But I got to tell you, I think it needs more definition than that. And I think industry's role can be great if it's defined better.

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "But I got to tell you, I think it needs more definition than that. And I think industry's role can be great if it's defined better."

George Shaw
5 years ago
Views:

1 GEN Anthony (Tony) Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Chairman and Acting CEO, BAE Systems, Inc. Speech at ComDef 2009, National Press Club, Washington, DC September 9 th, KOCH: Ladies and gentlemen, our next keynote speaker will be retired General Anthony Zinni from the U.S. Marine Corps. He was recently appointed chairman of the board and acting president and CEO of BAE Systems Incorporated. General Zinni's distinguished 39-year military career culminated in his assignment as Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. During early 1995, General Zinni served as Commander of the Combined Task Force for Operation United Shield, protecting the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia. He has held numerous diplomatic positions and serves on various advisory and non-profit group boards. In 2002, he was selected to be a special envoy for the United States to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. While serving as special envoy, General Zinni was also an instructor in the Department of International Studies at the Virginia Military Institute. General Zinni holds a Bachelors degree in economics and two Master of Arts degrees; one in international relations and another in management and supervision. And General Zinni will speak to us about the industry perspective and industrial imperatives of international cooperation. General? (APPLAUSE) ZINNI: Thank you. I look at the title here and I saw "Smart Power." I'm waiting to hear what smart power is. I haven't heard it yet. We seem to be all focused on the military dimension. I guess from the assistant secretary's perspective this morning, if we stay in our lane and in FMS and we fight pirates, we are contributing to smart power. But I got to tell you, I think it needs more definition than that. And I think industry's role can be great if it's defined better. I probably have participated in every smart power study or project in this town in the last 10 years. It kind of reminds me of "transformation" -- about 10 years that was the buzzword. And if you sold a screwdriver to the Department of Defense, you could tag it as transformational and probably will end up winning a contract. And smart power is going to go that way if we don't clearly understand what it means. I got to believe it means more than the three D's of defense, diplomacy and development. And I think that the environment and the climate we are in now, the missions that we are giving not only our military, but our other agencies of government and our allies and partners who are represented here today tell us we've got to think more broadly and got to think outside just the military. I was in Iraq in November and last October to do an assessment at the request of our ambassador and our senior military commander there. I was amazed by one thing in particular as

2 I left there -- that surprised me. And that was how much the military, the coalition forces were doing that were non-military. And I can tell you, everything from monitoring the date palm harvest to running the zoos were being done by the military. The energy grid, the energy fusion cell, monitored and run by the military, the engagement cell that really got itself involved in the diplomacy and the reconciliation of certain of the tribal and ethnic groups -- run basically by the military. I stopped at writing down 54 areas that the military was involved in. Stuckese (ph) was the problem. And I think it's important that we begin before we can understand -- I represent the industry perspective here now -- before we can begin to understand how we help where we're involved, that there needs to be a more significant definition. It isn't going to be a matter of just taking the other agencies of government, the Department of State and USAID, and throwing some money and resources and people at them and saying, "That will bring it up on par with the Department of Defense and everything it's been tasked to do" in this era of conflict that is gone far away from the conventional model that we have all grown up with and our military has been trained to operate within. And I think these agencies of government are going to have to understand if they are going to stand up to this. They are going to have to develop a different culture; a culture of planning, a culture of deployment, a culture of being able to build programs, and to be able to integrate those other elements; the political, the social, the economic requirements in terms of capacity building with what the military does and what the defense industry support in terms of building up the security aspect of that. We will leave Iraq with a tremendous security assistance program in place. Have you seen the government's assistance program -- the governance assistance program or the economic assistance program or the social assistance program in building light capacity? Not there. And here we are, one of the most powerful elements in our society that's represented here by most of you, an industry that grew up that scared the bejesus out of Dwight Eisenhower. You know, I just re-read his speech recently. You have to realize he gave that speech in Two decades before that, he was an old lieutenant colonel about ready to retire from the 17th largest military, just behind Romania, in the world. Two decades later, he was retiring as the president of the United States. He saw us meet a military challenge that was unbelievable. In four years, that 17th largest military in the United States grew to the most powerful in the world. I read a memoir of Sir John Hackett, British commander, NATO commander, who said that in his career as a young officer, he drew his sword in a calvary charge and retired in the command of nuclear weapons in his command element in NATO. They went through a remarkable process in a rapid period of time. Not only did they see their militaries develop, they saw this unbelievable industrial complex develop along with it. And because of the needs of the time, because of the threat of not only a global war that we had faced at the time, but the aftermath and the Cold War, the need for technology and

3 innovation and support grew this tremendous industry and this tremendous complex that scared a president of the United States because of its power. Now that power, we've come to learn, has served us well in terms of preventing existential threats, in terms of developing technology that have had uses in utility beyond just the military dimension. So here we sit, representing this industry, this powerful industry, and here we are at a conference trying to understand now how we will support a shift in policy over toward a more balanced use of our elements of power. And we are waiting for the requirement. And I think it's more than just this industry staying in its lane of defense and continuing along that track. The client we serve, the military, has found itself doing more than military things. It is the tool of smart power. We are trying to get that back to where it may more appropriately belong into the other agencies of government, into international and regional organizations better suited for this. We are trying to get it back into the civilian sector, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, better equipped to do this. But we want to find a way in industry to support that. And I think there is a way. I think there is a way that our industry can bring its innovation, its technology to bear in very different ways in just the defense perspective. It's going to require a tremendous ability now if we shift to this major strategic direction in terms of detection of potential threats, detection of areas where instability may cause problems, where reconstruction and capacity building is necessary. That detection is going to require a different way we analyze and process data, the way we integrate information and intelligence to match it up with our security requirements and needs. It's going to mean new systems and new technologies for that management. It's going to mean we need to go into a more protective mode, not only in terms of cyber-security, but better ways to find protective ways of doing business rather than relying on the event manifesting itself and us reacting in some way. There are ways that we can take the technology base that we have and the innovation base that we have and apply it to these problems. I have asked my people or my staff, you know, give me a requirement. Find me a requirement that would help in this area. If I can produce a desalinated gallon of water at 5 cents does that solve a lot of problems and help stabilize a lot of parts of the world? If I can find a way to deliver a kilowatt-hour of power and energy for a dime, and I don't know if these numbers are right or wrong, does it become more efficient and do I help stabilize and become more preventative and have less requirement than on the military option? And I'm disappointed that we don't have, in our own government in the United States or even in our -- even in cooperation with our allies, a better look at what industry can provide and the solutions it can provide. This is not low-level manual stuff. I think there are technological solutions. There are information management solutions. There are ways to build capacity out there in governance. I've been around to most of the regional development banks and find they don't want for

4 resources or capital. What they want for is governments and agencies to qualify for it, to know how to use it, to how to build programs, to how to manage it, how to leverage technology in parts of the world where they could have access to the resources and improve their way of life, and consequently make that part of the world more stable. And I think that we have to think outside this defense box. It's wonderful to see all these tanks and guns up here. But what I think we are here about and the theme here now is to understand how we apply the brainpower, the investment in this tremendous industry that's been built in the last half century to see how now it's more balanced. I know in the course of discussion today we will find that defense budgets are flattening or declining. We all know that. We all face that. And yet, we have a very powerful thing to contribute if we are allowed into this. Why isn't the State Department creating its own version of DARPA? Why isn't it looking at reconstructing itself in a different way, in leveraging the same kinds of things our Department of Defense did to build the kinds of systems that allow to plan and process and manage information, analyze data, use I.T. and other systems to best support the way they go about the business of diplomacy and development? And I think this is going to be the important role for us to examine. And we need to look beyond just retaining the security contribution that we make, because there is nobody else out there that will fill this role. It is going to be this vast industry that has the power, that has the background, that understands how to apply it in a military context now to apply it in these other contexts. And I think that's going to be the challenge for us. I'm disappointed this morning that we didn't hear more in-depth analysis to how this is going to work. I've been involved with the Policy Advisory Group, founded by Senators Lugar and Biden, and now Senator Lugar and Kerry, to look at where do we put our resources in this. You know, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the questions I heard there, during the testimony and afterwards, is tell me what this smart power means. If you're going to come to me for resources, increasing in your manpower and structure, increases in your budget, tell me what it's for. Tell me what I'm building. I mean, this is a natural question for Congress. And nobody has been out there to tell them. No one has described the new structure, the new organization, the new purpose, the new functions and what it will take to do that. We have a military structure that was built out of necessity at the end of the Second World War and took us through the Cold War and now into this very murky area we are in now. That structure is elaborate not only in its organization and structure, but in its processes and what it does, how it applies technology, how it operates and deploys and functions from the strategic to the operational to the tactical level. If we are going to partner in this and balance it, you're going to need that same capability in the other agencies of our government, international, our allied governments, and the ability to then perform and develop not only the strategies and policies needed, but to actually go on the ground and prevent our own military from having to do the things they are not trained or equipped for and take a lot of heat for in the end.

5 When I was the Commander of U.S. Central Command, we had a reporter from The Washington Post, Diana Priest (ph), who realized that our unified commanders, our regional commanders were going way beyond the military dimension. And the QDR at that time, they had taken to heart. One of the verbs, the three verbs put in there to "shape" their area of responsibility. And we were shaping it in a political sense, in an economic sense, in a social sense, in an environmentally sound sense, and she got on to this, and wrote a book called "The Mission," which I would recommend to you. And "The Mission" basically describe the Department of Defense, the U.S. military and cooperation with our allies in the region that we were doing with the other agencies of government we are supposed to do. And that book, I think, was probably the first stage of a realization that we needed this balance, this so-called smart power. I've been on the studies with Nye/Armitage CSIS. And it's not enough just to articulate there is such a thing as "soft power." What is it? If you tell us and industry what it is, we could be pretty innovative and creative about the best ways for us to support it. And don't underestimate the power of what we could bring. This isn't just a matter of a few people on the ground trying to develop some sort of crop or agricultural marketing process. It's way beyond that. It's how we establish capacity and ability to govern economic systems, systems in capacity that allow people to have the benefits that we realized in the first world. And we can bring those to the Third World if we understand how to apply the investments in the best way. And, again, leverage technology and the innovation that this industry can begin. You can continue to show wonderful slides about weapon systems, but weapon systems aren't what's going to get it right now. It has to be more than that. And there is -- as someone just said, one of the previous speakers, there is tremendous amount of brain power in this room and what you represent. And I'm disappointed that our government and others don't see the need to tap into this. We are what Eisenhower cautioned, a very powerful complex. And if it was a military industrial complex, why can't it be a diplomatic industrial complex or a developmental industrial complex, you know, or an intelligence industrial complex? And what I have found representing industry and all my partners here and colleagues in industry, we stand ready to enter this field and we stand ready to contribute. We respond to the requirements though. And I would challenge those in government and those in governments of our allies and those in international agencies charged with these sorts of missions, give us the requirement and let us show you what we can do. We build the most powerful security institutions in the world that gave us 50 years of peace when we could have reduced this planet to a cinder. We can do the same thing now in these areas that require different kinds of thinking. And I think the important message from this conference ought to be: Give us some ideas and we can actually help you think through it. If you look at our security history, we have probably

6 given more ideas to the military and to the Defense Department than they have given us in requirements at the end. So I think this ought to be where we focus. And we ought to stop thinking about an industry so powerful as this that simply stays in a lane worrying about Somali pirates or whether we can make the next FMS sale. And I could tell you, in terms of my company, that's where we are going to head. Thank you very much. (APPLAUSE) KOCH: General, thank you very much for your challenging speech. And I was wondering if anyone from State is still around. (LAUGHTER) Are there any questions? And I would like to make it short because we are behind schedule. QUESTION: I'm Mitzi Wertheim. I now work for The Cebrowski Institute and run an... I think what you are saying has to be heard by a lot of smart people outside of this room. Would you consider putting it into a New Yorker article? The reason I -- I'm quite serious about this. If you remember, somebody wrote an article about health care that the White House keeps referring people to as sort of the document that you need to read to understand health care. And your presentation was incredibly powerful. I would hate to have to follow you on the podium. (LAUGHTER) ZINNI: Thank you. I'll consider it. Thank you. QUESTION: (inaudible) General, your presentation was wonderful. Obviously, the three Ds of defense, diplomacy and development is what makes policy. And also your comment on the State Department being here was excellent. Obviously, they should have been here to listen to your presentation. ZINNI: Thank you. QUESTION: Good morning. (OFF-MIKE) KOCH: Wait for the microphone please. QUESTION:... Canadian embassy. In following the idea of better integrating the industry into the identification of what the military requires to do other tasks than the military, as you mentioned. How -- what are the current initiatives that the industry is lobbying for or currently taking with the Department of State and the Department of Defense and to integrating

7 immediately the lessons learned from the military? Is that process working at its best? And how could industry help to improve that? ZINNI: Well, I think we are not learning the lessons that the military had learned the hard way because there isn't the structure in the other agencies of government to pass it on. I go back to my point about being in Iraq and seeing these ad hoc military organizations put together doing these non-military things. And there isn't really a counterpart. If you look at the structure that -- let's just take for example what deploys from these organizations. Remember, the Coalition Provisional Authority and its predecessor, ORHA, and I know we've got some people that served in those capacities. Those were thrown together ad hoc organizations that left the scene after they did what they did. And so there isn't any corporate knowledge or collective knowledge that can process that. Creating small little staffs for organizations in the State Department, I know that there is an Office of Stability and Reconstruction, that isn't enough. You know, the way the military addresses the world, it has the Department of Defense here, the largest office building in the world. As a matter of fact, there are more people in that building than I had in all of CENTCOM operating on the ground out there when I was the commander. There are, at the unified command levels, the huge staffs through the planning. We have a plan for everything. What worried me when I was a commander is I had a plan for Iraq, Iran, or whatever. There was no counterpart plan for reconstruction and stabilization. There were no counterpart plans for my engagement in the way that we prevent having to use the military parts of those plans where we build capacity, where we are more preventative in terms of what destabilizes areas and societies that causes the problems we face. And I was looking at that time not only in terms of military threats, but if you ask me my biggest concern, it was water. It was environmental issues; it was resources; it was economic conditions. And I didn't have counterparts working the same thing. So what we learned in the military of having to deal with those things, to answer your question specifically, there is no entity to pass it to and no entity to work with. I mean, I would be dramatic about all this. I would remove those regional bureaus and State Department at Foggy Bottom, and I'd put them out there and collocate them with the regional commanders. We don't even have the same geography. The military command and the State Department commands are -- the geographies different, which is illogical and drives differences in policy and approaches. So you have to fix the structure in addition to changing the policy. KOCH: I would like to allow just one more question please because we are, like I said, behind schedule, please. QUESTION: Thank you, General. Let me push you a little harder in an area you know a lot about. Let's say you are in charge of the West Bank today. We understand how the military would train the security forces of the Palestine Authority. You are in charge of the West Bank today. You want to use the whole of government, all the things the U.S. government could

8 bring. What would you do in the West Bank today that has not been done? ZINNI: Well, first of all, I think the issues that involved are more than just security. Security is an important issue and the quality of, let's say, Palestinian Security Forces has always been an important issue. But there is also a quality of governance. I think support and assistance in a viable governance system for the Palestinians and assisting their ability to govern more effectively, we could see the problems that exist there; a viable economic system, education system, health system. I mean, these are the things that create a viable society, and if it's done within the authority of the leadership, let's say, now, Fatah and Abu Mazen and his people, it gives popular credibility to that government, makes it more able in terms of them to convince their own people that there is hope, there is an ability then to negotiate in some way. So you have -- I've been involved in eight mediation efforts. And in these mediation efforts, you have to balance the parties. If the parties are not balanced, and I don't mean that in terms of military strength or anything else, I mean in the terms of credibility with their own people, the ability to arrive at the table with something that assures stability going forward, to be representatives of their own society. And I think that's important to structure, as you mentioned, on the West Bank and Gaza eventually. I think that what's been missing in that whole process is the lack of a permanent address by the mediators. I think -- and I've been an envoy. Envoys don't get it. You have got to work a series of very difficult final status issues and a number of other issues that come right under that. And it requires a major political, economic, security component, monitoring components on the ground to work these issues in detail. You can get an agreement tomorrow in principle, and you can paper the walls with all the agreements you've ever gotten in this process and everything just produced by all the summits. That's not the way you do. It's going to be hard work, taking a lot of time building work and implementation plans on the ground. And you need a structure on the ground to do that, and you need to build the viability of both sides to be able to handle it and to negotiate those things very successfully. Thank you. (APPLAUSE) (ENDED IN PROGRESS)

Dr. John Hamre President and Chief Executive Officer Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C.

Dr. John Hamre President and Chief Executive Officer Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C. Tactical Air Issues Series: The F-22 Fighter April 23, 2009 I am probably going to make