Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa: A Conference Report

Transcription

1 C o n f e r e n c e R e p o r t Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa: A Conference Report by Rebecca Shereikis, ISITA Coordinator, Northwestern University From May 17-19, 2007, the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) at Northwestern University (Evanston, IL) sponsored an international conference on the theme of Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa. Over three days, participants from nine countries engaged in lively discussions about the presence and influence of Islam in the contemporary public sphere in Africa. The highlight of the conference was a keynote address by distinguished scholar of Islam and human rights Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na im of Emory University. An-Na im s address attracted a large and varied audience including faculty, graduate and undergraduate students from Northwestern and other universities, and the general public from the Chicago area and the greater Midwest. The conference also included a special session in honor of John Hunwick (emeritus, history and religion, Northwestern University) ISITA s co-founder and one of the pioneers of the study of Islam and Africa where audience members who had encountered John Hunwick in various contexts (as teacher, colleague, researcher, etc.) spoke movingly of his contributions to the field and to their personal careers. ISITA and Northwestern University gratefully acknowledge the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which provided major funding for this event, with supplemental funding provided by the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University. The statements made and views expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the authors. The conference drew on perspectives from many disciplines, including law, philosophy, political science, history, journalism, religious studies, women s studies, and anthropology. The conference highlighted the range of possible relationships between Islam and the state in Africa from the majority John Hunwick and Bachir Diagne Muslim countries of Senegal (a secular state with a democratic political system) and Morocco (a constitutional monarchy where the King is considered Commander of the Faithful ); to Nigeria, where a delicate balance maintains between Muslims and Christians in a democratic system under strain; to South Africa and Kenya where Muslims are a minority population. Since the conference took place within months of presidential elections in Senegal (February 2007) and Nigeria (April 2007), the relationship between Islam and politics leading up to and during these two important elections was the focus of several presentations, and formed the backdrop to the panels on Senegal and Nigeria. A noteworthy feature of the event was that it brought together scholars from francophone and Anglophone countries, who seldom find opportunities to exchange ideas in academic venues. One of the trends noted in many of the presentations was an increasingly blurred boundary between religious and political activities. In the case of Senegal, presenters cited a more overt identification of the state with a particular religious affiliation (the Mouride tariqa, or Sufi brotherhood), while in both Senegal and Nigeria, the increasing political activity of religious

2 leaders and ulama was noted. While some presenters saw this as a worrying trend, others questioned the assumption that a healthy democracy hinges on relegation of religion to the private sphere. Some presentations also suggested that Muslim political engagement does not necessarily translate into an Islamist political agenda and that we must expand our vision of Muslim politics to include new ways of being Muslim that are emerging in tandem with a neo-liberal political economy. Indeed, the papers presented evidence that the relationship between Islam and the state can take various forms, and that the emergence of public Islam does not necessarily constitute a threat to democracy. The process of negotiating the boundaries between religion and politics, and between public and private, could, in fact, be viewed as evidence of democratic processes at work. However, vigilance is required to ensure that these boundaries continue to be negotiated and debated in a truly inclusive Hassan Ndzovu, along with two new essays authored by the conference co-organizers Muhammad Sani Umar and Souleymane Bachir Diagne. To request a copy, please contact ISITA at ISITA@northwestern.edu. Richard Joseph and Abdullahi An-Na im. Photo by Jim Ziv. Keynote Address: Islam, Politics, and the State: Mediating Permanent Paradox Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory University Penda Mbow and Leo Villalon. Photo by Jim Ziv. manner, including the participation of women, who are often denied space in the public sphere to debate as equals with men. Taken together, the presentations challenged the idea that there exists a clean division between secular and religious visions of the state or society. In fact, the example of the recent Moroccan family code that was accepted by both secularists and Islamicists after a long process of struggle and negotiation (see Harrak) is testimony to the fact that the two are not always irreconcilable. The following report provides a synopsis of each presentation. Selected papers from the conference have been published by ISITA and are available in paper and electronic formats. Published papers include those by Penda Mbow, Abdoulaye Dièye, Alexander Thurston, Haruna Wakili, Hauwa Mahdi, Fatima Harrak, and Distinguished scholar of Islam and human rights, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na im, opened the conference with a keynote address, Islam, Politics, and the State: Mediating Permanent Paradox. Throughout this talk, An-Na im argued for the importance of deconstructing and demystifying certain key concepts concerning Islam s relationship to the state, and the state s relationship to sharia. First, An-Na im argued, the state is a political institution that cannot believe or disbelieve therefore the idea of an Islamic state is a conceptual impossibility. In his reading of Islamic history, the state has never been Islamic, and in fact, there has been a constant process of differentiation between Islam and the state, with religious authority residing in the community. Second, he argued that the state cannot enact sharia, which evolved completely independently from state authority. Far from being part of the state apparatus, sharia scholars have historically resisted being co-opted by the state. An-Na im also called attention to the fact that in the post-colonial 2

3 Program of African Studies period, existing states are based upon a European model, so no matter what the relationship was in the past between Islam and the state, it can never be recovered. The irony is that present-day advocates for an Islamic state are adopting a European conception of the state and the law to claim that we can have an Islamic state and that the state can enact sharia. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na im. Photo by Jim Ziv. But while asserting the need to separate Islam from the state, An-Na im insisted that we must recognize the permanent connectedness of Islam and politics, since people enter the political arena as religious actors, bringing their beliefs with them. This is the permanent paradox that must constantly be mediated, over time, and in different contexts. Moreover, An-Na im believes that sharia has a role to play in the public sphere; the challenge is how to keep sharia relevant to public life without enacting it as state law. He proposed a solution in the concept of civic reason, according to which principles from sharia could be debated, discussed, and potentially enacted as state law, but without social justice. To keep discourse civic and civil, we must separate it from religious rhetoric. An-Naim also stressed the importance of human agency and struggle in shaping institutions and political outcomes. He urged African intellectuals to come to terms with the current political situations in their countries and remain committed to engaged scholarship. As daunting as the problems facing African states may be, these are the only systems and institutions we have and we must find ways to work within them to create positive change. At the same time, An-Na im acknowledged the dilemma facing African intellectuals: those who remain at home and speak out are persecuted, while those who relocate to other countries to protect their safety and freedom of speech lose legitimacy in their home countries. Transnational alliances between academics can help to support African intellectuals in their struggles. Robert Launay and Ramatoulaye Diagne. Photo by Jim Ziv. Panel I: Islam and the Public Sphere in Senegal Panel Chair: Souleymane Bachir Diagne (philosophy, Northwestern University) Conference participants enjoying the keynote reception. Photo by Jim Ziv. reference to belief or religious authority. If sharia principles are enacted, it would be because they have been deemed beneficial for the society, rather than through reference to religious authority. For example, a prohibition against riba (usury) should be enacted not because it is haram (prohibited), but perhaps on the basis of This panel reunited the participants in a workshop with the same title organized by Souleymane Bachir Diagne in March 2007 in Dakar. Held immediately following the February 2007 elections, this workshop attracted a varied audience of scholars, journalists, and the public, and generated discussion in the media. In Evanston, the participants presented their papers to a different, largely Anglophone, audience, which invited comparisons between the Senegalese situation and other contexts. In his presentation titled Politique et Religion au Sénégal: les Nouveaux Paradigmes, Ousseynou Kane (philosophy, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar) opened the session with 3

4 a discussion of recent trends that he believes pose a threat to Senegal s historic commitment to a secular state. He focused on the increasingly influential role of the Mouride tariqa (Sufi order, or brotherhood) in Senegalese politics. Kane revisited an op-ed article he had published in 2001 titled La République couchée (The Bachir Diagne. Photo by Jim Ziv. Republic on its Knees), where he expressed his dismay at the recent visit of President Wade to Touba to publicly renew his allegiance to the Caliph General of the Mouride tariqa. While acknowledging that the Sufi brotherhoods have always played a role in Senegalese politics, Kane noted several new phenomena that lead him to wonder whether Senegal may soon become a brotherhood state. These include the increasing dominance of the Mourides in political life and the overt allegiance of the presidency to the Mourides. The rise of this religious state is occurring against the backdrop of the decay of civil institutions such as police and courts, the growing economic power of the Mourides, and the appearance of new, more overt forms of religiosity. Kane believes this tendency towards a brotherhood state must be resisted. The sympathetic reaction he received to his 2001 article from a variety of Senegalese (including religious leaders) convinces him that a large sector of the citizenry remains committed to secularism. Ramatoulaye Diagne (philosophy, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar) followed with a presentation titled Women and the Public Sphere: Is Religion an Obstacle? in which she asked whether Senegal, as a secular state, uses Islam to limit women s political empowerment. Senegal has ratified most of the international conventions that seek to end discrimination against women, and various laws have been enacted to protect Senegalese women. However, despite constituting 52% of the electorate, women play a limited role in Senegal s political life, and their growing economic independence is certainly not reflected in the political realm. The Family Code still places men as heads of the family, even though women are often the primary economic providers. Additionally, many social practices such as early marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM) continue despite Ousseynou Kane Bakary Mane, Abdoulaye Dièye, Ramatoulaye Diagne, and Penda Mbow laws on the books prohibiting them. Diagne questioned the religious origins of these practices: is Islam being used to justify traditions that are harmful to women? Diagne concluded that it is not religion that keeps women away from the public sphere, but rather tradition, poverty and illiteracy. Although many Senegalese women belong to the Sufi orders, they usually have a secondhand knowledge of the Qur an, and therefore cannot distinguish between religious recommendations and cultural traditions. She called for improved education for girls and women, especially education about how to be a citizen which means more than simply voting in elections and a recasting of the public sphere to facilitate women s full participation. 4

5 Program of African Studies In her presentation titled Secularism, Religious Education, and Human Rights in Senegal, Penda Mbow (history, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar) explored how the evolving relationship between religion and the state is affecting the educational system in Senegal. In 2002, the state enacted reforms that introduced religious education into the state school system and also allowed all children enrolled in the daara (Senegalese Qur anic schools) to be considered schooled in the same way as those enrolled in public schools. These are profound new developments, Mbow argued, that challenge the state s longtime commitment to secular education. The decision to introduce religious education into the state system she considers to be partially the result of the increasing need for politicians to appease religious authorities, and linked to the growing influence of the Mouride tariqa. The decision to include daara students in national educational statistics she considers motivated by a desire to increase Senegal s primary education statistics in order to meet development markers set by international organizations (by counting children enrolled in daaras as part of Senegal s educational system, the numbers increase dramatically). The daaras are controversial institutions that have also come to the attention of human rights groups because of the strong association between daara students (talibes) and mendicancy. Mbow urged that the question be approached from a human rights perspective recognizing the right of all children to receive an education and be free from exploitation and outlined a series of measures designed to protect their rights. Penda Mbow. Photo by Jim Ziv. Abdoulaye Dièye (law, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar) adopted a legal perspective in his presentation titled La Laïcité à l Epreuve des Faits au Sénégal: Approche Juridique and traced the history of the deliberate manner in which the Senegalese constitution was constructed to ensure the secular orientation of the state. He emphasized that Senegalese secularism is not anti-religious, but rather emphasizes mutual tolerance among diverse religions and guarantees freedom of worship. Although secularism in Senegal rests on a solid legal base, it is not untouchable. Dièye outlined what he considers to be the current threats to secularism in Senegal including a president who openly manifests religious affiliation and the new marabout politicians and their increasingly militant supporters. Dièye also noted the attempted removal of references to secularism in the draft of the 2001 constitution and the proposal of a new Family Code with an Islamist agenda that claims to be in accordance with sharia. On balance, however, Dièye concluded that the populace remains highly committed to secularism, and observed that an association of organizations has been created for the defense of secularism. Ousseynou Kane and Abdoulaye Dièye. Photo by Jim Ziv. In Why is Militant Islam a Weak Phenomenon in Senegal?, Alexander Thurston (Fulbright Scholar) raised the question of whether the existence of a viable public sphere hinges upon the banishment of religion to the private realm. While some scholars have suggested that the encounter between public Islam and democratization inevitably produces political collapse (as in the case of Algeria), Thurston contended that the case of Senegal, a Muslim majority country and functioning democracy, challenges this assumption. Senegal s lack of widespread radical Islamic political activity is often attributed to cultural factors the supposed peaceful character of Senegalese Islam and the influence of the Sufi brotherhoods. Thurston argued that we must look instead at the concrete social, economic, and political factors that have made co-existence of Islam and democracy possible in Senegal. Thurston focused on two Islamic movements in Senegal the AEMUD (Association of Muslim Students 5

6 of the University of Dakar) and the Moustarchidine both of which have the potential to develop radical political agendas and challenge the state. But in both cases, the state s willingness to negotiate with and give these groups space (with the Alexander Thurston and Bachir Diagne exception of a brief period of repression of the Moustarchidine) has prevented their radicalization. Thurston concluded that the Senegalese case demonstrates that Islam s emergence in the public sphere does not automatically undermine democratization; moreover it suggests that various relationships between Islam and democracy are possible. This calls into question the assumption that Islam must be privatized in order to maintain a viable public sphere and viable democracy. The new pressures on the press in a context where religion and politics are increasingly mixed was the topic of the presentation by Bacary Mane (journalist, Sud Quotidien) titled La Presse Face aux Lobbies Religieux en Période Electorale. He began by recounting various incidents from the recent presidential election campaign, where journalists were the victims of violence or intimidation by disciples of Sufi orders after providing coverage that was critical of their leaders. The press has an important role as watchman and critic, but certain religious leaders expect the Bacary Mane press to be submissive to them. Journalists face a dilemma when religious figures are involved in politics: how to preserve the dignity of the religious figures while respecting the public s right to information? Additionally, given that many journalists also belong to brotherhoods themselves, how does the press maintain its objectivity? Mane suggested that more education and seminars for religious leaders and the press were needed to help clarify the role of the press in a democracy; he also suggested that objectivity would be easier to maintain if journalists did not report on events related to their own brotherhoods (for example, a Mouride journalist could cover the events of the Tijaniyya, etc.). Panel discussant Leonardo Villalón (political science and African Studies, University of Florida) observed that despite the pessimistic tone of some of the presentations, which framed recent developments in terms of an attack on secularism, Senegal is actually considered a success case when it comes to the peaceful co-existence of religion and the state. Villalón emphasized that we must place recent developments in their historical political and religious contexts. Democracy was not truly practiced in Senegal until the late 1980s; therefore we are witnessing a relatively young democratic process working itself out. In the religious realm, we are witnessing generational change and fragmentation of the important religious families, as the grandsons of the founders compete for influence. The young marabouts referred to in some of the papers are among hundreds of descendents; thus its not surprising that they would make dramatic statements to get attention. Villalón argued that there are two separate issues at stake. First, is secularism in Senegal in question? Villalón suggested that despite being put to various tests, the secular state in Senegal is quite stable. In fact, Abdoulaye Wade s victory in the 2007 elections is considered a victory for secularism, since he defeated candidates campaigning on religious grounds. Second, is the neutrality of the state being eroded? Villalón acknowledged the widespread concern that the state is leaning towards the Mourides, but views this as more of a political than a religious issue that is, Wade makes appeals to the Mourides as a unified political constituency. The Mourides, in fact, are not pushing for a more Islamic agenda than other religious groups. Villalón suggested that the real issue is whether the current Mouride unity will hold with the passing of the current leader. In conclusion, Villalón urged that Senegal be viewed as a place where negotiation is taking place at a specific historical 6

7 Program of African Studies juncture and in the context of a relatively recent democratization. In fact, many of the issues discussed in the papers, such as ambivalence over education or how to report on religious events, are evidence of a process of negotiation, which is part of democracy. He also suggested that more empirical and ethnographic research on, for example, followers of the marabouts and members of youth groups would better illuminate who is supporting various positions. Panel II: Islam and the Public Sphere in Muslim Minority Countries: Kenya and South Africa Leo Villalon would conform to the South African Bill of Rights, and another, which contended that the government should have no say in how sharia is enacted. In the political realm, Tayob observed that the Muslim political parties that emerged in the 1990s have met with little success and have turned instead to promoting a hyper concern with morality and primordial messages about the Qur an and Hadith. The redefinition of public space (renaming buildings and streets, for example) has been a project of the South African government since The government has tried to engage religious communities in transforming their sites of significance into national symbols. Tayob noted that in these discussions Muslims are more prepared to take on a defensive, protest position than they are to engage in the debates. Tayob concluded that the reluctance of conservative Muslim leaders to embrace the demands of engagement and contestation in the public sphere as equals flies in the face of justice, undermines freedom, and puts Muslims on the defensive. Moreover, it does not reflect the freedoms accorded Muslims in the democratic, pluralistic, and human rights-oriented culture of post-apartheid South Africa. Panel Chair: Ruediger Seesemann (religion, Northwestern University) In his presentation titled A Muslim Public in Post- Apartheid South Africa: Between Law, Politics and Culture, Abdulkader Tayob (religious studies, University of Cape Town) offered his observations of recent developments in South Africa, where Muslims make up less than 1.5 percent of the population. While Muslims occupy all points on the political spectrum, Tayob noted that Muslim politics are currently dominated by a conservative, inward-turning trend, which stands in contrast to the liberation projects of earlier Muslim intellectuals. Tayob focused on three sites of political engagement for South African Muslims: debates over Muslim personal law; the activities of Muslim political parties; and the redefinition of public space. In the legal realm, the post-apartheid constitution guaranteed personal law for Muslims, but the Muslim community was charged with putting forth the type of law they wanted. Several years of intense debate ensued, with two positions emerging: one that believed fiqh and sharia should be translated into a form that Abdulkader Tayob. Photo by Jim Ziv. In Muslims and Party Politics in Kenya, with Special Reference to the Role of Islamic Topics in Elections, Hassan Ndzovu (religion, Moi University, Eldoret) traced the historical struggle of the Muslim community to have a voice in Kenyan politics and discussed Islamic topics that have surfaced during electoral periods. In Kenya where Muslims are in the minority (statistics vary from 5-35% depending on the source) Muslims have faced political marginalization more on the basis of race and ethnicity than religion. The pre-independence period saw 7

8 the development of racially based Muslim organizations made up of Arabs and Asians. The colonial regime, which viewed its subjects in racial rather than religious terms, accorded Arabs and Asians privileges of representation that they did not extend to Africans. The racially based patterns of organization and privilege that developed in the colonial period influenced the shape of Muslim political activity after independence. The first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was primarily concerned with ethnoregional balancing. He and his successors included individual Muslims in their governments, but these Muslims did not stress their religious affiliation. An important change occurred in the 1990s when, in the context of a shift to multi-party politics, Muslims tried to form their own political party (the Islamic Party of Kenya or IPK). However, the government banned the IPK on the grounds that it was discriminatory, and tried to split the Muslim constituency along racial lines by creating its own party (United Muslims of Africa), which attempted to draw support from Muslims of African background. These events demonstrate how the race factor has been an obstacle to Muslim political unity. Hassan Ndzovu and Ruediger Seesemann Since 1990, Kenyan Muslims have managed to coalesce around perceived attempts at marginalization or discrimination, such as their reaction to the succession act of 1981 (which Muslims considered contrary to Islamic law) and Moi s singling out of Somali Muslims to carry additional identification. While Muslims won concessions on both issues, Ndzovu contended that these were acts of appeasement by the government to win Muslim votes. Issues of concern to Muslims that will surface in the 2007 elections include the anti-terrorism bills that are viewed as discriminatory towards Muslims, and the status of the Qadi courts, powerful symbols of Muslims identity. Ndzovu concluded that Muslim political unity is being more clearly articulated now than anytime since the IPK period; at the same time, however, race and ethnicity continue to be divisive factors. Which trend will prevail remains to be seen. Panel III: Islam and the Public Sphere in Nigeria: Ulama, the Sharia and Gender Matters Panel Chair: Muhammad Sani Umar (religion and ISITA Director, Northwestern University) Haruna Wakili (Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Bayero University Kano) delivered a presentation titled Islam and the Political Arena in Nigeria: Ulama and the 2007 Elections. He discussed the results of a study he had conducted in the pre-electoral period, interviewing and tracking the political activities and statements of twelve members of the ulama (Islamic scholars), most of whom were from Kano. Wakili observed four areas of consensus among these scholars, who represent diverse brotherhood and political affiliations: 1) The compatibility of Islam and democratic politics; 2) The imperative of the ulama s participation in politics. Most ulama in the study believed that Islamic scholars should play an active role in the political sphere, and that their participation could help sanitize the public space. This represents a major shift from the period prior to 1999, when a popular view in circulation was that Islamic scholars should reject and overthrow if possible the secular state; 3) The importance of Muslim participation in the electoral process. Ulama were observed calling for Muslims to vote en masse and to resist any attempts at fraud or intimidation at the polls; and 4) Encouraging Muslims to vote for the most credible candidate regardless of political party and perhaps even religious disposition. Political and religious affiliations, and even the implementation of sharia, were thus downplayed in the 2007 elections, while the emphasis was placed on the candidates character and personality. Once the elections which Wakili describes as the worst elections in the country s electoral history were over, many ulama condemned what had happened, but others urged Nigerians to accept the results without recourse to violence. Wakili concluded by observing that an interesting dialogue 8

9 Program of African Studies : A Sourcebook, which will be published in several volumes, beginning in late It includes items such as legal documents from the pre-1999 period, past and current penal codes, reported crimes and punishments, documents about the high-profile adultery cases, and other previously un-compiled data, all accompanied by scholarly essays to provide context. The sourcebook reveals variances between states in how the sharia is interpreted and applied, and provides resources to help illuminate whether enforcement of sharia is having the intended outcome for example, whether crime is being reduced in the sharia states. Muhammad Sani Umar and Haruna Wakili between Islam and democracy is taking place in Nigeria s public sphere, and Nigerians must face the challenge of determining how to accommodate religion and religious actors in the country s democratic space. In his presentation titled Sharia Legislative Enactments in Nigeria, Philip Ostien (law, University of Jos) began by noting that an important logic behind sharia implementation in twelve northern Nigeria states beginning in 1999 was the belief that Western laws and institutions have obviously failed Nigeria, and that only a return to divine law can cure the country of its sickness. Ostien reviewed the principal types of legislation intended to bring laws and institutions into conformity with the sharia, including the establishment of new sharia courts and other Islamic institutions, revision of the penal codes, and legislation against social vices. These significant changes are somewhat unique in the political history of Islam for two reasons, Ostien contended: they have been enacted by democratically elected executive and legislative officials responding to the unquestionable desires of the vast majority of their constituents at a relatively local level; and those behind sharia implementation accept that they exist within a larger non- Muslim federation, the supremacy of whose constitution and laws they concede, seeking simply to go as far as possible to enact Muslim legislation and institutions within that framework. Recognizing the lack of documentation and data on the actual implementation of sharia and its outcomes, Ostien and his colleagues launched a documentation project designed to make the legislative materials and other information about the sharia implementation project available for further study. The result is a sourcebook, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria Phil Ostien Exploring how women in Nigeria discuss sharia and hudud in public and private contexts was the topic of the presentation by Margot Badran (Senior Fellow, Georgetown University) titled Women s Views of Shariah and Hudud in Nigeria: Between Private and Public Articulation. Her research was based upon interviews with women mostly public intellectuals and scholars in the North and Middle Belt states in 2005, in the aftermath of the high-profile cases of women tried for adultery by sharia courts. Badran s research revealed that women s views of sharia are most often expressed privately. They fear being labeled as Western or radical if they speak out in public. There are, however, some public forums that allow women s voices to be heard for example, women lawyers and women-led NGOs played a major role in determining the outcome of the high-profile Lawal and Hussaini adultery cases. Conferences also provide public venues where women can express their views and engage men, but Badran found these interactions to be structured, formal and bounded; they often 9

10 amounted to token opportunities to grant women free speech but did not translate into actual social change. Margot Badran. Photo by Jim Ziv. In private, she found women engaging in lively and rigorous discussions about sharia as a social and gender issue. Many women stated that their problem is not with the sharia itself which they consider an inspiration or path that they have always followed but rather with the manner of its implementation, which seems aimed at controlling women. They expressed concerns over misuse of sharia, noting that the first victims of its implementation were poor women. A constant refrain in these conversations was that these issues cannot be taken into the public sphere that, in effect, the public sphere must be managed. Finally, they voiced their desire to engage in deeper study of sharia and fiqh. They recognize that the problem for women is not Islam itself, but rather patriarchal cultural practices and the manner in which sharia is being interpreted by men. In her presentation titled The Hijab in Nigeria, the Woman s Body and the Feminist Private/Public Discourse, Hauwa Mahdi (history, Gothenburg University) further explored women s negotiation of public and private spheres through an analysis of how the hijab (Islamic head covering for women) has taken on different meanings in different contexts in Nigeria, both liberating and limiting women. She noted that prior to the 1970s women did not wear the hijab, but instead often wore Nigerian-style head wraps. In the 1970s with the new oil economy, increasing migration to cities, and the expansion of education for women, greater numbers of women began appearing in public spaces in urban areas. Women began wearing the hijab in this period to protect themselves from verbal assaults from men who objected to their presence in public. Thus the hijab was initially a choice for these urban women, and one that gave them the freedom to move about in public. The impracticality of the hijab for rural women engaged in farming meant that the debate over the hijab remained an urban, middleclass debate. Mahdi traced how the hijab eventually became compulsory rather than a choice. With the collapse of education due to the devaluation of Nigeria s currency by the World Bank, IZALA (a reformist movement that seeks to enforce a strict application of sharia) and other Islamic organizations began to replace the state in offering services such as health care and education. Women who wished to access the services of these organizations were compelled to conform to their ideas of proper dress for women, which included the hijab. Mahdi ended by noting that the compulsory hijab has contributed to an erosion of Nigerian culture and especially an erasing of the cultural variety found in Nigeria. Hauwa Mahdi. Photo by Jim Ziv. 10

11 Program of African Studies Panel IV: Preachers, Public Intellectuals, and Family Law: Perspectives from North and West Africa 1 Panel Chair: Robert Launay (anthropology, Northwestern University) Benjamin Soares (anthropology, Afrika-Studiecentrum Leiden) spoke about ways of being Muslim in contemporary Africa, drawing from the findings of a comparative research project he ran with René Otayek. They commissioned studies on the intersecting dynamics of Islam, politics, and transnationalism within the context of the dramatic changes in Africa over the last fifteen years, including democratization, the weakening of the state (and sometimes its collapse), and the increased importance of transnational and global interconnections. Soares and Otayek s dissatisfaction with the manner in which the topic of political Islam or Islamism has been discussed led them to seek alternate models for understanding contemporary ways of being Muslim in Africa. Their research project showed that Muslims from all sectors of society are often concerned with their identities as Muslims, with questions of religiosity, the correct practice of Islam, and ethical reform or improvement. While Soares thinks that it is premature to pronounce the end of Islamism ( post-islamism ), he contended that some of the new ways of being Muslim in Africa (and elsewhere) provoke a rethinking of existing categories of analysis of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa. Soares and Otayek proposed an alternate framework, what they termed islam mondain (roughly translated as Islam in the present world ), which describes a new type of Muslim sociality that is compatible with the neo-liberal political economy. As African Muslims grapple with economic decline, cutbacks in state services, and disenchantment with politics, they are frequently asking themselves questions about what it means to be Muslim. This new way of being Muslim is especially evident among certain groups usually excluded from public space, including new Muslim intellectuals, youth activists, and women. The concept of islam mondain, Soares argued, helps to destabilize Benjamin Soares. Photo by Jim Ziv. the image of Africa either as a prisoner of its traditions (that is, the idea that there is an authentic African Islam that is predominantly Sufi) or as a fount for Islamism. In a presentation titled The History and Significance of the New Moroccan Family Code, Fatima Harrak (history and African Studies, University Mohammad V-Souissi, Rabat) began by observing that growing religious identity throughout the world is challenging conventional social science wisdom, according to which modernization is accompanied by the marginalization of religion in the public sphere. By discussing the struggles over family law in Morocco a constitutional monarchy where the King is Commander of the Faithful she hoped to offer a case study of an alternative modernity, demonstrating that there are several different models for being Muslim and being modern. Harrak framed her discussion of family law reform within the context of a process of democratization and modernization that has been taking place in Morocco since the 1990s under a political system which, if not exactly religious, is at least not secular. After reviewing various initiatives to reform family law since independence, Harrak described how a new family code (Mudawannat al- Usra) came to be adopted in 2004 after a long and painful process of civil action, controversial debates, and difficult negotiations, in which women s organizations played a primary role. The code, which is quite progressive, undertakes 1 This panel originally included Khaled Chegraoui, of University Mohammad V-Souissi, who was unable to attend the conference. He had planned to present on New Islamic Preachers from the Islamic World: The Case of Amr Khalid. 2 The results of this project have been published as Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and will be published in French by Karthala in

12 an educated woman of humble background, for example). Harrak noted that in Morocco, the monarchy has always been more progressive (because pragmatic) than the religious elite (ulama and other religious groups) and therefore the king s symbolic actions can go beyond the boundaries of debate set by others. She concluded that the role of the King as arbiter between various positions remains a necessary and vital ingredient in Morocco s development and modernization process. Fatima Harrak. Photo by Jim Ziv. a number of reforms including upholding equality in marriage, ending guardianship, allowing women to initiate divorce, and restricting polygamy. The role of King Muhammad VI was crucial in ensuring that the new family code was ultimately supported by both Islamist opponents of the reforms and modernist supporters. He formed a national commission comprised of people from all perspectives; he took pains to demonstrate that the new law was in conformity with Islamic jurisprudence; and he implicated himself in the debate through his personal behavior (his public marriage to Abdul-Rasheed Na Allah asks a question following the keynote address. Photo by Jim Ziv. The Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Northwestern University 620 Library Place Evanston, IL USA Director: Muhammad Sani Umar Program Coordinator: Rebecca Shereikis Telephone: Fax: ISITA@northwestern.edu 2008 Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA), Northwestern University. All rights reserved.