The al-masā il al-qudsiyyah and. Mullā ^adrā s Proofs for Mental Existence 1

Transcription

1 The al-masā il al-qudsiyyah and Mullā ^adrā s Proofs for Mental Existence 1 Abstract The analysis of the nature of mental entities and the demonstration of their existence was an important epistemological issue, as the world can only be known through mental forms or representations. Avicenna believed in a distinct mental existence, but did not elaborate much on the issue. By the time of Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī and Na īr al-dīn al-tūsī, it integrated philosophical discussions. Much later, Mullā ^adrā discussed extensively mental existence, for example, in his al-asfār al-arba ah. In al-masā il al- Qudsiyyah, however, he proposes clear and condensed discussions and demonstrations. In this latter work, he proposes three important proofs: a teleological proof, a proof based on the ability to judge (between two mental concepts) and a proof based on the universality of mental concepts. It will become apparent that Mullā ^adrā was more concerned with ontological, rather than epistemological questions, than with the nature of the correspondence of mental entities and the external world. Aristotle noted that representation occurs through particular mental images and wrote that without a presentation [that is., an image] intellectual activity is impossible. 2 Mental representation lies, therefore, at the heart of cognition and the construction of knowledge. The soul never thinks without an image, Aristotle adding that the faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images. 3 1 Presentations of earlier versions of this paper include Mental Existence in Mullā S adrā (d.1050/1640) in the Arabic al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, delivered at the Cordoba and Isfahan, International Colloquium on Two Schools of Islamic Philosophy, Isfahan, Iran (April 27-9, 2002) and A Philosopher at Work: Mulla Sadra s al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, delivered at the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto, Canada (October 31, 2005). Research for this paper was made possible by a FCAR (Formation de chercheurs et aide à la recherché) Postdoctoral Fellowship, Quebec Government (Canada) and our residency at the Institut Français d Études Arabe à Damas, IFEAD (June 2000 to June 2001) and the Insitut Français de Recherche en Iran, IFRI, and the University of Tehran (Aug to May 2002) as a Visiting Researcher. This enabled us to attend classes of Professor (H ujjat al-islām) Mohsein Kadivar on Mullā S adrā at Tarbiyat Modarres University (Tehran). Many insights included in this paper find their origin in our class discussions, while any infelicities or errors remain entirely ours. Finally, we need to thank Professors Mehdi Mohaghegh and Hermann Landolt (our shaykh) who made it possible for us to attend the Cordoba and Isfahan conference in The best example being geometrical proofs, cf. Aristotle, De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith in The Works of Aristotle, trans. into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross (1931; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), vol. 3, 431b2 and 434a9 (respectively); cf. Idem, Posterior Analytics, trans. with notes by Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 100a4-16; cf. Idem, Metaphysics: Newly Translated as a Postscript to Natural Science with an Analytical Index of Technical Terms, by Richard Hope (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 980b28-981a9. 3 Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia, trans. by J.I. Beare in The Works of Aristotle, 449b30-450a9. In his account of the Idea of God, Plato, for example, resorts to the idea of an image (that of the Sun), cf. Plato, Republic, in Plato: With an English Translation, trans. Paul Shorey (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ), vol. 5-6, 507b-509d.

2 2 In what follows, we would like to present one of the less known works of Sadr al- Din al-shīrāzī, known as Mullā Ṣadrā s (d. 1051/1641), focusing specifically on his discussions surrounding mental entities and the concept of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī). This work is al-masā il al-qudsiyyah in which Mullā Ṣadrā proposes more concise and clearer discussions and demonstrations of mental existence than those he included in his al-asfār al-arba ah (The Four Journeys). In this work, he proposes three different proofs to explain the existence and nature of mental entities: a teleological proof, a proof based on the ability to judge (between two mental concepts) and a proof based on the universality of mental concepts. One my equally ask whether Mullā ^adrā addressed the issue of the correspondence of mental entities and the external world. It will become apparent that Mullā ^adrā was primarily concerned with ontological, than with epistemological questions. Mullā ^adrā s Predecessors Mullā ^adrā was certainly not the first to tackle the issue of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī). Before him, others discussed its nature and its relationship with extramental objects in the world, making for gradually more complex discussions with the passing of time as philosophers tried to provide demonstrations for their existence and their nature. 4 The following discussion is not intended to be a detailed presentation of the historical and philosophical developments of the discussions and debates before Mullā ^adrā. Rather, these few comments only purport to indicate some of main figures and their concerns and questions over epistemological and ontological issues raised by any analyses of mental representation that preceded the works of Mullā ^adrā. Avicenna (d.429/1037), for example, wrote about both epistemological (matters that pertain to the nature of knowledge) and ontological (matters that pertain to being) issues related to mental existence. In his al-ta līqāt (Notes), for example, he notes that the general meaning (ma nā) does not have an existence in reality (fī al-a yān), but rather in the mind (dhihn), a distinction he reiterated in his al-ishārāt wa al- Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Remarks). 5 The perception of a thing occurs via the representation of its quiddity or reality (ˆaqīqah). What is perceived is the reality of the thing, but without possessing all the characteristics that its in re existence possesses, for example, geometrical shapes, or the image (mithāl) of something concretely existing in the external reality. What is perceived is an imprint that occurs in the essence of the one who perceives and becomes one with the form. These representations or images are mental (dhihniyyah) forms. 6 Avicenna believed in a distinct mental existence, but nowhere did he elaborate on the issue. 4 For a very general historical overview of its discussion, see, for example, the section on The Problem of Mental Existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī), in Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā ^adrā (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1975), Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), al-ta līqāt, ed. Abd al-raḥmān Badawī (reprint; Qum: Maktabat Maktab al-a lām al-islāmī, 1984), 183.9; cf. Jules Janssens, Mullā ^adrā s Use of Ibn Sīnā s Ta līqāt in the Asfār, in Journal of Islamic Studies, 13.1 (2002): Ibn Sīnā, al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, ma a Sharˆ Nas īr al-dīn al-œūsī, 3 rd ed. of Sulaymān Dunyā, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-ma ārif, 1992), vol. 2, II, 7,

3 3 Abū al-barakāt al-baghdādī (d.ca.1160) similarly alluded to the distinctive nature of mental existence with his nominalist (conceptualist) approach. 7 In his al-mu tabar fī al-h ikmah (Considerations on Philosophy), he noted that intellective perception (idrāk dhihnī) was the perception of abstracted forms that only have an existence in the mind and which possess their own characteristics (mīzah) and reality (ˆaqā iq). 8 Abstract forms include both universal meanings, such as the concept of humanity, and the meanings of metaphysical entities, such as soul and entities that exist at ontologically superior levels. 9 These are the ones towards which the soul needs to turn. 10 Three quarter of century later, Shihāb al-dīn al-suhrawardī (d.587/1191) was also to discuss, for example, in his al-mashāri wa al-muṭāraḥāt (Paths and Conversations), the distinctive nature possessed by mental existence with regards to its intelligibility, that is, its capacity to be grasped by the mind. 11 These discussions find parallels in the earlier works of both Avicenna and Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī (d.606/1209), one of Suhrawardī contemporary who, in his al-mabāˆith al- Mashriqiyyah (Oriental Investigations), provided a number of proofs to establish the existence of the distinctive nature of mental existence which is distinct from any other type of being whose existence occurs in the external world. 12 About half to three quarter of a century later, Na īr al-dīn al-œūsī (d.672/1274) proposed, in his Tajrīd al- I tiqād (The Freeing of Belief), a similar distinction between entities found in the external reality and those found only in the mind. In his discussion of existence and non-existence, a section provides a number of proofs to establish the independent existence of mental existence. 13 In his commentary on Avicenna s al-ishārāt wa al- Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Remarks), al-œūsī appears to have rejected a number of Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī s objections pertaining to the objects of perception of the mind, a discussion that has yet to be explored and analyzed. 14 On the whole, by the time of Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī and Na īr al-dīn al-tūsī, philosophical discussions about mental existence had become a distinctive philosophical topos. 7 Shlomo Pines, Studies in Abu l-barakât al-baghdâdî s Poetics and Metaphysics, in Idem, The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, 5 vols, Vol I, Studies in Abu l-barakāt al-baghdādī. Physics and Metaphysics (Leiden: E. J. Brill / Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1979), , surtout , especially 279 and [reprint of Scripta Hierosolymitana, 6 (1960): ]; cf. Ibid., Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin: Gräfenhainichen, Gedruckt bei A. Hein gmbh, 1936), 82-3; cf. Ibid., Studies in Islamic Atomism, trans. Michael Schwarz, ed. Tzvi Langermann (Jérusalem : The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1997). 8 Abū al-barakāt (Ibn Malkā) al-baghdādī, al-mu tabar fī al-ḥikmah, ed. Şerefettin Yaltkaya, 3 vols. (Haydarābād: Jam iyyat Dā irat al-ma ārif al- Uthmāniyya, 1358/1939), vol. 3, ; cf. Ibid., vol. 3, al-baghdādī, al-mu tabar, vol. 2, al-baghdādī, al-mu tabar, vol. 3, ; cf. Ibid., vol. 2, Suhrawardī, al-mashāri wa al-muṭāraḥāt, in Sohravardî, Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, tome I, textes édités avec prolégomènes par Henry Corbin (reprint 1976; Tehran: Mu assassah-yi Mu\āli āt va Taˆqīqāt-i Farhangī, 1372/1993), , esp. 3-5, Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī, al-mabāˆith al-mashriqiyyah, vol. I, 1, He may have adopted a more theological stance in his al-muˆas s al and rejected mental existence. 13 al-œūsī, Tajrīd al-i tiqād, ed. Muḥammad Jawād al-ḥusaynī al-jalālī (Qum: Maktab al-a lām al-islāmī, 1407/1986), al-œūsī, Sharˆ al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, in Ibn Sīnā, al-ishārāt, ed. S. Dynyā, vol. 2, II, 7,

4 4 Qu\b al-dīn al-shīrāzī (d.710/1312), one of Na īr al-dīn al-œūsī s many students, wrote a Persian philosophical compendium entitled Durrat al-tāj, in which he provided a number of arguments to uphold the distinctive nature of mental entities, that can serve as a succinct presentation of the main arguments that were discussed by the end of the 7 th /13 th and early 8 th /14 th centuries (in the Islamic East). The (i) first argument Qu\b al-dīn al-shīrāzī present is the possibility of conceiving mentally the association of two opposites (ijtimā -i ḍiddayn) (for example, cold and hot), something that cannot have an incidence in the external reality. The (ii) second argument he offers is the possibility of distinguishing mentally between non-existent (i dām) entities. Finally, the (iii) third argument he gives is the possibility of distinguishing mentally between two accidents that occur at the same time. This argument rests on the possibility to establish mentally a logical priority of one accident over another accident, while both occur at one and the same time. 15 By the 11 th /17 th century, Mullā Ṣadrā s, one of the great philosophical minds of his time who himself was greatly preoccupied with epistemological issues, reviewed and criticized earlier theories of knowledge. He was motivated by a desire to restructure metaphysics wherein the concept of existence would now predominate. This led him to define knowledge as a part of being. 16 His attempts to complete the ontologization of physics, with his theory of substantial motion, were grounded in a similar ontologization of epistemology. In his al- ikmat al-muta āliyyah fī al-asfār al- Aqliyyah al-arba ah (The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys), also known as al-asfār al-arba ah (The Four Journeys), Mullā ^adrā defines knowledge as neither a privation like abstraction from matter, nor a relation, but a [certain type of] being (wujūd). 17 His ontological definition of knowledge, in terms of being, builds on the idea of modes of existence of quiddities. 18 Mental Existence (wujūd dhihnī) in al-masā il al-qudsiyyah Mullā ^adrā discusses, in a number of his works, the nature of mental existence, seeking to explicate the nature of the independent existence of mental entities. Among his works, al-masā il al-qudsiyyah wa al-qawā id al-malakūtiyyah (Sacred Questions and Angelic Principles) is of particular interest (henceforth, MQ). 19 Mullā 15 Qu\b al-dīn al-shīrāzī, Durrat al-tāj, 5 vols. in one, 3 rd ed.[?], ed. Sayyid Muh ammad Mishkah (Tehran: Ḥikmah, 1369/1990), vol. 3, 1, ; cf. Q. D. al-shīrāzī s Epistle Fī Tah qīq Ālam al-mithāl, trans. in John Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights; Qutb al-dīn Shīrāzī and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1992), , esp. 203 and For general introductions, cf. Hossein Ziai, Mullā ^adrā: His Life and Works, in History of Islamic Philosophy, 2 vols, eds. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (1996; London: Routledge, 1999), vol. 1, ; cf. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Mullā ^adrā: His Teachings, in Ibid., vol. 1, Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, 213 (based on Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, I, 3). 18 For a good introduction, see Đbrahim Kalın, Mulla ^adrā s Realist Ontology of the Intelligibles and Theory of Knowledge, Đslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi, 7 (2002): 1-29; cf. the section on noetics in Sajjad Rizvi, Mulla ^adrā, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Online: (accessed December 31, 2009). 19 Āshtiyānī notes that in a number of manuscripts he consulted (seven listed) the title is al- Masā il al-qudsiyyah fī al- ikmah al-muta āliyyah, cf. Sadr al-dīn Muˆammad Shīrāzī [Mullā ^adrā],

5 5 ^adrā mentions that his aim in writing this work is, first, to present a condensed selection of arguments that could be more easily accessible to readers of his works, especially in view of the fact that he scattered a number of arguments throughout his works (MQ, ). His second aim is to provide a readable account of three important philosophical issues, among which is included that of mental existence (MQ, ). When he mentions that his account will be readable, he most probably alludes to discussions found in the works of his master, Mīr Dāmād (d. 1041/1631), who was well known for his use of convoluted expressions that made most of his texts very difficult to decipher and understand. Moreover, Mullā ^adrā indicates that some of the arguments he includes in al-masā il al-qudsiyyah were provided to him by inspirations of the heart (al-waridat al-qalbiyyah), such that those are not derived from the discursive speculations of formal philosophy (al-falsafah al-rasmiyyah), theological debates, blind imitation of the public, or the false arguments of the sophists. 20 Mullā ^adrā divided al-masā il al-qudsiyyah into three parts. The first part (maqālah) consists of an analysis of the reality of existence (wujūd) and of its principles (MQ, ). The second part introduces the principles of the Necessary Being, or God (MQ, ). Finally, the third, and the longest section of the work presents a number of demonstrations to establish the nature of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) (MQ, ). Compared to Mullā ^adrā s other works where he discusses mental entities, al-masā il al-qudsiyyah proposes, on the one hand, a more detailed discussion the nature of mental entities and provides proofs to establish their existence than his al-shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah fī al-manāhij al- Sulukiyyah (The Divine Witnesses in the Paths of Spiritual Journey), 21 while, on the other hand, it offers a more condensed version of discussions included in his al-asfār al-arba ah to which he seems to refer ( our large book ). 22 Mullā ^adrā begins the third discussion on mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) with two important remarks, both also found in his al-asfār al-arba ah, but absent from his al-shawāhid al- Rubūbiyyah. A First Remark In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, philosophers held, at least form the time of Avicenna onwards, that the nature of a thing could be known in itself, as it really is. This topic became part of classical medieval Arabic cognitive psychology. The (i) classical distinction between quiddities (māhiyyāt) and existence (wujūd) and the (ii) al-masā il al-qudsiyyah in Idem, Sih Risālah-yi Falsafī (Mutashābihāt al-qur ān al-masā il al- Qudsiyya Ajwibat al-masā il), 3 nd ed., intro., ed., and commentary Sayyid Jalāl al-dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Markaz-i Intishārāt-i Daftar-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī, 1378/1999), 185 n Kalın, Mulla ^adrā s Realist Ontology, Mullā ^adrā, al-shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah, with the complete Glosses (ˆawāshī) of Hājjī Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī, ed., intro. and notes by Sayyid Jalāl al-dīn Āshtiyānī, Engl. preface by Sayyid Hossein Nasr (Mashhad: Chāpkhānah-yi Dānishgāh-yi Mashhad, 1347/1967), mashhād 1, shāhid 2, Kalın, Mulla ^adrā s Realist Ontology, 53-4; cf. Mullā ^adrā, al- ikmah al-muta allihiyyah fī al-asfār al- Aqliyyah al-arba ah, 2 nd ed., intro. by Muˆammad Ri ā al-muœaffar (Qum: Sharikat al- Ma ārif al-islāmī, 1387/1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, [Hereafter, al-asfār].

6 6 theory of correspondence of quiddities in the mind made it possible to conceive of the mind grasping the essence (dhāt) or quiddity of the objects in the world via its mental representations. With time, arguments were developed to establish the existence of mental entities, their nature, their epistemological function, and their relation to the external world. Mullā ^adrā s first remark pertains to the nature the distinct modes of existence that beings possess whether they occur in the mind or in the external reality. The first mode of being is mental, whereas the second mode corresponds to in re existence. Their respective modes of being determine the nature of these two types of entities. 23 On the one hand, entities that exist extra-mentally are deemed complete beings. Their quiddity (māhiyyah), which Mullā ^adrā considers mentally posited (i tibārī), possesses all the specific effects (athār makh ūsah), or accidents (a rā ), that are associated with their essence or reality (ˆaqīqah). On the other hand, entities that exist in the mind share the same quiddity as the one belonging to objects in the world, but some of the particular effects that characterize their reality in the external world are absent in their mental representation. In this perspective, some mental entities may be deemed incomplete beings. A good example is the mental representation of fire or a tree, as in Diagram 1 below. One of the particular effects that characterize fire, in the external reality, is its capacity to burn, a capacity that, however, is quite naturally absent from the mental representation of fire. Whereas, the extra-mental entity and the mental entity both possess the same quiddity, the mental entity of fire only possesses some of the specific effects possessed by the extra-mental fire, but not all. The representation of fire, for example, is devoid of any heating capacity. Mental existence remains an incomplete being insofar as its existence is characterized with the possession of a more limited number of distinctive effects or characteristics when compared with the object existing in the external world to which it corresponds. The combination of various effects associated with each quiddity determines what Mullā ^adrā calls the aspects (naˆw) of their respective being. Quiddity no longer solely defines a being. 24 In accordance with his own notion of gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), 25 the presence or absence of certain effects determines the different degrees or grades of existence of various beings (MQ, ). 23 All possible existents (mumkināt) possess quiddity and existence (wujūd), cf. Mullā ^adrā, al- Asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, Sajjad H. Rizvi, Molla Sadra and Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 2009) and Idem,, Mulla Sadra [online].

7 7 Diagram 1 Correspondence of Quiddities in the mind Mind Quiddity (māhiyyah) + aspects (naˆw) of their existence (wujūd) = only some specific effects (athār makh ūsah) or accidents (a rā ) Reality Quiddity (māhiyyah) + aspects (naˆw) of their existence (wujūd) = all specific effects (athār makh ūsah) or accidents (a rā ) Mullā ^adrā makes a further distinction between two types of mental entities represented by Bx 2 (a) and Bx 2 (b) in Diagram 2 below). On the one hand, mental entities can be quiddities represented by x in Diagram 2 of entities that exist in the external reality and have a concrete mode of existence represented by Ax 1. These mental entities correspond to concepts, in some way, abstracted from objects existing in the extra-mental world, such as primary intelligibles like, for instance, the concept of humanity represented by Bx 2 (b). On the other hand, mental entities can be concepts or universals that are not abstracted from any particular individual entity that may exist in the extra-mental world, for instance, secondary intelligibles, like the concepts of causality, of the first being, or of logical categories (for example, greater than) represented by Bx 2 (a). Diagram 2 Different Types of Mental Existence Providential Existence of God [x, x, x, ] Separate Intellects [x, x, x, etc. ] Agent Intellect [x, x, x, ] World Concrete mode of existence Ax 1 Mind Conceptual of mode of existence Bx 1 Bx 1 (a) Imagination Bx 2 (b) Intellect Ax 2 Ax 3 Bx 2 Bx 3 x = quiddities (māhiyyah)

8 8 Mullā ^adrā also provides the example of substantiality (jawhariyyah) with which he identifies three modes of being it possesses, an example that can be taken to allude to his gradation of being theory. A first mode of being a mental entity may possess is (i) its existence itself independent of any kind of substrate and matter, for example, its existence present in the active intellect (or in the separate intelligences or those present in God). A second mode of being a mental entity may possess is (ii) its existence in matter and affected by external causes or generation and corruption, for example, specific forms and terrestrial souls. A thirds mode of being mental entities may possess is (iii) their existence viewed as a type of weaker existence, for example, imagined forms, neither active nor passive (MQ, ). 26 In a fashion similar to discussions found in his al-asfār al-arba ah, Mulla ^adrā identifies different intellective mental forms, without, in fact, excluding the possibilities of different, imaginative forms. 27 At the heart of Mullā ^adrā s epistemic process lays a unity of reality of all knowable entities thesis: the unity of quiddities that belong to mental entities and those that belong to their extra-mental in re existence. Via the apprehension of quiddities by a knowing subject, this unity of quiddities offers a partial solution to the problem of the representativeness or the correspondence of mental concepts with extra-mental objects. Mullā ^adrā adopts what some have labeled the essential identification, or the identification of quiddity thesis. 28 Since both the object in the world and its mental representation are believed to share the same quiddity, access to the real essence of entities found in the world becomes possible via their corresponding quiddities found in the mind, such that the extra-mental world can be truly known, as it really is. 29 In al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, Mullā ^adrā seems more concerned with the demonstration of the independent nature of mental entities and their modes of being, rather than with the question of the nature of the relation that exists between objects of our knowledge found in the world and their mental representation (concepts and universals) and what guarantees a true correspondence between the two. This is not the case in his al-asfār al-arba ah, wherein the problem of the relation between mental existence and objects in the world remains central, whether this relation might be understood in terms of a real correspondence that should exist or in terms of mere images being intermediaries in this epistemic process. In this latter work, he would appear to propose a realist solution. The mind is a passive receptacle, capable of receiving forms of intelligible, similar to a mirror reflecting images that are the objects of its creative power. 30 A Second Remark 26 Mullā ^adrā, al-shawāhid, Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, Sayyed Mustafa Muhaqqiq Damad, Some Notes on the Problem of Mental Existence in Islamic Philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, 2.1 (2001): 53-61, esp. 55-6; Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, 46. This view appears to have been rejected by Qu\b al-dīn al-shīrāzī, cf. Damad, Some Notes on the Problem of Mental Existence, For a study of this concept in Avicenna, cf. Deborah L. Black, Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna, Mediaeval Studies, 61 (1999): See Rizvi, Mulla Sadra [online].

9 9 Mullā ^adrā s second remark, one which he also includes in his al-asfār al- Arba ah, 31 pertains to the creative power of the soul. The soul is able to create (ījād), on the one hand, the forms of immaterial entities, for example, the concept of humanity (or that of causality, or any other universal) in the intellective faculty of the soul represented by Bx 2 (b) in Diagram 2 above. The soul can create, on the other hand, the forms of material entities, for example, the representation of a tree, in the imaginative faculty of the soul represented by Bx 2 (a) in Diagram 2 above. Mullā ^adrā writes that this is possible because, the soul is cognate with the divine world (min sinkh al-malakūt), the world of power and of activity, the soul being a microcosmic reflection of the macrocosm. Within its own psychic realm, human souls possess, in some sense, certain affinities with God s creative power in the external reality (MQ, ). Mullā ^adrā explains that the nature of the manifestation of a given reality merely depends on the degree of perfection of the agent. Hence, the human soul creates entities that are deficient, since the soul itself is deficient, and that theses mental entities merely resemble entities that exist in the external reality, because the soul possesses a limited creative power. Nonetheless, the creative power of the human soul enables it to produce mental entities. Definition of mental existence Towards the end of the preamble to the section on mental existence of al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, 32 Mullā ^adrā provides a definition of mental existence, one which he opposes to in re existence: This existence that belongs to things and the quiddities upon which [all] specific effects (āthār) corresponding to it are not found when the soul conceives of them (yataṣawwaru-hā) and that are present (ḥāḍīra) in the world of the soul, even when it stops to look at the external world, is called a mental (dhihniyy an ), tenebrous (ẓilliyy an ), and imaginative (mithāliyy an ) existence. 33 That other [type of existence] in which [all] the effects corresponding to it are found is called an in re (khārijiyy an ), concrete ( ayniyy an ) and fundamental (aṣīl an ) existence (MQ, ). In his al-asfār al-arba ah, Mullā ^adrā presents a similar definition of mental and extra-mental existences, where he also discusses the modalities of the existence of mental entities in terms of aspect (naˆw) or manifestation (Œuhūr) of beings, reiterating the above definition of mental entities in terms of mental and tenebrous existence, while in re existence is defined as external and concrete ( aynī) existence Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, And just before he introduces an example taken from Ibn Arabī s work. 33 Somehow possessing incomplete existential determinations, cf. Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1,

10 10 Demonstrations for the Existence of Mental Entities Throughout his works, Mullā ^adrā provides a number of demonstrations to prove the existence of mental entities. In the Raˆīq-i Makhtūm: Sharˆ-i ikmat-i Muta allihiyyah (The Sealed Nectar: Commentary on the Transcendent Wisdom), a commentary on Mullā ^adrā s al-asfār al-arba ah, Āyat Allāh Javād Āmulī identifies at least seven different demonstrations: 1. One demonstration relies on the ability to distinguish between different nonexistents (ma dūmāt), for example, between a unicorn and a phoenix; 2. Another demonstration rests on the ability to predicate positive judgments on non-existents, for example, that unicorns do not exists or that a phoenix is a kind of bird; 3. Another demonstration rests on the possibility of conceiving of universals. This latter demonstration is presented in two different forms: (3.a) the first form is based on the representation of natural universals (identical to unconditioned nature), for example, quiddities themselves; 4. (3.b) and the second form is based on the representation of substantial and intelligible universals, for example, humanity (or causality); 5. A fifth demonstration relies on the ability to conceive of abstracted truths. This demonstration can, in some sense, be reduced to the first or the second demonstration, for example, that the whole is greater than the parts; 6. Another demonstration rests on the representation of the ends that set an agent in motion; 7. And finally, a last demonstration, which, in fact, amounts to a remark, is based on representations and perceptions that are not real but that, nonetheless, have real effects, for example, sadness, happiness, fear, or false reports that create anxiety. 35 In his al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, Mullā ^adrā notes that various demonstrations can be proposed to argue for the existence of mental entities, but here in this particular work, he only introduces and discusses three of the above. Since the work proposes only succinct presentation of most important matters, we may presume that Mullā ^adrā considers these three demonstrations of relatively importance. Each demonstration is followed by objections that have, or can be raised to these demonstrations. Mullā ^adrā then supplements the demonstrations with further analyses and proposes some solutions to the objections. The First Demonstration In al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, the first demonstration on mental existence is one that is absent from Mullā ^adrā s other works. It should not be forgotten that he alludes to 35 Āyat Allāh Javād Āmulī, Raḥīq-i Makhtūm; Sharˆ-i ikmat-i Muta allihiyyah, vol. 1 in 5 parts, ed. amīd Pārsāniyān (Qum: Markaz-i Nashr-i Isrā, 1417/1375/1995), vol. 1, pt. 4,

11 11 a possible divine origin of a number of insights presented in this work. Mystical contemplation is said to have been at the origin of the reception of inspiration (MQ, ). He was thus inspired and intuited this particular demonstration, an insight that God eventually confirmed (MQ, ). This first demonstration rests on the capacity to envision or to represent a nonexistent entity, which in this particular demonstration is the non-existing end that initiates motion. This demonstration (no. 6 above) is a teleological proof. The first premise of his demonstration is that universal natures that move their elemental matters are attentive, in the sense of being inclined, to their natural ends. 36 Mullā ^adrā gives three examples: first, the attention of simple elemental entities to a certain place ; second, the attention of celestial spheres to a certain position ; and third, the attention of composites to a certain quality or a certain quantity. 37 The second premise is that the end of every motion, even the end of a request, must necessarily possess a certain existence (wujūd un mā) before the advent of that particular motion, because the end constitutes the cause of motion. The end, therefore, cannot be pure non-existence, because pure non-existence cannot initiate motion. The third premise is that the cause, here the end, must necessarily be prior in existence to its effects, in this case, motion itself. Mullā ^adrā can then draw the conclusion that these ends do not possess a complete existence in the world of beings, before the completion of motion. Hence, these ends must necessarily possess another type or aspect of existence, other than the one possessed by any existent in the external world. This is the entity called a mental existence. But what kind of mental existence are these ends? Mullā ^adrā notes the following objection: if bodily natures possessed ends that they would desire, and if this were the cause of their motion, then inanimate entities 36 Avicenna had described universal nature (the third principle after intellect and soul) as a force that moves the (universal) elements (being complementary) towards their perfection. Avicenna defines universal nature in the Fann-i Samā -yi œabī ī in the following manner: Nature can be considered as particular (juz ī) or universal (kullī). Particular Nature is confined to each individual while Universal Nature can be considered as belonging to the intelligible order and being the immaterial source from which the total order emanates. If we accept a single Universal Nature, this Nature is the first sphere of the heavens which preserves the cosmic order, quoted in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Cosmological Doctrines, revised ed. (1964; London: Thames and Hudson Ltd, 1978), 218. In his Shifā, Avicenna also introduced a distinction between a universal nature and the same nature existing in the subject: Horsehood, to be sure, has a definition that does not demand universality. Rather it is that to which universality happens. Hence horsehood itself is nothing but horsehood only. For in itself it is neither many nor one, neither is it existent in these sensibles nor in the soul, neither is it any of these things potentially or actually in such a way that this is contained under the definition of horsehood. Rather [in itself it consists] of what is horsehood only, cf. Avicenna, Metaphysica V, 1, S. Van Riet (ed.), 2 vols., E. Peeters: Louvain, and E. J. Brill: Leiden, 1977, 1980), II, ; translation found in P. V. Spade, A Survey of Medieval Philosophy, Version 2.0, (PDF file - c. 21, p. 461; quoted in Gyula Klima, The Medieval Problem of Universals, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Online 37 Mullā ^adrā s idea of inclination (tawajjuh) shares some affinity with Avicenna s notion of impetus (mayl), a power of inclination toward movement whose power of guidance (hidāyah) comes from the world of Intellect, while its capacity to put in motion comes from the world of Divine command, cf. Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (based on a passage of Avicenna s Risālah dar aqīqat va Kayfiyyat).

12 12 (jamādāt), plants, and elemental and simple bodies would necessarily possess knowledge ( ulūm) and perception (idrākāt), because they would be aware of the ends of their motions (MQ, ). The objection is similar to the one that al-rāzī leveled against Avicenna s views on existence and its causes and which he included in his commentary on Avicenna s al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt (Pointers and Remarks). 38 In the Sharˆ al-ishārāt wa al- Tanbīhāt (Commentary on the Pointers and Remarks) he wrote on Avicenna s work, al-œūsī informs us that, like Mullā ^adrā (MQ, ), al-rāzī objected to Avicenna s view that natural activities can yearn for their final causes ( ilal ghā iyyah) and that these ends exist (mawjūdah) in their minds, or for that matter, in the external reality, because natural activities or forces do not possess any type of awareness (shu ūr). Siding with Avicenna, al-œūsī deems al-rāzī s objection as implausible, because the existence [of the ends] depends on the existence of the effects; and that if these ends are non-existent, then that which is non-existent cannot be the cause of what is existent. 39 In short, what has not yet occurred cannot be the cause of anything that exists, such as motion, or incite what belongs to the natural world to yearn for non existing ends. Mullā ^adrā notes that Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī rejected Avicenna s thesis that bodily natures possess ends (MQ, ), since, according to al-rāzī, the only solution to Avicenna s dilemma is to state that natural activities do not possess ends. 40 Mullā ^adrā quotes al-rāzī s objection against philosophers (Avicenna) who established that bodily natures possess ends: If realities are investigated and demonstrations are provided for the realization of the degrees of awareness (shu ūr) and of perception (idrāk) of all natural bodies that possess a real, not a mental (i tibārī), unity and that possess an existence by essence (bil-dhāt), not by accident (bil- ara ), then, there is nothing left to deny, except the merely improbable and what produces habituation in human beings to what is familiar to them. Their minds do not consider what is beyond, such as the existence of awareness [or sensation] (shu ūr) of something that is conditional upon animal instruments and the principles of the differences of willful (ikhtiyāriyyah) actions; whereas absolute choice (ikhtiyār) is one thing, and the ability of motion and willful [actions] is another, such that the loss of one does not entail the loss of the other (MQ, ). Mullā ^adrā does not include al-œūsī s reply to al-rāzī s objection, but it may, nonetheless, have guided him in his attempt to clarify the apparent Avicennan paradox. Al-œūsī states that naturals, for example, universal nature, were made up of entities whose essences do not need anything, such as a certain place, or an end. Universal natures do not set the body (jism) in motion in order that it may obtain a desired end, such that the existence (kawn) of the end would depend on the existence 38 Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī s objection is found in al-œūsī s commentary, cf. Nas īr al-dīn al-œūsī, Sharḥ al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt in Ibn Sīnā, al-ishārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, ma a Sharˆ Nas īr al-dīn alœūsī, 3 rd ed. of Sulaymān Dunyā, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-ma ārif, 1985), vol. 3, nama\ IV, 7, al-œūsī, Sharḥ al-ishārāt, vol. 3, IV, 7, al-tūsī, Sharḥ al-ishārāt, vol. 3, IV, 7,

13 13 of the natures, or that it would be some kind of subsisting matter (amr thābit) that indicates the existence of the end it would possess in potentiality and of which the naturals would possess a certain awareness (shu ūr) before its actual existence. What al-œūsī does is to rejects al-rāzī s objection by making these ends the final causes of their action and not an end they willfully seek to reach. 41 Mullā ^adrā is certainly not unaware al-œūsī s refutation in his dismissal of al-rāzī s objection which he discusses in his al-asfār al-arba ah. 42 He reiterates that Avicenna has demonstrated that they do have some sort of awareness (shu ūr) of that to which they aspire, or of that toward which they lean, and even possess a presence (ˆu ūr) of its necessity (MQ, ). Mullā ^adrā s Solution In one respect, Mullā ^adrā s solution appears to depart from al-œūsī s objection and, in another respect, to follow it. One the one hand, Mullā ^adrā maintains that these ends are the final causes of natural bodies, and this is where he agrees with Avicenna and al-œūsī. On the other hand, he appears to tackle the problem in a way which al-œūsī may have precluded. Mullā ^adrā prefers to view the problem from a metaphysical, rather than a physical angle. He writes: [Universal] natures (\ibā i ) that set in motion their elemental matters are attentive (la-hā tawajjuh) to their natural ends (ghāyāt), such as a certain place, as is the case for simple elemental entities, or to a certain position, as is the case for [celestial] spheres, or to a certain quality or a certain quantity, as is the case for composites (murakkabāt). It is necessary that the end of every motion and request (\alab) possess a (certain) 43 existence (wujūd) before the existence of that motion, because it is a cause a cause of motion and the cause is prior to its effects in existence. And when something of those ends, which are in what is found in this world of beings (taˆt al-kawn), does not possess a complete (tamm) existence before the completion of the motions (ˆarakāt), then, these ends necessarily possess another aspect (naˆw) of existence that is called a mental existence (MQ, ). What Mullā ^adrā does is to maintain the idea that ends that lead to motion must consist of some sort of mental existence, what he calls a deficient being (kawn nāqi ), and ascribes these mental entities to the active power of natural bodies that is attentive to its own end (a type of mental existence), as each universal nature yearns for its completion. Yearning for these ends occurs because natural bodies possess deficiencies, deficiencies that are of two kinds. They can either be according to substantiality and 41 Nas īr al-dīn al-œūsī, Sharḥ al-ishārāt in Ibn Sīnā, al-ishārāt, vol. 3, IV, 7, The objection and its solution are absent from the section on Ithbāth al-wujūd al-dhihnī in al-œūsī s Tajrīd al-i tiqād as reported in Allāma Hillī s (d. 726/1325) commentary, the Kashf al-murād fī Sharˆ Tajrīd al-i tiqād, notes and commentary by Āyat Allāh al-sayyid Ibrāhīm al-mūsavī al-zanjānī (Qum: Shukrūrū, 1373/1993), 19 and from F. D. al-rāzī s section on mental existence in his al-mabāˆith al- Mashriqiyyah, vol. I, 1, Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, Added in parentheses in Ashtiyānī s edition.

14 14 subsistence or be according to excellence and completeness. For the first type of deficiency, Mullā ^adrā gives the example of the motions of seminal and germinal matter that leads to the creation of individual animals and plants. For the second type of deficiency, he provides the example of the motions of simple bodies and of inanimate composites in their quantities, their qualities, colors, and locations: The active power is attentive of the deficient being (kawn nāqi ) and yearns for its completion, and it exists in natural bodies that possess deficiencies that are either according to substantiality (tajawhur) and subsistence (qiwām) or according to excellence (fa īlah) and completeness (tamām). The first is like the motions of seminal (minawiyyah) and germinal (bidhriyyah) matters for the coming about of animal and vegetal individuals (ashkhā ). And the second is like the motions of simple bodies, of inanimate composites in their quantities, their qualities, their colors, and their locations (MQ, ). But what does Mullā ^adrā mean when he writes that the active power of natural bodies is attentive to its own end, a mental existence, as each universal nature yearns for its completion? Although he does not elaborate, 44 he had mentioned that it was established that the ends of these natural motions belong to another world. Here is the metaphysical leap that permits Mullā ^adrā to maintain that ends are mental entities. These ends are now ascribed to a distinct ontological realm: Indeed, it has been established that the ends (maqāsid) of those natural motions belong to another world, that they possess a subsistence (thubūt) in that world, distinct from their external subsistence (siwā thubūti-hā alkhārijiyyah), and that they possess a presence (ˆu ūr) in it, distinct from their concrete presence (siwā ˆu ūri-hā al- ayniyyah) [in the external reality]; and that world is the hidden world (bā\inī), unveiled (makshūf) by those who possess the ability to unveil, [it is] the real ( aynī) world, contemplated with this eye or with any of the external senses, and [it is] the imaginal world ( ālam al-mithāl) that those who treads the mystical path (sullāk) and ascetics (ahl al-riyā ah) unveil (MQ, ). Here, Mullā ^adrā may develop an original argument by having ends postulated as causes of motion or action that can not only exist in the mind, but that can also exist in natural universals (for example, universal nature), before they are ever materialized. Such a demonstration would rest on the assumption that natural universals exist and that they can be aware of their ends. It also supposes that they are, somehow, the forms of concrete individuated existences, the depositors of their ends, the final ends guiding material beings toward their completion. 44 And only notes that this issue will be discussed in a section on the final cause.

15 15 The Second Demonstration The second demonstration included in al-masā il al-qudsiyyah is a well-known demonstration that appears (perhaps for the first time) in Fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī s al- Mabāˆith al-mashriqiyyah (Oriental Investigations). 45 The demonstration soon found its way into the works of numerous writers, for example, Na īr al-dīn al-œūsī s Tajrīd al-i tiqād (The Freeing of Belief), 46 in his student Qu\b al-dīn al-shīrāzī s Durrat al- Tāj, 47 and eventually in Mullā ^adrā s al-asfār al-arba ah and al-shawāhid al- Rubūbiyyah. 48 This demonstration (no. 2) rests on the ability of the mind to positively establish (thubūtiyyah) that non-existent entities (ma dūmāt) do not possess an existence in the external world and the possibility of predicating positive judgments, that is, factual propositions on such non-existent entities. The first premise of this demonstration is that it is possible to judge that some entities have an extra-mental existence and that some entities do not exist (ma dūm) in the external reality, by providing true and affirmative judgments (aˆkām thubūtiyyah ādiqah) that apply to these entities. The second premise is that one can only pass judgment on the existence of something that exists, so that the possibility of making any type of judgment, or for that matter, to provide a factual proposition about something is subordinated to the existence of that particular thing, independently of the type of existence it may possess. The third premise is that judgment is not limited to what exists in the external reality. Mullā ^adrā argues that judgments apply more comprehensively to all entities that are realized and determined in the mind. He gives the example of the Phoenix ( anqā ) and of the triangle that have no existence in the external world. A representation of the Phoenix can occur in the mind, such that the following proposition A Phoenix, or any Phoenix, is a kind a bird must necessarily be true of any representation of a Phoenix to actually correspond to a Phoenix. The same holds true for the proposition that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles (that is, 180 degrees). A final premise is that the truth-value that can be positively ( idq al-ˆukm al-ījābī) ascribed to any given proposition requires, first, the establishment of the existence of its substratum (maw ū ), such that, in the case of the Phoenix, the substratum of the Phoenix, that corresponds to being a kind of bird with certain qualities that make such propositions as x is a Phoenix true, only occurs in the mind. No such entity exists extra-mentally. 49 This is true for any (positive or negative) proposition that can be predicated of a subject, whether it be a Phoenix, the Law of Non-Contradiction 45 F. D. al-rāzī, al-mabāˆith al-mashriqiyyah, vol. I, 1, Al- illī, Kashf al-murād, Q. D. al-shīrāzī, Durrat al-tāj, ed. Sayyid Muˆammad Mishkāt, 5 vols. in one (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ikmat, 1369/1989), vol. 3, , esp Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, (2 nd proof); cf. Idem, al-shawāhid al- Rubūbiyyah, (it is the first proof shorter and slightly different). 49 Like œūsī, illī takes it to be in re (fī al-a yān), cf. al- illī, Kashf al-murād, 19.

16 16 ( adam ijtimā al-nāqi ayn), or any other proposition that only possesses an existence in the mind. 50 Mullā ^adrā then draws the conclusion that the substratum, the subject of the proposition to which a (positive or negative) proposition is applied, must, therefore, possess some kind (or aspect ) of existence. Since such things as Phoenixes or, for that matter, Sherlock Holmes, do not exist in the external reality, possessing no in re existence, they must, therefore, have an existence in the mind. Mullā ^adrā defines this existence as an intellective ( aqlī) and comprehensive (iˆā\ī) existence in other words, a mental existence (MQ, ). In al-masā il al-qudsiyyah, Mullā ^adrā notes the existence of a number of objections leveled against this particular demonstration. He mentions having discussed them elsewhere in more details and to which he refers the reader, that is, al- Asfār al-arba ah, where he raises three different objections. 51 In al-masā il al- Qudsiyyah, he makes only one remark. He notes that propositions that can be applied to mental entities must necessarily extends to more than one individual, such as a judgment on the individuality (shakh iyyah) or the naturalness (\abī iyyah) of entities. Although such propositions pertain to the substratum of entities (ˆaqīqiyyāt), whose real essence (ˆaqīqiyyah) may exist in the external reality (wujūd muqdar), the propositions applied to mental entities remain, in a sense, restricted (maˆ ūrāt). The judgment that applies to an individual does not extend to other in re individuals (MQ, ). 52 For instance, something that would possess attributes x, y, z, would constitute a representation of the Phoenix or, for that matter, a representation of Sherlock Holmes. They would, nonetheless, possess distinctive mental existence. Representations, such as miniatures depicting the Phoenix or novels and films about Sherlock Holmes, only provide external representations of that which only exists in the mind. Mullā ^adrā notes that these clarifications can answer most of the objections that have been made against this particular demonstration. He then concludes by stating that aspects that are shared by many activities and the comprehensive judgment that can encompass different individuals and apply to numerous objects, for example, the concept of color, can only exist in another kind of vessel that does not exist in the external reality and whose origin (manshā ) is other than what the external senses can contemplate (MQ, ). Such concepts are mental entities. The Third Demonstration The third demonstration (no. 3) from al-masā il al-qudsiyyah rests on the ability of the human soul to conceive of universal concepts or notions (ma nā), a demonstration that Mullā ^adrā included in his Asfār al-arba ah and his al-shawāhid 50 The possibility of conceiving two opposites (d iddayn) in the mind, such as cold and hot, that cannot have an incidence in the external world is the first demonstration provided by Q. D. al-shīrāzī in his Durrat al-tāj, vol. 3, , esp Mullā ^adrā, al-asfār, vol. 1, pt. 1, This appears to be the second comment discussed in the Asfār and which is briefly discussed by Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā ^adrā, 218.