Perek III Daf 58 Amud b

Transcription

1 Perek III Daf 58 Amud b מתני ה א ומ ר ל ח ב יר ו צ א ו ק ד ש ל י א ש ה פ ל ונ ית, ו ה ל ך ו ק ד ש ה ל ע צ מ ו מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י. ו כ ן ה א ומ ר ל א ש ה ה ר י א ת מ קו ד ש ת ל י ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים י ום ו ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה ב ת וך ש ל ש ים י ום מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י, ב ת י ש ר א ל ל כ ה ן ת אכ ל ב ת רו מ ה. מ ע כ ש יו ו ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים י ום, ו ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה ב ת וך ש ל ש ים י ום מ קו ד ש ת ו א ינ ה מ קו ד ש ת. ב ת י ש ר א ל ל כ ה ן א ו ב ת כ ה ן ל י ש ר א ל ל א ת אכ ל ב ת ר ו מ ה. גמ ה א ומ ר ל ח ב יר ו: צ א ו ק ד ש. ת נ א: מ ה ש ע ש ה ע ש ו י, א ל א ש נ ה ג ב ו מ נ ה ג ר מ או ת. ו ת נ א ד יד ן, ה ל ך נ מ י ד ק ת נ י ה ל ך ב ר מ או ת. מ אי ש נ א ה כ א ד ק ת נ י ה א ומ ר ל ח ב י ר ו With regard to one man who says to another: mishna Go and betroth h so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second n man. And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: n You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, h and another man came and betrothed her n within those thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man. This is a full-fledged betrothal, so that if she is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest, she may partake of teruma. b If the first man said to the woman: You are hereby betrothed to me from now, and only after thirty days h shall the betrothal take effect, and another man came and betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed to each of them. Consequently, if she was the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest, or the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. Since her betrothal is uncertain, the daughter of a non-priest cannot be considered the wife of a priest, and similarly a priest s daughter who is doubtfully married to an Israelite loses her right to partake of teruma as the daughter of a priest. The mishna teaches that in the case of one gemara man who says to another: Go and betroth so-and-so to me, and the latter went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man. A tanna taught concerning this issue: What he did is done; it is effective and the woman is betrothed to the second man, but he has treated him, i.e., the first man, in a deceitful manner, h and it is prohibited to act in this fashion. The Gemara explains: And the tanna of our mishna, when he teaches the apparently superfluous term: Went, also indicates that he went and acted deceitfully. The Gemara asks a question concerning the language of the mishna: What is different here that the mishna teaches: With regard to one man who says to another, ה א ומ ר etc. One who says to another, go and betroth, If one appoints an agent to betroth :ל ח ב יר ו צ א ו ק ד ש וכו a woman to him and the agent went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the agent, provided that he betrothed her using his own money (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 9:17; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 35:9). You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, etc. If one betroths a :ה ר י א ת מ קו ד ש ת ל י ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים י ום וכו woman by saying: You are hereby betrothed to me after thirty days, and someone else came and betrothed her within those thirty days, she is fully betrothed to the second man. The Rema, citing the Tur, claims that if the second man died or divorced her within the thirty-day period, the betrothal of the first one can take effect. The Rosh and the Rashba maintain that the betrothal of the first man is entirely nullified (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:11; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:2). מ ע כ ש י ו ו ל א ח ר ש ל ש י ם days From now and after thirty If one betroths a woman by saying: You are hereby :י ום betrothed to me from now and after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within those thirty days, it is uncertain which betrothal takes effect, and they must each give her a bill of divorce. If one of the men divorces her, some authorities say she is permitted to the other (Perisha; Taz, inferred from Tur), whereas the Maharshal rules stringently and deems her forbidden to both of them regardless (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:12; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:3). א ל א manner But he has treated him in a deceitful If one appoints an agent to betroth :ש נ ה ג ב ו מ נ ה ג ר מ או ת a woman to him, and the agent went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the agent. Nevertheless, it is prohibited to do so, and one who acts in this manner is referred to as wicked (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 9:17; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 35:9). background She may partake of teruma אכ ל ב ת רו מ ה :ת By Torah law, non-priests are usually not permitted to eat teruma. In certain cases, relatives or dependents of priests may eat teruma, even though they themselves are not priests. In these cases, the adult priest confers the right to partake of teruma upon his wife, children, slaves, and animals. Betrothed to the second ש ת ל ש נ י :מ קו ד Many early commentaries ask: Isn t it obvious that she is betrothed to the second man? Some suggest that in fact this clause of the mishna is not needed, and it is stated only as an introduction to the subsequent cases that do teach a novelty (Ramban). Others explain that it is referring to one who initially told the woman that he was acting as the other man s agent, and only subsequently informed her that she is betrothed to him. One might have thought that in this situation he meant to betroth her to the man who sent him, and therefore the mishna explicitly states that this is not the case (Tosafot). There are those who explain the novelty of this case in light of the verse: The remnant of Israel will not do iniquity nor speak lies (Zephaniah 3:13), as one might have thought that the agent merely intended to play a joke on the first man, and did not actually intend to betroth her himself (Rid). Therefore, the mishna needs to rule that he did betroth her. Alternatively, the Ramban suggests that the mishna teaches that one does not say that had she known that he was sent by another she would not have accepted his betrothal. Yet others suggest that the novelty is that the Sages did not deem the betrothal invalid, despite the fact that the agent acted improperly. ו כ ן ה א ומ ר ל א ש ה etc. And similarly, one who says to a woman, indi- The commentaries note that the phrase: And similarly, :וכו cates that in this case too, as in the first one, the second man acted improperly by betrothing the woman himself (Maharshal). ו ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה etc. And another came and betrothed her, be- Since the mishna does not state explicitly: She is not :וכו trothed to the first one, some commentaries infer that although the betrothal of the second man is perfectly valid, the first person s action is not nullified entirely. Rather, his betrothal cannot take effect because she is already betrothed to someone else. The practical implication of this inference is that if the second man dies or divorces the woman within the thirty-day period, the betrothal of the first man would take effect at the end of thirty days as initially stipulated (Ramban). It is explicitly stated in the Jerusalem Talmud that this is the case. Others reject this opinion and maintain that there is disagreement between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud with regard to this matter (Rashba).. Kiddushin. Perek III. 58b 323 ג קרפ :חנ ףד

2 Perek III Daf 59 Amud a ל א י ה ב ו ה son They would not give her to the If a woman was unwilling to betroth herself :נ יה ל יה to the one who appointed an agent to betroth her to him, and the agent instead betroths her to himself, he is not considered to have acted in the manner of a scoundrel, as indicated by the incident involving Ravin the Pious. The later commentaries discuss the obligation of the agent to inform the one who appointed him (Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 35:10 and Taz there). ב א ג א ד א ל י מ י men In a valley inhabited by violent : If one gave money to another to purchase an ה ו ה ל י ה item on his behalf, and the agent went and bought the same item for himself with his own money, what is done is done, but he is considered a scoundrel. If the agent knew that the seller respected him or was fond of him and would sell the item only to him and not to the one who appointed him, he is permitted to acquire it for himself, provided that he informs the one who appointed him. If the agent is concerned that in the time it takes to inform him he might be preempted by another, he may purchase it first and afterward inform the one who appointed him, as indicated by the incident involving Rav (Rambam Sefer Kinyan, Hilkhot Mekhira 7:10 11; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 183:2). ו מ אי ש נ א ה ת ם ד ק ת נ י ה א ומ ר ל ש לו ח ו? ה כ א ר ב ו ת א ק א מ ש מ ע ל ן, ו ה ת ם ר ב ו ת א ק א מ ש מ ע ל ן. ה כ א ר בו ת א ק א מ ש מ ע ל ן: ד א י ת נ א ש לו ח ו ה ו ה א מ ינ א: ש לו ח ו הו א ד ה ו י ר מ אי, ד ס מ כ ה ד ע ת יה, ס ב ר: ע ב ד ל י ש ל יחו ת י, א ב ל ח ב יר ו, ד ל א ס מ כ ה ד ע ת יה א ימ א ל א ל יה ו י ר מ אי. ה ת ם ר בו ת א ק א מ ש מ ע ל ן: ד א י ת נ א ה א ומ ר ל ח ב יר ו ה ו ה א מ ינ א: ח ב יר ו הו א ד כ י ק ד ש ה ב מ ק ום א ח ר א ינ ה מ קו ד ש ת, ד ס ב ר: ל א ט ר ח, א ב ל ש לו ח ו ד ט ר ח א ימ א: מ ר א ה מ ק ום הו א ל ו. ק א מ ש מ ע ל ן. ר ב ין ח ס יד א א ז יל ל ק ד ו ש י ל יה א ית ת א ל ב ר יה, ק יד ש ה ל נ פ ש יה. ו ה ת נ י א: מ ה ש ע ש ה ע ש ו י א ל א ש נ ה ג ב ו מ נ ה ג ר מ או ת! ל א י ה בו ה נ יה ל יה. א יב ע י ל יה ל א ודו ע י. ס ב ר: א ד ה כ י ו ה כ י א ת א א ינ יש א ח ר ינ א, מ ק ד ש ל ה. ר ב ה ב ר ב ר ח נ ה י ה יב ל יה זו ז י ל ר ב, א מ ר: ז ב נ ה נ יה ל י ל ה אי א ר ע א. א ז ל ז ב נ ה ל נ פ ש יה. ו ה ת נ י א: מ ה ש ע ש ה ע ש ו י א ל א ש נ ה ג ב ו מ נ ה ג ר מ או ת! ב אג א ד א ל ימ י ה ו ה ל יה. ל ר ב נ ה ג י ב יה כ ב וד, ל ר ב ה ב ר ב ר ח נ ה ל א נ ה ג י ב יה כ ב וד. א יב ע י ל יה ל א ודו ע י! ס ב ר: א ד ה כ י ו ה כ י א ת א א ינ יש א ח ר ינ א ז ב ין ל ה. and what is different there, in the previous chapter (50a), that the tanna teaches: With regard to one who says to his agent, go and betroth a certain woman for me in such and such a place, and he went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed? Why does the mishna there label him an agent, and here it labels him simply another? The Gemara answers: Here the mishna teaches us a novel element and there it teaches us a novel element, through its use of these terms. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: His agent, I would say that it is his agent who is considered a scoundrel in that case, as one who sends an agent relies upon him, thinking: He will perform my agency for me, since he was sent for that purpose. But with regard to the use of the term: Another, who was not appointed and upon whom he does not rely, as he is not his agent, you might say that he should not be considered a scoundrel. Similarly, the mishna there teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: One who says to another, I would say that it is in the case of another that she is not betrothed if he betrothed her in a different place, as he thinks that this person would not go to the trouble of looking for her elsewhere, and therefore he authorized him to betroth the woman only in that particular place. But with regard to his agent, who is assumed to take special trouble to fulfill his agency, you might say he is merely showing him the place where she is likely to be found, and she is betrothed in any case. The mishna therefore teaches us that even when he appointed an agent she is not betrothed if he does not find her in the place the putative husband specified. The Gemara relates: Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn t it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? How could a pious individual act in this fashion? The Gemara answers: The woman s family would not give her to the son, h and agreed only to let her marry the father. The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her. The Gemara relates a similar story: Rabba bar bar Ĥana gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. n The Gemara asks: But isn t it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? The Gemara answers: The land was located in a valley inhabited by violent men, h who treated Rav with respect and were prepared to sell the land to him, but who did not treat Rabba bar bar Ĥana with respect. As in the case of Ravin, the Gemara questions this behavior: Nevertheless, Rav should have informed him. The Gemara responds that Rav thought: In the meantime someone else will come and purchase the land. ג קרפ.טנ ףד. 59a 324 Kiddushin. perek III. Purchased it for himself ז ב נ ה ל נ פ ש י ה : The ge onim note that the ruling of this Gemara, that the land was acquired by Rav, seems to contradict the ruling of the Jerusalem Talmud that even if the agent acquires the land for himself, it belongs to the one who appointed him. Some explain that in this case, Rav used his own money to purchase the land, whereas in the Jerusalem Talmud a case is discussed where the money of the one who appointed the agent was used. Likewise, in the case of betrothal, Ravin the Pious used his own money (Rambam). Alternatively, this Gemara is referring to even a case where Rav used the money of the one who appointed him, but that person had owed him an equivalent sum. The difference between the cases is that here, Rav stated that he was acquiring the land for himself, and in the Jerusalem Talmud the agent did not state on whose behalf he is acquiring the land (Ritva).

3 ר ב ג יד ל ה ו ה מ ה פ יך ב ה ה יא א ר ע א. א ז ל ר ב י א ב א ז ב נ ה. א ז ל ר ב ג יד ל ק ב ל יה ל ר ב י ז יר א. א ז ל ר ב י ז יר א ו ק ב ל יה ל ר ב י צ ח ק נ פ ח א. א מ ר ל יה : ה מ ת ן ע ד ש י ע ל ה א צ ל נו ל ר ג ל. כ י ס ל יק, א ש כ ח יה, א מ ר ל יה : ע נ י מ ה פ ך ב ח ר ר ה ו ב א א ח ר ו נ ט ל ה ה י מ נ ו, מ א י? א מ ר ל יה : נ ק ר א ר ש ע. ו א ל א מ ר מ אי ט ע מ א ע ב ד ה כ י? א מ ר ל יה : ל א ה ו ה י ד ע נ א. ה ש ת א נ מ י נ ית ב ה נ יה ל יה מ ר! א מ ר ל יה : ז ב ו נ י ל א מ ז ב נ ינ א ל ה, ד א ר ע א ק מ י ית א ה יא, ו ל א מ ס מ נ א מ יל ת א. א י ב ע י ב מ ת נ ה נ יש ק ל יה. ר ב ג יד ל ל א נ ח ית ל ה ד כ ת יב: ו ש ונ א מ ת נ ת י ח י ה. ר ב י א ב א ל א נ ח ית ל ה מ ש ו ם ד ה פ יך ב ה ר ב ג יד ל. ל א מ ר נ ח ית ל ה, ו ל א מ ר נ ח ית ל ה, ו מ ית ק ר י א א ר ע א ד ר ב נ ן. ו כ ן ה א ומ ר ל א ש ה ה ת ק ד ש י ל י כו. ל א ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה ב ת וך ש ל ש ים, מ הו? ר ב ו ש מו א ל ד א מ ר י ת ר ו י יהו : מ קו ד ש ת, ו א ף ע ל פ י ש נ ת א כ לו ה מ ע ות. מ אי ט ע מ א? ה נ י זו ז י ל א ל מ ל ו ה ד מו, ו ל א ל פ ק ד ו ן ד מ ו. The Gemara further relates: Rav Giddel p was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzĥak Nappaĥa. Rav Yitzĥak Nappaĥa said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, n when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitzĥak Nappaĥa found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf nh of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the? Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitzĥak Nappaĥa replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land. Rabbi Yitzĥak Nappaĥa retorted: Now too, the Master should give it to him, since you have been made aware that he submitted the first offer. Rabbi Abba said to him: As for selling, I will not sell it, as it is the first land I have ever purchased, and this matter of selling one s first acquisition is not a good omen. If he wants to accept it as a gift, let him take it. Rav Giddel did not descend to claim this plot of land, as it is written: But he who hates gifts shall live (Proverbs 15:27), h and therefore he did not wish to accept the land as a gift. Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel was already engaging in the acquisition of it when he acquired the land. In this manner, this Sage did not descend to take the plot of land, and that Sage did not descend to take care of it, and it was called the land of the Sages. n The mishna teaches: And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within this period, she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara asks: In a case where another did not come and betroth her within the thirty days, what is the? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed after thirty days, even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been used h before the end of this period, as the betrothal takes effect from when the money is given. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that she is betrothed despite the lack of money at the end of the thirty days? The Gemara explains that these dinars given for her betrothal are not comparable to a loan, n nor are they comparable to a deposit that was transferred into her possession and subsequently lost. In both of these cases she would not be betrothed. Personalities Rav Giddel ר ב ג י ד ל : Rav Giddel was a secondgeneration amora who lived in both Babylonia and Eretz Yisrael. Before he ascended to Eretz Yisrael his primary teacher was Rav, in whose name he cites many statements. Upon Rav s death, he learned for a time in Rav Huna s study hall. It is possible that Rav Giddel studied under Rabbi Yoĥanan when he came to Eretz Yisrael, along with many of Rav s and Rav Huna s students. The incident related here apparently occurred in Eretz Yisrael. Little is known of Rav Giddel s life, but this episode suggests that he dealt in real estate, although he was not wealthy. He likely died childless. A pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf : If one is engaged in the purchase or ע נ י מ ה פ ך ב ח ר ר ה rental of land or movable property and another comes and buys it, the second person is called wicked and is declared as such in the synagogue. According to the Beit Yosef, this applies only if the one who appointed him has agreed on certain terms with the seller, but if they have yet to agree on a price another person may purchase it. The same applies to one who offers to perform a paid service, thereby replacing one who had that position. Some say that one may take ownerless property or an item offered for free that another is engaged in acquiring without being called wicked, as such items are unavailable elsewhere and therefore are considered like lost property (Tosafot; Rosh; Rema). Rashi and others contend that it is prohibited even in these circumstances (Rambam Sefer Kinyan, Hilkhot Mekhira 7:10 11; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 237:1). He who hates gifts shall live ונ א מ ת נ ת י ח י ה :ש One attribute of pious individuals is that they do not accept gifts. Rather, one should trust in God to provide him with all he lacks, as taught by Rav Giddel (Rambam Sefer Kinyan, Hilkhot Zekhiya 12:17; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 249:5). א ף ע ל פ י ש נ ת א כ לו used Even if the money has been : If one betroths a woman while stipulating ה מ ע ו ת that the betrothal should apply after thirty days, the betrothal takes effect after the thirty days even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been spent, as stated by Rav and Shmuel. The Rema, as well as the Ran and Mishne LaMelekh, who cite Rashba, maintain that if he betrothed her via a document worth less than one peruta that was torn or lost before the thirty days have passed, she is not betrothed (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:10; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:1). ש י ע ל ה א צ ל נ ו Festival Ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage : Rashi explains that Rabbi Abba would ascend with other ל ר ג ל scholars to hear the Festival sermon and greet their rabbis. Although it is a mitzva to undertake a special pilgrimage to greet one s rabbi on a Festival, Rav Yitzĥak Nappaĥa was apparently not Rabbi Abba s primary teacher, as indicated by the fact that Rav Yitzĥak Nappaĥa called him Master. Consequently, Rabbi Abba would not have come for that purpose alone. ע נ י מ ה פ ך loaf A pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a : The commentaries point out that this parable was not ב ח ר ר ה mentioned in the previous incident involving Rav because that case included an intermediary, i.e., the agent (Sefer HaMikna). Rashi explains that the example given by the Gemara here is referring to a pauper who has found a loaf of bread and is moving it to lift it up and thereby acquire it, at which point someone else snatches it from him. Others maintain that this does not apply to ownerless property, as the first one to find an ownerless article has no greater right to it than another (Rabbeinu Tam). Most early commentaries agree that this does not apply to ownerless or lost property, as there is no reason for the second person to refrain from the opportunity to acquire an item at no cost. Instead, Rabbeinu Tam explains that it refers to one attempting to purchase a loaf. In this case, the interloper is criticized, as he presumably could find a different loaf to purchase. With regard to the comment that one who acts this way is called wicked, some contend that this is based on the exposition of the verse: He has defiled his neighbor s wife (Ezekiel 18:11), and is referring to one who infringes upon his neighbor s trade. In chapter 18 of the book of Ezekiel, this individual is labeled as wicked (Maharit). Land of the Sages א ר ע א ד ר ב נ ן : Some commentaries explain that while this plot of land was not declared ownerless, it was left vacant to be used as a strolling area for the Sages (Meiri). Not comparable to a loan, etc. ל א ל מ ל ו ה ד מ ו ו כ ו : The question the Gemara is addressing is how the betrothal can come into effect after thirty days if the money is no longer extant. With what exactly is the woman betrothed? The Gemara answers that the betrothal money is not similar to a loan, as a loan is given to be spent and therefore is unfit for use in a betrothal even if she retains the money. It is also not comparable to a deposit, which can be used for betrothing a woman only if at least one peruta remains. Rather, since he gave her the money for her own use, the value of the benefit she has derived from it and the fact that she is not required to return it are worth one peruta when the betrothal comes into effect (Rashba). The commentaries write that if the betrothal was in the form of a document that was subsequently lost she is not betrothed, as in that case there is nothing available for her to betroth herself with at the time the betrothal is meant to take effect (Ramban; Rashba). This is likewise indicated in the Jerusalem Talmud. Others suggest it is possible that the betrothal in fact applies from the moment it is given, although it comes into practical effect only at the stipulated time (Meiri). If this is the case, she would be betrothed even if he used a document. There is a lengthy discussion in the Jerusalem Talmud with regard to the relationship between this and transactions and consecrations performed under similar conditions.. Kiddushin. Perek III. 59a 325 ג קרפ.טנ ףד

4 If another did not come and betroth her, and she :ל א ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה ו ח ז ר ה ב ה consent retracted her If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that the betrothal should take effect after thirty days, and either of them retracts their consent during this period, the betrothal is nullified. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:10; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:1). If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma ם ע ד ש ל א ת ר ם ב יט ל :א In the case of one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency before the agent carried out the task, if the agent deviated from the initial instructions, e.g., he was instructed to separate teruma from the north of the heap and he separated from the south, his separation of teruma is not considered teruma. If he followed the initial instructions, his separation of teruma is teruma. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Jerusalem Talmud. Some authorities hold that the Jerusalem Talmud rules in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, while the Babylonian Talmud rules in accordance with Rabbi Yoĥanan s opinion. Accordingly, once the owner canceled the agency, the agent does not have the ability to separate teruma in any manner (Rambam Sefer Zera im, Hilkhot Terumot 4:9 and Kesef Mishne there; Shulĥan Arukh, Yoreh De a 331:36). ה ש ו ל ח etc. One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, If a man sends a bill of divorce to his wife via :ג ט ל א ש ת ו וכו an agent, and he subsequently nullifies it either by issuing a declaration to this effect or by sending another agent after the first, the bill of divorce is nullified. Once the bill of divorce has reached the wife s domain the husband can no longer nullify it (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Geirushin 6:16; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 141:59). Vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by ה כ ל ים י ור ד ין ל יד י טו מ א ת ן ב מ ח ש ב ה etc. means of thought, contract- All vessels attain a state of susceptibility to :וכו ing ritual impurity, i.e., are considered to be completed vessels, by means of thought. They can lose their status as completed vessels only if some actual adjustment is made to them. This adjustment would nullify the earlier thought and action completing the vessel, whereas a thought to no longer use it as a vessel cannot negate an action or a previous thought that it is a completed vessel (Rambam Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Kelim 8:10). And she retracted her consent, what is the The commentaries ask: Does this dispute :ו ח ז ר ה ב ה מ הו apply only if she retracted her consent, or do the amora im also disagree over whether the man can retract his betrothal (Tosefot Tukh)? Some maintain that the same dispute applies in either case (Tosefot HaRosh). Others claim that the man can certainly retract his betrothal, as the whole point of the stipulation was to give himself time to change his mind if he so chooses (Rabbeinu Yehonatan of Lunel; Meiri). The commentaries further ask: How can Reish Lakish say that she cannot retract her consent? If she can accept betrothal from another man during this period she can certainly change her mind concerning the first betrothal. They answer that her acceptance of betrothal from someone else is an action, which can nullify her earlier statement, in contrast to retraction of consent, which is verbal (Talmid HaRashba). ה כ ל י ם etc. Vessels descend into their ritual impurity, Rashi cites the example of vessels :י ור ד ין ל יד י טו מ א ת ן וכו that have not been entirely finished. Although crude vessels do not contract ritual impurity, one can decide that a particular vessel is complete and requires no further work. An alternative example of this principle is a ring adorning an animal, which is not normally susceptible to contracting ritual impurity. If the owner decides the ring will now be used by a person, this decision renders the ring susceptible to contracting impurity (Rambam). ל פ ק ד ון ל א ד מו פ ק ד ון ב ר ש ו ת א ד מ ר א ק א מ ת א כ ל י, ו ה נ י ב ר ש ו ת א ד יד ה ק א מ ת א כ ל י. ל מ ל ו ה נ מ י ל א ד מו מ ל ו ה ל ה וצ א ה נ ית נ ה, ה נ י ב ת ור ת ק יד ו ש ין י ה ב ינ הו נ יה ל ה. ל א ב א א ח ר ו ק יד ש ה ו ח ז ר ה ב ה, מ הו? ר ב י י וח נ ן א מ ר: ח וז ר ת, א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד יב ו ר. ר יש ל ק יש א מ ר: א ינ ה ח וז ר ת, ל א א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד יב ו ר. א ית יב יה ר ב י י וח נ ן ל ר יש ל ק יש : ב יט ל, א ם ע ד ש ל א ת ר ם ב יט ל א ין ת רו מ ת ו ת רו מ ה. ו ה א ה כ א, ד ד יב ו ר ו ד יב ו ר הו א, ו ק א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד יב ו ר! ש אנ י נ ת ינ ת מ ע ות ל י ד א ש ה, ד כ י מ ע ש ה ד מו, ו ל א א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל מ ע ש ה. א ית יב יה : ה ש ול ח ג ט ל א ש ת ו ו ה ג יע ב ש ל יח, א ו ש ש ל ח א ח ר יו ש ל יח, ו א מ ר ל ו ג ט ש נ ת ת י ל ך ב ט ל הו א ה ר י ז ה ב ט ל. ו ה א נ ת ינ ת ג ט ל י ד ש ל יח ד כ י נ ת ינ ת מ ע ות ל י ד א ש ה ד מ י, ו ק ת נ י: ה ר י ז ה ב ט ל! ה ת ם נ מ י, כ ל כ מ ה ד ל א מ ט א ג יט א ל י ד ה ד יב ו ר ו ד יב ו ר הו א, א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד יב ו ר. א ית יב יה ר יש ל ק יש ל ר ב י י וח נ ן: כ ל ה כ ל ים י ור ד ין ל יד י טו מ א ת ן ב מ ח ש ב ה, ו א ין ע ול ים מ יד י טו מ א ת ן א ל א ב ש ינ ו י מ ע ש ה. Before the agent separated the teruma ד ש ל א ת ר ם :ע A certain portion of a farmer s produce must be designated for priests. The Torah does not specify the amount of teruma that must be separated; one may theoretically fulfill one s obligation by separating even a single kernel of grain from an entire crop. The Sages established a measure: One-fortieth for a generous gift, one-fiftieth for an average gift, and one-sixtieth for a miserly The Gemara elaborates: They are not comparable to a deposit, as a deposit is used in its owner s possession, i.e., any loss is incurred by the owner, whereas these are used in her own possession, as he gave her the money to keep. These dinars are also not comparable to a loan; a loan is given for spending and therefore no money remains at the time of the betrothal, whereas these dinars were given to her from the outset for the purpose of betrothal. The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent h to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the? n Rabbi Yoĥanan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement. Rabbi Yoĥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, hb his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money. Rabbi Yoĥanan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, h and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action. Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman s hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoĥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity n by means of thought. h Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. background gift. If one appoints an agent to separate teruma on his behalf without specifying how much of the crop he wishes to donate, the agent uses his discretion and makes the decision himself. Subsequently, the owner might have second thoughts about how much his agent should separate, and this uncertainty may be a reason for the owner to cancel the agency. ג קרפ.טנ ףד. 59a 326 Kiddushin. perek III.

5 Perek III Daf 59 Amud b מ ע ש ה מ ו צ י א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ו מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה, מ ח ש ב ה א ין מ וצ יא ה ל א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ו ל א מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה. ב ש ל מ א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ל א מ פ ק ה ד ל א א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל מ ע ש ה. א ל א מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה מ יה א ת פ יק! ש אנ י מ ח ש ב ה ד טו מ א ה, ד כ י מ ע ש ה ד מ י, ו כ ד ר ב פ פ א. ד ר ב פ פ א ר מ י: כ ת יב כ י י ת ן ו ק ר ינ ן כ י י ת ן. ה א כ יצ ד? כ י י ת ן ד ו מ י א ד כ י י ת ן, מ ה י ת ן ד נ יח א ל יה, א ף י ת ן ד נ יח א ל יה. ר ב ז ב יד מ ת נ י ל ה א ש מ ע ת ת א א ה א: ו כ ן ה י א ש נ ת נ ה ר ש ו ת ל ש ל ו ח ה ל ק ד ש ה, ו ה ל כ ה ה יא ו ק ד ש ה א ת ע צ מ ה, א ם ש ל ה ק ד מו ק יד ו ש יה ק יד ו ש ין; ו א ם ש ל ש לו ח ה ק ד מו א ין ק יד ו ש יה ק יד ו ש ין. ל א ק ד ש ה א ת ע צ מ ה ו ח ז ר ה ב ה, מ הו? ר ב י י וח נ ן א מ ר: ח וז ר ת, ו ר יש ל ק יש א מ ר: א ינ ה ח וז ר ת. ר ב י י וח נ ן א מ ר: ח וז ר ת, א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד יב ו ר. ר יש ל ק יש א מ ר: א ינ ה ח וז ר ת, ל א א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד י ב ו ר. א ית יב יה ר ב י י וח נ ן ל ר יש ל ק יש : ב יט ל, א ם ע ד ש ל א ת ר ם ב יט ל א ין ת רו מ ת ו ת רו מ ה! א מ ר ר ב א: ה כ א ב מ אי ע ס ק ינ ן כ ג ון ש ק ד ם ב ע ל ה ב י ת ו ת ר ם א ת כ ר י ו, ד ה ו ה ל יה מ ע ש ה. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. In that case the vessel cannot contract ritual impurity until the craftsman has finished working on it. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish finds this difficult for the following reason: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. This indicates that a statement does not nullify a previous statement. The Gemara answers: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: With regard to the that produce must become wet in order for it to contract ritual impurity, the verse states: But if water is placed [vekhi yuttan] upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure (Leviticus 11:38). The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Accordingly, this would mean that one must actively place the water on the produce. Yet we read it, based on the tradition as to its correct pronunciation, ki yuttan, n which includes any situation where the produce becomes wet. How so? How can the way the verse is written and the way it is read be reconciled? Rav Pappa explains that the standard of if water is placed [ki yuttan] is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term is placed [yuttan] means that it is satisfactory to the owner h that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. This is proof that thought is equivalent to action with regard to ritual impurity, as if one is satisfied with the produce becoming wet it is considered as though he actively placed the water himself. By the same reasoning, thought which renders a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity is powerful enough to require an action to counteract its effect. The Gemara presents another version of the discussion: Rav Zevid taught this dispute with regard to this : And similarly, in a case where she gave permission to her agent h to accept betrothal for her and she subsequently went and accepted betrothal herself from someone else, if her betrothal came first, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, but if the betrothal of her agent came first, her betrothal is not a betrothal. The Sages discuss this : If she did not accept betrothal herself and retracted her appointment h of the agent, what is the? Rabbi Yoĥanan says: She can retract her appointment; and Reish Lakish says: She cannot retract n her appointment. The Gemara clarifies their respective opinions. Rabbi Yoĥanan said: She can retract her appointment, as a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement, by which she appointed the agent. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her appointment, as a statement does not come and nullify a previous statement. Rabbi Yoĥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the aforementioned mishna (Terumot 3:4) with regard to one who appointed an agent to separate teruma on his behalf and subsequently canceled the agency: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated teruma, his teruma is not teruma. This shows that a statement nullifies a previous statement. Rava says: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the homeowner preceded the agent and separated teruma from his heap himself, which is an action, and an action certainly nullifies a statement. Ki yitten ki yuttan י י ת ן כ י י ת ן :כ Although the Hebrew writing in a Torah scroll does not have vowels, certain consonants, known as matres lectionis, literally, mothers of reading, are occasionally inserted to indicate the correct pronunciation of the word. This is not done consistently. A word can thereby be written defective, without these additional letters, or plene, with them. Some Sages maintain that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. By contrast, others hold that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling. This dispute applies only when the written and vocalized texts of the Torah are entirely different. If it is possible to reconcile the two readings, as is the case here, this is certainly preferable (Tosefot Tukh). She cannot retract א י נ ה ח ו ז ר ת : The Tosefot HaRosh questions the opinion of Reish Lakish: Is it possible that the woman explicitly says that she does not consent to the betrothal, and yet it nevertheless takes effect against her will? The Penei Yehoshua claims that it is a Torah decree that a statement alone is effective for the appointment of an agent, whereas nullification via a statement is granted no such sanction. Consequently, she can nullify the appointment only by means of a declaration before a court. The Ritva states that this retraction of hers is not a private matter, and must be performed in the presence of witnesses. So too, the term is placed [yuttan] means that :א ף י ת ן ד נ יח א ל יה owner it is satisfactory to the Foods are susceptible to contracting ritual impurity only after one of the seven liquids that render food fit for impurity has fallen on it. Furthermore, it must be satisfactory to the owner that this liquid touch the food (Rambam Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Tumat Okhalin 1:2). נ ת נ ה ר ש ו ת etc. She gave permission to her agent, : In a case where a woman appointed an ל ש ל ו ח ה ו כ ו agent to accept her betrothal from one man and she proceeded to accept betrothal from another, if it is unknown whose betrothal came first, both men must give her a bill of divorce. If they so desire, one may give her a bill of divorce and the other may marry her by means of a different betrothal (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 9:4; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 36:7). Retracted her appointment ח ז ר ה ב ה : If a woman appointed an agent to accept betrothal on her behalf, and she nullified the appointment before he could accept the betrothal, she is not betrothed. If it is unknown whether he accepted the betrothal before or after the nullification, it is uncertain whether she is betrothed, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 9:20 and Mishne LaMelekh there; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 36:6).. Kiddushin. Perek III. 59b 327 ג קרפ :טנ ףד

6 The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, etc. Is it possible that Reish Lakish :ת יו ב ת א ד ר יש ל ק יש וכו was unaware of this mishna, which clearly contradicts his ruling? One answer is that whenever an opinion of an amora is recorded, he must have had some way to reconcile his opinion with that of the tanna. Nevertheless, if the Sages of the Talmud considered the reconciliation inadequate they did not record it (Tosefot Tukh; Tosefot HaRosh). He has not nullified it from its status as a bill of divorce ת ור ת ג ט ל א ב ט ל יה :מ The parallel passage in tractate Gittin (32a) reads: Is the bill of divorce itself nullified? Some commentaries accept a similar reading here as well. There is a fundamental difference between the two versions. According to the version of the text in Gittin, the bill of divorce itself cannot be nullified in any manner, even if the husband says so explicitly, whereas the Gemara here indicates merely that a nullification directed at the agent is ineffective with regard to the document. The question of whether a bill of divorce itself can be nullified by a statement is in fact a matter of dispute among the early commentaries. Some say that in this case a statement cannot nullify the earlier action (Ramban). Others add that once a bill of divorce has been properly written and signed there is no way it can lose its status merely via a statement alone. Still others suggest that it is nevertheless possible that the writing of a bill of divorce is not considered a complete action, as the act of divorce is the actual giving of the document, while its writing is merely a preparatory stage for this act. Consequently, when the husband nullifies the document s status as a bill of divorce, it is simply considered paper that is of no significance (Rashba). He can return and divorce with it ר ו מ ג ר ש ב ו :ח וז If one sends a bill of divorce with an agent and subsequently nullifies the agency, the bill of divorce itself is not nullified. Consequently, the husband can still divorce his wife with this document if he so chooses. If the bill of divorce was in the husband s possession when he nullified it, he can no longer divorce her with it, as the is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naĥman. If he informed the agent that he is nullifying the bill of divorce, he cannot divorce her with it, and if he did so it is uncertain whether she is divorced, as the in this case is a matter of dispute between the Rambam, the Ramban, and the Rashba (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Geirushin 6:21; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 141:66). :מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י man She is betrothed to the second If someone betroths a woman on the condition that the betrothal should take effect after thirty days, and another man betrothed her in the meantime, she is betrothed to the second man forever. The is in accordance with the opinion of Rav in his disputes with Shmuel with regard to prohibitions (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:11; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:2). ג קרפ :טנ ףד. 59b 328 Kiddushin. perek III. א ית יב יה ר יש ל ק יש : כ ל ה כ ל ים י ור ד ים ל יד י טו מ א ת ן ב מ ח ש ב ה, ו א ין ע ול ין מ ט ו מ א ת ן א ל א ב ש י נ ו י מ ע ש ה, מ ע ש ה מ ו צ י א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ו מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה, מ ח ש ב ה א ינ ה מ וצ יא ה ל א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ו ל א מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה. ב ש ל מ א מ י ד מ ע ש ה ל א מ פ ק ה ל א א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל מ ע ש ה, א ל א מ י ד מ ח ש ב ה מ יה א ת פ יק! א מ ר ל יה : ש אנ י מ ח ש ב ה ד טו מ א ה, ד כ י מ ע ש ה ד מ י, ו כ ד ר ב פ פ א. ד ר ב פ פ א ר מ י: כ ת יב כ י י ת ן ו ק ר ינ ן כ י י ת ן, ה א כ יצ ד? כ י י ת ן ד ו מ י א ד י ת ן, מ ה י ת ן ד נ יח א ל יה, א ף י ת ן נ מ י ד נ יח א ל יה. א ית יב יה ר ב י י וח נ ן ל ר יש ל ק יש : ה ש ול ח ג ט ל א ש ת ו ו ה ג יע ב ש ל יח, א ו ש ש ל ח א ח ר יו ש ל יח, ו א מ ר ל ו ג ט ש נ ת ת י ל ך ב ט ל הו א ה ר י ז ה ב ט ל. ת יו ב ת א ד ר יש ל ק י ש! ת י ו ב ת א. ו ה יל כ ת א כ ו ות יה ד ר ב י י וח נ ן, ו א פ יל ו ב ק מ י ית א. ו א ף ע ל ג ב ד א יכ א ל מ ימ ר: ש אנ י נ ת ינ ת מ ע ות ל י ד א ש ה ד כ מ ע ש ה ד מ י, א פ יל ו ה כ י א ת י ד יב ו ר ו מ ב ט ל ד י ב ו ר. ק ש י א ה י ל כ ת א א ה י ל כ ת א ; א מ ר ת : ה יל כ ת א כ ר ב י י וח נ ן, ו ק י ימ א ל ן: ה יל כ ת א כ ר ב נ ח מ ן. ד א יב ע י א ל הו : מ הו ש י ח ז ור ו י ג ר ש ב ו? ר ב נ ח מ ן א מ ר: ח וז ר ו מ ג ר ש ב ו, ר ב ש ש ת א מ ר: א ינ ו ח וז ר ו מ ג ר ש ב ו. ו ק י ימ א ל ן ה יל כ ת א כ ו ת יה ד ר ב נ ח מ ן! נ ה י ד ב ט ל יה מ ת ור ת ש ל יח, מ ת ור ת ג ט ל א ב ט ל יה. מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י. א מ ר ר ב: מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י ל ע ול ם. ו ש מו א ל א מ ר: מ קו ד ש ת ל ש נ י ע ד ש ל ש ים י ום, ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים י ום פ ק ע י ק יד ו ש י ש נ י, ו ג מ ר י ק יד ו ש י ר אש ון. Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoĥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. An action undertaken to improve the vessel negates both the status created by an earlier action that supposedly completed the vessel and the status created by the thought not to perform more work on the vessel. By contrast, a thought to improve the vessel negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Reish Lakish explains his objection: Granted, thought does not negate action, as a statement does not come and nullify action. But it should at least offset thought. Rabbi Yoĥanan said to Reish Lakish: Thought in the case of ritual impurity is different, as it is considered like action, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa raises a contradiction: The word yuttan is written defective, and is written as if it says ki yitten. Yet we read it ki yuttan. How so? The standard of if water is placed [ki yuttan] is similar to: If one places [ki yitten]; just as the term places [yitten] indicates that it is satisfactory to the owner for the produce to become wet, as he himself is placing the water, so too, the term is placed [yuttan] means that it is satisfactory to the owner that the produce becomes wet, despite the fact that he did not place the water himself. Rabbi Yoĥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. This indicates that the appointment of an agent can be nullified even by a statement. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish n is in fact a conclusive refutation. The Gemara adds: And the is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan, and this is even according to the first version of their dispute, with regard to a woman who retracts from her betrothal after accepting the money for it. And even though there is room to say that giving money to a woman for betrothal is different, as it is considered like an action, even so, a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement with regard to her consent to the betrothal, provided that the betrothal has yet to take effect. The Gemara asks: The recorded here is difficult with regard to the recorded elsewhere. You said that the is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan, and yet we maintain that the is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naĥman. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the in the case of a bill of divorce sent by an agent that the husband nullified before it was received by his wife? Can the husband return and divorce his wife with the very same bill of divorce? Rav Naĥman says: He can return and divorce her with it, h and Rav Sheshet says: He cannot return and divorce her with it. And we maintain that the is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naĥman in this case. By contrast, according to the ruling of Rabbi Yoĥanan, since the husband has nullified the bill of divorce it should no longer be valid. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as, although the husband has nullified the agent from his status as an agent, he has not nullified the bill of divorce itself from its status as a bill of divorce. n The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman and stipulates that the betrothal will take effect in thirty days time and another man betroths her within that period, she is betrothed to the second man. h Rav says: She is betrothed to the second forever, i.e., the betrothal is fully effective, and Shmuel says: She is betrothed to the second until the thirty days pass. After thirty days have passed, the betrothal of the second lapses, and the earlier betrothal of the first man is completed.

7 י ת יב ר ב ח ס ד א ו ק א ק ש י א ל יה : ק יד ו ש י ש נ י ב מ אי פ ק ע י? א מ ר ל יה ר ב י וס ף: מ ר א ר יש א מ ת נ י ל ה, ו ק ש י א ל יה. ר ב י הו ד ה א ס יפ א מ ת נ י ל ה, ו ל א ק ש י א ל י ה ; מ ע כ ש יו ו ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים י ום וכו א מ ר ר ב: מ קו ד ש ת ו א ינ ה מ קו ד ש ת ל ע ול ם. ו ש מו א ל א מ ר: מ קו ד ש ת ו א ינ ה מ קו ד ש ת א ל א ע ד ש ל ש ים י ום; ל א ח ר ש ל ש ים פ ק ע י ק יד ו ש י ש נ י ו ג מ ר י ק יד ו ש י ר אש ון. ל ר ב מ ס פ ק א ל יה א י ת נ א ה ה ו אי א י ח ז ר ה ה ו אי. ל ש מו א ל פ ש יט א ל יה ד ת נ א ה ה ו אי. ו ב פ לו ג ת א ד ה נ י ת נ א י, ד ת נ י א: מ ה י ום ו ל א ח ר מ ית ה ג ט ו א ינ ו ג ט, ד ב ר י ח כ מ ים. ר ב י א ומ ר: כ ז ה ג ט. Rav Ĥisda sat and found this difficult: By what means is the betrothal of the second man abrogated? When the second betrothal took effect, the first betrothal was not yet in effect. Why, then, is the second betrothal abrogated? Rav Yosef said to him: The Master teaches this dispute with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and therefore he finds it difficult, whereas Rav Yehuda teaches it with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and consequently he does not find it difficult. Rav Yehuda s version of the dispute is as follows: The mishna teaches that if the first man says to her: You are hereby betrothed to me from now and after thirty days, h and another man betrothed her within those thirty days, there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed. Rav says: This means that there is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed forever, and her only option is to receive a bill of divorce from both men. And Shmuel says: There is uncertainty whether she is betrothed or whether she is not betrothed only until thirty days have elapsed, whereas after thirty days the betrothal of the second is abrogated, and the betrothal of the first is completed. The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rav is uncertain what the first man meant. Is it a condition, n i.e., the man is saying: If I do not change my mind within thirty days, you are betrothed to me from now, or is it a retraction, n that is, he immediately retracted after he said: From now, in favor of a betrothal that will take effect only after thirty days have elapsed. This uncertainty remains even after the end of the thirty days. It is obvious to Shmuel that it is a condition. Consequently, the uncertainty whether or not she is betrothed to the second man applies during the thirty-day period, as the first man might yet change his mind. After the completion of thirty days, the betrothal from the first man retroactively takes effect from the moment he gave it, and therefore the betrothal of the second man is abrogated. The Gemara comments: And Rav and Shmuel disagree in the dispute between these tanna im. As it is taught in a baraita: If one says to his wife upon giving her a bill of divorce that it should take effect: From today and after my death, h there is uncertainty whether it is a valid bill of divorce or whether it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is the statement of the Rabbis. The Rabbis are uncertain whether he meant that the bill of divorce should take effect retroactively from that moment, in which case it is valid; or whether he changed his mind and meant for it to take effect only after his death, which would mean that it is not a valid bill of divorce. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A document like this is a valid bill of divorce. The husband meant his statement as a condition that the bill of divorce should, after his death, take effect retroactively from now, and therefore it is a valid bill of divorce. מ ע כ ש י ו ו ל א ח ר ש ל ש י ם etc. From now and after thirty days, If a man said to a woman that he is betrothing her from :י ום וכו now and after thirty days, and another man betrothed her during those thirty days, it is uncertain whether she is betrothed or not betrothed to both men. The is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as explained by Rav Yosef (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Ishut 7:12; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 40:3). From today and after my death מ ה י ו ם ו ל א ח ר מ י ת ה : If a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now and after my death, and he died, it is uncertain whether she is divorced, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis (Rambam Sefer Nashim, Hilkhot Geirushin 9:14; Shulĥan Arukh, Even HaEzer 145:3). Is it a condition א י ת נ א ה ה ו א י : Rashi explains that the husband is stipulating at the time of betrothal that he can retract it within thirty days. Others reject this explanation, as they maintain that one cannot state a condition that the effectiveness of a betrothal should depend on his will alone. The Ramban contends that this condition means that if they are both alive after thirty days, the betrothal should retroactively take effect from the time he betrothed her (see Rashba and Ritva). Or is it a retraction י ח ז ר ה ה ו אי :א The commentaries ask: The Sages have taught that one who betroths a woman cannot retract his betrothal, even if he attempts to do so immediately. Accordingly, how is the possibility of a retraction contemplated in this case? The Rashba suggests two answers. First, it is possible that this is not an actual retraction, but an emendation of the husband s statement, and he is clarifying that he did not mean that the betrothal should apply now, but only after thirty days. Alternatively, as he issued both statements before giving her the betrothal money, the act of betrothal was incomplete when he issued the first statement, and therefore he is not considered to have retracted his betrothal.. Kiddushin. Perek III. 59b 329 ג קרפ :טנ ףד