Enabling the Sin Machzek Yiday Ovray Aveira

Transcription

1 Enabling the Sin Machzek Yiday Ovray Aveira Note: This is the third essay in a series dealing with the issues of Lifnei E ver. It is assumed that the reader has seen the first two essays, Causing the Blind to Stumble and Supporting the Cause of Evil. Introduction We have discussed at length the notion of Lifnei E ver, both biblical and rabbinic. In the first essay of the series, Causing the Blind to Stumble, we discussed the biblical prohibition of Lifnei E ver both in terms of giving negative self-serving advice as well as helping another person sin when he could not have otherwise done so without that help. In both cases one is placing a stumbling block in the path of the other. He is either causing the fellow to stumble due to the malicious advice or stumble in a spiritual sense by falling into the abyss of sin. In the second essay of the series, Supporting the Cause of Evil, we discussed the rabbinic prohibition that kicks in when the biblical prohibition ends. We saw that even when the sinner could have accomplished his desired ends without our help, in which case there is no biblical prohibition, there is nevertheless often a rabbinic prohibition. This rabbinic prohibition is the subject of a great deal of discussion in the later Halachic authorities and we noted that it only applies under very specific circumstances. We saw that it only applies where we lend a hand to a person who is not fully aware of what he is doing or to someone who is in the process of doing the sin right now (or possibly a combination of these two). In this essay we will tie up some loose ends so as to round out our understanding of the prohibition of Lifnei E ver, and its parameters. Toward that end, we will discuss three separate but related issues; 1. Supplying the materials needed for wrongdoing, 2. Cheerleading for sin, and 3. Giving the sinner enough rope with which to hang himself We will start with the first and largest of these three issues; Enabling the sin by supplying the sinner with the goods.

2 Supplying the Necessary Materials The Background The Mishnayos in Shvi is: Supplying the would-be sinner with the materials he needs to progress with his wrongdoing, is the subject of some Mishnayos in Shvi is. Shvi is is the tractate that discusses the rules of the seventh year of the agricultural cycle. In the seventh year of the cycle, known as Shmita, active work in one s fields and orchards is prohibited. Furthermore, harvesting into one s storehouse whatever produce ends up growing, is prohibited. Rather, the produce is to be considered ownerless and everyone may take of it as they please. In the times of the Mishna, there were large groups of Jews who were not meticulous in the laws of Shmita. They worked their fields and harvested in their produce as in any other year, effectively violating a biblical command. The Mishna 1 therefore rules that one may not sell to such people in the 7 th year certain agricultural tools such as a plow or winnowing instrument. However, the Mishna goes on to allow certain other instruments that are not specifically associated with the sinful act of ignoring Shmita, such as a hand sickle or a wagon. In the case of the former instruments it is clear that their usage is for the violation of the rules of Shmita, whereas the latter form of permitted instruments are those which are very possibly being used for permitted activity. As the commentators there explain, a hand sickle is needed to harvest small amounts of food from the fields (a permitted activity), and a wagon is necessary to transport that small amount back to one s home. No such assumptions can be made in the case of the earlier instruments in that a plow is clearly used to till the soil (which is prohibited in Shmita) and the winnowing instrument spoken of was specifically used in one s granary (for large amounts of produce ostensibly to be stored in defiance of the laws of Shmita). Therefore, one was not permitted to sell those instruments during Shmita to those who were suspect in their Shmita observance. Later the Mishna 2 gives a more borderline case of selling a plowing ox during Shmita. Here it is very likely that the buyer wants it to work his field, therefore Bais Shamai forbid its sale. But Bais Hillel note that insofar as the buyer may desire this ox for its meat, and plans to slaughter it and not work it, it is permitted to sell it to him. In all these cases though, if the buyer specifically says why he is buying it, and that stated purpose is a violation of Shmita, then it is forbidden. Finally the last Mishna in that chapter 3 goes on to list some other cases which it says are permitted only due to the fact that were they not permitted it would lead to anger and animosity. Therefore the Mishna allows a woman to lend out her sieves, mortar and stove to her neighbor who is non-shmita observant. a The commentators note, that these items are permitted due to the fact that although they are almost certainly going to be used for forbidden produce, there is a slight chance that they are being borrowed for some permitted activity. That is, maybe the stove is being borrowed to dry flax, and maybe the sieve is being used for sand, and maybe the mortar is being used for plants used in dyes. Therefore, due to a One who hordes Shmita produce past the point where they are readily available in the fields ( Shas Biur ), effectively forbids that food in consumption. This Mishna is discussing the point at which the produce is no longer available in the fields and then the implements in question will most likely be used to produce forbidden food!

3 the fact that we want to keep the peace, no prohibition was placed on lending out such items. b This is admittedly a bit confusing. This last Mishna seems to allow the reliance on an assumption that the borrowed item is for permitted use, only in conjunction with the notion of keeping the peace. However, the earlier Mishnayos made no such mention of any requirement, and seemed to allow the sale of such items as a hand sickle (notwithstanding the possibility that it would be used in defiance of Shmita), even without the pressing mitigating factor of keeping the peace. Why in this last Mishna is that not the case? If there is a possible assumption of permitted usage (e.g. drying flax, grinding dyes etc.) why not permit these items outright without the notion of peace keeping? The Rishonim c explain 4 the difference between the last Mishna and the earlier ones as follows: The last Mishna is dealing with a woman who is known to not have any supply of last year s wheat, but rather only has this year s (now forbidden) wheat. Therefore, the likelihood that she is planning to use these borrowed implements for anything other than sinful activity is extremely low. In the case of the earlier Mishnayos, though, the assumed permitted usage is a normal usage and as such we need not worry that this individual is buying this item for a non-permitted usage. Therefore, in the earlier Mishnayos there was no need to discuss any extenuating circumstances of keeping the peace in that selling (or lending out) such items would be permitted even in circumstances that had nothing to do with keeping the peace. d In the case of the last Mishna, though, the assumption of permitted intentions is very weak and as such the lending of these items was only permitted due to the extenuating notion of peace keeping. How Do The Mishnayos Fit with Lifnei E ver? Now let us take what we have learned about Lifnei E ver and try and apply it to these Mishnayos. Why is it forbidden to lend or sell items like a plow or large-scale winnowing instrument? If we are to explain that we are dealing with a case where the seller is the only source of these implements, then the sinner needs the seller s help e. If that is the case then we are dealing with a possible biblical prohibition of Lifnei E ver. How then is it permitted to sell him such items as the hand-sickle? Normally we are very careful when dealing with a biblical prohibition and rule stringently even where the violation of that prohibition is doubtful ( Sofeik M dorysa L Chumra). Here too then we should have to assume that the sickle will be used to do a biblical prohibition!? If on the other hand we are to assume that the Mishna is dealing with a situation where there are non-jewish sources for such implements, in which case the sinner does not need this Jewish buyer s help, that would not make the Mishna any better! If, due to the availability of the item elsewhere, the prohibition being dealt with is a rabbinic one, then once again we will b However, the observant woman would not be allowed to work together with the non-observant woman if she indeed did end up using these items in there normal usage (which in the case of this produce is forbidden). c Translation: Rishonim Early (post talmudic) commentators d Even where not selling the item to the non-shmita observant fellow would not bring about animosity, it would nevertheless be permitted to engage in such a transaction. e I.e. Tray Avrah D Nahara

4 run into difficulty. We noted that the rabbinic prohibition is only violated at the time of the sin itself and/or if the individual is a Shogeg (unwitting violator). Here neither of these are the case; the sinner is willing and the sale of the item is taking place long before the forbidden activity will take place! The Mishna Rishona 5 is troubled by this dilemma and notes that the Mishna makes no mention of the availability of these items by any other seller. He therefore leans in the direction of assuming that the Mishna is dealing with the biblical issue of Lifnei E ver. In other words, we can assume from the fact that the Mishna made no distinctions that the cases it deals with include ones where this seller is the only one in town - and nevertheless the sale is permitted by such items as a hand sickle or wagon. Which brings us back to our original question; what happened to the possible biblical violation of Lifnei E ver? Solution #1: Defining a Stumbling Block The Mishna Rishona provides a possible solution. The biblical prohibition of Lifnei E ver is violated by giving a stumbling block to a sinner and thereby enabling his sin. There is a tacit understanding that the item being supplied is essentially a stumbling block. By virtue of the fact that hand-sickles and wagons have normal permitted usages, it is hard to label these items stumbling blocks. f Rav Moshe Feinstein also takes this approach and rules accordingly. 6 Thus, even when one is possibly enabling a sin to take place by providing the item necessary to accomplish the wrongdoing, he need not always assume that the one to whom he is selling (or lending) the item has sinful designs. If that were the case then one would never be able to lend or sell anything! What can t be used for sin!? You couldn t manufacture knives because maybe they would be used for murder. You could not lend someone a piece of paper because maybe they will use it to write G-d s name and then treat it disrespectfully! Each and every item has a theoretical use that would be a violation of some Torah precept. f The Mishna Rishona ends up rejecting this approach based on a Gemora in Avoda Zara (14a). The Gemora there discusses whether it is permitted to sell ritual incense to pagans before their holiday. The Gemora rules that if you sell a large amount then it is permitted in that large amounts are bought for business purposes (i.e. for resale in smaller amounts), and not for personal use. Even though, it is clear that the buyer will turn around and sell it to another pagan who will use it for idolatry nevertheless that is not the first seller s concern as the Gemora notes the Torah only forbids Lifnei E ver and not Lifnei d Lifnei (i.e. only enabling a sin about to take place, but not when it is two steps removed). The Mishna Rishona asks that if the assumption that the item may be used for permitted purposes takes it out of the realm of Lifnei E ver (i.e. it is not a stumbling block), then why did the Gemora not permit the sale of the incense based on that. Why did the Gemora have to rely on this idea of Lifnei d Lifnei as opposed to simply saying that the incense may end up just being sold for non-ritual use? [Therefore the Mishna Rishona himself rejects this approach and ends up saying that the idea that one violates Lifnei E ver by enabling a sin to take place is actually a rabbinic idea, and the biblical Lifnei E ver is only where one gives malicious advice. This though is very difficult because it seems clear from Rishonim that enabling a sin is indeed a biblical Lifnei E ver issue!] Rav Moshe, who sticks with this distinction that an item not necessarily used for Issur is not a stumbling block, notes that the question of the Mishna Rishona from the Gemora in Avoda Zara is not compelling. The idea of Lifnei d Lifnei is used elsewhere in Shas (see AZ 21a) and it is clearly an expression of sorts. The expression means that we need not look so far into the future and make unnecessary assumptions. Thus, what the Mishna Rishona wanted the Gemora to answer, i.e. that maybe the incense will not be used in pagan worship is in fact what it answered, according to Rav Moshe.

5 It is therefore understood that when we are dealing with the prohibition of Lifnei E ver that a line has to be drawn. The Mishnayos are teaching us that so long as there is a possible permitted usage of the item then no violation of the Lav of Lifnei E ver takes place because who is to say that this item is a stumbling block? However, where that possible permitted usage is a far-fetched assumption, then the rabbis forbade such a transaction from taking place unless there was a strong mitigating reason (e.g. keeping the peace). Discussion Point: You live in Chile and have a coffee bean plantation. You are the only source of coffee for 700 miles around. Your neighbor has a small cocaine operation going on. He wants to purchase 80 killo of coffee beans from you. Do you need to assume that he is going to use them as packing materials g for his cocaine? It is almost impossible that this fellow drinks that much coffee! It is pretty clear that he wants to use the beans for packing materials. There is always the possibility, though, that he wants to resell the coffee for a profit. If one has a good reason to sell to him, (e.g. keeping the peace, making a living, staying alive etc.), it may in fact be permitted notwithstanding the fact that no one else is available to sell him the beans. Solution #2: Balancing Different Concerns There is another, totally different approach to the Mishnayos in Shvi is, namely that of the Chazon Ish. 7 The Chazon Ish was also bothered with the issue of how the Mishna could allow the sale of a hand-sickle and the like when there is a possibility of sinful usage. What happened to Lifnei E ver and Sofeik M dorysa L chumra? It is clear that he assumes that even a questionable stumbling block is nevertheless a stumbling block. He then needs to propose a different solution. The solution he offers is very interesting. By definition we are dealing with a situation where the seller or lender is caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand there is the likely violation of the Halachos of Shmita, but on the other hand this individual is still a Jew for whom we are responsible to care for and support. In fact, if all such sales or lending were forbidden it would almost certainly lead to a situation of hatred and infighting. The prohibition of Lo Sisna h is no less of a prohibition than that of Shmita. So here the person is caught between two D orysa issues! Effectively, then, the sages are telling us that it is better to violate a possible Lifnei E ver than to create major rifts in the Jewish community. So long as there is even a minor chance that the item will be used for a permitted usage (e.g. an oven for flax), one should lend it out. However, the Chazon Ish agrees that if the prohibition of Lifnei E ver were clearly being violated (e.g. where there is no permitted assumed usage even far fetched), then one would indeed need to not sell the item notwithstanding the animosity that would cause. g I.e. to throw the dogs at customs off h Translation: Lo Sisna Do not hate (please see the essay on that subject, where this prohibition is explained at length).

6 Cheerleading the Sinner On Until this point we have been discussing the lending of support to wrongdoing in a very material way. We have been talking about enabling a sin to take place by way of supplying the necessary materials. What about other types of support? Can one give verbal encouragement? Can you cheerlead the sinner on in his endeavor? i You are driving together with your friend, who is fully aware of the rules of Kashrus but nevertheless feels they are not for him. He is in the drivers seat and pulls up to the drive through window at the local Burger King. He orders a burger and fries, and proceeds to eat them. Are you allowed to say, Enjoy? Your cousin, who is not Shabbos observant, drops by your house and tells you about this big business meeting he is going to have at work over the weekend. The big meeting will take place on Saturday (Shabbos!) and will very much define the future of the company. You tell him, Good luck! Is that permitted? The Gemora in Gittin 8 notes that one may wish good luck to a non-jew who is working his land during Shmita in that for him such work is permitted. The obvious implication though is that if the worker were a Jew, it would be wrong to wish him luck. The Magen Avrohom 9 rules that although it is good manors to wish a person engaged in work Hatzlacha j, we may not do so when the activity they are engaged in is wrong. This is called, Machzeken Yedai Ovray Aveira k and is forbidden. To tell your friend who is eating the burger, Enjoy, or to wish your cousin good luck with the business deal on Shabbos, is a violation of this imperative. Giving Him Enough Rope With Which to Hang Himself So we have seen that we may not lend the sinner any support be it in providing him the material means with which to do the sin, or be it even a word of encouragement. We are to steer clear of participating in any way in sinful activity even in a peripheral auxiliary function. Ostensibly, then, we should do the opposite. We should seek to minimize the sin of the person bent on doing what is wrong. Or should we? The Mishna in Ma aser Sheni 10 describes how one should mark the different trees or vines in his orchard so as to show that they are either Orlah or Kerem Revai. That is, a tree in its first three years of planting is known as Orlah, and its fruit is forbidden in any and all benefit. During the forth year the produce is permitted to eat, but only in the holy city of i It should be noted that we are not discussing the issue of Chanufa (flattery) which is a different type of verbal support altogether. Chanufa is done when one communicates to a sinner that his actions are not at all incorrect. Here we are discussing a situation where no implication is given that the action being done is good, rather even though all present know that it is bad can one then go ahead and give encouragement? [For more on the prohibition of Chanufa, please see the Linas HaTzedek Essay entitled, Flattery Will Get You Nowhere! ] j Translation: Hatzlacha Good luck or Success k Translation: Machzeken Yedai Ovray Aveira Supporting the hand of those who transgress

7 Yerushalyim. l This forth year produce is known as Kerem Revai m. Since the fruit of these trees are forbidden to eat n, the trees must be marked so that no one comes to eat from them. Toward that end, the Mishna tells us that a tree of Kerem Revai is marked by putting large clumps of dirt around its base while a tree of Orlah is marked by placing clay around its base. The next part of the Mishna is the part we need to focus on. The Mishna brings the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel to the affect that this marking was only necessary during Shmita. o The Gemora in Bava Kama 11 explains Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel s statement as follows: Since during Shmita all are permitted to eat of the fruit, there needs to be some recognizable mark placed on forbidden trees. During the rest of the year, though, there would be no need to mark the trees. That is, even though people may (and do) walk by and grab a fruit off this tree there is no need to minimize their transgression and mark this tree. If they are stealing your fruit, you are not supposed to try and make sure that they don t steal from this tree because it is Orlah or Kerem Revai. In the words of the Gemora: Haleetayhu LeRasha V Yamos! Feed it to the wicked and let him die! Our attitude toward those who are engaged in iniquity is not to attempt to minimize their transgression. Rather, our attitude should be toward moving them in a direction where they abandon the sin altogether. In the early 1900s, many Jews who had immigrated to the United States had succumbed to the overwhelming pressure to work on Shabbos, so as to be able to hold down a job. They had originally been Shabbos observant, but when they arrived on the shores of the US they abandoned that observance because it was no longer convenient. Many such individuals approached Rav Moshe Feinstein asking for his advice as to how to avoid doing major transgressions at the work place of Shabbos. He refused to discuss the issue. Rav Moshe was a lighthouse who lit up the entire Lower East Side of Manhattan with his warmth and Torah. He was personally responsible for increasing the level of observance and adherence to Torah values of that community in particular and, in a broader sense, all of American Jewry. Nevertheless, when it came to this issue of those who knew they were doing the wrong thing and nevertheless wanted his help to minimize their transgression he took a strong stand. Haleetayhu LeRasha V Yamos! Similarly the Tzitz Eliezer 12 ruled that if an old-time Israeli who was well aware of Shabbos and the severity of its transgression p - were to drive by an observant person walking down the street on Shabbos and ask for directions, the observant fellow would be forbidden to offer those directions. Even though by giving the directions to this driver, one would l Alternatively the forth year fruit can be redeemed and that money can be brought to Yerushalyim and used to purchase food there. m Kerem Revai technically refers to a grape vine in its forth year. All other fruit trees in there forth year and the need to bring them to Yerushalyim is the subject of a Machlokes in the Gemora (Brachos 35a). The Rambam rules like the opinion that there is indeed a notion of Revai by other fruit trees as well. In the case of other fruit trees the term used is Neta Revai but the Halachos are the same as by grape vines (Kerem Revai). n (in the case of Kerem Revai forbidden to eat here) o The Halacha follows this statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel (Rambam Hilchos Ma aser Sheni 9:7) p The earlier Israeli generation who came over from Europe made a conscious decision to drop the Torah values and traditions of their youth and sought to make Israel over in their image. They fought tooth and nail to create a totally secular society on a larger scale, and in their own personal lives they chose the same path.

8 effectively get him to his destination quicker and thereby minimize the violation of Shabbos it is nevertheless forbidden. Haleetayhu LeRasha V Yamos! Conclusion By this point we have seen a great deal regarding the prohibition of Lifnei E ver and its various corollaries. We have noted the biblical prohibition of assisting a would-be sinner in a way that enables him to do his sin when he otherwise would be unable to do so. We saw in this essay that the providing of the necessary materials to sin would be very much contingent on the item and the situation. Not every item can be categorized as an item of sin just because there is a chance that it will be used in some wrongdoing. It all depends on the item and the situation. Will the item necessarily be used for wrongdoing or is there a good chance that he wants it for some innocent purpose? Even when the innocent purpose is a long shot we have to continue to delve and ask whether withholding this help will lead to animosity. In the words of the Chazon Ish, creating a situation of rampant violation of the notion of not hating our fellow Jew is not a lesser evil than the sin of Lifnei E ver in something like Shmita observance. The sages therefore made very clear lines that were contingent on the situation and the balance necessary due to the gravity of both sides of the issue at hand. Furthermore we saw that lending verbal or emotional encouragement to a sinner is also prohibited. Thus not only is the providing of material aid to wrongdoing disallowed, but so is a simple word of support. Notwithstanding the need to steer clear of wrongdoing and the providing of assistance in any way, at the other extreme we are told that we must not work to minimize the severity of the act of the willful transgressor. Haleetayhu LeRasha V Yamos! It is clear that our attitude toward our fellow Jew should be one of lending a helping hand. When our fellow Jew sinks into the abyss of wrongdoing we are to work toward the end of setting him back on his feet. It is clear that we must not make the descent into that abyss any easier by pushing him further and further into it. Nor may we allow him to stay in that abyss and just make it slightly less horrific. We have to get him out. The world has enough darkness. Our job is to do our utmost to not only not add to that darkness but to be a beacon of light. Our own lives should be lived in such a way that those who witness it will be driven to move away from that which is inimical to Torah values and be moved toward greater and greater spiritual heights.

9 Sources 1 Shvi is 5:6 2 ibid 5:8 3 ibid 5:9 4 See Rash to Mishna 9. See Tosfos to Gittin (61a sv Masheles) who says the same idea more succinctly. 5 To Mishna 6 The Mishna Rishona is a relatively recent commentary written by HaRav Ephraim Isa ac. 6 YD vol 1 #72 [We saw the first part of this responsa in the previous essay ( Supporting the Cause of Sin ), where Rav Moshe wanted to allow the rental of a wedding hall notwithstanding the fact that it would be used for mixed dancing. Now with this logic of a permitted usage redefining something as not being a stumbling block, he wants to say that even if there is no other wedding hall in town there would still not be a problem renting this one out. A wedding hall is made for permitted usage i.e. getting married and eating. Mixed dancing is a usage that these people chose to make, and is not an intrinsic assumed usage.] 7 To Shvi is #12 par. # 9 sv V Nira 8 62a 9 OC 347 #4 10 5: a 12 Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg vol 15 #18