez, I argue specifically that that good moral judgments can arise when agents have automatic, gut-reactions based on intuitions that are themselves based on implicit held values. Page 5 of 5