Robert E. Lee (Library of Congress) 1324 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

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1 Robert E. Lee (Library of Congress) 1324 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

2 Robert E. Lee U.S. Army Officer and General of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia Featured Documents Letter to Mary Lee (1856) Letter to Custis Lee (1861) Letter to Jefferson Davis (1862) Letter to Jefferson Davis (1863) Letter to Jefferson Davis (1864) Letter to Andrew Hunter (1865) General Order No. 9 (1865) Lee, Robert E. Overview Robert E. Lee was born on January 19, 1807, on the plantation of Stratford Hall, Virginia, just south of the Potomac River. Lee s father died in disgrace and disrepute when his son was eleven years old, a victim of bad business decisions and poor health, leaving Lee to be brought up by his mother in Alexandria, Virginia. In 1825 he secured an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he achieved exceptional marks, graduating second in the class of Assigned to the Army Corps of Engineers, Lee spent much of the next sixteen years shifting from post to post, performing noteworthy work on the Missouri and Mississippi rivers as well as the harbor facilities at St. Louis between 1837 and In 1846 Lee jumped at the chance to see action in the Mexican-American War; early the following year he was assigned to the staff of Winfield Scott, and he distinguished himself during Scott s campaign from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. After the war, he won appointment as superintendent at West Point, a post he held from 1852 to 1855, and then became a lieutenant colonel assigned to the newly established Second U.S. Cavalry. Upon the death of his father-in-law in 1857, Lee returned home to Virginia and established a residence at Arlington, just across the Potomac from Washington, D.C. He found managing the slaves at Arlington an onerous business and gained notoriety in 1859 when the New York Tribune reported that Lee had whipped some of the very slaves that he was supposed to free under the terms of his father-in-law s will. Later that year, he hurried west to Harpers Ferry to take command of a detachment of U.S. Marines to subdue the abolitionist John Brown, who had seized a federal arsenal as the first step in his plan to incite a slave insurrection. Lee anxiously watched as several southern states declared that they were seceding from the United States in the aftermath of the election of Abraham Lincoln. As of early 1861 Lee was determined not to take part in any conflict so long as Virginia remained in the Union. On the heels of Virginia s decision to secede, made in the wake of Lincoln s call for troops after the Union surrender of Fort Sumter, Lee turned down a general s commission in the U.S. Army, resigned his colonelcy, and joined first the Virginia militia and then the Confederate forces, winning elevation to general in a matter of months. From June 1862 until April 1865 he led the Army of Northern Virginia, winning plaudits for his generalship, but he found himself forced to surrender to Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865, at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. After the war, Lee accepted the presidency of Washington College (which was renamed Washington and Lee University after his death), in Lexington, Virginia. Although he advised his fellow former Confederates to accept the outcome of the war, he remained uneasy about emancipation and contemplated writing a history of his army s operations to suggest that the South had been overwhelmed and not outfought. After a short illness, he died on October 12, Explanation and Analysis of Documents Although Lee was engaged in a successful military career in the U.S. Army, he tended to identify himself as a Virginian and sympathized with the interests of the slaveholding South. Regarding slavery itself, his views reflected a mixture of misgivings about the impact of slavery on whites and a belief that the institution was the best that could be done for blacks so long as they lived in the United States. He never doubted white supremacy; he blamed abolitionists for the controversy over slavery. Once he identified his interests with those of the Confederacy, Lee looked to wage aggressive war in order to beat back Union battalions and weaken northern public support for the war effort. He was always aware of the wider dimensions of his military operations; by 1865 he was prepared to accept the enlistment of African Americans in the Confederate army as a means of reviving his military manpower. Never questioning the correctness of the Confederate cause, even in defeat, Lee steadfastly maintained that the Union victory was the result of overwhelming resources, not superior military skill. The documents produced by Lee primarily personal correspondence focus upon two themes. First, Lee dealt throughout his adult life, in various ways, with questions of slavery, freedom, and race. He was a slaveholder, and for a Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1325

3 Time Line 1807 January 19 Lee is born at Stratford Hall, Westmoreland County, Virginia June Lee graduates from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York Lee supervises the refashioning of channels 1840 of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers and improves the harbor at St. Louis, Missouri Lee begins serving in the Mexican-American War, which ends in Lee accepts the post of superintendent at West Point Lee is appointed lieutenant colonel in the Second U.S. Cavalry December 27 Lee writes a letter to his wife, Mary Lee, sharing his thoughts on President Franklin Pierce s annual message to Congress October Lee leads a contingent of U.S. Marines to suppress John Brown s raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia January 23 Lee writes a letter to Custis Lee sharing his thoughts on secession and the Confederacy April Lee resigns his commission as colonel in the U.S. Army to become a major general in charge of Virginia s forces; he is soon confirmed as a full general by the Confederate Congress. brief period he managed a plantation. Never did he question white supremacy or black inferiority, and if he questioned slavery at all, it was because it presented a burden to southern whites and not because of its impact upon the lives of southern blacks. He faulted abolitionists for their agitation of the slavery question. However, as a pragmatic matter, he came to accept that in order for the Confederacy to survive, it might have to enlist blacks into military service and offer them the reward of freedom. Lee s second realm of concern was that of military strategy. As a military commander, Lee demonstrated an appreciation of the broader concerns of national policy and an understanding that the manner in which war is waged should be shaped by the ends sought in waging it. He was acutely aware of the importance of public support for any war effort, and at several opportune moments he suggested to the Confederate president Jefferson Davis that northern morale and public opinion were viable targets of Confederate war making. Letter to Mary Lee (1856) In 1831 Robert E. Lee married Mary Anna Randolph Custis at Arlington House, Virginia. Mary was a granddaughter of Martha Washington (the wife of George Washington); by wedding her, Lee married into the Washington legacy and benefited from the estate of the Custis family, including Arlington and its slaves. For the next twenty-five years Lee was often away from his wife while serving in the military, including during the Mexican-American War of In 1856 he was on duty in Texas when he read President Franklin Pierce s annual message to Congress, and he hurried to share his impressions with his wife. The year 1856 had proved a critical one in American politics, with the discussion over slavery and its expansion looming large. In his last annual message to Congress, Pierce blamed northern agitators for the violence of the past year, whether it took place on the plains of Kansas, as proslavery and antislavery forces vied to determine the fate of that territory, or on Capitol Hill; the Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner was beaten by the South Carolina representative Preston Brooks in the Senate chamber in retaliation for a speech by Sumner attacking slavery and its advocates, particularly Brooks s kinsman Senator Andrew Butler. In the letter to his wife, Lee expresses his relief that the Republican Party failed to prevail in the presidential contest that had concluded the previous month. Agreeing with Pierce, Lee charges that the North bore responsibility for the sectional crisis because of northerners continual agitation against slavery. Although Lee considers slavery a moral & political evil, he argues that its primary victims were whites. Black slaves, he asserts, are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, socially & physically. Lee expresses the belief that if it is to be successful, emancipation must come gradually, and he measures that process in centuries and millennia, not months or years. He defers to God s will over the question of when slavery should end, meanwhile deploring any agitation of the issue as needless and counterproductive. In short, Lee was a supporter of the peculiar institution of slavery and shared 1326 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

4 in its white supremacist assumptions. Never did he hold southern whites accountable for their role in the sectional crisis that exploded in violence in the 1860s. Letter to Custis Lee (1861) The debate over slavery and its future escalated during the late 1850s. In November 1860 the antislavery Republican Party at last triumphed in the presidential contest with the election of Abraham Lincoln. Several southern states then hastened to declare that they would leave the Union and set up their own slaveholding republic in order to protect slavery from the encroachment of a Republican-controlled White House. Texas was among the first states to secede; as it prepared to do so, Colonel Lee contemplated his own next move. He shared his thoughts in a letter that was most probably addressed to his son Custis. In this letter of 1861 Lee again blames the crisis on northern agitators, although he displays impatience with convoluted theories of secession. It would be better, he thought, to label the departure of the southern states for what it was a revolution, with the goal of independence. Regardless, he admits to having no interest in serving on the side of the United States in any war that might result. If fighting were to break out, he would assess his fortunes according to what the state of Virginia decided to do. If it stayed within the Union, he would set aside his commission and watch from the sidelines; if Virginia cast its fate with the Confederacy, he would side with his state and offer his military services. He professes to deplore the idea of a country held together by force rather than sentiment, explicitly noting that he would not take up arms against the Confederacy. Not until Virginia chose to secede and join the Confederacy in the wake of the Union surrender of Fort Sumter and Lincoln s call for volunteers did Lee s course become clear. Any notion that he might have led U.S. forces against the Confederacy is belied by his own correspondence from when he was considering his options. Letter to Jefferson Davis (1862) Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, At that time, the men of the Union general George B. McClellan s Army of the Potomac could see the church spires in the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia. Within a month, however, Lee succeeded in driving McClellan away from Richmond and toward the James River. Once he learned that the Union high command had decided to order McClellan to evacuate his position and take his army north via water to join John Pope s Army of Virginia in central Virginia, Lee moved quickly to strike at Pope before McClellan arrived in full force. After smashing Pope at the Second Battle of Bull Run (also called Second Manassas) at the end of August, Lee decided to advance into Maryland. The decision reflected his belief that the Confederacy s best chance to achieve independence lay in undermining support for the Union war effort through a series of Confederate victories. Invading Maryland, he believed, might well bolster the cause of secession in that state; it might also persuade European powers that the Time Line 1862 June 1 After serving as the Confederate president Jefferson Davis s military adviser, Lee accepts command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which he leads for the next thirty-four months. September 8 Lee writes a letter to Davis in which he advocates negotiations for peace and Confederate independence June 10 Lee writes to Davis further discussing strategy for achieving both peace and victory March 25 Lee writes to Davis about General Ulysses S. Grant s expected advances on Virginia January 11 Lee writes a letter to the Virginia legislator Andrew Hunter explaining his opinions on the idea of enlisting blacks in the Confederate army. April 9 Lee surrenders to Grant at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. April 10 Lee issues General Order No. 9, dismissing Confederate soldiers. October 2 Lee becomes president of Washington College, in Lexington, Virginia October 12 Lee dies in Lexington, where he is buried. time had come to intervene. For the moment, it appeared that Lee had indeed caught the Union off balance, with its armies still recovering from defeat. In September 1862 Lee decided to take the war north of the Potomac River into Maryland and Union territory. Even as he pressed forward, Lee thought it time to alert Jeffer- Lee, Robert E. Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1327

5 son Davis to the possible political advantages to be gained by coupling an invasion north of the Potomac with a call for peace negotiations, to result in the recognition of Confederate independence. As he puts it, it would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace. Nothing came of this proposal; in less than two weeks Lee had returned to Virginia after having held off McClellan at the Battle of Antietam in the bloodiest day of combat in the American Civil War. Letter to Jefferson Davis (1863) Although he scored several key victories in his first year as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee bemoaned the fact that he could not transform any of those battlefield triumphs into an event of far larger strategic significance. After he beat back a series of Union attacks at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, despite the damage he inflicted upon the enemy, he regretted that the outcome was not beneficial enough. Nor was he completely satisfied with the results of his most spectacular battlefield triumph, at Chancellorsville (April 30 May 6, 1863), where he defeated an enemy force twice the size of his own, though at heavy cost. Once more he chose to cross the Potomac north; once more he sought to impress his president with the political advantages that might accrue from such an offensive. In this letter to Davis, Lee argues that it is important for Confederate politicians to say nothing that might dampen talk of a peaceful resolution of the conflict by northerners. By 1863 some northern Democrats were charging that the war was a failure, that reunion by coercion was doomed, and that the time had come to negotiate a settlement. Whether Confederate independence would be part of such a settlement remained open to discussion. Lee argues, then, that it would be best not to preclude any efforts at negotiation; if such negotiations were to take place, northerners might well come to accept Confederate independence as talks dragged on without evidence of Union progress on the battlefield. Implicit in Lee s letter is the notion that Confederate resources were not inexhaustible: Our resources in men are constantly diminishing. Lee believes it critical for the Confederacy to use whatever means are available, including deception, to weaken northern resolve. Thus, he concludes, it would be important to welcome any talk of negotiations without mentioning any preconditions, including the recognition of Confederate independence. Lee remarks that should his invasion of Pennsylvania prove a success, that result would add to the northern cry for peace and an acceptance of an independent Confederacy. Davis might well have replied that to enter into such negotiations without any assurance regarding independence could demoralize support for the Confederacy in the South. Other observers might have noted that Lee was perhaps overestimating the number of northerners willing to talk peace, especially at a time when the Union general Ulysses S. Grant s Army of Tennessee was laying siege to Vicksburg, Mississippi. The Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, which proved costly in terms of both manpower and leadership losses, rendered the discussion moot. Lee may have at first secured the upper hand on the battlefield, but by the end of 1863 it was evident that his victories had come at such a cost that he was unable to exploit them to much advantage. Letter to Jefferson Davis (1864) If Lee understood that his defeat at Gettysburg represented a setback for Confederate fortunes in 1863, he did not assume that it represented the turning point of the war. As spring came to Virginia in 1864, he prepared once more to check Union offensive operations in that state. He looked forward to meeting Grant in battle. In a March 1864 letter to Davis, Lee shared his speculations about Grant s plans based upon close observation of northern newspaper reports about the Union general s activities. Lee professes to believe it obvious that Grant will plan to make Richmond the objective of a spring campaign and, as the new Union commander, will come to Virginia to supervise that offensive. Lee remarks, Energy and activity on our part, with a constant readiness to seize any opportunity to strike a blow, will embarrass, if not entirely thwart the enemy in concentrating his different armies, and compel him to conform his movements to our own. In short, Lee holds that Confederate commanders must be ready to repel Union advances and take the initiative when necessary, even undertaking offensive operations of their own. Lee s stance remained aggressive, as he was looking to land a blow to keep his foe off balance and perhaps seize the initiative; he repeatedly sought reinforcements to enable him to take advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves. He was also mindful that 1864 was an election year, such that Union military reverses might well lead to the repudiation of Lincoln and the Republicans at the polls. However, in May and June 1864, he discovered that in Grant he had met a general who matched up well against him. Grant refused to surrender the initiative and seemed undeterred from achieving his objectives. By June, Lee found himself clinging to Richmond and Petersburg, fending off Grant s efforts to cut his supply lines. Lee s efforts to regain the offensive failed; if Grant could not defeat Lee outright, he at least pinned the Confederacy s most able military leader in place while Union armies elsewhere scored the military triumphs that reassured the reelection of Abraham Lincoln. Letter to Andrew Hunter (1865) During the course of the Civil War, Lee did not question the cause of the preservation of slavery. His army swept through the countryside of Maryland and Pennsylvania looking to gather up blacks suspected of being fugitive slaves; in 1864 he put black Union prisoners of war to work on fortifications within range of Union weaponry, relenting only when Grant responded in kind by deploying Confederate prisoners in the same way. Lee dragged his feet when it came to emancipating his family s slaves in accordance with his father-in-law s will. Desperation for manpower, however, drove him to consider the idea of enlisting black 1328 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

6 Lee, Robert E. Bodies of fallen troops lie on the field after the Battle of Antietam, the bloodiest one-day battle of the American Civil War. (AP/Wide World Photos) slaves in the Confederate army, especially when it became a topic of political debate in the winter of Although Lee prided himself on being apolitical, he often gave advice and shared his sentiments privately, and nowhere was his willingness to do so more evident than in this letter to Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia state legislature who had solicited Lee s views on the subject of black enlistment for the Confederacy. Lee s response, written in January 1865, is richly suggestive of the way in which he sought to balance the preferred ideal from a white southern perspective with the reality of the Confederacy s situation. Although he still praises slavery as the best way to define the relationship between black and white Americans, he recognizes that with the Union now tapping into black manpower to bolster its military effort, if the Confederacy did not do the same, it would be overwhelmed and crushed. He professes to be, unlike some others, willing to offer emancipation to black soldiers and their families as a reward for faithful military service. Noteworthy in light of modern-day controversies about the extent and nature of black service in the Confederate armies is Lee s failure to mention any such service as a way to combat objections to the plan for enlisting blacks. In later years Lee would claim that he had always been in favor of gradual emancipation, but this letter sets that claim in a more limited context, suggesting that he would have preferred emancipation only if accompanied by the colonization of the former slaves and other blacks outside the United States. General Order No. 9 (1865) Lee looked to continue the Civil War through His first mission early in the year was to evade Grant and evacuate Richmond and Petersburg in such a fashion as to render a pursuit difficult. However, his initial effort to achieve this proved a disaster when his attack on Fort Stedman of March 25 was soundly repulsed; a week later, after Grant took the offensive, Lee abandoned Richmond and Petersburg and headed west. Grant then launched a vigorous pursuit, cutting off Lee s efforts to venture into North Carolina and smashing his rear guard. Hungry and ill supplied, Lee s command began to disintegrate, until at last he accepted the inevitable and surrendered to Grant on April 9, 1865, at Appomattox Court House. By the next day, the staff officer Charles Marshall had drafted a farewell order, which Lee edited before issuing it to the twenty-five thousand or so men who remained in the ranks. The order states nothing about the cause for which the Confederates had been fighting; Lee suggests that the ultimate outcome was due to their being overwhelmed by superior Union numbers, and he commends the men on their bravery and sacrifice. These themes would help form the basis of what is sometimes called the mythology of the Lost Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1329

7 Essential Quotes Secession is nothing but revolution. (Letter to Custis Lee, 1861) Still, a Union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me. I shall mourn for my country and for the welfare and progress of mankind. If the Union is dissolved, and the Government disrupted, I shall return to my native State and share the miseries of my people, and save in defence will draw my sword on none. (Letter to Custis Lee, 1861) We should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies that they may feel some of the difficulties experienced by ourselves. It seems to me that the most effectual mode of accomplishing this object, now within our reach, is to give all the encouragement we can, consistently with truth, to the rising peace party of the North. (Letter to Jefferson Davis, 1863) Considering the relation of master and slave, controlled by humane laws and influenced by Christianity and an enlightened public sentiment, as the best that can exist between the white and black races while intermingled as at present in this country, I would deprecate any sudden disturbance of that relation unless it be necessary to avert a greater calamity to both. (Letter to Andrew Hunter, 1865) After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources. (General Order No. 9, 1865) Impact and Legacy Cause, including the notion that the Confederacy was overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers despite their soldiers superior fighting ability. Lee concludes, With an increasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous considerations for myself, I bid you all an affectionate farewell. Had there been no American Civil War, Robert E. Lee would have been remembered, if at all, as an extremely competent army officer. His brilliant military leadership brought the Confederacy as close as it ever came to battle Milestone Documents of American Leaders

8 field victory, but at heavy costs that would be felt during the latter years of the war, as Lee found he could no longer replace his losses. Moreover, as tremendous as some of his military triumphs might have been, he proved unable to exploit them, and both of his invasions north across the Potomac River resulted in defeats that might have turned into disasters were it not for the inability of Union forces to capitalize on their own opportunities. Nevertheless, the Confederacy may have survived as long as it did because of Lee s leadership, and not until he encountered Grant did he find himself unable to reverse Union offensives. After the war, Lee came to be portrayed as a simple soldier who went along with his state because he embraced a simple conception of duty. In truth, not all Virginians shared his particular notions of duty and loyalty, including George H. Thomas, who rose to become one of the Union s greatest generals. Nor was he nearly as opposed to slavery as some eulogists would have it: His writings suggest that he was comfortable with white supremacy and that his commitment to abolition was strictly practical and qualified by conditions. He understood the advantages of abolition primarily in relation to the potential impact on military operations. While identifying himself as a Virginian, Lee took the southern view when it came to slavery, emphasizing that it was a burden upon white people but the best status that blacks could enjoy in first the United and then the Confederate States of America. For most of the years since the end of the Civil War, Lee has been accorded iconic status by many Americans, although he has always had his critics. Several biographical efforts sought to celebrate his greatness as a general and his goodness of character while distancing his persona from issues of slavery and the nature of the Confederate cause. Indeed, for some, Lee became the model of southern honor and gentility; his image was used to refashion the essence of Confederate identity as being detached from slavery and white supremacy. In more recent years, some scholars have raised questions about Lee both as a general and as a white southerner, especially regarding his views on slavery and race, and have rendered him as a somewhat more complex character. However, old images die hard, and as the bicentennial of Lee s birth passed, it was clear that many white Americans still held him in high regard. Key Sources Major collections of Robert E. Lee s papers can be found at the Virginia Historical Society and the Library of Congress; smaller collections are at the University of Virginia, the Library of Virginia, the Museum of the Confederacy, the Huntington Library (in San Marino, California), and Duke University, as well as at Lee s birthplace in Stratford Hall and at Washington and Lee University. Many of Lee s formal dispatches appear in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. ( ). A published Lee, Robert E. Questions for Further Study 1. In the popular imagination of the United States as a whole and the South in particular, Robert E. Lee is typically regarded as a heroic figure. Although most Americans, even in the former Confederate states, would say that the Confederate causes of slavery and secession were wrong, Lee himself is often viewed as a victim of circumstances a man of principle who, while he did not personally support these causes, nevertheless remained loyal to his state of Virginia. Judging from Lee s writings, how justified is this portrayal? What were his positions on slavery and secession? 2. In the 1863 letter to Confederate president Jefferson Davis, Lee critiques what in modern times would be called the media, maintaining that the southern press was actually hurting the Confederate cause by giving northerners little reason to believe that the issues underlying the Civil War might even then be settled by peaceful means. Likewise, the 1864 letter to Davis opens with an analysis of northern newspaper reports on the movements of troops under his counterpart, General Ulysses Grant. How did Lee regard the media, in terms of both its impact on popular opinion and its reliability as a guide to what was really happening in wartime situations? How might he have viewed the role of journalists in later conflicts, such as World War II, Vietnam, and the two conflicts involving Iraq? 3. Discuss the specifics mentioned by Lee in his 1864 letter to Jefferson Davis. Give a day-by-day account of events leading up to the moment when he composed that letter and consider how we would have viewed Confederate chances of victory at that point in the war. Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1331

9 collection is Clifford Dowdey, ed., The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee (1961). Further Reading Books Carmichael, Peter S., ed. Audacity Personified: The Generalship of Robert E. Lee. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, Fellman, Michael. The Making of Robert E. Lee. New York: Random House, Freeman, Douglas S. R. E. Lee: A Biography. 4 vols. New York: Charles Scribner s Sons, Lee s Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Charles Scribner s Sons, Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Lee the Soldier. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, Nolan, Alan T. Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Thomas, Emory M. Robert E. Lee: A Biography. New York: W. W. Norton, Brooks D. Simpson 1332 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

10 Letter to Mary Lee (1856) The steamer also brought the President s message to Cong; & the reports of the various heads of Depts; the proceedings of Cong: &c &c. So that we are now assured, that the Govt: is in operation, & the Union in existence, not that we had any fears to the Contrary, but it is Satisfactory always to have facts to go on. They restrain Supposition & Conjecture, Confirm faith, & bring Contentment: I was much pleased with the President s message & the report of the Secy of War, the only two documents that have reached us entire. Of the others synopsis have only arrived. The views of the Pres: of the Systematic & progressive efforts of certain people of the North, to interfere with & change the domestic institutions of the South, are truthfully & faithfully expressed. The Consequences of their plans & purposes are also clearly set forth, & they must also be aware, that their object is both unlawful & entirely foreign to them & their duty; for which they are irresponsible & unaccountable; & Can only be accomplished by them through the agency of a Civil & Servile war. In this enlightened age, there are few I believe, but what will acknowledge, that slavery as an institution, is a moral & political evil in any Country. It is useless to expatiate on its disadvantages. I think it however a greater evil to the white man than to the black race, & while my feelings are strongly enlisted in behalf of the latter, my sympathies are more strong for the former. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, socially & physically. The painful discipline they are undergoing, is necessary for their instruction as a race, & I hope will prepare & lead them to better things. How long their subjugation may be necessary is known & ordered by a wise Merciful Providence. Their emancipation will sooner result from the mild & melting influence of Christianity, than the storms & tempests of fiery Controversy. This influence though slow, is sure. The doctrines & miracles of our Saviour have required nearly two thousand years, to Convert but a small part of the human race, & even among Christian nations, what gross errors still exist! While we see the Course of the final abolition of human Slavery is onward, & we give it the aid of our prayers & all justifiable means in our power, we must leave the progress as well as the result in his hands who sees the end; who Chooses to work by slow influences; & with whom two thousand years are but as a Single day. Although the Abolitionist must know this, & must See that he has neither the right or power of operating except by moral means & suasion, & if he means well to the slave, he must not Create angry feelings in the Master; that although he may not approve the mode which it pleases Providence to accomplish its purposes, the result will nevertheless be the same; that the reasons he gives for interference in what he has no Concern, holds good for every kind of interference with our neighbors when we disapprove their Conduct; Still I fear he will persevere in his evil Course. Is it not strange that the descendants of those pilgrim fathers who Crossed the Atlantic to preserve their own freedom of opinion, have always proved themselves intolerant of the Spiritual liberty of others? Lee, Robert E. Glossary expatiate elaborate, write or speak in detail Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1333

11 Letter to Custis Lee (1861) The South, in my opinion, has been aggrieved by the acts of the North, as you say. I feel the aggression, and am willing to take every proper step for redress. It is the principle I contend for, not individual or private gain. As an American citizen, I take great pride in my country, her prosperity and institutions, and would defend any State if her rights were invaded. But I can anticipate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union. It would be an accumulation of all the evils we complain of, and I am willing to sacrifice everything but honor for its preservation. I hope therefore, that all constitutional means will be exhausted before there is a recourse to force. Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the Confederacy at will. It was intended for perpetual union so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession. Anarchy would have been established, and not a government by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and the other patriots of the Revolution. Still, a Union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me. I shall mourn for my country and for the welfare and progress of mankind. If the Union is dissolved, and the Government disrupted, I shall return to my native State and share the miseries of my people, and save in defence will draw my sword on none Milestone Documents of American Leaders

12 Letter to Jefferson Davis (1862) HEADQUARTERS. Near Fredericktown, Md., September 8, His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederate States, Richmond, Va.: MR. PRESIDENT: The present position of affairs, in my opinion, places it in the power of the Government of the Confederate States to propose with propriety to that of the United States the recognition of our independence. For more than a year both sections of the country have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace. The rejection of this offer would prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United States elect to prosecute it for purpose of their own. The proposal of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination, which can but be productive of good to both parties without affecting the honor of either. I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. Lee, Robert E. Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1335

13 Letter to Jefferson Davis (1863) To JEFFERSON DAVIS Richmond, Virginia Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia June 10, 1863 Mr. President: I beg leave to bring to your attention a subject with reference to which I have thought that the course pursued by writers and speakers among us has had a tendency to interfere with our success. I refer to the manner in which the demonstration of a desire for peace at the North has been received in our country. I think there can be no doubt that journalists and others at the South, to whom the Northern people naturally look for a reflection of our opinions, have met these indications in such wise as to weaken the hands of the advocates of a pacific policy on the part of the Federal Government, and give much encouragement to those who urge a continuance of the war. Recent political movements in the United States, and the comments of influential newspapers upon them, have attracted my attention particularly to this subject, which I deem not unworthy of the consideration of Your Excellency, nor inappropriate to be adverted to by me in view of its connection with the situation of military affairs. Conceding to our enemies the superiority claimed by them in numbers, resources, and all the means and appliances for carrying on the war, we have no right to look for exemptions from the military consequences of a vigorous use of these advantages, excepting by such deliverance as the mercy of Heaven may accord to the courage of our soldiers, the justice of our cause, and the constancy and prayers of our people. While making the most we can of the means of resistance we possess, and gratefully accepting the measure of success with which God has blessed our efforts as an earnest of His approval and favor, it is nevertheless the part of wisdom to carefully measure and husband our strength, and not to expect from it more than in the ordinary course of affairs it is capable of accomplishing. We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting. The decrease of the aggregate of this army as disclosed by the returns affords an illustration of this fact. Its effective strength varies from time to time, but the falling off in its aggregate shows that its ranks are growing weaker and that its losses are not supplied by recruits. Under these circumstances we should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies that they may feel some of the difficulties experienced by ourselves. It seems to me that the most effectual mode of accomplishing this object, now within our reach, is to give all the encouragement we can, consistently with truth, to the rising peace party of the North. Nor do I think we should in this connection make nice distinctions between those who declare for peace unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means of restoring the Union however much we may prefer the former. We should bear in mind that the friends of peace at the North must make concessions to the earnest desire that exists in the minds of their countrymen for a restoration of the Union, and that to hold out such a result as an inducement is essential to the success of their party. Should the belief that peace will bring back the Union become general, the war would no longer be supported, and that after all is what we are interested in bringing about. When peace is proposed to us it will be time enough to discuss its terms, and it is not the part of prudence to spurn the proposition in advance, merely because those who wish to make it Glossary adverted to subjugate referred to subdue, defeat 1336 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

14 believe, or affect to believe, that it will result in bringing us back to the Union. We entertain no such apprehensions, nor doubt that the desire of our people for a distinct and independent national existence will prove as steadfast under the influence of peaceful measures as it has shown itself in the midst of war. If the views I have indicated meet the approval of Your Excellency you will best know how to give effect to them. Should you deem them inexpedient or impracticable, I think you will nevertheless agree with me that we should at least carefully abstain from measures or expressions that tend to discourage any party whose purpose is peace. With the statement of my own opinion on the subject, the length of which you will excuse, I leave to your better judgment to determine the proper course to be pursued. I am with great respect, your obt servt R. E. LEE Genl Lee, Robert E. Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1337

15 Letter to Jefferson Davis (1864) To JEFFERSON DAVIS Richmond, Virginia Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia March 25, 1864 Mr. President: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter forwarded to me by your directions, containing the views of the writer as to the intentions of the enemy in the approaching campaign. I have read the speculations of the Northern papers on the subject, and the order of Genl Grant published in our papers yesterday, but I am not disposed to believe from what I now know, that the first important effort will be directed against Richmond. The Northern papers, particularly if they derive their information from official sources, as they profess, do not in all probability represent the real purpose of the Federal Government, but are used to create false impressions. The order of Genl Grant, closely considered, is not inconsistent with this idea. There was no apparent occasion for the publication at such a time and place of his intention to take up his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, and the announcement appears to me to be made with some hidden purpose. It will be remembered that Northern papers of the 14th instant represented Genl Grant as en route for Tennessee to arrange affairs there preparatory to assuming immediate command of the Army of the Potomac. What those arrangements were, we do not know, but if of sufficient moment to require Genl Grant s personal presence in the West just on the eve of his entering upon active duties with another army, it can not be probable that he had completed them by the time his order bears date, March 17th, especially as several of the few days intervening between his departure from Washington and the publication of the order, must have been consumed in travelling. The establishment of an office in Washington to which communications from other armies than that which Genl Grant accompanies shall be addressed, evidently leaves everything to go on under the direction of the former authorities as before, and allows no room for inferences as to whether any army will be active or not, merely from the fact of the presence of Genl Grant. There is to my mind an appearance of design about the order which makes it of a piece with the publications in the papers, intended to mislead us as to the enemy s intention, and if possible, induce corresponding preparation on our part. You will remember that a like ruse was practised at Vicksburg. Just before the Federal Army went down the river, the indications given out were such, that it was thought the attempt on Vicksburg would be abandoned, and that it was proper to reinforce Genl Bragg, whose army it was supposed would next be attacked. It is natural that the enemy should try to conceal the point which he intends to assail first, as he may suppose that our armies, being connected by shorter lines than his, can concentrate more rapidly. In confirmation of these views, I cannot learn that the army of Genl Meade has been reinforced by any organized troops, nor can I learn of any coming east over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad which I have ordered to be closely watched. A dispatch from Genl Imboden dated March 23rd states that it is reported that the enemy was moving troops westwards over that road all last week. The report is vague but if true, the troops referred to may be recruits, convalescents & furloughed men going to the corps from the east now serving in the west, or they may be reinforcements for the Army of Tennessee. I have reiterated my order about watching the road, and directed the rumor above mentioned to be carefully investigated. From present indications, I am inclined to believe that the first efforts of the enemy will be directed against Genl Johnston or Genl Longstreet, most probably the former. If it succeeds, Richmond will no doubt be attacked. The condition of the weather and the roads will probably be more favorable for active operations at an early day in the South than in Virginia where it will be uncertain for more than a month. Although we cannot do more than weigh probabilities, they are useful in stimulating and directing a vigilant observation of the enemy, and suggesting such a policy on our part as may determine his. His object can be ascertained with the greatest certainty by observing the movements of his armies closely. I would advise that we make the best preparations in our power to meet an advance in any quarter, but be careful not to suffer ourselves to be misled by feigned movements into strengthening one point at the expense of others, equally exposed and equally 1338 Milestone Documents of American Leaders

16 important. We should hold ourselves in constant readiness to concentrate as rapidly as possible wherever it may be necessary, but do nothing without reasonably certain information except prepare. This information I have already said, can be best obtained by unremitting vigilance in observing those armies that will most probably be active in the campaign, and I trust that Your Excellency will impress this fact, and the importance of energy, accuracy, and intelligence in collecting information upon all officers in a position to do so. Should a movement be made against Richmond in large force, its preparation will no doubt be indicated by the withdrawal of troops from other quarters, particularly the Atlantic coast and the West. The officers commanding in these regions should endeavor to get early and accurate information of such withdrawal. Should Genl Johnston or Genl Longstreet find the forces opposed to them reduced sufficiently to justify attacking them, they might entirely frustrate the enemy s plans by defeating him. Energy and activity on our part, with a constant readiness to seize any opportunity to strike a blow, will embarrass, if not entirely thwart the enemy in concentrating his different armies, and compel him to conform his movements to our own. If Genl Johnston could be put in a condition to operate successfully against the army opposed to him, he would effectually prevent a combination against Richmond. In the meantime, to guard against any contingency, everything not immediately required should be sent away from Richmond, and stores of food and other supplies collected in suitable and safe places for the use of the troops that it may become necessary to assemble for its defence. I beg to repeat that the utmost vigilance and circumspection, coupled with active and energetic preparation are of the first moment to us. With high respect, your obt servt R. E. LEE Genl Lee, Robert E. Glossary Army of the Potomac Genl Bragg Genl Grant Genl Imboden Genl Johnston Genl Longstreet Genl Meade instant Richmond Vicksburg the chief Union army in the eastern theater during the Civil War General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Confederacy s army in the western theater General Ulysses S. Grant, general of the army who became head of the Union forces in 1863; later eighteenth president of the United States General John Imboden, a Confederate cavalry commander General Joseph Johnston, a senior general in the Confederate army General James Longstreet, General Robert E. Lee s chief subordinate officer General George Meade, Union general who distinguished himself at the Battle of Gettysburg of this month capital city of Virginia and capital of the Confederacy during the Civil War a city in Mississippi, the site of a major campaign ( ) during the Civil War Milestone Documents of American Leaders 1339