(1998: 125) points out that by then, to be sure, the theory had spread far and

Transcription

1 CHAPTER SIX URDU LANGUAGE AND RECONSTITUTION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN INDEPENDENT INDIA The focus of this chapter is on the process of redefinition and reconciliation of identity of Muslims in independent India. Since the symbols of identity claimed by the Muslims to justify their demand for a separate state were altered by the very process of partition, the status of Muslims who remained in India had to be redefined. 6.1 Situation of Indian Muslims after Independence Between , through the vigorous activities of the Muslim League for the creation of Pakistan based on the ideology of two nation theory, the symbols of Muslim identity that included Urdu language were fixed. Noorani (1998: 125) points out that by then, to be sure, the theory had spread far and wide in the minds of millions and caused damage far more grave than the Partition of India. The damage occurred because of the image of Muslims that emerged as a consequence of these events. For their opponents, all Muslims appeared to be separatists and anti-national. The association of Muslims with these images would persist as part of their identity long after the Partition. After the formation of the new state, Pakistan, Muslims were forced to reconstitute their identities. Reconstruction meant redefining the status and role of Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu language and Sharia etc after independence. The Muslim League leaders mostly from the predominantly Hindu provinces, like UP in undivided India, who created these identities and symbols, left for Pakistan. At the time of partition according to the 1951 census, 64 million Muslims went to Pakistan while 36 million decided to stay in India. Das Gupta (1970:27) says that if one were to accept the principle set forth by the leaders 203

2 of Muslim separatism that religion was the basic criterion of a nation, one could understand the problem of status which the creation of Pakistan undoubtedly posed for the Muslims in new India. Mohamed Raza Khan, who was a member of the League Council since 1943, and of the Madras Legislature from 1946 to 1962, describes the Muslim mood at Partition as follows; Having worked for the creation of Pakistan, they found themselves left without an organization and leadership, with nobody to guide them, Mr. Jinnah left for Karachi to lead the new State. Most of the top leaders, who were on the League Working Committee and prominent Leaguers in different States, either left for Karachi to build up their own careers, as they felt they had no political future in India, or went into complete retirement. A fear complex had overtaken the Muslim community throughout the country. They could not think in terms of their political rights or their material welfare. All that they wanted was that there should be no communal trouble in their areas. They practically lost all interest in politics and wanted that they should be left to themselves. This mood of withdrawal lingers till today (Quoted in Noorani, 1998: 129). Some of the leaders who stayed behind added to the confusion. According to Noorani (1998:126), one of them, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, offered support to Jawaharlal Nehru's motion on the national flag and implicitly pledged loyalty to the new state, which was contrary to the previous Muslim League's policy and guidance to the Muslim masses. The League leader and former premier of Bengal, H. S. Suhrawardy, raised an important question, which is still relevant, in his letter to Khaliquzzaman on 10 September What I fear is, will they have respect for you if you have not strength, that is to say if you give up your particular group solidarity? At the same time, any attempt to acquire solidarity and strength will raise suspicion in their minds as regards of bona fides (Noorani, 1998: 126). This dilemma was experienced even by the League and Jinnah himself, perhaps in a more embarrassing manner. Jinnah had repeatedly counselled them to organize themselves and professed that they should chalk out their own future, which is precisely what he afterwards prevented them from doing. The League Council met on December 1947 in Karachi and decided that there shall be separate Muslim League organizations for 204

3 Pakistan and the Indian Union (Noorani, 1998: 127). Accordingly he said that there must be a Muslim League in Hindustan. If they were thinking of anything else then they were finished. If they wanted to wind up the League they could do so but he thought it would be a great mistake. He said he knew there was already an attempt to do that (Noorani, 1998: 127). These remarks raised a question as to why Indian Muslims had to maintain the League, which was meant for the creation of Pakistan when there was no need of another Pakistan under the secular policy of Indian Union. The Muslim's dilemma was also reflected in the Hindu leaders' comments against them. In relation to the dispute raised by Pakistan regarding the status of Kashmir, Vallabhbhai Patel in a public meeting on 6 January 1948, angrily questioned the Indian Muslims' alleged silence on the issue. He asked them why they did not open their mouths on the Kashmir issue. He wondered why they had not condemned the action of Pakistan (Noorani, 1998: 130). Noorani points out that it was obvious that Patel was prescribing a loyalty test to Muslims- support to the Government of India's stand on the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan (1998: ). Though the League continues in India, it is as a regional body with strong base in only Tamil Nadu and Kerala (ibid.: 132). All Muslim identities and symbols, which were created during the colonial period in one way or another, lost their objectives and relevance. Muslim masses were left behind without leaders. Noorani (1998: 133) comments on the Indian Muslim condition after the Independence by pointing out that no grievance was redressed and no reform carried out. The insecurities yet remain. Muslims continue to perceive their identity to be under threat. The principal gainer was, of course, the League leadership. Thus they had no choice but to reconstitute/reconcile their identity. In the next section the role of Urdu language in the reconstruction of 205

4 identity is examined. 6.2 Decline in the :instrumental power of Urdu 6.21 Internal Factor: State Language Policy As we have seen already, policy can create hierarchies both at social and psychological levels. UP State language policy had two negative effects on the instrumental power of Urdu language. First the language was denied a legitimate status on account of being a minority language and secondly the reluctance to provide protection to the minority language meant an impediment on its development and a decline in its use. In addition it is important to note that central and state policies toward linguistic minorities especially in the case of UP are contradictory. While central government policies are designed to promote national unity by accepting linguistic and cultural pluralism, State government policies seek to pursue the same objectives by encouraging homogenization on the basis of the dominant regional cultures. Brass, (1975: ) argues that in this way state governments seek to avoid the implications of linguistic and cultural pluralism and the political demands of linguistic and religious minorities for privileges which foster separate cultural identities. In other words, as Kirpalani Committee says in the case of UP, the State Government is one which is concerned about the interests of 'national integration' by rejecting the 'national policy'. As far as the second status of Urdu is concerned, technically the government of Uttar Pradesh, did not deviate from the norm that was agreed upon by the states in the Indian Union, since the State Reorganization Commission in its report (1955) had suggested that before a language could be considered as a second state language, the population speaking the language should be 30 percent of the total population of the state and the Union government. Through a memorandum the Ministry of Home Mfairs agreed with this proposal and advised the state governments 206

5 accordingly (Das Gupta, 1970: 148). On this basis they could legally deny Urdu a legitimate status as the second official language. This imposition of majority's language and culture on the minority in UP had a second dimension. The step they took was to provide poor or no facilities for Urdu education and discouraging and de-linking it from higher education and administrative services. In this way the UP state government succeeded in restricting Urdu to.the poor or inferior sections of society leading to a decline in the image and status of Urdu. This neglect and discriminative policy of the state therefore prevented Urdu speakers from feeling part of or joining the mainstream society and created a sense of deprivation among the Muslims. In the next section, we see how all these factors have affected Muslim identity External Factor: Effect of Globalization- As shown in the discussion above, legitimate power provided through policy determines both the symbolic and instrumental significance of languages especially in the context of relations between different linguistic groups. Without any support of the state however, English remains a powerful language because of its association with the market institution through which languages enter the arena of legitimation (Singh, 2000: 149). Languages of significant value in the market context like English have increased in importance due to the process of globalization. While policy creates the internal divisions and hierarchy among languages, globalization works as an external factor to change 'in' and 'out' group language categories since 'in' and 'out' relationships are not absolute. Although Urdu and Hindi fall into separate categories in relation to each other because of different statuses accorded by the state as well as the emotional rivalries between the cultural groups associated with them, when viewed externally in relation to English they fall into the same 'in' group as 207

6 Indian languages. Singh, (2000: 163) therefore observes that the new phase of economic development not only alters the market situation for languages externally (outside the country) but also within the society. He notes further that; The crucial factors which govern the viability of a language for the internal market are: modernization of teaching in the language and its orientation to services and the integrative capacity within the linguistic community to absorb in its educational system the skills and vocations that the emergent new economies may require. The responses to these new demands in education influence the market prospect of a language (2000: 163). Like language policy, globalization provokes a sense of identity. Due to globalization, homogenization of cultures takes place in several aspects of cultural life of the people but this process also accelerates the growth of cultural self-consciousness and cultural identities (Singh, 2000: 98). In a sense, globalization and the influence of English has helped to reduce the gap in instrumental power between Urdu and Hindi. Due to comparatively little power of both Hindi and Urdu in the market sphere (in the instrumental sense), their symbolic power have increased tremendously. That is why 'angrezi hatao' 1 recognition of Urdu as a second language in UP. by Mulayam Singh eased the process of Even if Muslims have strong attachment to Urdu, identity claims can not be sufficient reason for the language retention. The linguistic identity needs 'legitimation'. Singh (2000: 166-7) says that a major loss to Urdu language in India during the past fifty years has been due to its displacement as a language of symbolic domination as well as major changes in policies of states towards Urdu language which have adversely affected its market value. One of the reasons why, during the British period, the Muslim elite tried to defend the continued use of Persianized Urdu in the courts, offices 1 This political slogan expresses sentiments against English and support for Indian languages 208

7 and schools of the northern provinces was that it enabled the Muslim elite to maintain their dominance and limit others' access to positions of dominance in the ruling institutions of the provinces (Brass, 1975: 179). Especially after independence, the apathy of the upper and the middle class Muslims towards Urdu and the tendency in the Muslim community to appropriate it merely as a religious-cultural phenomenon has reduced its utilitarian as well as ideological appeal. It is no longer patronized by the state, or the market as in the past. The job opportunities for graduates in Urdu have become negligible except for a limited number of teaching positions. All this signifies the loss of symbolic domination or instrumental value of Urdu language (Singh, 2000: 167). This erosion in its symbolic domination is 'as a result of ascendance of English' and this results from its precarious linkages with the market, now in the process of economic globalization (ibid.:168). This effect of globalization applies as well to other Indian languages including Hindi which otherwise enjoy considerable state patronage and articulate higher degree of cultural domination in the social space (ibid.: 167). That is one of the reasons why English still occupies a dominant position in language hierarchies in India in spite of its lack of official status in many regions. The process of globalization produces dual and contradictory trends in the usage of the languages, which can be applied to Indian situation. Muslim elite patronize English-medium, private or convent schools while professing oral commitment to education through Urdu medium (ibid.: 174). This happens even in Pakistan, where Urdu is the national language of the country. Rahman, (1999: 98) notes that English remains the language of power and high social status in Pakistan. At the rhetorical level, however, the ruling elite appears to support Urdu. Thus this process produces new hierarchies of power among languages. 209

8 A brief review of the situation in Pakistan could be used to illustrate this point. Rahman, (1997: 177) writes that Pakistan is no doubt an ideologically inspired state and Urdu was a part of this ideology. The situation of Urdu is however not so stable even in Pakistan. Though as a national language, it enjoys considerably high status like Hindi in India, the effects on Urdu from the internal regional divisions and external factors are tremendous. Except for relatively better situation of Urdu in Pakistan than in India, these external and internal factors undermine the importance of Urdu as a single dominant national language. Symbolically Urdu has a strong ideological and official support in Pakistan because of its centrality in national integration. Though this is the same with Hindi in India, which is supposed to be a symbol of national integration, the presentation of this issue takes a secular approach while in Pakistan, Urdu language is often associated with religion. Thus in Pakistan, the Perso-Arabic roots are used in order to stress the Muslim aspect of the Pakistani identity and, in keeping up with the two-nation theory, differentiate Pakistani Urdu from India Hindi which is becoming more and more Sanskritized (Rahman, 1999: 266). At the same time, now it is being used to counter the hegemony of Western culture and Anglicization (Rahman, 1999: 291). After partition and independence of Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders who formed the government associated Urdu with Islamic and Pakistani identity. Moreover, they also felt that only Urdu could be used to integrate the diverse nationalities of Pakistan. Thus they propounded the uni-national thesis - that Pakistanis are one people - and chose Urdu as the national language (Rahman, 1999: 9). This policy has remained almost the same either at educational level or administrative level and has been followed by several political parties, though their motives could be different. However 210

9 there have been several regional linguistic movements including the Bengali movement against Urdu language and Urdu speaking dominant group. Rahman, (1999: 289) observes that at the same time, however, for all lucrative and high-powered positions, it is English, which is required as it was in the days of the British Raj. In that context, Urdu is ghettoizing. Hence, whereas highly placed state functionaries support Urdu in their official roles, they privately use English and educate their children in it. In fact even middle class people who support Urdu for ideological reasons adopt the pragmatic policy of learning English and teaching it to their children. This dual and contradictory attitude is a universal feature of elite and middle classes in almost all marginalized speech communities and is related to linguistic ideology, which is mobilized at two levels, namely, general (communicative) and specific (symbolic), with the structure of social stratification and division of classes in a speech community (Singh, 2000: 143). With the dominance of English as the global language and the recognition of Hindi as the official language in India, Urdu's position as legitimate language in the communicative ~ense is weakened further. 6.3 Urdu as a Symbol in Identity Reconstitution The denial of legitimate status to Urdu especially in UP has not only affected the instrumental power of Urdu but also created an acute identity crisis among the Muslims in India. The government policies especially on language have not only affected Muslims in economic spheres but have also stirred their human consciousness especially where policy decisions are unfair and unjust. After independence, the role of Urdu language in the constitution of Muslim identity has been enhanced in last five decades by the official neglect and even suppression of the language itself. This political neglect and denial of legitimate status to Urdu is strongly connected with the image, which surrounds Urdu language and its identification with Muslims 211

10 and Islam. In the next section the discussion focuses on how this image has been created and is maintained Social Construction of Image Human beings understand themselves through interaction with others. In the process of identifying others, human beings can identify themselves. If they can not identify others, their own identification is also not clear. Thus the role of others become a very important factor for the identity formation. Creation of image or myth is not only an outcome of direct interaction but also a result of indirect information transmission. In indirect method of image creation, the power of language and media like journals and the press plays a crucial role. They can give idea about what people know they are, what they think they ought to be, and what others think they really are. They create the image and even contribute to the creation of myths. Through interaction, people begin to have certain 'images' about others and vice versa. This 'others' perceptions might or might not be congruent with the self-image. Normally human beings have their own self-perception about their own image and seek to present it that way. However it depends on various factors whether others also interpret it the same way. When it is incongruent and especially when others are in powerful position, like a majority, they can enforce their version of image. The projection or transference of image and status from majority to minority and appropriation of cultural symbols or values of dominant groups in society plays a crucial role in the constitution of identity. Thus as Noorani (1998:121) says, a minority's sense of identity is shaped by its understanding of its own history. Its self-image is influenced, no less, by the image the majority groups have of the minority - an image shaped, in turn, by their understanding of history. Not infrequently, historical perceptions clash. History does not address itself in the same language to 212

11 different peoples. Through the nationalistic movement followed by the birth of Pakistan, the interaction between Hindus and Muslims has led each group to have certain images of each other. Their behavior towards each other in present times majorly depends on the image, which was created during that time. Since colonial period basically Indian Muslims, especially in northern parts, have always been seen in opposition to Hindus. Thus a number of elements of their identities are also the creation of this interaction. The emergence and continuation of an identity is sometimes supported by a counterpart. Since this majority and minority group relationship has always been marked by conflict, their identities are also constructed in that context. Thus when identity has a counterpart in this manner, it increases attachment to one's in-group. There are several identities, which are attached to each of these sociocultural groups. Several of these identities were created during the colonial period and some of them have persisted in India to this day. For Muslims in contemporary India, the status of Aligarh Muslim University, the oispute over Muslim Personal laws, and the Urdu language are major identity issues. Among them, Urdu has a unique position in the constitution of Muslim identity especially in relation to Hindus, since it has a counterpart, Hindi. In order to understand the uniqueness of such identities, a comparison is made here between the aspects of identity, which have counterparts in other groups and those that do not have. The importance of cow to Hindus and Sharia to Muslims constitute symbols of identity that belong to this category that lacks counterparts in the opposite group. Both of them are central factors in the identity of each religious group. Sharia is therefore used as a symbol of Muslim identity in a manner similar to the use of the cow by Hindus (Brass, 1996: 97). Even 213

12 though each group views its own elements of identity with high regard and reverence, there is a contradictory perception about the same elements by the rival community (ibid.: 99). In this sense, these symbols are viewed different from the way Hindi and Urdu are viewed. There seems to be a tacit agreement between Hindus and Muslims in contemporary India that so far as Hindus do not interfere about the cause of Muslims, the Muslims also do not interfere with Hindus. Brass (1996:99) notes that; Hindus revere the cow and Muslims are brought up to eat it, but dietary habits are changed more easily than religious beliefs. Consequently, Muslims may change their primordial attachment to eating beef for the sake of the Hindu primordial attachment to the sanctity of the cow, particularly if Hindus agree not to tamper with those attachments that Muslim value more than the Hindus, such as the Sharia. Now, this particular bargain, though not an explicit one, surely exists tacitly in contemporary in India. It is at least certain that the ulema will not rise up in a body to defend cow sacrifice as long as there is no interference with Muslim personal law. This point should be considered from the character of each symbol. While eating cow is not mandatory for Muslims, it is mandatory for Hindus to worship cow. In the same way, to support Sharia does not harm Hindus since there is no importance for them. In short, protection of the Sharia does not affect the cause of cow protection and vise versa. On the other hand, the promotion of Urdu, especially giving the second official status, which gives the practical opportunity for Muslims to get jobs, definitely threatens the cause of Hindi, even if the numbers are not so high. Especially in north India, where Hindi is widely spoken, the more the number of Urdu speakers reduce, the more the numbers of Hindi speakers increase, which is evident from the census (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183). Thus between the issue of Sharia and cow, there can be tacit agreement, while that agreement is impossible between Hindi and Urdu. At the same time, the issue of Sharia is complicated and divisive among the Muslims but not between them and Hindus. Brass (1996:97) therefore observes that 214

13 unlike the symbol of the cow for the Hindus, however, the Sharia is a divisive symbol within the Muslim community itself. One would be hard put to find many Hindus who think it important to slaughter cows but many secular Muslims consider it essential to modernize the Sharia and to adopt a uniform civil law administered by the state. However this division in the community 1s generally overlooked or neglected by others and even by their own people. Once multiple symbols are attached to a particular group, those who belong to the group will be considered to have accepted all the symbols. Hasan, Zoya (1994:63) notes that; Over the years, the salient features of minority identity found expressions in maintaining the status quo on personal law, besides defending places of worship, and promoting Urdu. But what is often ignored is that Muslims are by no means a homogeneous community; they do not exist in Indian society as separate and isolated entities, they operate within the social structure as segments of a composite social framework. Equally significant is the tendency towards pluralism in matter pertaining to the Shariat. Whenever a collective identity is externally assigned by a group outside the one whose identity is in question, then it is assumed that all members share those attributes or attach the same value to them. This has been the case with Urdu. According to statistics, Urdu is not the language of all Indian Muslims. According to the census of India, 1991, only 42.73% of the total Muslim population could claim it as their mother tongue, although most people assume that all Muslims are Urdu speakers. However because of the tragic experience during the partition, anything related with Muslims and Islam has always been seen through this particular perspective by Hindus. Any demand related with Urdu or otherwise has always been viewed with suspicion and always raises questions of Muslim loyalty to India. Thus Muslim political leaders who wished to demand protection for Muslim minority rights were now on the defensive, forced to defend not only their rights but their loyalties, which 215

14 were called into question by Hindu communalist leaders whenever Muslim demands became assertive (Brass, 1975: 183). Mayer, (1983: 9) observes that substantial numbers of Hindus still believe that Indian Muslims owe their primary loyalty to Pakistan. In turn, Muslims always feel discriminated against whether it is true or imagined. Mayer (1983:10) citing Imtiaz Ahmad comments that;... the important thing is not that there is discrimination against Muslims in the economic structure. What is important is that Muslims have felt so insecure as to believe themselves to be the target of continuos economic discrimination. The fact of their belief has been crucial to their social adjustment in the country. About Urdu, it was worse than any other symbol of Muslim identity since it was connected exclusively with Muslims by Muslim themselves, especially beginning with the Muslim league. It was used to assert differences rather than commonness and it played a critical role in the ideology of Pakistan movement, and it was eventually declared. the national language. of Pakistan. It is also at the center of different interpretations of history between the two communities. According to Brass (1975:186) in the eyes of the more militant Hindu supporters of Hindi as the sole official language of India and the north Indian states, this attachment of Muslims to Urdu and its script is an attachment to a 'foreign' script and an alien culture by a communal minority whose loyalties to India are suspect. On the other hand, Urdu supporters deny this charge and argue that Urdu is an indigenous language just like Hindi and is spoken by both Hindus and Muslims and is thus a symbol of unity of the two communities (ibid.). While Urdu speakers' claim is genuine, there is another aspect, which is not always mentioned. It is that the special heritage of Indian Muslims and the religious literature as well as the cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu (ibid.: 187). This is the very reason why it is mostly Muslims who defend this language. Thus the harder Muslims try to defend Urdu, the more the suspicions of 216

15 Hindus increase and get confirmed that Urdu is a Muslim language. From this brief observation of the interaction between two communities, there seems to be a consensus between Hindus and Muslims on the basis of the image that Urdu is a language of Muslims. liowever complications arise when both communities want to see the issue from completely opposite perspectives. While some may want to emphasize the inclusive aspect of the language, others may want to do the same from an exclusive perspective. In the next section, the place of Urdu in the interaction between these two communities is examined on the basis of presentation and interpretation of community image Muslim Identity: The Self-Image Attitude of Non-Urdu speaking Muslims to Urdu As explained in the introduction, only a few states have Muslim population of more than 1 million according to the 1991 census. Among them, UP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan accounted for 43% of the total Muslim population in India. This indicates that more than 50% of the Muslim population were spread throughout India. In the same way, Urdu speakers were also dispersed all over India. Eight states, each with more than one million Urdu speakers, accounted for more than 93% of the total Urdu speakers in India. The states were UP, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh. In each of these states however, Urdu speakers constituted a minority linguistic group. These figures indicate the extent of diversity of customs, culture, history, and languages even among the Muslims. Following the linguistic reorganization of Indian states in 1956, cultural differences and regional distinctions especially on the basis of language have become sharper. Since Urdu language was and is more associated with Northern Muslims 217

16 rather than the south, Muslim attitudes towards Urdu as a factor in identity is more strongly and emotionally displayed in the north. However there is evidence that south Indian Muslims are also increasingly adopting Urdu as part of their Islamic identity. Table 10. Urdu Speakers and Muslim Population (in Millions) since Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers among among among Muslims Muslims Muslims India Uttar Pradesh Bihar Andra Pradesh Karnata ka Mahar a shtra Sour~: Censuses oflndia 1971, 1981, and The censuses from show that the proportion of Urdu speakers in Muslim population in the non-hindi speaking states is higher than in the Hindi speaking states. According to Farouqui (1992:101) observes that the condition of Urdu in UP is worse, while in Maharashtra and southern India it is comparatively encouraging. This fact can be understood from the fact that in Andhra Pradesh, the official status to Urdu was granted much earlier than in both UP and Bihar (Khalidi, 1995: 141). Apart from that, the number of students who study in Urdu medium and the facilities for education are far better in other states, especially in the south than in UP, where the highest number of Urdu speakers live. In a sense, instrumental power of Urdu is more prominent in the south than in the north. These trends are borne out by the following data. 218

17 Table 11. The comparison of Urdu Primary and Secondary educational facilities in UP and Maharashtra in Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers Year: Primary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting instruction through Urdu UP Maharashtra Year: Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers Secondary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting instruction though Urdu UP Maharashtra Source: 33ro Report of Comnnss10n for Linguistic Minorities in India. Note: Bihar, AP, and Karnataka governments did not furnish the data regarding the minority educational facilities. However from previous reports there was evidence that generally the southern parts of India provide better facilities and enroll more students compared with UP. Thus it is important to see how Muslims in other states other than UP see the issue of Urdu. Here some patterns of development of Islamic culture especially in the south that have influenced attitudes towards Urdu language are examined. The advent of Islam in south India can be categorized into three phases. First, after establishing their power in northern part of India, Muslim rulers started penetrating deep into the south. Secondly, there were local converts through missionary activities. Thirdly, and perhaps primarily, the long-standing trading relations with the ancient Romans, Greeks and Arabs gave them chance of assimilation. Islam in southern India actually owes its origin primarily to its direct contact with the Arab traders, who contracted marriage alliances with indigenous coastal women. In the first case, during the penetration of the Muslim rulers into the south, a large number of soldiers, poets and administrators came and settled in south India from the Deccan and north India. These settlers and their 219

18 descendants, who were mainly Urdu speaking, made south India their home but did not sever their historical, cultural and ethnic ties with their northern Muslim brethren. They were never able to identify themselves fully with the predominantly non-urdu-speaking local populations. In the second and the third cases, they remained as Tamil or its derivative Malayalam speakers (More, 1995: 336). There was considerable influence through the Muslim League movement on Tamil Muslims to awaken and propagate their Islamic identity. More (1995:338) says: In 1906, the All India Muslim League was founded in Dacca to protect Muslim interests in India. Its Madras branch was founded in The very next year, separate electorates were accorded to the Muslims. Until about 1930, Muslim politics in the Presidency was dominated by the Urdu-speaking aristocratic merchant elite, centred in Madras city. The situation of the Tamil Muslims, who had their own powerful merchant elite and who until the launching of the Non-Cooperation and Klclafat Movements in the 1920s were impervious to national and pan-islamic sentiments and usually kept a low political profile, underwent a sea-change. In fact, Khilafat Movement drew the Tamil Muslims into national and international issues and made them join hands with the Urdu-speaking Muslims. They thus became conscious of their Islamic identity and there was certainly an awakening of their political consciousness, too. In the same way the Hindustani controversy had also arisen in south even before the installation of the Congress government in The Hindi versus Urdu controversy of the United Provinces was well known. Since the Congress party assumed office in 1937 in the Madras Presidency, with the Tamil Brahman, C. Rajagopalachari as Prime Minister, naturally the Muslims of Madras feared that they were being obliged to learn a Sanskritised Hindi in the name of Hindustani 2 (ibid.: 351). In Madras Legislative Assembly, there was no unanimity of opinion against Hindustani among the Muslim League members. It was indeed on this 2 The anti-hindustani movement in the south brought together the non-brahman who were against Hindi that was supported by Brahmans and the Tamil speaking Muslims who were against Urdu speaking Muslims' dominance. See More, 1993: p

19 question of Hindustani that real cleavage between the Tamil Muslims and the Urdu-speaking Muslims became apparent (ibid.: 352). Some Urdu speaking Muslim League Assembly members could see an advantage in this controversy. They thought that in the name of Hindustani, they could promote their own language, Urdu, since Hindustani meant both Hindi and Urdu as Gandhi had said. Prominent leader Basheer Ahmad Sayeed even insisted that there was no controversy over this. In his view, the government wanted to propagate this spoken language (Hindustani) which was a Muslim language. They could therefore get the facilities for the speedy learning of this language (More, 1995:352-3). More observes that; The support that Urdu-speaking Muslims extended to Hindustani is understandable. Though Urdu was the cultural language of the vast majority of Muslims in India, it was not the cultural language of the non-urduspeaking Muslim majority of the Madras Presidency. The maintenance and the propagation of Urdu as the cultural language of all the Muslims of the Presidency was absolutely essential for the survival of the Urdu speaking Muslims as a political force in the Presidency, for without the predominance of Urdu, the Urdu-speaking Muslims knew that it would be more and more difficult for them to stake their claim for the leadership of the Madras Muslims or to play an important role in Madras Muslim Politics. Many Urduspeaking Muslims saw in the proposal to introduce Hindustani a golden opportunity to propagate their language among the other Muslims and thus maintain their influence (1995: 353). For the Tamil speaking Muslims, Urdu!Hindustani was the symbol of the linguistic and cultural dominance of the Urdu speaking Muslims. Learning it would only prolong their cultural subordination to Urdu-speaking Muslims in spite of the latter being a minority among Muslims in the Tamil country (ibid.: 354). In Mappila Muslims of Kerala, Miller (1992: 173) describes their relationship with north Indian and other Muslims as follows: The Mappilas 3 were cut off from Indian Muslims by the barriers of language and culture as well as by geography. Aside from Bengal the bulk of Indian 3 The Mappilas are all located in a narrow belt along the southwest coast of India. Not only geographically, but also linguistically and culturally, the Mappila Muslims are for all practical purpose identified with Kerala (Miller, 1992: 1). 221

20 Muslims was Urdu speaking, and their cultural affinities lay to the north and west. These Muslims had no visible interest in the Mappilas... Few Mappilas, in turn, knew Urdu, and today only a minority show interest in the language. Mappilas had little knowledge of the leaders of north Indian Muslims, and less of their writings. At practical levels the contacts were marginal, and distance, language and culture remain as blocks to regular communication and larger contacts today. This means that although the number of Urdu speakers among the Mappila Muslims is small, they are aware that there is the dominant image that Urdu is a Muslim language and that Urdu symbolizes unity of Muslims in India, or at least the language is treated in that way. The question that arises is why the Mappila Muslims would think of Urdu as a symbol of Muslim identity in India if their contact with the northern Muslims is limited. In order to answer this question it is important to revisit the history of colonial India. During the colonial period Muslim League's influence was widespread among the Muslims all over India. As it was in Tamil Nadu's case, in Kerala also, the Malabar branch of the Muslim League fully supported League policies as they developed in relation to the partition proposal (ibid.: 162). Although the Muslims in Kerala and Tamil Nadu prefer to identify with the culture and dominant languages of these two regions, they are at the same time conscious of their larger ideologically constructed 'Indian' rather than 'regional' Muslim identity. A similar pattern can be observed nearer north in Gujarat. In the case of Gc.jarat, Misra (1964: 168) notes that;... almost all Muslim in Gujarat speak Gujarati with fluency and Urdu with a varying degree of ease. Among most fluent are the Syeds and other foreign Muslim communities who speak Urdu as the first language and Gujarati as the second. Amongst others like Patani Vohras and Tais, in the Urdu they speak as the first language, the Gujarati imprint is so heavy (except for some words) that it appears almost indistinguishable from Gujarati. Being the language of the Islamized elite and also because it is nearer to the languages in which the Islamic sacred lore is couched, Urdu has come to be regarded as one of the indices of Islamization. It has also been advocated as a factor of Muslim unity and in actual fact, before and after partition, there was a strong movement urging the Muslims to declare Urdu as their mother 222

21 tongue in the census questions. The result has been a greater awareness of Urdu as a peculiarly Islamic language and an effort on the part of average Muslims to speak it with reasonable degree of purity and competence. It will be noted that peculiarly enough, this competence is limited to speech alone. From examples of these three states, we can see the different patterns of attitudes among Muslims towards Urdu language. The conclusion one may draw here is that among Muslims the attitude to Urdu can be assessed at two levels; the inter-community and intra-community levels. For non-urdu speaking Muslims they recognize Urdu as part of their identity when it comes to inter-community relations but do not necessarily accept the same identities when it comes intra-community relations. In Tamil Nadu for example, the Urdu speaking Muslims were the ones who were dominant and their imposition of identity on non-urdu speaking Muslims would be more strongly presented than the non-urdu speaking Muslims' refusal to accept the identity. We can see here how political power can transfnrm the symbols of a handful of people into an entire community's symbols. This process of adoption of symbols of part of a community by the entire community gives an insight into how Urdu has played a crucial role in the constitution of Muslim identity across India especially after independence. The significance of the language is particularly evident in the higher percentage of Urdu speakers or better Urdu education systems among Muslims in the southern parts than tne northern part. In this sense Farouqui (1995:93) notes that without doubt, today the Muslims of south India and west Bengal are recognizing Urdu as their language and a symbol of their religious identity in the changed political milieu, even if Urdu was never their language and in the past they were greatly distanced from the Muslims of north India. Siddiqui (1979:27) explains this phenomenon by stating that; This common identity as a result of a common religion as practiced, subject to sectarian variations, and a sort of psychological unity and a growing sense of 223

22 common destiny within the socio-political life of the country is partly expressed in the process of Urduisation to a considerable extent among the non-hindustani speaking Muslims, drawn not only from the Indo-Aryan speaking areas of north and north-west India but also the Dravidian speaking south, as well as from the delta region of which Calcutta is a natural part. Even those who have retained their mother tongue such as Bengali, Rajasthani, Malayali and Tamil tend to become bilingual and adopt Hindustani as a second language for conversation outside their homes or with people other than their own linguistic group. According to some scholars, the views discussed above about the Muslims' perception of Urdu is only partial and should not be construed to apply in all situations. Hasan, M. (1998: 17) points out that in reality, the commitment of some Muslim groups to specifically Islamic ideas and symbols does not indicate a unified structure of consciousness or a community acting in unison. What should not be assumed is a monolithic conception of Islamic ideology and practice or a teleology dictating the actions of the Muslims or a general acquiescence in the actions of few. It is an undeniable fact however, that the Muslims are generally seen and judged by others as a collective group through these Islamic ideas and symbols that are created by 'some Muslim groups'. These ideas and symbols are the ones, which dominate other people's understanding and perceptions of Muslim identity and often come to be accepted even by Muslims themselves. The Muslim identity is created on the basis of an image that is assumed to apply universally to all Muslims across India. Since the people who create or hold such images are usually powerful or in the majority, people come to believe in these images and treat Muslims accordingly. Urdu movement in UP Farouqui (1995:93) observes that Muslim politics in contemporary India is not particularly different from what it was in the past. The hold of north India Muslims on Muslim political campaigns even after independence has been strong. This view could apply to Urdu movement as well. After independence, as discussed in the previous chapters, Urdu lost the 224

23 dominant power in the field of administration, education and employment as it was during the colonial period. This loss of legitimation was an outcome of policies that were implemented by the state governments especially in UP. All these reactions were connected with the history of nationalistic movement and the birth of Pakistan. However the loss was not just concerning the legitimate status of the language. Since Urdu was a key component in the ideology of the Pakistan movement it lost its place in independent India as a consequence. Now Muslims in India had to struggle for reconstitution of identity and especially to redefine the place of Urdu. There was a consensus at least in UP and Bihar on the dangers overshadowing the future of Urdu. This was taken seriously by the some of the Muslims who saw it as neglect and attack on their identity and further spurred Urdu movement in the northern part of India especially in UP in 1950s and 1960s. Brass (1996:90) observes that in the post-independence period, as Urdu lost some of its hold in the government schools in the north, the Ulama rushed to the defence of Urdu, which came to be seen as part and parcel of Muslim social and cultural identity and their spiritual inheritance. The Jamiyat alulama jumped into the fray as its foremost defender. At a conference in Lucknow, Maulana Hifzur Rahman and Syed Mahmud made fiery speeches on this subject (Hasan, 1997: 191). The Majlis-i Mushawarat (the federation of various Muslim organizations) released a nine-point manifesto in July It records that Urdu was being ignored in schools as a medium of instruction. The manifesto constructs Muslim identity in terms of endangered yet chosen emblems such ::1s Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu and Muslim Personal Law. Constituted as social and cultural simulacrum, this ensemble of objectified emblems denotes the 225

24 Muslim community (Talib, 1998, 307-8). Some considered it as an opportunity for reviving the League (Hasan, 1997:191). Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan announced that they had recently demanded religious training and Urdu as the medium of expression in primary schools for those whose mother tongue was Urdu, but the majority community was against them. He wondered how their demands could reach the Government through the majority community organizations. It was therefore necessary that the League revive its political activities (ibid.). The most famous movement, however, was the signature camprugn of Anjuman-i- Talaqqui-i- Urdu led by Zakir Husain. Das Gupta (1970: 142) writes that the sense of neglect as felt by the Urdu speech community led the working committee of the Anjuman Taraqqui-i-Urdu (Hind) to lead a campaign on behalf of the Urdu-speaking people of Uttar Pradesh for the acceptance of Urdu as a regional language in the state. Ten thousand parents and guardians, worried over diminishing employment prospects for their wards, petitioned the state education minister (Hasan, 1997: 191). On 15th February 1954, a deputation of the Anjuman led by Zakir Husain and others met President Rajendra Prasad and presented a memorandum signed by over 2, 700,000 persons (Noorani, 2003: 19). The memorandum submitted by the Anjuman requested the president to issue a directive under Article 347 of the Constitution of India that Urdu be recognized as one of the regional languages of UP (ibid.: 299). However the crucial difference between this movement and the one led by the Ulama and potential League revival campaigners was that the Anjuman did not approach this issue through a separate identity factor, while former tried to associate the issue of Urdu with Muslims for different motives. The memorandum read as follows; We submit that Urdu, which through centuries has developed a style and a 226

25 literature which any people can justly be proud of, is today the spoken language of a large number of men and women of all faiths and creeds in Uttar Pradesh, who rightly claim it as their mother tongue or their literary language. All these people while anxious to learn and write Urdu in its own script and for, very good reasons, wish to preserve this national heritage (ibid.: 300). This approach of the Urdu speaking Muslims, which seeks to present the issue of Urdu from the perspective of a composite culture, has been observed in several fields. The stated purpose of the reorganized Anjuman in independent India is also to adopt all possible measures for promoting Urdu and to popularize its simpler form, the Hindustani (Das Gupta, 1970: 209). As Singh (2000:195) notes, most scholars continue to view Urdu language and literature as a part of composite Indian culture shared both by the Muslims and non-muslims and they do not associate Urdu either exclusively with Islam or with Muslim community. This includes even some of the eminent Hindu leaders like Inder Kumar Gujral. By emphasizing that Urdu is an Indian language (and therefore not only for Muslims), they try to present a perspective which would be acceptable to the other Indians. This signifies a reconstitution of Identity - from Muslim identity to a composite Indian cultural identity. As a part of Indian identity, they try to increase the instrumental power of the language also. These efforts could however not be sustained for long nor could they secure the support from Muslims in other states. This could be explained first by the dispersal of the population of Muslims and Urdu speakers in several states. Oommen (1997b:158) explains it in terms of the disjuncture between Urdu and Islam that has further muted the possibility of Urdu nationalism emerging as an authentic force in independent India. In this case while Islam remains a unifying factor for Muslims throughout India, they cannot be similarly united on the basis of a common language, Urdu. Apart from this fact, there is no ideological consensus among the Muslims on how to present the issue of Urdu and there is no strong leadership or organization to 227

26 do that. The 'secular' Muslims and the Ulama's presentation of the issue of Urdu are completely at variance. While the Ulama still prefer to promote Urdu exclusively as a Muslim identity, 'secular' Muslims seek to emphasize the composite culture of India, though their approaches are similarly motivated by the desire to uphold the Muslim cultural distinctiveness. Another reason why Urdu movement cannot be sustained is the lack of goal orientation as was the case during the colonial period. Instrumentally they can ask at most for the second (official) status in the states or better educational facilities where Urdu speakers are in substantial numbers. Symbolically they can ask for the protection of Urdu so long as Urdu is not identified as the language of Muslims only (Brass, 1975: 430). Thus this movement led by Zakir Husain could not continue because Urdu was seldom the main plank of any organized or sustained agitation by UP Muslims (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183). According to Noorani (2003:20) what followed is recorded in documents - speeches full of anguish at the plight of Urdu; a succession of delegations and memoranda; and steady banishment of Urdu as a medium of instruction at the school level in Uttar Pradesh. In the early 70s, again Urdu speakers mounted renewed pressure on the government through seminars, public meetings and petitions to the state government. These demands received some attention from the central government, which appointed the Gujral Committee to explore the problems faced by Urdu speakers (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183-4). The report made recommendations in several fields including education and administration. However the result as found by the Jafri Committee was that most of the recommendation were not implemented even more than 15 years later ( Jafri Committee Report). Muslim legislators lobbied the government to push through the legi$lation, but there was no sustained movement (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 184). The UP 228

27 Anjuman failed to exert any autonomous pressure on the ground to accord Urdu its due, while in neighbouring Bihar the Anjuman conducted a successful democratic movement for the recognition of Urdu and functioned as an intermediary group in mobilizing voters and pressurizing the new Bihar Government to act on its electoral promise (ibid.: 184-5). Although the Urdu movement may have weakened, it does not necessarily mean that the efforts were fruitless. The percentage increase between 1951 to 1961 in the number of Urdu speakers was 71.3 in India. Considering that the percentage for all the languages in the same duration was 21.6 %, possibly Urdu consciousness increased among the Urdu speakers (Pandey, 1997:85). Eventually Urdu acquired the second official language status in UP in 1990, as we have seen above. There is no doubt that because of these movements, Urdu started regaining some instrumental power, though in desecularized form. The impact of this new power has however been slow and not so obvious. Although secular nationalists from among the Muslims insist that Urdu is part of India's composite culture, they in fact are conscious of its unique association with their identity. While it is true that Urdu is spoken by non Muslims and is a symbol of composite Hindu and Muslim culture, it is a special heritage of the Indian Muslims and that religious literature as well as the cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu. Thus it is not Hindu-Muslim unity which is threatened by the decline of Urdu, but the cultural vitality and sense of identity of the Muslim community, which the Muslim elite of north India wish to preserve and strengthen (Brass, 1975: 186-7). There is almost a consensus among Muslims on this account. While logically they are aware Urdu is not exclusively for Muslims, they have greater emotional attachment to it than non-muslim speakers of the 229

28 language do. Khalidi (1995:131-2) elaborates this view by stating that; Few topics among Muslims invite such emotional outpouring as does Urdu. This is one of the few subjects over which there is near unanimity among "progressive", "moderate", "modernists" and "orthodox" Muslims. Among the progressive academics, Muhammad Mujib asserts that "stability and progress, national dignity and individual character all require that we should appreciate the true value oflndian Muslim culture and the Urdu language as the most precious heritage of our past and our greatest support in the future." A moderate and a modernist" like Sayyid Abid Husain opined "the learning of Urdu for Indian Muslims is not only a vital cultural but also a religious necessity... It would be nothing less than intellectual and spiritual suicide to give up Urdu." Abid Husain's views do not seem greatly diferent from an "orthodox" Maulana Muhammad Ali Jawhar who "confessed in the end that Urdu is the irreducible minimum to which the most compromising Muslim would consent" The declining fortunes of Urdu were neatly summed up by a leading authority on Islam, Prof Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "the community is in danger of being deprived of its language, than which only religious faith is a deeper possession. Since the association of Urdu with Muslims has never been in question, anything that adversely impacts on Urdu is considered as an attack on the Muslim community itself. It spurs the Muslims to seek to protect Urdu more strongly. Thus it is assumed that to protect Urdu is equivalent to protecting Muslim identity. The efforts to safeguard Muslim identity through the establishment of Urdu medium schools, the demand for grant of official status for Urdu, signature campaigns or memoranda and seminars, all constitute a modified postindependence Urdu movement. It is different from the pre-independence movement that aimed to separate Muslims from non-muslims and led to the creation of Pakistan. In addition the Urdu movement or Urduisation of non-urdu speaking Muslims can be understood as a part of Islamization or Islamic revivalism. Singh (1994:76-7) elaborates that; Islamization, in the form of religious revivalism, distantiated Muslims from the cultural ties existing with Hinduism, and the increased identity conscious and political mobilization of the community was the normal sociological process for this minority group under type of political and socirl situations to which it was exposed after the partition. Some of the studies which are available on this problem suggest that Islamization, in the form of a solidaristic movement reinforcing communal, cultural and political 230