SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Transcription

1 SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO: SC INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, RE: JUDITH W. HAWKINS NO MOTION FOR REHEARING I am respectfully moving for rehearing pursuant to rule 9.330(a) on the ground that the Court overlooked and, in some cases, misapprehended points of fact and law. POINTS OF FACT In its analysis section, the written opinion highlights my acknowledgement that I failed to pay Florida sales tax and to register the name of my ministry under the Florida fictitious name statute. (Op ). The opinion fails to address the Judicial Qualifications Commission Hearing Panel specific finding that I addressed both of these oversights by voluntarily paying the taxes and incorporating the business in a timely manner. (Report. 12). (Tr. 530). The written opinion focuses on my lack of candor during the investigation in failing to turn over subpoenaed material. (Op. 29). However, it was uncontested before the Hearing Panel that the requested material was turned over to the Judicial Qualifications Commission Investigative Panel within eight weeks. (Tr. 266). Further, the Hearing Panel s Report specifically found and made its finding clear 1

2 that the investigation had been provided with what was requested. (Report. 6); (Tr. 266). Contrary to the facts described in the opinion; I did file an objection stating that the Request to Produce was overbroad and outside the scope of the initial investigation. Following ruling on that objection, I surrendered the financial data requested. (Tr. 553). Regarding removing the Quicken program from my traveling ministry laptop, the opinion fails to consider the fact that when I appeared at the investigatory deposition in February 2013 I informed the Commission s counsel what I had done. I never claimed that my ministry laptop s Quicken program contained financial data. There was never evidence presented which would so indicate. Even the Commission s investigator testified that he believed the financial data had not been deleted. (Tr ). This diametrically contradicts Commission counsel s later position that I had engaged in the destruction of evidence. (Op. 24). The investigator later complained about the volume of original documents which were turned over. (Tr. 110). The Hearing Panel s Report makes it clear that the Commission received what was requested. Within eight weeks of the February deposition, the Commission had obtained the data which was sought. Any representation that I somehow destroyed evidence is contradicted by the Report which specifically finds otherwise. (Report. 6) 2

3 Much of the same material was requested through a contemporaneous request for production (Op. 31). This request allowed thirty days for objection. My counsel tendered an objection within the applicable time period. (Tr. 553). Following appropriate orders, the material was turned over. The Commission attempted, and failed, to show that I had not turned over requested material at the hearing. (Report. 6). The opinion misapprehends my statement regarding my flash drives. This is important because the opinion describes the statement as a misstatement of fact. (Report ) (Op. 19, 31). The existence and my use of flash drives was no secret since I disclosed the information at the deposition in February (Depo. 18). There was never any rational basis for me to then tell the Commission s agents in March 2013 that I did not possess the drives. Because I informed the commission s investigator and computer expert that anything on a flash drive was copied from the hard drive, I did not have any flash drives to surrender on the day they came to image the computers. (Tr ; 606-7). Within weeks I surrendered multiple flash drives to the Commission. (Tr. 119). However, the Commission s expert, who mirrored and inspected four computer hard drives, as well as multiple flash drives, did not testify that anything existed on any flash drive which did not also exist on one of the four examined hard drives. In addition, flash drives were requested which I did not possess, and 3

4 was unable to locate, as explained at the hearing. (Tr. 544). It is important for me to acknowledge that I could have avoided this confusion by meeting the Commission s agents with the flash drives in my possession. I want to make it clear that it was never my intent to conceal any flash drive from the Commission. Additionally, the opinion misapprehends my statements about the list of purchasers I kept for my ministry materials. (Op. 27). There was a list of persons to whom I had sold materials at events outside of Tallahassee. This list included the purchasers addresses because those purchasers used a payment method which provided mailing addresses. (Tr. 642, ). The list of out-of-town purchasers was reviewed by the Commission and deemed irrelevant to the investigation. (Tr. 119; 676). The opinion misapprehends my statement that I kept a fairly meticulous list of local purchasers. I kept a list of Tallahassee purchasers, most of whom I saw regularly. (Tr. 676; 109). The Commission acknowledged receiving that list. (Tr. 120). Because of my relationship with these purchasers, I only needed to jot down their first names. I submitted what I had. There was no attempt to mislead the Commission as to the local purchasers of my ministry materials. Lastly, the opinion claims that I failed to accept responsibility for my actions until my response to the second order to show cause as to why removal from office would not be appropriate. (Op. 24). As issues were raised by the Commission, I 4

5 made several corrective actions in order to promptly comply. This factual position overlooks my acceptance of significant sanctions in the form of a ninety-day suspension, reprimand, and a specified fine. (Op. 24). I believed that by posing no objection to a ninety-day professional suspension, a public reprimand, and a seventeen thousand dollar fine I was accepting responsibility, offering an apology, and acknowledging that the Hearing Panel found my actions improper. (Report ). I still do. Therefore, there was no need to file a detailed response. Thereafter, in response to this Court s second order to show cause, I identified and detailed multiple errors and shortcomings, as well as corrective actions, which had already been implemented. (Answer. 7-8). POINTS OF LAW Given the nature of the allegations against me, I humbly assert that the ordered removal is inequitable when compared to other cases such as In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2006); Inquiry Concerning Davey, 645 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1994) and In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2005). In those cases, jurists acted with personally selfish financial motives or in detriment to the citizens served. In this matter, I did not act with a selfish financial motive in mind. Neither before nor after the allegations and charges by the JQC Investigative Panel was there any evidence that the integrity of my rulings were unfair, unjust, or partial. This is not to say that I am attempting to justify the improper actions which the panel 5

6 determined warranted discipline. Indeed, I was fully prepared to accept the panel s recommended discipline without reservation. If the objective of the Commission s disciplinary proceedings is not the purpose of punishment but instead the gauging of a judge s fitness to serve as an impartial judicial officer, I humbly ask this Court to weigh the context and motives behind these violations against my judicial record. CONCLUSION In filing my earlier Answer, I made a statement about fighting the good fight. (Answer. 12). It is apparent to me that this Court construed that statement as a justification of the destruction of evidence. That statement was not a reference to, much less the justification of, destruction of evidence. The reference to the good fight was a reference to my objection to the Commission s intrusion into matters I felt were personal and irrelevant to the investigation. I employed the proper legal means to file that objection. In hindsight I should have been more clear about what I meant about fighting the good fight. I sincerely apologize to the Court for any misunderstanding. I am not standing before this Court in righteous indignation as if I did nothing wrong. Indeed I have. I accept full responsibility for improper acts as a county judge. Looking back at my tenure as a judge, I can say that the greatest opportunity enjoyed was to be a servant to the people of Leon County. I was privileged to 6

7 intersect with people at times when judicial concern and care could, would, and did make a difference in the choices they made going forward. This is especially true with the under-privileged and disadvantaged who appeared before me time and again. I approached my tenure as a judge motivated by principles of justice, fairness, and impartiality. I do not see the word "judge" as a noun; I see it as a verb and that motivated my solemn oath to the citizens of Leon County to ensure that justice considered the whole person. My judicial commitment is anchored in my Christian beliefs that demand that I, as a believer, extend to others mercy, grace, forgiveness, and restoration as has been given to me. I believe, being labeled as "the judge of second chances," confirms that I gladly accepted the opportunity and responsibility afforded to me as a judge who touched lives and changed hearts. WHEREFORE, I humbly request this Court issue an order granting rehearing pursuant to rule 9.330(a) and issue a revised opinion. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Judith W. Hawkins Judith W. Hawkins Fla. Bar ID

8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to: Gregory R. Miller grm@beggslane.com David L. McGee dlm@beggslane.com Michael L. Schneider mschneider@floridajqc.com Hon. James A. Ruth jruth@coj.net Hon. Charles A. Francis francisc@leoncoutyfl.gov Hon. Paul A. Backman Pback64040@aol.com Lori Walden Ross RossGirten@Laurilaw.com on this fourteenth (14th) day of November, /s/ Judith W. Hawkins Judith W. Hawkins Fla. Bar ID Leon County Courthouse 265A 301 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida jhawkins1@comcast.net 8