Thomas Bartscherer. Bard College. In one s friend, writes Friedrich Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,

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1 1 With Friends Like Nietzsche: Hard Time for Liberal Education 1 Thomas Bartscherer Bard College In one s friend, writes Friedrich Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, one should have one s best enemy. 2 Nietzsche is often regarded as an enemy of political liberalism, and it would be fair to say that he his critique would apply equally to the ideals of what is currently referred to, in the United States particularly but increasingly also in other parts of the world, as liberal arts education. 3 I would like to suggest, however, that in being a good enemy of liberal education, Nietzsche may well also turn out to be one of its best friends. Nietzsche was a product of, and one might even say the apotheosis of, one of the most influential movements in modern liberal education: the neohumanism that was theorized by Wilhelm von Humboldt and promulgated by the Prussian state in the first half of the 19 th century. It will be useful to sketch 1 Published as: Nasz przyjaciel Nietzsche albo trudne czasy dla kształcenia ogólnego Kronos Metafizyka Kultura Religia (Warsaw, Poland) Nr 4/ Part I, On the Friend, Nietzsche (2006), For Nietzsche on liberalism, see for example Twilight of the Idylls, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 38: Of course people know what [liberal] institutions do: they undermine the will to power, they set to work levelling mountains and valleys and call this morality, they make things small, cowardly, and enjoyable, - they represent the continual triumph of herd animals (Nietzsche (2005), 213).

2 2 out some of the principles of the neohumanist program before considering how Nietzsche both adopts and critiques this approach in his own writing on education. I shall conclude with some speculation on how Nietzsche might respond to at least one prominent contemporary articulation of the ideals of liberal education in the 21 st century. While Nietzsche is concerned with education throughout his career, it is in the early period of his writing that he is most explicitly engaged not just with the theorizing, but also with the practical implementation of his ideas on the topic. From the time of his appointment as professor at Basel in 1869 the publication of his last Untimely Meditation in 1876, his work includes teaching, research, publishing, and public lecturing. His public lectures include an inaugural address at Basel, which reads like a manifesto of Humboldt-inspired neo-humanism, as well as a series of five public lectures collected under the title, On the Future of Our Educational Institutions. Education, in theory and practice, is an explicit theme not only of these lectures, but also in publications from this period, most importantly, the essays Schopenhauer as Educator and On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. Nietzsche s notebooks during this time, moreover, including extensive drafts for an unfinished untimely

3 3 meditation to have been titled We Philologists, are rife with speculations about the past, present, and future of education, including outlines for new curricula and new configurations of educational institutions. Nietzsche s own career as a student was profoundly influenced by the educational reforms conceptualized, and to an extent actualized, by the Prussian neo-humanists. Humboldt s educational theory proceeds from his anthropological teleology. As he writes in On the Limits of State Action, The true end of man is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. 4 Later in that text, he writes: reason cannot desire for man any other condition than that in which each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies, in his perfect individuality, but in which external nature even is left unfashioned by any human agency, but only receives the impress given to it by each individual of himself and his own free will, according to the measure of his wants and instincts. 4 Humboldt (1854), Chapter II.

4 4 The task of liberal education, according to Humboldt, is to foster this condition. In his very brief but very influential term as Director of Education and Instruction in the Prussian Interior Ministry ( ), Humboldt reorganized the Prussian secondary schools, establishing a unified curriculum for the neo-humanist gymnasium, which was a pre-requisite for anyone in any field wanting to go on to university study. Humboldt s vision was liberal, in that it was not job specific vocational training, and it was democratic, in that he believed this universal education should be available to all citizens. 5 Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that Humboldt regarded this education as essential to the formation of citizens in a liberal democracy. He was a staunch opponent of early vocational training designed to prepare citizens to serve the needs of the state, but this position was not rooted in any opposition to liberal democracy. Rather, he believed that liberal education, rather than vocational training, was the best way to prepare all citizens for life and work in liberal democracies. 5 See his Unmaßgebliche Gedanken über den Plan zur Einrichtung des Litthauischen Stadtschulwesen Humboldt (1920), 278.

5 5 Beyond these secondary school reforms, Humboldt also founded the University of Berlin at this time. In so doing, he established two principles that were profoundly influential on the subsequent development of higher education in the Germany and abroad: the unity of research and teaching, and academic freedom. The former meant that university faculty would not only be pedagogues but would also be active researchers in their given fields; the latter meant that faculty would be free to research and teach what they wished without state interference, and students would be free to elect their course of study. When Nietzsche studied at the Schulpforta gymnasium in 1858, and later at the University of Bonn and the University of Leipzig, he was in a world profoundly influenced by Humboldt. His early writing on education reflects this experience. Nietzsche certainly endorsed Humboldt s belief that education must be directed toward individual self-development. If anything, Nietzsche was even more radical on this point. I cite here at length a key passage from Schopenhauer as Educator: No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself

6 6 alone There exists in the world a single path along which no one can go except you: whither does it lead? Do not ask, go along it. Who was it who said: 'a man never rises higher than when he does not know whither his path can still lead him'?" But how can we find ourselves again? How can man know himself? Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be... your educators can be only your liberators. And that is the secret of all culture [Bildung]: it does not provide artificial limbs, wax noses or spectacles that which can provide these things is, rather, only sham education [Afterbild der Erziehung]. It [Bildung] is liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant 6 6 Schopenhauer as Educator 1, Nietzsche (1997),

7 7 Here Nietzsche sounds like a committed Humboldtian, echoing the latter s insistence that Nietzschean version of Humboldt s idea that each individual enjoys the... absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies, in his perfect individuality. 7 What Nietzsche objects to, however or at least wishes to raise questions about is the democratic ideal of neohumanist liberal education. In the series lectures titled On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche purports to recount a dialogue between an old philosopher and his younger disciple (though the text is almost certainly Nietzsche s own invention). The disciple identifies two aspects of contemporary education that he regards as deleterious: a striving to achieve the greatest possible expansion of education on the one hand, and a tendency to minimize and weaken it on the other. The first-named would, for various reasons, spread learning among the greatest number of people; the second would compel education to renounce its highest, noblest and sublimest claims in order to subordinate itself to some other department of 7 Humboldt (1854), Chapter II.

8 8 life such as the service of the State. 8 In a subsequent passage, the old philosopher brings the two together in this pointed formulation: One should reveal nothing publically of the laughable disproportion between the number of truly educated ones and the monstrously great educational apparatus. Here is hidden the authentic secret of education [Bildungsgeheimnis]; that, namely, countless human beings are struggling after education, apparently for themselves, but fundamentally only in order to make possible some few human beings. 9 According to Nietzsche, the true goal of education, as he puts it in Schopenhauer as Educator, is the production of genius. Nietzsche s position here is derived at least in part from Schopenhauer s metaphysical account of the relationship between the culture of a people and the genius it produces. For Schopenhauer, the artistic genius, qua genius, 8 Nietzsche ( ). 9 Ibid..

9 9 transcends his individual subjectivity insofar has he contemplates the eternal Ideas, which are the most perfect objectification of the will [Wille] and, as Schopenhauer sees it, the manifestation of the Kantian thing-in-itself. The work of art produced by the genius is thus regarded as the re-articulation of those Ideas inartistic form. The genius is thus the medium through which the eternal will achieves self-contemplation. There is evidence that Nietzsche was skeptical of Schopenhauer s metaphysics even as he is writing these passages, and he will soon thereafter explicitly reject it outright. Nevertheless, his skepticism about the democratizing impulse of the neohumanist educational paradigm persists, and is of a piece with Nietzsche s general skepticism toward democracy. To summarize this skepticism in broad strokes, Nietzsche is concerned that democracy may undermine political organization, promote conformity, diminish true individualism, debase culture, promote slave morality, and perhaps most importantly, undermine the qualitative distinctions between individuals, institutions, achievements, and ways of life that alone make it possible for western civilization to overcome the threat of nihilism.

10 10 In addition to this hostility toward the democratic ideal embodied in neohumanist education, Nietzsche argues (and this comes primarily in the second Untimely Meditation) that higher education in Germany has produced a kind of anti-culture of hypertrophic historical learning that threatens the very vitality of true culture. To cite just one passage that summarize much of Nietzsche s argument: The oversaturation of an age with history seems to me to be hostile and dangerous to life in five respects: such an excess creates that contrast between inner and outer which we have just discussed, and thereby weakens the personality; it leads an age to imagine that it possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any other age; it disrupts the instincts of a people, and hinders the individual no less than the whole in the attainment of maturity; it implants the belief, harmful at any time, in the old age of mankind, the belief that one is a latecomer and epigone; it leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself and subsequently into the even more dangerous mood of cynicism: in this mood, however, it develops more and more a

11 11 prudent practical egoism through which the forces of life are paralyzed and at last destroyed. With this, we have a rough overview of Nietzsche s response to the ideal conception, and to the concrete manifestation, of the 19 th century Prussian version of liberal education. What, then, would Nietzsche say about liberal education as it is theorized and practiced in the 21 st century? A useful point of reference is a recent statement by the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU) on their website dedicated to the Liberal Education and America s Promise (LEAP) project. 10 The AACU defines liberal education as: an approach to learning that empowers individuals and prepares them to deal with complexity, diversity, and change. It provides students with broad knowledge of the wider world (e.g. science, culture, and society) as well as in-depth study in a specific area of interest. A liberal education helps students develop a sense of 10

12 12 social responsibility, as well as strong and transferable intellectual and practical skills such as communication, analytical and problem-solving skills, and a demonstrated ability to apply knowledge and skills in real-world settings. Whereas the LEAP definition suggests that liberal education empowers individual, Nietzsche would argue that the relevant power can only come from within. Education cannot confer power any more than it can confer individuality: No one, Nietzsche writes, can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life. 11 The same would apply to the contention that education prepares student to deal with complexity, diversity, and change. Your true educators, Nietzsche would say, cannot prepare you; they can only serve as revered examples. You must prepare yourself. Regarding the provision of broad knowledge and in-depth study, Nietzsche would presumably warn against the dangers of excessive knowledge the sum total of which, we should point out, has grown enormously since the time Nietzsche wrote. The flood of knowledge, 11 Schopenhauer as Educator 1, Nietzsche (1997), 128.

13 13 according to Nietzsche, can inhibit or even paralyze our capacity to put knowledge to use in the service of life. The LEAP project also outlines what it regards at the primary differences between the 20 th century model of liberal education and the 21 st century paradigm that it envisions. 12 Both emphasize the goal of intellectual and personal development. In the older model, such development is considered an option for the fortunate and is meant to be non-vocational, whereas the 21 st century version foresees it as a necessity for all students and essential for success in a global economy and for informed citizenship. Here, there can be no doubt that from a Nietzschean perspective, the 20 th century model is preferable. The authors of the website write that for the 21 st century, the goal of intellectual and personal development should be met through studies that emphasize essential learning outcomes across the entire educational continuum. The project specifies that those learning outcomes should include Knowledge of Human Cultures and the Physical and Natural World, ; 12

14 14 Intellectual and Practical Skills ; Personal and Social Responsibility, ; and Integrative and Applied Learning. Certainly Nietzsche would object to this thoroughgoing instrumentilization of education. In the lectures on the future of educational institutions, Nietzsche s interlocutors are acutely troubled by intstrumentalization, and specifically, by the use of education primarily to prepare producers and consumers, people suited for the needs of the economy. Beyond this, however, the most important even if also the most perplexing complaint, from a Nietzschean perspective, about this 21 st century paradigm for liberal education is the very notion that learning outcomes can and should be identified in advance. To quote again the passage cited above from Schopenhauer as Educator : There exists in the world a single path along which no one can go except you: whither does it lead? Do not ask, go along it.. a man never rises higher than when he does not know whither his path can still lead him.

15 15 Nietzsche was a true friend, and therefore necessarily also a true enemy, of the neo-humanist model of liberal education in the 19 th century. As for the 21 st century model we have just examined, he seems at least to be an enemy. Whether or not he will turn out to have been a friend cannot yet be determined. It depends, in part, on the power and perspicacity of his critique, and in part on the capacity of contemporary educators to hear and understand his argument and to respond to it as worthy adversaries. The ultimate value of a friend like Nietzsche for liberal education, from my perspective, is two-fold. First, by challenging the unacknowledged presuppositions, the bedrock principles, of the liberal democratic worldview, he compels those of us who would defend and promote liberal education to sharpen and strengthen our arguments. More importantly, however, in posing this radical challenge to the most deeply held convictions of the modern liberal democratic worldview, he compels us continually to re-think our convictions and commitments. The perpetually unfinished business of selfexamination is, to my mind, at the heart of liberal education. In this sense, if Nietzsche is a steadfast critic of liberal education, he is also, and for that reason, an indispensible friend.

16 16 WORKS CITED Humboldt, Wilhelm von The Sphere and Duties of Government. London: Chapman. Available from on (accessed. Humboldt, Wilhelm von Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by A. Leitzmann. Berlin: De Gruyter. Nietzsche, Friedrich Untimely Meditations. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Edited by D. Breazeale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm On the Future of Our Educational Institutions. In Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed J. M. KENNEDY. Edinburgh: Foulis. Available from (accessed. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings. Translated by J. Norman. Edited by A. Ridley and J. Norman. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm Thus Spoke Zarathustra : A Book for All and None. Translated by R. B. Pippin. Edited by A. Del Caro and R. B. Pippin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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