Internalism and Et Externalism
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1 Internalism and Et Externalism
2 Control freak or laissez faire? Some managers are control freaks, or micro managers. They don t trust their workers to do anything properly, and so check up on everything. They re in control. Other managers are hands off, or laissez faire. They trust their workers, to the extent of not really knowing what s going g on. (Even if things work out well, then this is merely lucky, as they re not really in control of the situation.) As managers of our own belief formation, how much should we sit back and trust our cognitive mechanisms (e.g. perception) to do their job? How much should we oversee, validate (and even overrule) these processes?
3 Internalism vs. Externalism Internalists are theepistemic epistemic control freaks, or micromanagers. It s all about fulfilling our epistemic duties, diligently ensuring that our beliefs are true, or probable true, by finding evidence for them. If we fail to do this, then we could end up believing any old rubbish. Externalists are more laissez faire. It s ultimately not possible to validate your own cognitive processes, as you need to use those same processes throughout. So why bother? Just relax and trust what your senses, reasoning etc. seems to be telling you. As long as those mechanisms are right (e.g. reliable, working properly) then it s all good.
4 Emma the dog Et Externalists lit are happy to lte let Emma the dog enjoy her beliefs, free from the burden of finding a reason to think they re true.... it is doubtful whether Emma could have even understood the basic idea of having a reason for a belief, an understanding that seems to be required for her to have had fully explicit access to any reasons at all. Thus it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Emma had no justified beliefs (The same goes for children and unsophisticated adults.)
5 Compromise? As I ve described dthem, internalism and externalism sound rather extreme, and it might be worth exploring the possibility of a compromise. Good managers, for example, have a degree of trust in their workers, but also check up on them to some extent. Perhaps knowledge requires some degree of checking (i.e. justification) i )but also depends d on external factors?
6 Terminology In the Bonjour chapter, externalists t are presented td as analysing justification in external terms. Plantinga (an externalist) sees this as a mistake for externalism. Plantinga defines justification as the internalists t do, but says that t knowledge requires warrant something defined externally. So there s a question for externalists: Are you giving an account of justification, or something else?
7 We may begin by asking whether it is really as clear as I have in effect been assuming (and as those on both sides of this issue typically assume as well) that the internalist and the externalist views of justification are incompatible in a way that means that t one must be simply right and the other simply wrong. Some philosophers have in fact suggested that perhaps there are instead two (or even more) different conceptions of knowledge or justification, one (or more) of them internalist and one (or more) of them externalist: conceptions that simply address different issues and serve different purposes, and that are thus not in any meaningful sense competitors between which a choice must be made. Bonjour, pp
8 Internal markers (Cognitively accessible indicators of something) The certainty of our senses and of the ideas we receive through them is not lessened by our not knowing how the ideas are produced. The best assurance I can have, the best my faculties are capable of, is the testimony of my eyes; they are the proper and sole judges of this thing Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chapter XI
9 One reason to trust tthe senses is: the assurance we have from our senses themselves that they don t err in what they tell us about the existence of things outside us when we are affected by them It s the assurance. (Of course every con man is good at assuring people p that s he s on the level.)
10 I am certain that I am a thinking thing; but do I not therefore likewise know what is required to render me certain of a truth? In this first knowledge, doubtless, there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm, which would not indeed be sufficient to give me the assurance that t what I say is true, if it could ever happen that anything I thus clearly and distinctly perceived should prove false. Descartes, Meditation III.
11 From an engineering perspective, internal markers are essential components of a cognitive system. How is the user of the cognitive system going to distinguish between reliable products of the system and mere idle imaginings? How is the user to be made aware of the fact that some beliefs are more reliable than others? Each belief is accompanied by a phenomenological feel, in proportion to its reliability. The user has a duty to pay attention to this degree of assurance.
12 Suppose you take on a new job at the nuclear power plant and I instruct you to press a certain button if the temperature of the reactor core goes above a certain point. You see a dial which is labeled "Reactor Core Temperature." You ask me, "So what you mean is, I should press this button whenever the indicator on that dial goes above that line?" Now suppose I respond, "No, that's t' not what I mean. That dial might not be working properly. I want you to press the button whenever the reactor core is above the danger point, regardless of what that dial says." You wouldn t know how to follow my instructions. I m asking you to regulate your activities by a guide-post which you don t have access to, when performing those activities. It doesn t seem possible to do that. Jim Prior (handout on reliabilism)
13 Examples of epistemic it i duties: Only trust reliable perceptions Only make cogent inferences Only believe genuine memories Don t engage in wishful thinking These duties make no sense unless we have cognitive access to such things. From an engineering perspective, such access has to be provided to the user, as part of the design.
14 Reliabilism Rlibili Reliabilism says that t a belief blifis justified d( (or warranted?) when it is reliable in some sense. Process reliabilism says that a belief is justified by virtue of the reliability of the process that produced the belief. Subjunctive or counterfactual reliabilist theories (e.g. Nozick, Dretske) say things like, if P weren t true, then the subject would not believe that P (owing to the laws of physics, and the construction of the cognitive process)
15 What is a reliable process? Onethatalways always (or almost always) works, across a wide range of circumstances. Range of reliability: E.g. a voltmeter has a maximum voltage before it gets fried. It also works only in a certain temperature range, gets affected by ionizing radiation, etc. It withstands ordinary knocks, butwon t t work after getting hit by a sledge hammer. O t id th th d i i li bl Outside the range, the device is unreliable. What does it mean to say that it s reliable inside the range?
16 Scepticism According to externalism, there is no general need to rule out sceptical scenarios, using the resources you have cognitive access to. Knowledge may require that you couldn t be wrong, but in the objective sense of possible, not the subjective sense. Nozick s externalism has interesting consequences: I know there is one hand here I don t know that I m not a brain in a vat
17 Foundationalism According to externalism, there is no need to find a reason why your basic beliefs (e.g. perceptual beliefs) are likely to be true. Like Emma the dog, we can simply follow our Like Emma the dog, we can simply follow our instincts.
18 Bonjour s objections to externalism 1. Reliability is not necessary for justification The Cartesian evil genius case. These people are epistemically responsible and thorough, hence justified. But they re not at all reliable. 2. Reliability is not sufficient i for justification Clairvoyance cases. These genuine clairvoyants have reliable beliefs, but the beliefs are unjustified because they have no reason to think they re true.
19 1. Evil genius case Imagine a group of people who live in a world controlled by a Cartesian evil genius The people in this position are, we may suppose, careful and thorough investigators. They accumulate large quantities of sensory evidence, formulate hypotheses and theories, subject their beliefs to careful experimental and observational tests, and so on Are the beliefs about their apparent world that the people in such a Cartesian demon world arrive at in these ways justified? From an intuitive standpoint, it seems hard (doesn t it?) to deny that they are.
20 2. Clairvoyance cases Case 1. Norman believes himself to have the power of clairvoyance, though he has no reasons for or against this belief. One day he comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that the President is in New York City. He maintains this blif belief, appealing to his alleged clairvoyant li power, even though he is at the same time aware of a massive amount of apparently cogent evidence, consisting of news reports, press releases, allegedly live television pictures, etc., indicating that the President is at that time in Washington, D.C. Now the President is in fact in New York City, the evidence to the contrary being part of a massive official hoax mounted in the face of an assassination threat. Moreover, Norman does in fact have completely reliable clairvoyant power, under the conditions that were then satisfied, and his belief about the President did result from the operation of that power.
21 doesn t it seem as though hnorman is being thoroughly hl irrational and so is not in fact justified in confidently accepting beliefs on this sort of basis? (Think about this question on your own. One way to develop the issue further is to ask whether Norman would be justified in acting on one of these beliefs if an urgent occasion should arise: perhaps someone is trying to contact the president on an urgent matter and asks Norman if he knows where to find him.)
22 From the engineering perspective? What if Norman isn t just a reliable clairvoyant, butis designed to be one? (The other perceptual mechanisms are designed, after all.) What if Norman s clairvoyant beliefs are clear and distinct,assuring him of their reality? (This is of course a design feature as well.) We don t think ordinary perceptual beliefs need independent verification. (They re basic.) Why then would clairvoyant beliefs need this?
23 Variants of the clairvoyance case In the case mentioned, Norman has independent d evidence that his clairvoyant belief, that the President is in NYC, is false. (TV news, etc.) Bonjour also considers cases where Norman has scientific evidence that clairvoyance is impossible, all alleged clairvoyants have been exposed as fakes, etc. Such evidence makes no difference at all to Norman s reliability, yet it certainly makes his belief that the President is in NYC less justified!
24 Multiple cognitive mechanisms At this point a reliabilist might appeal to the fact that we have multiple cognitive faculties (perception, reasoning, memory, etc.) which overlap in the sense that theycan agree with or contradict each other. This occurs, for example, when you see (or seem to see) a pink elephant, floating in the air. In these cases, where Norman has contrary evidence concerning clairvoyance, there is such a clash of cognitive faculties. What does a reliable agent do in such cases? (What would an engineer design an agent to do?)
25 E.g. you re wandering around a science museum, and you enter a room that has a large sign, HOLOGRAM ROOM over the entrance. A few moments later, a large tiger appears from nowhere, and leaps at you. It looks very real totally clear and distinct so you It looks very real, totally clear and distinct, so you feel a very strong urge to run for your life. But should you believe there s a tiger there?
26 In some cases at least, reasoning overrules perception. In other cases, perception overrules previously strong convictions. (Your friend had a leg amputated. You saw the stump. But later you see him again with two legs, and he says it grew back. Will you ever believe this happened?) In such clashes, what determines the winner? Presumably there is some faculty (probably related to reason) that decides such things. A reliabilist will say, I suppose, that this adjudicating faculty must also be reliable. If Norman sloughs off contrary evidence, then he s not reliable overall?
27 Reliabilist internalism? If a reliabilist (or proper functionalist) t)tk takes this route, then they re apparently making some concessions to internalism, or agreeing gwith some internalist motivations. They re saying that a reliable cognitive process can be overruled, on the basis of factors that are internally available (e.g. other beliefs). (Of course the overruling is handled dby another process that needs to be reliable.)
28 Generality problem for reliabilism The Generality Problem is the problem of specifying i exactly which h process it is whose reliability determines how justified your belief is. (Prior) E.g. I look out the window, and believe it s raining. Which process formed this belief? Is it: the process of forming beliefs on the basis of perception the process of forming beliefs on the basis of vision the process of forming beliefs about the weather on the basis of looking out a window the process of forming a belief that it s raining on the basis of seeing droplets splashing on the pavement etc.
29 Generality problem 1. If we define the process broadly, e.g. vision, then the problem is that some visual beliefs are a lot more justified than others. Yet on this view they d all be equally justified. 2. To avoid (1) we define the process as narrowly as possible. But then there may be only one belief that theprocess ever produces (no two perceptions are identical) and so it s meaningless to ask how often it produces true beliefs. Appeal to single case chances, rather than frequencies? But surely a reliable cognitive mechanism is also robust, in the sense that it is reliable over a wide range of circumstances? So some broader definition is needed.
30 Without t some way of answering this question in a specific and nonarbitrary way, the reliabilist has not succeeded in offering a definite position at all, but only a general schema that there is apparently no nonarbitrary way to make more definite. Certainly some ways of specifying the relevant process are more natural than others; but the epistemological relevance of such naturalness is questionable, and even these more natural specifications are numerous enough to result in significantly differing degrees of reliability. Though reliabilists have struggled with this problem, no solution has yet been found that even a majority of reliabilists find acceptable. (Bonjour, p. 215)
31 Range Problem The reliability of a machine is always limited it to a certain range of circumstances, or possible environments. The Range Problem is the problem of specifying where a process has to be reliable--in what range of possible environments?--in in order for beliefs produced by it to count as justified. Knowledge seems to require some range of reliability, surrounding the actual circumstances. What defines this range?
32 The Serendipitous Brain Lesion Plantinga Suppose that Sam suffers from a serious abnormality a brain lesion, let s say. This lesion wreaks havoc with Sam s noetic structure, causing him to believe a variety of propositions, most of which are wildly false. It also causes him to believe, however, that he is suffering from a brain lesion. Further, Sam has no evidence at all that he is abnormal in this way, thinking of his unusual beliefs as resulting from an engagingly original turn of mind.
33 Plantinga supposes that the brain lesion is a reliable producer of the belief that one has a brain lesion, yet it seems that the belief isn t knowledge. Is that right? In that case, having a reliable true belief isn t sufficient for knowledge. How does this compare to Bonjour s clairvoyance case?
34 A Gettier case against internalism An aging forest ranger lives in a cottage in the mountains. There is a set of wind chimes hanging from the bough just outside the kitchen window; when these wind chimes sound, the ranger forms the belief that the wind is blowing. As he ages, his hearing (unbeknownst to him) deteriorates; he can no longer hear the chimes. He is also sometimes subject to small auditory hallucinations in which he is appeared to in that wind-chimes way; and occasionally these hallucinations occur when the wind is blowing. (Plantinga likes such cases that involve cognitive malfunction, as they motivate his view.)
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