PHIL 400: ACTION THEORY

Transcription

1 PHIL 400: ACTION THEORY SPRING 2014 Professor: Avery Archer Class time: T, Th 2:10 3:25P Classroom: 202 Bailey Office: 804 McClung Tower Office Hours: Th 4-5, by apt. Course Description A great deal of philosophical work has been done on the nature and rational significance of theoretical attitudes, such as perception and belief. However, much less has been said about the nature and rational significance of practical attitudes, like desire and intention. Just as the philosophical analysis of perception and belief has important implications for epistemology, so too the analysis of desire and intention promises to have significant implications for moral psychology. As such, the investigation of the nature and rational significance of practical attitudes remains a worthwhile endeavour. In this course, we will examine what being a reason for action entails, and we will attempt to determine whether our desires and intentions provide us with reasons to act. Some of the key thinkers whose work we will be covering in this course include Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby, and David Velleman. Learning Outcomes After successfully completing this course, you will be able to: Propose, motivate, and defend your own conception of desire. Propose, motivate, and defend your own conception of intention. Distinguish between motivating and justifying reasons. Develop a rudimentary account of practical reasons. Coursework The grade for the course will be broken down as follows: 1. Class Participation (10%): Regular class attendance and participation is expected. This includes coming to class prepared, having done the required reading, asking questions, answering questions, and engaging in a constructive way in class discussion.

2 2. Weekly Reading Reports (30%): You will compose and submit (via ) a weekly reading report (of approximately 150 words) for one of the two required weekly readings before midnight each Sunday. Each report must answer the following question prompts: i. Before I read this text, the author assumed that I believed [fill in]. ii. After I finished reading this text, the author wanted me to believe [fill in]. iii. The author was/was not successful in changing my view. How so? Why or why not? Reading reports will be graded as Outstanding, Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory. This requirement is meant to help prepare you to participate in class discussion, and strengthen your ability to clearly and concisely analyse, question, and/or object to the various arguments presented in the readings. 3. Midterm Exam (20%): There will be an in- class midterm exam in essay question format. The midterm will include a section requiring you to present your own positive view on a topic covered in class. 4. Final Paper (40%): Minimum length = 2,000 words/maximum length = 2,500 words. The final paper is due before midnight on Monday, April 28 th. A list of topics will be distributed on Tuesday, March 25 th. You may also write on a topic of your own choosing with my prior approval. Grade Scale: A = 95 A- = 90 B+ = 87 B = 83 B- = 80 C+ = 77 C = 73 C- = 70 D+ = 67 D = 63 D- = 60 F = Anything below 60 Policy on Late Assignments: Late papers will only be accepted in extenuating circumstances (e.g., serious illness). Appropriate documentation must be provided (e.g., note from doctor).

3 Required Reading: All the required readings for this course are available electronically in the Course materials section of the course s Blackboard website. You have three main goals when reading assigned material: (1) Identify the main claims the author is arguing for ( What are the author s main conclusions? ); (2) Understand how the author argues for those claims ( What arguments does the author offer to support her/his main conclusions? How, exactly, are those arguments supposed to go? ); and (3) Evaluate the author s arguments ( How strong are the author s arguments for her/his main conclusions? ). I have included a pair of essays by Jim Pryor entitled Guidelines on Reading Philosophy and Guidelines on Writing Philosophy in the Assignments section of the course Blackboard website. As we begin our course, please have a look at these essays. Reading Schedule: Week 1, Thursday (January 9 th ) Introduction and Overview No Readings I. Action and Causes Week 2, Tuesday (January 14 th ) The Causal Theory of Action I Davis, The Causal Theory of Action (2010) Week 2, Thursday (January 16 th ) The Causal Theory of Action II Stout, Deviant Causal Chains (2010) Optional: Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963) Week 3, Tuesday (January 21 st ) Action and Agency I Frankfurt, The Problem of Action (1978) Optional: Davidson, Agency (1971) Week 3, Thursday (January 23 rd ) Action and Agency II Bratman, Two Problems about Human Agency (2001) Optional: Hornsby, Agency and Action (2004)

4 II. Actions and Desires Week 4, Tuesday (January 28 th ) The Humean Theory Smith, Humeanism about Motivation (2010) Optional: Scheuler, Humean Theory Rejected (manuscript) Week 4, Thursday (January 30 th ) The Nature of Desire I Scheuler, What are Desires? (1995) Week 5, Tuesday (February 4 th ) The Nature of Desire II Schroeder, Desire and Pleasure (2010) Optional: Davis, The Two Senses of Desire (1984) Week 5, Thursday (February 6 th ) Desire and the Good I Tenenbaum, Desires as Appearances (2007) Optional: Boyle & Lavin, Goodness and Desire (2010) Week 6, Tuesday (February 11 th ) Desire and the Good II Stocker, Desiring the Bad (1979) Optional: Velleman, The Guise of the Good (1992) Week 6, Thursday (February 13 th ) Desires and the Good III Hawkins, Desiring the Bad under the Guise of the Good (2008) Optional: Archer, Cognitivism and the Aim of Desire (manuscript) Week 7, Tuesday (February 18 th ) Desires as Justifying Reasons I Chang, Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? (2006) Optional: Scheuler, Desires as Justifying Reasons, Part 2 (1995) Week 7, Thursday (February 20 th ) Desires as Justifying Reasons II Archer, Do Desires Provide Reasons? (manuscript) Optional: Woods & Foot, Reasons for Action and Desires (1972)

5 III. Actions and Intentions Week 8, Tuesday (February 25 th ) The Nature of Intention Mele, Intention (2010) Optional: Velleman, Intentions (1999) Week 8, Thursday (February 27 th ) The Nature of Intention Bratman, The Two Faces of Intention (1984) Optional: Baier, Act and Intent (1970) Week 9, Tuesday (March 4 th ) Intention and Trying Hornsby, Trying to Act (2010) Optional: O Shaughnessy, Trying (as the mental pineal gland ) (1973) Week 9, Thursday (March 6 th ) Intention and Knowledge Moran, Anscombe on Practical Knowledge (2004) Optional: Voglar, Anscombe on Practical Inference (manuscript) Week 10, Tuesday (March 11 th ) Direction of Fit Humberstone, Direction of Fit (1992) Optional: Archer, What is Direction of Fit? (manuscript) Week 10, Thursday (March 13 th ) MIDTERM EXAM No Readings. IV. Actions and Reasons Week 11, Tuesday (March 25 th ) The Nature of Reasons I Scanlon, Reasons (1998) Optional: Broome, Reasons (2006)

6 Week 11, Thursday (March 27 th ) The Nature of Reasons II Broome, Rationality (2010) Optional: Broome, Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires (2005) Week 12, Tuesday (April 1 th ) Acting for Reasons I Quinn, Putting Rationality in its Place (1993) Optional: Audi, Acting for Reasons (1986) Week 12, Thursday (April 3 st ) Acting for Reasons II Dancy, Reasons for Action (2000) Week 13, Tuesday (April 8 th ) Acting for Reasons III Smith, Humeanism, Psychologism and the Normative Story (2004) Week 13, Thursday (April 10 th ) Acting for Reasons IV Sterelny, Rational Agency in Evolutionary Perspective (2010) Optional: Glock, Animal Agency (2010) Week 14, Tuesday (April 15 th ) Weakness of Will Tenenbaum, Akrasia and Irrationality (2010) Optinal: Tenenbaum, The Judgement of a Weak Will (1999) Week 14, Thursday (April 17 th ) Weakness of Will II Watson, Skepticism about Weakness of Will (1977) Optional: Arpaly, On Acting Rationally Against One s Better Judgment (2000) V. Wrap Up Week 15, Tuesday (April 22 nd ) Actions and Norms Velleman, The Story of Rational Action (1998) Week 15, Thursday (April 24 th ) Actions and Norms Brandom, Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning (1998)

7 Resources The Philosophy Department s UT website ( and Blackboard site ( access restricted to current majors) offer a variety of resources helpful to those studying Philosophy as well as information about our degree programs and other opportunities for undergraduates including our scholarships (applications considered, and awards announced, this semester), essay contest (competition takes place this semester), and Philosophy Club. All of these are open to students not in a Philosophy degree program. Academic Integrity An essential feature of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville is a commitment to maintaining an atmosphere of intellectual integrity and academic honesty. As a student of the university, I pledge that I will neither knowingly give nor receive any inappropriate assistance in academic work, thus affirming my own personal commitment to honour and integrity. Provost Susan Martin Disabilities If you have a disability that requires accommodation, please contact the Office of Disability Services ( ) to discuss your needs, and then schedule an appointment to meet with me during my office hours.