Lehrhaus Lunchtime Talmud The Invention of Marriage. Selections from Responsa On Jewish Marriage by Rabbi Eugene Mihaly

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1 Lehrhaus Lunchtime Talmud The Invention of Marriage Selections from Responsa On Jewish Marriage by Rabbi Eugene Mihaly Background In 1983 the Joint Outreach Task Force of the UAHC and the CCAR issued a closing report on reform rabbis officiating at mixed marriages. They reached a consensus, stating, the Reform movement as a whole must enter into a process of a most thoughtful consideration of this issue. We must all, rabbis and laypersons alike, express ourselves, listen to other carefully, learn, and become informed. They concluded that: The Task Force unqualifiedly affirms the right of every rabbi to act in accordance with his/her religious conscience in the matter of officiating at inter-faith marriages free from any external pressure. In response, a group of rabbis who do not officiate at inter-faith marriages called the Committee of 100 issued a responsa to the Task Force, called Reform Rabbis and Mixed Marriage. In 1985 Rabbi Eugene Mihaly issued a responsa of his own, On Jewish Marriage with special reference to Reform Rabbis and Mixed Marriage. The authors of Reform Rabbis and Mixed Marriage argue that: 1.) Since the bride and groom consecrate themselves to each other according to the heritage of Moses and Israel, and since These words are the essential and traditional heart of the Jewish marriage ceremony, If one of the partners in a marriage is not a member of the Jewish people and is not heir to the heritage of Moses and Israel, what reasonable purpose is served by using those time hallowed words? 2.) In a Jewish marriage ceremony, there is a additional element. Kiddushin sacred Jewish marriage reaffirms the covenant between God and the Jewish people. 1

2 She elot (questions) prompted by these statements were put to Rabbi Eugene Mihaly z l, Professor of Rabbinic Literature and Homiletics at the Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Religion in Cincinnati. The following pages are selections from his responsa, On Jewish Marriage. Lehrhaus Lunchtime Talmud Note: We studied the Mishna text Kiddushin 2a where the Rabbis conclude that the biblical term nikneit (take) is synonymous with the rabbinic term mekaddesh. Rabbi Mihaly asks If the rabbinic and biblical words have the identical meaning, what impelled the Rabbis to coin a new term? (This is the meaning of the question Mai lishna derahbanan, a meaning obscured by the extant translations.) Why not use the extant biblical expression? Why do they resort to a new term, the primary meaning of which is "sacred," "holy," and refers primarily to sacerdotal objects? Surely, by adopting a novel term, the Rabbis must have intended to convey a nuance lacking in the biblical term! The final conclusion of the talmudic discussion is that the two terms are not synonymous. The rabbinic term connotes something that the biblical word does not, namely, that kiddushin results in an essential change in the woman's status. Through kiddushin, "the man prohibits her to all others like an object which has been dedicated for sacred use (hekdesh). Just as an object which has been consecrated (hekdesh) is forbidden for all secular use, so a woman who has been acquired through kiddushin is forbidden to all other men. If the Rabbis would have used only the biblical term "acquire" (koneh, nikneit), we would mistakenly infer that marriage is like any other purchase, when ownership is transferred to the buyer, but another purchaser may subsequently acquire it. The purchased object is not interdicted to others. There is no change in its status there is only a change in ownership. By using a new term, kiddushin (mekaddesh, mekuddeshet), the Rabbis subtly indicate that kiddushm is a special kind of acquisition, one which involves an essential change in the status of that which is acquired "the woman is henceforth prohibited to all others" and she retains this new status until the death of the husband, or until he divorces her. 2

3 Tosaphot accordingly explains: "... the plain meaning of Harei'at mekuddeshet li is (Behold you are) singled out for me {meyuhedet li appointed for me), set apart for me (mezumenet li appropriated for me). But if he says this garment is set apart, appropriated (mekud-dash) for me, it does not seem that it would avail. For, with a woman, in that she is singled out to be for him, she is forbidden to all others, but with a loaf of bread or a garment, it is not appropriate to say thus." (Therefore, mekuddeshet is the proper formula only when one acquires a woman through kiddushin, but it cannot be used as a formula of acquisition of an object like a garment or a loaf of bread.) It is clear from the talmudic discussion that kiddushin as the rabbinic term for the first stage of marriage is a metaphor, a kind of analogy when one thing is understood in terms of another. In a metaphoric expression, the two things which are implicitly or, in simile form, explicitly compared are not identical. They only resemble each other in one or more dominant feature. When we speak of the "foundation"' of a theory, for example, we compare a theory to a building. The intent is surely not to imply that a theory is literally like a building. We can only smile indulgently at the youngster who arrives in class with his toy bulldozer to topple the theory of evolution; or at his alert classmate who volunteers to plow the magnetic field. In their naiveté they have literalized the metaphors; they have extended them beyond their legitimate limits. Similarly, kiddushin is a metaphor. Just as hekdesh, a consecrated object anything dedicated for sacred use is forbidden for all secular purposes, so a woman who has been "appropriated," "set apart," "singled out" through the initial act of marriage (kiddushin) is forbidden to all other men. In the entire talmudic literature, this is the only point of analogy between hekdesh (consecrated objects) and kiddushin. Every attempt to find other common elements between them to extend the metaphor is rejected. 3

4 Rabbinic Literature abounds in metaphors of every kind. Metaphoric expression with its subtle ambiguity engages the student and may be an effective device in transforming a passive, disinterested listener into an active participant. The variety of metaphors in the Midrash and Talmud are often aspects of their poetry the relief of the circular in a predominantly linear literature. But figurative language has its potential hazards as well. When we extend a metaphor beyond its legitimate limits, or when we translate a metaphor literally, and thereby obscure its true intent, we not only distort and abuse the text, we are used by it. We substitute the mask for the face and the model for the thing modelled. When this is done with texts which are invested with sanctity and religious authority under the banner "our sacred tradition," we are, as Maimonides sensitively perceived, precariously close to setting up idols. We may wryly smile at the pietist who is intent on planting an elaborate privet hedge around the Synagogue Ark in order to fulfill the admonition of the Men of the Great Assembly, "Make a hedge around the Torah."" We would be less sanguine, however, if he were seriously to claim the authority of Jewish tradition for his act, proclaim it as a central imperative of the Jewish faith, and even attempt to impose it on every congregation. The assertion in the Statement (Reform Rabbis and Mixed Marriage): Kiddushin sacred Jewish marriage reaffirms not only the bond between God and humanity, but also the covenant between God and the Jewish people. The "marriage" between God and Israel, which, tradition teaches us, took place at Mount Sinai is renewed whenever a Jewish couple marries "according to the heritage of Moses and Israel" may well qualify as inspirational homiletic hyperbole. That is the privilege of every rabbi, of every Jew. But when one claims to speak in the name of Jewish tradition and, more so, to define the imperatives of Judaism what is and what is not permitted on the basis of his interpretation of Jewish tradition, we may expect, we have every right to demand, more than imaginative romantic musings. The 4

5 statement quoted above not only literalizes the metaphor kiddushin, it mistranslates kedat Moshe v Israel, which means "in accordance with the requirements of the Jewish faith," as denned by the authorities of each age." The Statement also misrepresents the traditional concept of marriage and makes of it a form of sacrament which every serious student, classic and modern, insists it is not. The continuation of the Statement (p. 3) which speaks of the "Sheva Berachot (the traditional blessings) which are recited under the chuppah..." in addition to its farfetched interpretation which has little relation to the intent of the traditional benedictions, fails to mention that these blessings were classically not part of the marriage service; that they were incorporated into the service only during the late medieval period when, in response to a changed environment, the two stages of marriage, kiddushin and nissum, were merged; and that the recitation of these blessings was never considered by traditional halakha as essential to the validity and legality of a marriage. More importantly, the references in the Statement to " the traditional chuppah under which the bride and groom stand..." and to "the Sheva Berachot (the traditional blessings) which are recited under the chuppah..." disregard the well-over-a-century Reform tradition which deleted, for good and sufficient reason, a number of the traditional seven benedictions, changed the contents of others which were retained, and certainly minimized the religious significance of the huppah. In any case, kiddushin is clearly a rabbinic metaphor, and refers to a man's acquisition of a woman through an act of appropriation (setting apart, singling out) and thus prohibiting her to all other men. If we care to treat the sources with integrity, we cannot translate kiddushin as the Statement does, as "sacred Jewish marriage." Developing Jewish tradition has certainly viewed the marriage of a man and woman as a sacred bond, the fulfillment of a divine command. The spiritual aspect of the marriage relationship is a prominent and repetitive theme in the classic haggadic literature. The traditional halakha, however, sees marriage primarily as an act of acquisition by the man, as a kinyan, a commercial transaction, with the woman as a passive object in the process. Reform Judaism so changed the liturgy and the marriage ritual that they reflect the aspect of Jewish tradition which perceives marriage as a sacred union of two equals who find completion and wholesome fulfillment in each other. 5