Harry Frankfurt. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

Transcription

1 Harry Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

2 What is a Person? What are the essen$al characteris$cs that make something a person? A person is a member of the species homo- sapiens. Ø A person is defined by abilibes rather than what genes they have. What abilibes? Reason Self- consciousness Ability to follow moral rules Others?

3 Frankfurt s Answer One essenbal difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person s will. Human beings are not along in having desires and mobves, or in making choices [but] it seem to be peculiarly characterisbc of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call second- order desires. (323) Besides wanbng and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and mobves. They are capable of wanbng to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are No animal other than man appears to have the capacity for reflecbve self- evaluabon that is manifested in the formabon of second- order desires. (323)

4 A Rough Guide to Frankfurt Desire: A desire is a want, as captured in the statement A wants to X, where A is a person and X is an acbon. Will: A person s will is idenbcal to their effecbve desires. An effecbve desire is one that succeeds in bringing about an acbon. First order desire: A first order desire is a desire for anything that is not itself a desire. Second- order desire: A second order desire is a desire to have a first order desire. Second- order voli$ons: A second order volibon is a second order desire for the first order desire to be part of your will, i.e. a desire that a desire be effecbve.

5 The Vegan Megan is a vegan, even though she really, really likes the taste of meat. She chooses to refrain from consuming any kind of animal product for ethical reasons. What is her: First- order desire Second- order desire Second- order volibons Will

6 The Kleptomaniac Kate is a kleptomaniac. She believes that stealing is wrong, yet she finds herself compelled to slip small items into her bag when she s at the shops, even though they re not things she really wants. She s morbfied by her behavior. What is her: First- order desire Second- order desire Second- order volibons Will

7 Two ways to Desire to Desire Second order desire for a non- effec$ve desire One might desire to have a certain first- order desire, but not want that desire to be effecbve or sabsfied. Example: Doctor who wants to know what its like to be addicted to drugs, but does in fact not want to be addicted to drugs. His second order desire to be moved to take the drug does not entail that he has a first order desire to take it (325) Second order desire for an effec$ve desire (a voli$on) One might desire to have a first- order desire be the one that effecbvely moves one to act, to provide the mobve for what one actually does (326).

8 Second- order VoliBon When A desires to have a first- order desire to X be the one that effecbvely moves one to act it: entails that A already has a desire to X. It could not be true both that A wants the desire to X to move him into acbon and that he does not want to X Suppose a man wants to be mobved in what he does by the desire to concentrate on his work. It is necessarily true that he already wants to concentrate on his work. The desire is among his desires. But the quesbon of whether his second order desire is fulfilled does not turn merely on whether the desire he wants is one of his desires. It turns on whether this desire is, as he wants it to be, his effecbve desire or will (326-7).

9 Second- order VoliBons and Personhood Frankfurt ublizes the disbncbon between 2 nd order desires and volibons to provide his mental requirement for personhood: Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situabons of the lafer kind, I shall call his second- order desires second- order volibons" or volibons of the second order". Now it is having second- order volibons, and not having second- order desires generally, that I regard as essenbal to being a person. (327)

10 The Wanton A wanton is a being who has no second- order volibons. The essenbal characterisbc of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. The class of wantons includes all nonhuman animals that have desires and all very young children. (327-8) He ignores the quesbon of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue whatever course of acbon he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclinabons is the strongest. (328)

11 Example: Two Types of Addict The Unwilling Addict Has volibons of the second order because he cares which desire is effecbve for him. Because he cares about his will, about his preferences and ends, he is a person. The Wanton addict Does not have volibons of the second- order. The wanton does not care about which desire is his will, and so is not a person. Their will is determined by whatever desire is in fact strongest, and they don t care about which desire that is.

12 Two Types of Freedom Freedom of Ac$on Being free is a mafer of doing what one wants to do (330-31). But an uncaged animal is free do what they want to do. Thus the freedom to do what one wants to do is not sufficient to have freedom of the will. Freedom of the Will Freedom of the will does not concern whether someone is able to translate their first order desires into acbon. Freedom of the will concerns one s desires themselves, whether one can determine them.

13 Freedom of the Will Freedom of acbon is the freedom to do what one wants to do The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what we wants to will, or to have the will he wants (331).

14 The Addict and Freedom The Unwilling Addict The unwilling addict does not in fact have freedom of the will because his desire for drugs overpowers his 2 nd order volibon to not do drugs. But because he has second order volibons he can be free or not free. It is only because a persons has volibons of the second- order that he his capable of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will (330). The Wanton Addict The wanton addict cannot have a free will or not have a free will. Freedom of the will does not apply to them because in not caring about their will, their acbvity is conbngently determined by their strongest desires.

15 Wantonness and Freedom It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second- order volibons that a person exercise freedom of the will. And it is in the discrepancy between his will and his second- order volibons, or in his awareness that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a happy chance, that a person who does not have this freedom feels its lack. The unwilling addict s will is not free. This is shown by the fact that it is not the will he wants. It is also true that the wanton addict is not free. The wanton addict neither has the will he wants nor has a will that differs from the will he wants. Since he has no volibons of the second order, the freedom of his will cannot be problem for him. He lacks it, so to speak, by default (331-2).

16 Possible PosiBons Vegan: Her second order volibon is the same as her will, so what she wants to want is the same as what she wants. She has freedom of the will. Unwilling addict: His second order volibon is not the same as his will, so he is in fact not free. But because he wants his will to be a certain way, he is a candidate for freedom of the will. Wanton addict: Does not have second order volibons, and so does not want his will to be any way rather than another. He is not even a candidate for having a free will.

17 Weakness of Will vs. Compulsion Two cases: 1. Megan the vegan breaks down one Bme and has a burger. 2. The unwilling addict. Both are un- free in the moment when their will is not in accord with their 2 nd order volibon. But they seem to be different kinds of cases. Megan has weakness of the will while the unwilling addict is under the spell of a psychological compulsion. The system of desire which lead Megan to eat a burger is different than the system of desire of the unwilling addict.