Llewellyn E. Thompson Oral History Interview JFK #1, 03/25/1964 Administrative Information

Transcription

1 Llewellyn E. Thompson Oral History nterview JFK #1, 03/25/1964 Administrative nformation Creator: Llewellyn E. Thompson nterviewer: Elizabeth Donahue Date of nterview: March 25, 1964 Length: 13 pages Llewellyn E. Thompson served as Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( ) and as US Ambassador-at-large ( ). This interview focuses on communication between John F. Kennedy [JFK] and Chairman Khrushchev, JFK s capabilities as President, and counsel to JFK regarding the Soviet Union, among other issues. Access Restrictions Open. Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed January 28, 1965, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research. f a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of fair use, that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff. Transcript of Oral History nterview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. f researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

2 Suggested Citation Thompson, Llewellyn E., recorded interview by Elizabeth Donahue, March 25, 1964, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

3 Gift of Personal Statement By Llewellyn E. Thanpson to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library ln accordanc with the prov1slons of the Federal Property and Administrallve St!rYlces Act of L949 ns amcnd.-d (()3 Stat nnd rcgulntions issued thereunder,, l.le...,ellyri E. Thanpson, hereinafter referred lo as th<t donor, hereby gi e, donate and convey to thu Un ted States of /\JnP.rica for evornual deposit in the proposed John Filzgcrnld K< nnedy Library, and (or ndmlnlstration therein by the authnritlcr Lhor of, a lrnnscripl o[ o personal stdtement opprovt d by mt! on Scpt mlh t'!!\, 964, and preparl'd for thl! purpose of dt:po~it in the John Pltz11crH ld Kt nnedy L Lbrary. TllP glf l of th! s document 11 rnndc i;ub ject Lo tlw Col lnwing Lt:ruis and cond! t ons:. Title to the catt!rial transferred hereunder will pass lo the UnH"d Stal s as of the date of the dell very of this material inco the physical custody of the /\rchivist of the United States. 2. lt ls lh<l donor's wish to rnalrn tht> material donlllt1d Lo the United States of /\JT11 rica by the terms oc this instrurnent nvn l tnbl e for research in the Jt hn Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. At the same time, it is his wish to gunrd against th~ possibility of its contents being used to embarrass, damnge, injure or harass 4nyone. Therefore, n pursuance of this objeclive, and 1n eccordance wllh the provisions of Sec. 507( )(3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, thi~ material shall not, until Ja~uary 1, 1970, be t1111de available for examine ti on by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it. This r~strlction shall not appl y to employees of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library engaged in performing normal archival work processes. 3. A revision of the above stipulation governing access to Lhe aforesaid document may be entered in betwe!en the donor and the Archi vist of the United States or his d~signee it it appears desirable to revise the conditions her~ n stipulated. 4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept inuct pen;ianent ly in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. Signed Date: Supte. '"r 18, )16f, Accepted ~(v.~~~~ _Jt:t.'.!~..,~ ::!;'W~--- Date: Archivist of th~ United Slates

4 APPE:!DX A GFT OF Yt3SONAL ~ By ue... "el.lyn t:. Tho:ipson to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library n accordance with paragraph 3 of t.he Gitt or Personal State=ent signed by me on September 18, 1964 and accepted by the Archivist of the United States on January 28, 1965, i t is ffl:t Yi&h to exercine l1ly option to revise the stipulation governing access to my oral history interviev for research. The original Gift of Personal Statem~nt is al.tered to include the following restrictions : t is the donor'n wish to make the me.teria.l donated to the United St ates of America by the terms of this instrument avatl.able for reoeo.rch in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. At the same time, it. ls his lfish to guard ~o.inst the possibil.ity of its contents being used to embarrass, ~e, lnjure, or hllrass aeyone. Therefore, ~n pursunnce ot thin objective, and in accordance Yith the provisions of Sec. 507 {f) (3) ot the Feder&l Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, this material. shall not until January 1, 1973 be made available for examination by anyone except persona..,ho have my expre11s written authorization to use t. This restriction shall not apply to P.mplo}'eei: of the John Fi t?.gi>r&.l.d Kennedy Library me~ed in por tonu;tng normo.1 archival -wor~ processes. Si gned.---'-'~"'- 1~;. _,_.. oate_-"j~,4/j...'/, -.,_.; /i....;!,.._...:...of -.;.: ~l:..;,:; ~'-'' ::::;,._f-/"-'.=- - ~. " '-y...,..l"'"/.- _h-'-"-r_l_-i_7-=c'--

5 Llewellyn E. Thompson JFK #1 Table of Contents Page Topic 1 Meeting and interacting with John F. Kennedy [JFK] 3 Correspondence between JFK and Chairman Khrushchev and the meeting in Vienna 4 Discussion with JFK about a successor 5 JFK s sensitivity to the feelings of others 7 JFK s capabilities that strengthened his role as President 8 JFK and public speaking: briefing the leadership of Congress on the Cuban crisis and other occasions 10 Advice to the Kennedy Administration regarding the Soviet Union: the Cuban crisis and other events

6 ! J J f, FOR THE KENNEDY LBRARY Submitted by: THE HONORABLE LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ; j j ' 1 : l ". j

7 j {, \. THE HONORABLE LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ' Other titles held during associations with President Kennedy: - ' American Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics J l f \ l ii p / Time and Place of nterview: nterviewer: Miss Donahue: 2:30 p. m. Wednesday, March 25, 1964 Ambassador Thompson 1 s office Miss Elizabeth Donahue Mr. Thompson, wonder if you could tell us when you first met President Kennedy. Ambassador Thompson: i do not recall exactly when first met the late President, but do recall meeting him at a party in about also recall having a long discussion with him in Rome in 1950 or ~ i i ' '. i ' On the latter occasion, he questioned me at length about the Soviet Union. also recall an incident when came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation of my appointment as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Several of the Republican members ma.de some rather flattering remarks, whereupon the then Senator Kennedy spoke up and said that the Republican

8 - 2 - Members of the Committee had no monopoly on admiration for me, and said that he and his colleagues had also known me and my record, and he also went on to make some rather nice remarks. On a subsequent occasion, came before the Foreign Relations Committee on one of my trips back to Washington for consultation, simply to brief them on Soviet affairs. n the course of the discussion, one of the Members asked me a question, and in giving my reply, referred to a book that had recently been published by an American scholar on the subject under discussion. was much impressed by the fact that after the Committee meeting was over, Senator Kennedy was the only Member of the Committee to get the name of the book and its author from me. He said that he intended to get it and to read it, and from my knowledge of his voracious appetite for ll?ormation, am sure that he did so. Soon after the President was inaugurated, in February 1961 returned to the United States for consultation. The President arranged a briefing session at which Messrs. Harriman, : -Kennan, and Bohlen, all former Ambassadors to the Soviet 1 Union,. were present, as well as Secretary Rusk and Mr. McGeorge l Bundy. This was a long and serious session at which led off with

9 - 3 - a briefing, followed by a discussion in which all present" took part.. was impressed by the way the President drew out the thoughts of everyone present, without revealyig his own thoughts. n subsequent experience, found this was characteristic of him. Following this briefing session, had several long conversations alone~ with him and was greatly impressed by the knowledge he already possessed of Soviet affairs. One of the subjects discussed was the text of a letter which he asked me to take back to the Soviet Union to give to Chairman Khrlishchev. This was the beginning of the very considerable correspondence between them. had advocated an early meeting between the President and Khrushchev, and continued to do so after my return to Moscow. One of my chief objectives was that found it impossible to convey either in writing or orally what Mr. KhrD?hchev was like, and felt that the President should find out for himself by a direct encounter. The text of the conversations that took place at the Vienna meeting are a matter of record and there is no need for me to repeat them here. t may be of interest, however, that in the course of one of the dialogues there was a break in the discussion and the President called me aside and said, "Tommy, is it al ways like this? 11 assured him that t.1.is

10 - 4 - was par for the course. n subsequent years, the President several times teased me about having recommended the Vienna meeting, saying that it ~d not gone very well, but he always ended up 15y admitting that it had been useful to him to get to know Khrushchev at firsthand. returned to Washington again for consuj.tation prior to my departure from Moscow and had several conversations with the President. One of the subjects discussed was the question as to who should succeed me. had recommended two Foreign Service Officers, one of whom was Mr. Kohler, and the President said that since he knew Mr. Kohler and did not know the other candidate, he would, of course, pref er Mr. Kohler. He mentioned the fact that the Soviets had indicated that they would like to have someone who was close to him and that he had considered sending his brother, the Attorney 9eneral, but thought that he was too greatly needed in Washington. observed that in my opinion the Attorney General would be an excellent choice, but warned the President that the Soviets had a purpose in mind in suggesting someone close to the President. said their obvious purpose was to hope to bypass the State Department, which they profess to consider to be opposed to the establishment of good relations.

11 - 5 - n this connection, it may be _worth pointing out that the Soviets had been making great use of a member of their Embassy named Bolshakov to contact membe~s of the Administration and particularly the White House staff. On one occasion, when talking to the President, warned him that there were pitfalls in this procedure and said that it would be quite easy for the Soviets to assume that remarks made by members of his staff represented his views, when this might, in fact, not be the case. said that we Americans were i.r1clined to discuss questions and give our personal views rather freely to foreign officials, but that since this was not true of the Soviets, they might attach great importance to careless remarks. suggested that the best way to avoid this would be to insist that any members of his staff who had conversations with officials of the Soviet Em- bassy, or other Soviet official:::;, be instructed to record them in an official memorandum. The President agreed. was much impressed with the President's sensitivity to the feelings of others. When returned from Moscow, was. given the President 1 s Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service, along with five other Government officials. My wife and my children, who were present at the ceremony, were anxious to

12 - 6 - meet the President, but told them that with so many distinguished people present, did not want to bother the President. However, he went out of his way to come over to speak to them. On another occasion, was sitting in a meeting of the Executive Committee during the Cuban crisis ~d mentioned to the Attorney General, who was sitting next to me, that was goifl.g to have to leave before the meeting was over in order to catch a plane to Colorado to attend my mo~er 1 s funeral. Although did not connect the matter at the time, did see the Attorney General later whisper something to the President, and shortly after that one of the President 1 s aides told me that the President had arranged for me to go to Colorado on a military plane, which would take off at any time would designate. Another example of the President 1 s sensitivity, occurred when was called back from a brief holiday in Cape Cod for the third time in less than three weeks, at his request. Although pleased at the thought that my advice was wanted, was rather anncyed at this third interruption of my holiday, particularly when the subject was the Vietnamese crisis, about which felt _had relatively little to offer., of course, did not say anything to anyone about my feelings, but at the beginning of the

13 ,_ 7 - meeting on this subject, the President opened the discussion by saying, "Tommy, we are sorry to have called you back again, but we didn't want to do a lot of work on this subject and then later find out from you that what we had done was all wrong." Even though knew he; was teasing, any resentment had completely vanished. The President had several extraordinary capabilities for his position. One that impressed me forcefully was his - exceptional capacity for grasping an intricate subject quickly, either from a written document or an oral briefing. On one occasion, he had to leave a meeting of the Executive Committee for some pressing business, during which time we considered a document about three or four pages long. We discussed the matter for, should think, about an hour, and finally after much argument and thought, arrived 'at a consensus. About this time, the President returned to the room, and after glancing through the document in a time so short that could not have read half of it, he said, "Well, gentlemen, think the following and proceeded to give exactly the conclusion that the rest of us had reached after long discussion. do not believe he could have seen the document before the meeting.

14 - 8 - Another extraordinary capability was his phenomenal memory. On one occasion he said to me, 11 Well, Tommy, suppose we 1 ll end up with the Berlin solution which you proposed. 11 had made so many suggestions about the Berlin problem that could not recall which one he was referring to but he had them all clearly in his mind. The President 1 s mind acted so quickly that he tended to be impatient with anyone who was long-vr.inded or unclear in his statements. n most cases this impatience was not evident to anyone who did not know him wen but in the case of garrulous junior officers, observed that they were seldom included on any subsequent briefings. On two occasions, the President asked me to be present when he was briefing th'e leadership of Congress on critical problems. One was in connection with the Cuban crisis. n the course of the discussion he was under considerable pressure and criticism, particularly from Republicans in the leadership, and he called on me for expert testimony, which gave. Another occasion was when he informed the leadership about the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union. He managed skillfully to let anyone speak who wanted to without getting himself bound in

15 - 9 - any way to follow their advice,. but at the same time without giving them the impression that their advice had been ignored. Several of the Senators present said with respect to the blockade of Cuba that they did not agree with my view that the Soviets would accept the blockade. emphasized particularly the importance of the strong support we had received in the OAS and. expressed the opinion that this would carry considerable weight with the Soviets. President Kennedy had a most unusual facility for public speaking, which greatly envied. On one occasion, he was going to make an address at the University of North Carolina and on the same trip visit Fort Bragg and other military facilities. A speech had been prepared for him which involved our relations with the Soviet Union and advance copies were sent to Ambassador Bohlen and myself. We we:r;e invited to accompany the President on his trip. After we had been airborne for some time, the President asked us both to join him to discuss the speech. When we both indicated that we did not like the text, he observed that he had not liked it either. He then produced a speech which he said he had been holding for '--. some time which was largely devoted to educational problems. He began extracting sections from the two speeches, making

16 : so:r:re notes or dictating other passages, including some re: marks related to the local scene and after about twenty minutes of this, asked his secretary to try to put the whole thing together. So far as know, he had no opportunity to do more than skim through it before we arrived. When he got up to speak, he seemed scarcely ever to read the text and merely glanced from time...-to-time at it, but gave an address which would have justified his listeners to conclude that it had been worked over and over and polished to perfection...._ sat in on most of the discussions with the President of the Cuban crisis in October presume that the discussions in the Executive Committee will have adequately been covered by others, and would add only a few personal impressions. One of my strongest impressions was the remarkable coolness of the President, despite the fact that he was probably more aware than anyone of the gravity of the situation and the weight of the decisions he would be making. was involved in the drafting of most of his exchanges with Chairman Khrushchev and in each case was impressed by the rapidity with which he grasped all of the implications involved in a text submitted to him. n every case, the amen<:iments he made were an improvement.

17 was asked on a number of occasions for judgments on what likely Soviet reactions would be to a given action on our part and suppose that much of the confidence which the President later placed in me was due to the fact that my batting average on this occasion was unusually high. was very much opposed to a sudden air strike at the Soviet missiles on a number of gro1;lllds, one of which was that Khrushchev's character was such that he might immediately give an order for a Soviet counteraction which would result eventually, if not immediately, - in nuclear war. considered that if such a course were to be followed, it should be done in such a way that Khrushchev would have time to reflect on his actions and that his advisers would have an opportunity to counsel him. pointed out that this action would result in the death of considerable numbers of Soviet military personnel and that the prestige of the Red Army woul? be engaged in such a way that some strong Soviet reaction would be inevitable~, and others, raised the question as to what we would do if Khrushchev, in reply, ordered an air attack on our missiles in Turkey. One adviser said that in this event we should attack the bases where the Soviet missiles came from and this seemed to point up how close the proposed action would ( bring us to nuclear war. These missiles in Turkey were very

18 '-12 - much on the President 1 s mind and he several times expressed a:nnoyance that the Department had not yet carried out the decision which had been taken long before the Cuban crisis to remove them. He seemed to forget that he had agreed in the plans for their removal which required careful preparation with the Turks and others. When the crisis was at its height and it appeared that we were within twenty-four hours or less of an invasion of Cuba, the President again considered making some statement about the removal of these-missiles. He explained that his concern was that an invasion was such a serious step and would result in the loss of many lives and it would be difficult for the public to understand why this had not been avoided by the removal of these missiles from Turkey, which were obsolete and which it was to our interest to remove in any event. very much favored the blockade path and was asked what the Soviet reaction would be. said thought they would probably try to run one ship through to test our reaction, but if we made clear we were not bluffing, they would back down. This is what, in fact, did happen. The President had an unusual faculty for concealing his own opinions while drawing out the thoughts of others and until the decision was actually made,

19 was never sure what the final decision would be. Looking back upon it, however, think that he had actually made up his mind much earlier but wanted to be certain that all advantages and disadvantages of each course of action were fully explored. A number of times in the course of the discussion, the President indicated he was aware of what the political risks to him were and explained the gro~ds on which he would be attacked politically, but so far as could tep, never let this affect his basic decisions other than to consider how they could ) best be presented. ~~cjl ~c~ EliZaeth Donahue,