Fate, Freedom, and Flies: A Consideration of <em>the Flies</em> and <em>the Oresteia</em>

Transcription

1 bepress From the SelectedWorks of Ann Connolly 2006 Fate, Freedom, and Flies: A Consideration of <em>the Flies</em> and <em>the Oresteia</em> Ann Taylor, bepress Available at:

2 Ann Taylor Las Positas College Fate, Freedom, and Flies: A Consideration of The Flies and The Oresteia Jean-Paul Sartre, as an existentialist, puts at the center of his works the question of freedom and responsibility. Existentialism posits the idea that existence precedes essence, thus leading to the conclusion that one is only what one makes him or herself to be through his or her actions; no purpose or meaning is pre-given to individuals. Sartre seems to be completely rejecting any ideas of determinism or fate as factors influencing one s life. The Greeks, on the other hand, speak constantly of the impact of fate and the actions of the gods on the lives of individuals. Perhaps the most well-known example is that of Oedipus; a prophecy is made about him before he is even born, that he will live to kill his father and marry his mother. Despite his best efforts to avoid this prophecy, Oedipus inevitably fulfills it. These two views of freedom and determinism seem to be entirely at odds with one another; how can one freely choose when the course of one s life has already been set out? This paper seeks to consider the questions of fate and free will in Greek mythology and existentialism, specifically looking at Sartre s play, The Flies. The Flies is a re-telling of the well-known Greek tragic trilogy by Aeschylus, The Oresteia (composed of The Agamemnon, the Libation Bearers, and The Eumenides), which, like the Oedipus cycle, is particularly representative of the tradition of Greek tragic drama. Like Sartre s other fictional works, The Flies addresses questions of freedom and responsibility through the experiences of the main character, Orestes. However, in The Oresteia, Orestes seems mainly driven by fate and divine command. Like all Greek mythology and tragic drama, The Oresteia is heavily laden with references to fate, destiny, and prophecy. In fact, fate was such an important concept to the Greeks that not only was the idea embodied (in the Moirae, or Fates: Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos- spinner, allotter, and inevitable or cutter ), but in most cases it was believed that even the gods could not interfere. They, too, were subject to fate, as we see in the stories of Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus they were all prophesied to be overthrown by a son, and so they were (except for Zeus; however, his attempts to avoid the fate of his father and grandfather are a major theme in many of the myths about him). Why would Sartre choose to explore the question of freedom and responsibility through the retelling of a Greek myth, one in which the main character precisely does not seem to be free? If Sartre believes that, man is nothing else but what

3 he makes of himself, 1 and that, man is responsible for what he is, 2 why would he choose to elucidate these principles with a myth interlaced with ideas of fate and destiny? Do the concepts of fate and destiny not point to the idea that man is not free, that he is determined by someone or something other than himself? Interestingly enough, this is precisely why Greek mythology and the story of Orestes in particular are so perfect for Sartre s purposes. The changes Sartre has made to the original telling of the story by Aeschylus serve to emphasize how this is so. In his essay entitled, The Evolution of the Tragic Hero, George Boas, speaking about Greek tragedy, states that, the tragic hero is made to feel himself caught in a situation over which he has little control but in which he must make some decision, however futile. But the unhappy outcome always emerges from his decision. He must choose and cannot choose well. 3 The first thing that this points out is the fact that regardless of the fate of an individual, he must still make decisions and act. The fate of Oedipus and his family is inescapable; but how will each of them choose to meet that fate? All three of them, Jocasta, Laius, and Oedipus, choose to try to circumvent it and only end up bringing about its realization in the most horrifying way. In the case of Orestes, his line has been cursed; there is no escape from this. Yet, he still has a choice in how the curse falls on him: kill his mother and be pursued by the Furies for the rest of his life, or not kill his mother and suffer the wrath of Apollo and of his father s ghost. His is a perfect example of being caught in a situation over which he has little control, but in which he must make some decision. Sartre states in Being and Nothingness that, If these ends are already posited, then what remains to be decided at each moment is the way in which I shall conduct myself with respect to them 4 It almost seems as though he had a figure such as Orestes, or Oedipus, or Odysseus, a figure doomed to a particular fate, already in mind when he made this statement. In fact, it is because of these so-called limiting factors that one has freedom in the first place. Sartre states that, empirically we can be free only in relation to a state of things and in spite of a state of things 5 and one cannot escape from a gaol in which one is not imprisoned. 6 He also adds, the coefficient of adversity in things cannot be an argument against our freedom, for it is by us i.e. the preliminary positing of an end that this coefficient of adversities arises. 7 Here he flatly denies that 1 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Essays in Existentialism. Existentialism is a Humanism. Ed. Wade Baskin. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. Carol Publishing Group: New York, P Ibid., p Boas, George. Tragedy: Vision and Form. The Evolution of the Tragic Hero. Ed. Robert W. Corrigan. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco, P Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. Washington Square Press: New York, P Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p. 620.

4 things over which we have no control limit or negate our freedom. He uses the example of a crag encountered while one is mountain climbing: In itself it is neutral; that is, it waits to be illuminated by an end in order to manifest itself as adverse or helpful. 8 In the story of Orestes, his crag is perhaps the law of blood vengeance. In this case, the ancient and inescapable law, the determiner of his fate, is only a problem because Orestes has posited a particular end, perhaps avenging his father s death without shedding the blood of his mother, the attainment of which is made difficult or impossible by this law. Perhaps another crag would be the curse upon his family, the House of Atreus. In any case, as a result of this law requiring him to avenge the death of his father, Orestes is caught between two terrible choices, but he must choose one of them. He is doomed to tragedy, but still must act. Boas makes a good point when he says, We have first to admit that there are some problems which are insoluble, conflicts which cannot be reconciled. To protest is to wail over the insolubility of the problem of squaring the circle or doubling the cube. 9 Such is the case of Orestes, and of human existence in general, but it does not mean that we are not free, or that we can only bewail the insolubility of some things. Orestes does not; he chooses one of the choices rather than inaction. There is no avoidance to be had. The idea of one s being caught between two bad choices, of one s not having control over the particular situations with which one is faced, is actually, then, an excellent way to explore the question of freedom. Another reason why the story of Orestes is actually an excellent shell for exploring freedom is that Sartre claims that freedom is a misunderstood concept: to be free does not mean to obtain what one has wished but rather by oneself to determine oneself to wish (in the broad sense of choosing). In other words success is not important to freedom. 10 For Sartre, freedom does not mean having the ability to attain desired ends; rather, it means making one s own choices (autonomy of choice). 11 Orestes is not free in the sense that he has the ability to pursue whatever ends he pleases; he cannot. The curse and the unwritten law of blood vengeance have placed him in a situation which limits the possible ends he can pursue. However, he is free in the Sartrean sense in that he is free to make his own choices; he does not need to rely on others to make his choices for him, and this is one aspect that Sartre emphasizes in The Flies through the changes that he makes. Although the original story of Orestes has many elements in it that make it an excellent vehicle for a display of freedom, Sartre does change some of its aspects in order to further emphasize this theme, and to elucidate the concept in a more thorough manner. Perhaps the most obvious change is in the title The 8 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. P Boas, George. The Evolution of the Tragic Hero. P Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. P Ibid., p. 623.

5 Flies. In Sartre s re-writing, flies buzz in masses around the city, a sign of the people s guilt, and of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra s guilt. The people of Argos are reminded of their guilt every year by the Festival of the Dead (another addition of Sartre s), a religious ceremony begun by Aegisthus in which the ghosts of the dead flow forth from a cave and dwell alongside their living relatives for a twenty-four hour period. Aegisthus says to the people, The dead have ceased to be think what that implies in all its ruthlessness yes, they are no more, and in their eternal keeping your crimes have no reprieve. 12 The citizens of Argos are constantly seeking forgiveness for crimes already committed, from those who are no longer alive to forgive. Like the Orestes of Aeschylus version, their exoneration lies in the power of another and which, in the case of the Argives, can never be granted. Thus, they are guilty and they see no possibility of escape from this guilt. The people of Argos, however, allow themselves to be controlled by their guilt and by Aegisthus by not assuming the burden of their guilt. Guilt and regret seem to indicate an inability to accept that which has already happened, a refusal to own and will what already is. It seems to be, for Sartre, an inability or refusal to accept responsibility for oneself. As the people of Argos do in The Flies, so did the ancient Orestes. The Orestes of The Oresteia is, in a sense, present in The Flies in the form of the citizens of Argos, and thus the hero of Sartre s version is contrasted against his ancient counterpart indirectly through the presence of the citizens. The ancient Orestes, like the Argives, is plagued by guilt and looks outside of himself for its relief and forgiveness (but unlike the Argives, Orestes attainment of this is not only possible, it is achieved). In contrast, and perhaps the most important change Sartre makes, the modern Orestes fully assumes the burden of guilt that results from a choice clearly and unequivocally made based on his own consideration of matters. As Käte Hamburger states about the original plays in her book From Sophocles to Sartre, Orestes did not decide for himself whether his deed had to be committed or not. He was not able to act as a free man making up his own mind; neither did he as a free man freely atone for his guilt. He is acquitted over his head, not on grounds which he himself gives but in accordance with impersonal laws to which he contributes nothing. 13 So Sartre actually makes two changes here, although they are intertwined: having Orestes freely choose to commit the act, and then having him assume the burden of the act without looking outside of himself for vindication. In The Libation Bearers, Orestes chooses his course of action, but under great duress. He says, Apollo will never fail me, no, his tremendous power, his oracle charges me 12 Sartre, Jean-Paul. No Exit and Three Other Plays. The Flies. Transl. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Vintage International, P Hamburger, Käte. From Sophocles to Sartre: Figures From Greek Tragedy, Classical and Modern. Transl. Helen Sebba. New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., P. 29.

6 to see this trial through. I can still hear the god a high voice ringing with winters of disaster, piercing the heart within me, warm and strong, unless I hunt my father s murderers, cut them down in their own style they destroyed my birthright. Gore them like a bull! he called, or pay their debt with your own life, one long career of grief. 14 In this speech, the reader can see clearly that although this Orestes chooses to commit the murder of his mother and her lover, he does so under threat and at the command of Apollo; if he does not, a potentially worse fate awaits him. It is made apparent throughout The Libation Bearers and The Eumenides that Apollo shares in Orestes guilt, as he is the one who commanded Orestes to avenge his father. Apollo even says this himself in The Eumenides at Orestes trial: His champion, too, I share responsibility for his mother s execution. 15 Because another has assumed some of the responsibility, Orestes does not entirely own the act; his guilt is shared with another. In addition, Orestes has fled to the Temple of Athena, seeking respite from the Furies. The Furies, his guilt, follow him as he runs from them/it, and in the end, after appealing to the gods, his act is proclaimed just and he is freed of guilt not by himself, though, but by the vote of the court (only half of whom voted to acquit him) just as the Argives in The Flies are plagued by their own guilt and finally have it lifted by Orestes. Caught in between two horrible possibilities, he chooses one and suffers for it. While he never seems to regret the act, neither does he ever seem to take it over as his own, nor is his exoneration given by himself. In The Flies, Sartre is very clear in making sure that the reader knows that his Orestes commits his own act, bears full responsibility for it, and has chosen it entirely on his own. Hamburger states, Sartre changes the Orestes of antiquity, who is forced to become guilty, into one who wills to become guilty. He freely chooses his deed of matricide. He chooses it to make the idea of freedom as such triumphant. For he does not kill Clytemnestra and Aegisthus because he is bound to exact blood vengeance or to fulfill a law or a decree of the gods; he kills them because they have both committed a sin against freedom by fostering among their subjects anxiety and guilt, the very things that make men non-free Aeschylus. The Oresteia. Trans. Robert Fagles. Penguin Books: New York, P Ibid., p Hamburger, Käte. From Sophocles to Sartre. P. 40.

7 Orestes commits to murdering Aegisthus and Clytemnestra not at the orders of Apollo or Zeus, or out of a fear of being plagued by his father s ghost, but purely because he has chosen it. This Orestes, like the ancient Orestes, has to make a choice between two equally terrible alternatives, and they both choose the same thing: murder. However, Sartre s Orestes does so in full recognition of his freedom to choose, while the ancient Orestes seems to be compelled by outside forces to make the choice that he does. And at the end of The Flies, Orestes is not exonerated as he is in The Oresteia. In Sartre s version, Orestes fully accepts his own guilt and does not ask for forgiveness. After Orestes has murdered Aegisthus and Clytemnestra in The Flies, Electra regrets the situation and asks, Can you prevent our being the murderers of our mother for all time? 17 Orestes reply reveals the extent to which he accepts his guilt, not grudgingly and under duress, but fully and consciously: Do you think I d wish to prevent it? I have done my deed Electra, and that deed was good. I shall bear it on my shoulders as a carrier at a ferry carries the traveler to the farther bank. And when I have brought it to the farther bank I shall take stock of it. The heavier it is to carry, the better pleased I shall be; for that burden is my freedom. Only yesterday I walked the earth haphazard; thousands of roads I tramped that brought me nowhere, for they were other men s roads. Today I have one path only, and heaven knows where it leads. But is it my path 18 Not only does he accept his own guilt, but he also accepts the guilt of the whole city of Argos, a guilt by which they have been completely consumed (due to Aegisthus and his Festival of the Dead). At the end of the play he says to the people, As for your sins and your remorse, your night-fears, and the crime Aegisthus committed all are mine, I take them all upon me. Fear your dead no longer; they are my dead. And, see, your faithful flies have leaft you and come to me. 19 The importance of this change in the ending is that it clearly shows Orestes accepting his guilt, not trying to get rid of it, and certainly not trying to get rid of it through the authority of an outside party. For Sartre, redemption and expiation would be indications of man s non-freedom, of his dependency, since they refer him to other authorities than those he finds within himself. 20 It is an indication not only of Orestes assuming full responsibility for his actions, but perhaps also an acknowledgement of Sartre s concept of anguish-- that when we choose, we choose for all men, and thus are responsible for all men. Orestes has not only refused to be exonerated; he actually revels in his burden, recognizing it as an indication of his freedom, and takes up those of the others. 17 Sartre, Jean-Paul. No Exit and Three Other Plays. The Flies. P Ibid., p Ibid., p Hamburger, Käte. From Sophocles to Sartre. P. 41.

8 Greek tragedy and myth, rather than being irreconcilable with existentialism due to its ideas of fate and destiny, actually presents excellent cases in which we can explore the question of freedom. In fact, because of the idea of fate, Greek tragedies in general and the Oresteia in particular, present the extreme end of the idea of thrownness, of being thrust into a situation not of our own making. These tragic figures must fulfill certain destinies; yet, they have a choice as to how they will do so, and whether they will take full responsibility for that fate or blame it on another. Human existence is filled with problems that seem to have no solution, or no good solution, but we still must act. Our freedom consists not in being able to determine our own fate, but in deciding whether or not we choose the fate we are given.

9 Works Cited Aeschylus. The Oresteia. Trans. Robert Fagles. Penguin Books: New York, Boas, George. Tragedy: Vision and Form. The Evolution of the Tragic Hero. Ed. Robert W. Corrigan. Chandler Publishing Company: San Francisco, Hamburger, Käte. From Sophocles to Sartre: Figures From Greek Tragedy, Classical and Modern. Transl. Helen Sebba. New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. Washington Square Press: New York, Sartre, Jean-Paul. Essays in Existentialism. Existentialism is a Humanism. Ed. Wade Baskin. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. Carol Publishing Group: New York, Sartre, Jean-Paul. No Exit and Three Other Plays. The Flies. Transl. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Vintage International, 1989.