Ideologies of Jihad in Europe

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1 Ideologies of Jihad in Europe Final draft of article published in Terrorism and Political Violence Volume 23, Issue 2, 2011, Pages By PETTER NESSER FFI s (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment s) Terrorism Research Group, Kjeller, Norway The article explores ideological fault lines among Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists) in Europe since the mid-1990s. It argues there have been disputes among the militants about whether to prioritize local struggles or Al Qaeda s global war, and about the legitimacy of launching terrorist attacks in European states offering political asylum to Muslims. It concludes that Europe s militants have become more ideologically unified in conjunction with the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and the Mohammed drawings, seeing European countries as legitimate and prioritized targets, and identifying with Al Qaeda. Keywords: Europe, terrorism, jihadism, ideology. Author: Petter Nesser is a research fellow with FFI s Terrorism Research Group. Trained in the areas of social science, Middle Eastern Studies and Arabic, he has conducted extensive research on Islamist militancy in Europe. Nesser has communicated his research results through academic channels and the media in Norway and internationally. The author would like to thank colleagues at FFI s Terrorism Research Group, Sean O Neill, Dominique Thomas and Will McCants for sharing sources and insights. Address correspondence to Petter Nesser, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, Postboks 25, 2027 Kjeller, Norway. petter.nesser@ffi.no Introduction 1 If I was asked about 11 September, shall we do it or not, I would have said no. 1 Since the 1980s Europe has functioned as a sanctuary and support base for Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists), from different ideological orientations. From the mid-1990s, and increasingly after 9/11 there has been a shift to terrorist violence inside Europe by militants residing in the region, or coming from abroad. In 1995 terrorists linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) staged a series of bomb attacks in France killing eight people and injuring more than Between 1998 and the invasion of Iraq, European security services intercepted several Al Qaeda linked terrorist cells preparing attacks against U.S., Israeli, French and Russian targets. 3 After the invasion of Iraq several European countries became targets for terrorist cells with varying ties to Al Qaeda, many of whom included Europeans by citizenship, or ethnicity. 4 These cells managed to execute lethal attacks in the Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. What have been the main ideological fault lines and dilemmas concerning the conduct of jihadist terrorism in Europe? This article argues that, ideologically, Europe s militant

2 Islamist networks have undergone three phases of evolution. 5 During the early to mid-1990s, local and internationalist trends co-existed in relative harmony, focusing on struggles to topple Muslim regimes and against foreign occupation of Muslim countries. The main ideological disputes during this period occurred over the killing of Muslims in local conflicts. The second phase, lasting roughly from the late 1990s until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was characterized by ideological disarray, by which Europe s militants were torn between local and global causes. The third phase, beginning around the Iraq invasion and lasting until present day, seems to be characterized by a process of ideological unification, and a new generation of jihadists embracing Al Qaeda s ideology of global jihad, seeing European nations as both legitimate and prioritized targets. An important ideological dilemma during the last two periods appears to have been the religious legitimacy of launching terrorist operations in non-muslim host states offering political asylum to Muslims. Regarding this question, ideological discourses on security treaties between Muslims and non-muslims appear to have played a significant role in either obstructing or promoting attacks in Europe. There have been recurring discussions about security treaties on radical websites, and many captured terrorists possessed texts dealing with the topic. What is jihadism? In this article the words jihadism and jihadist refer to Sunni Muslim militant ideologies and movements calling for armed struggle in the cause of God (jihad fi sabil Allah), aiming to defend Muslim territories, to establish Islamic Emirates, and re-establish the Caliphate. 6 Just like other militant ideologies, jihadism deals with three main questions: why do we fight, who are the legitimate and most important enemies to be defeated, and how can they be defeated? Different jihadist trends answer these questions differently. For example, for Al Qaeda, the U.S. is the most important enemy and should be attacked anywhere with all available means, including suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, whereas local militant groups in Muslim countries tend to prioritize the battle against their respective regimes. Perhaps the most important intellectual source of contemporary jihadism is the Egyptian radical Islamist Sayyid Qutb. In the 1960s Qutb called upon a vanguard of true believers to excommunicate the ignorant (jahili) Egyptian regime, which had failed to implement Islamic law and introduced westernized societal institutions and practices, - and wage Holy War against the rulers modeled on the Prophet s re-capturing of Mecca. 7 Jihadism emerged as an internationally oriented movement during the 1980s, among Arab volunteers taking part in the anti-soviet war in Afghanistan, - also referred to as the Arab Afghans. In Afghanistan Egyptian socio-revolutionary ideas mixed with the Saudi brand of salafism, evolving into the so-called salafist-jihadist movement, which established branches and networks throughout the Muslim world, as well as in western countries, mostly in Europe. 8 While Qutb s ideology essentially may be considered political realism covered with religious symbols, Saudi salafism brought to the table a stronger focus on the religious principles of absolute monotheism (tawhid) strict adherence to the Qur an and the Prophet s Traditions (al-sunnah), and emulation of the first Muslims, - the pious ancestors (al-salaf alsalih). 9 On ideological feature of jihadism in Europe, which is rooted in salafism, is the division of the world into two separate spheres, the land of Islam (dar al-islam) governed by Islamic law (al-shariah), and the land of unbelief (dar al-kufr), which may transform into the land of war (dar al-harb or dar al-jihad) under given conditions. In the land of war every Muslim has a religious obligation to fight (the article argues that, over the years Europe has gradually gone from being defined as dar al-kufr only to dar al-jihad ). 10 2

3 Salafist-jihadism may be divided into two main categories based on its political rationales; 1) classical or 2) global. Here, classical jihad refers firstly to armed struggle to overthrow Muslim world regimes and establish Islamic states, and secondly, to armed struggle against non-muslims occupying Islamic territories, for example the Afghan War of Liberation. Global jihad is the armed struggle against all enemies of Islam (but primarily the far enemy, the U.S.), anywhere, and with all available means. The global jihad aims to deter western interference in the Muslim countries (mainly military and economic interference, but also cultural influences). 11 Because salafist-jihadism implies literally pursuing the warrior traditions of the first Muslims it mixes fundamental ideological principles (who are we, who are our enemies and why do we fight?) and practical issues (how do we fight?). Accordingly, militant ideologues issue rulings based on the warfare of Mohammed s armies relating to the strategic-tactical level. For example, they may impose upon Europe s jihadists to flee to a secure base (undertake hijra) and prepare for armed struggle, or to conduct terrorist operations in lands of unbelievers, according to the circumstances (see below). 12 Who are Europe s jihadists? In this article Europe s jihadists refers to militant Sunni Muslims involved in concrete terrorist acts in Europe, and to a broader subculture of radicals centered mainly on the UK, but stretching across Europe. The European networks have involved many different individuals, gangs, groups and networks with varying ties to jihadist movements and organizations in the Muslim countries. Militant Sunnis in Europe seem to differ somewhat from counterparts in Muslim countries in terms of the level of organization, religious-political identity, enemy perception and activism strategy. For example, apart from a few semiorganized groups focused on propaganda and support activities there exist few, if any clearly defined militant organizations in Europe equivalent to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which are running websites and presenting ideological programs and strategies for violent jihad in Europe. 13 Ideologically European countries are considered by jihadists as lands of unbelief. Identifying with the Prophet, his Companions and Supporters in Medina, Europe s militant Sunnis like to portray themselves as a vanguard of true believers surrounded by an ocean of unbelief, supporting and preparing for Holy War. 14 Living among the unbelievers is a controversial topic addressed by jihadist ideologues and subjected to religious rulings. There appears to be consensus among followers of Al Qaeda that Muslims are allowed to live in lands of unbelief according to security treaties (covenants of security) granting mutual safety between Muslims and the host state. The Muslims cannot enter a covenant unless they are in a state of weakness, and the treaty cannot last for more than ten years. While living among the unbelievers, the Muslims are obliged to plan and prepare for armed struggle, - and resume fighting as soon as possible. 15 Methodology Mainly due to the relative absence of clearly defined organizations and ideological templates for a European jihad, studying ideological dilemmas and fault lines is methodologically challenging. With no single document specifying the causes, aims and strategic visions of militants in Europe, there is a need to rely on other indicators. The following takes a closer look at the origins of Europe s jihadist networks and discusses factors internal and external to the networks that contributed to shaping ideological trends. Next, the author provides a sense of what kinds of ideological influences jihadist terrorists have been exposed to by looking at evidence from terrorism investigations. 3

4 For example, did the terrorists maintain ties to known ideologues? If so, what was their ideological position? Likewise, to the extent the terrorists nurtured ties to organizations abroad, what was the ideological orientation of these organizations? Further, what kind of ideological sources surfaced in the investigations of active terrorist cells? And last, what did the terrorists own justifications (retrieved from testimonies from trials, transcripts from surveillance material etc), their target selection and attack methods tell us about their ideological affiliations? 16 For example, there have been several examples on terrorist cells in Europe plotting suicide attacks against American targets, - the typical modus operandi of Al Qaeda. If the terrorists justified their actions with reference to a global war against Islam in the manner of Al-Qaeda, this indicates a strong ideological affinity with bin Laden s group and the global jihad ideology. Conversely, if an Algerian terrorist cell places bombs in Paris and justifies the attacks with reference to France s political interference in Algeria, it indicates a classical jihad approach. Looking at such indicators may thus enable us to situate various jihadist cells and networks operating in Europe along the classical and global jihad spectrum. Approaching ideological dilemmas fault lines through indicators rather than in-depth analyses of ideological texts and discourses, the study should be considered exploratory and hypotheses generating. The origins of jihadism in Europe Jihadism came to Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s with a critical mass of activists, leaders and ideologues involved in local insurgencies, separatist and anti-occupation struggles throughout the Arab countries, in Afghanistan, Pakistan (Kashmir), Chechnya and Bosnia. London and the UK emerged as the main ideological center for Europe s militant communities. The British capital was labeled Londonistan by European security officials because the city served as a base and transit place for militant Sunnis going to Afghanistan. The label was also slang for British authorities turning a blind eye to radicalism and offering sanctuary to suspected terrorists. 17 Because of the concentration of Islamist hardliners and ideologues, the UK emerged as a popular destination for radicals from all over Europe, and other parts of the world. They travelled to the UK in order to interact with militant groups, attend the sermons of famous preachers, and make the contacts necessary to attend training camps and religious schools in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other places. Terrorism investigations in Europe have revealed that many jihadist terrorists in Europe had been in touch with, and attended sermons by radical preachers in London in addition to training camps overseas. 18 Importantly, there were also militant subcultures, radical mosques and ideological mentors in other European countries (for example in Milan, Madrid, Paris, Hamburg etc), but the community in London stood out as the most vigorous and influential. Well-known activists who played important roles in setting up and expanding militant networks from London include among others, the Palestinian Omar Abu Omar alias Abu Qatada, the Egyptian Mustafa Kamil Mustafa alias Abu Hamza, and the Syrians Omar Bakri Mohammed and Mustafa Setmariam Nasir alias Abu Musab al-suri (consult appendix for biographies). Abu Qatada, who has been referred to by journalists as Al Qaeda s Ambassador to Europe, acted as religious mentor for a number of militant groups formed by Arab Afghanistan veterans (such as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and the Jordanian al-tawhid wa l Jihad). 19 Omar Bakri headed the self-declared salafist-jihadist, Pakistani-based al-muhajiroun organization from localities in Edmonton, Tottenham, whereas Abu Hamza was the leader of a North-African based militant group called Supporters of Shariah centred on the Finsbury Park mosque. 20 Abu Musab al- Suri was a more independent activist and strategic advisor with ties to multiple radical groups, 4

5 including Al Qaeda. These entrepreneurial activists and others facilitated recruitment, radicalization and training of two generations of jihadists in Europe. 21 The first generation was dominated by people from Arab origins aiming to ignite Islamic revolutions in their home countries and to function as a mobile guerrilla force travelling between Muslim countries protecting co-religionists from injustices, aggression and foreign occupation. Abu Qatada was the leading ideologue for the Arab warriors. The first generation militants were trained and indoctrinated in Al Qaeda linked religious training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Witness accounts from the Afghan camps report that recruits were given special courses in the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb and other ideologues. 22 The first generation recruited, radicalized and trained a second generation consisting of young men who were born and raised in European countries. This generation had little or no personal experience with armed conflicts in Muslim countries. Many activists of the second generation militants came from Pakistani origins. Others came from multiple ethnicities, including European backgrounds. Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri Mohammed important charismatic leaders for the new generation, and within the frameworks of al-muhajiroun, Supporters of Shariah and likeminded groups across Europe they socialized young European radicals into adapting Al Qaeda s worldview and enemy perception. Second generation activists who are either linked to, or heavily inspired by Al Qaeda, constitute today s main terrorism threat to Europe. Young European jihadists, some of whom have received training in Al Qaeda linked training camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border, were behind the killing of Theo Van Gogh in Holland, the attacks on the London subway on 7 July 2005, and several attempted attacks in the UK, Spain, Denmark, Germany and other European countries that contributed militarily to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Importantly, the generation terminology is an analytical tool signifying phases in the evolution of Islamist militancy in Europe, and does not correspond to first and second generation immigrants. The second generation of jihadist networks includes first, second, third generation immigrants, as well as ethnic Europeans. Internet as source of ideology After 9/11 several radical mosques and centres in Europe were closed down, and radical preachers went in and out of prisons for inciting violence. In this security climate the second generation activists oriented themselves increasingly towards the Internet as one source of ideology. Online, the activists obtained free and direct access to a wide spectrum of ideological material, translated into multiple languages, enabling them to shop around for messages resonating with their beliefs and objectives. Al Qaeda and likeminded groups ran websites since the early 1990s, but the online activity accelerated in conjunction with September 11 and the Iraq war. The most important websites (mother sites) during the first years of Al Qaeda s Internet venture included Al-Nida and Al-Ansar al-islami web forums. These forums were outlets for genuine messages from Al Qaeda and allied groups. Also, Al Qaeda ran its own media production company since 2001 named al-sahab (The Cloud). Moreover, associates and sympathizers established websites and media-companies distributing messages from the mother sites, for example the Global Islamic Media Front. 23 Coinciding approximately with the invasion of Iraq, new mother sites appeared online, such as Ekhlaas, Al-Hisba, Buraq and Al-Fallujah. Another important outlet accessed by European jihadists was the so-called Monotheism and Jihad Platform (minbar al-tawhid wa l jihad), also known and the Maqdisi library, containing all the most influential ideological works by salafist jihadist theoreticians. 24 In recent years, Al Qaeda improved the apparatus for distribution of propaganda and operational advice online. Part of this development was an effort to make ideology accessible for western recruits. And so, originally Arabic language websites began to launch English 5

6 sections and translate propaganda to multiple languages, including European languages. For example, the Global Islamic Media Front set up a German branch and the London jihadist crowd launched all-english web forums. 25 In addition, Islamic radicals established their own translation service called At-Tibyan Publications administered from London, targeting non- Arabic speakers. 26 What ideological material did Europe s jihadists access? Information from terrorism investigations shows that European militants accessed three main categories of ideological sources: classical and contemporary Middle Eastern salafist ideologues; statements by Al Qaeda s leaders and spokesmen, as well as sermons, writings and audio-visual speeches by Europe based radical preachers. 27 They accessed these materials via three main platforms: radical mosques and study circles in Europe, religious schools and training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan, as well as websites and discussion forums on the Internet. The main topics of interest seem to be religious justification for jihad and martyrdom in general, justification for attacks against specific enemies (the U.S., Israel and their allies), justification for specific strategies and tactics such as martyrdom operations and the use of weapons of mass destruction, and the excommunication (takfir) and killing of Muslims. The GIA-linked terrorists who bombed Paris in 1995 left little evidence of their ideological influences. Leading figures escaped prosecution, or were shot dead by French gendarmeries, and those who went on trial were elusive about their motivations and ideological leanings. Moreover, the GIA as a group produced very little ideological material of its own. 28 Judicial documents from trials of the first Al Qaeda linked cells that were disrupted in Europe between 1998 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq contained only general references to ideological influences from radical mosques and study circles in Europe and training camps in Afghanistan. 29 In these cases, judicial documents rarely referenced specific ideological texts and statements. One exception was the verdict against the so-called Frankfurt Cell operating in 2000, in which indoctrinating warrior hymns from Afghanistan (anashid) were quoted. 30 When Spanish investigators recovered files from computers belonging to the terrorists behind the 2004 Madrid attacks, on the other hand, they retrieved loads of ideological materials downloaded from websites, - which justified terrorism and offered rulings on strategic and tactical issues. 31 The Madrid cell got hold of most of their ideological sources from the Maqdisi library and diverse distributor sites. 32 The material included classical theorists such as the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah; the founder of Saudi salafism/wahhabism, Mohammed Ibn Abd al-wahhab; author of the manifest for modern jihadism Sayyid Qutb; godfather of the internationalist Arab Afghan movement Abdullah Azzam; as well as contemporary theorists such as bin Laden and al-zawahiri, the Jordanian Abu Mohammed al-maqdisi, and a number of ideologues from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria and Kuwait. 33 Notably, the material also included texts and audiovisual speeches by Abu Qatada. Further investigations of the Madrid bombings revealed that several people in the broader network around the attack cell had been in touch with Qatada in London. According to a key witness, one member linked to the terrorist cell, Mouhannad al-mallah, said that Abu Qatada had the same position in Europe as Al Qaeda had in the world; that he was the person in Europe calling for attacks, recruiting members, giving them missions to fulfill. 34 The killer of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, Mohammed Bouyeri, downloaded English translations of Ibn Taymiyyah s and Sayyid Qutb s works and translated them into Dutch language. According to the expert witness, Professor Rudolph Peters, Ibn Taymiyyah s writings on Prophet Traditions (ahadith) justifying individual punishment of people insulting Islam were an important trigger for Bouyeri. 35 In addition he downloaded a number of works by Abu Hamza al-masri. According to Peters, because of Bouyeri s poor 6

7 Arabic, Hamza s writings functioned as an entrance to militant ideologies. The writings of Abu Hamza were retrieved from the belongings of several terrorist suspects and convicts in the UK and other European countries, and many terrorists operating in the UK had attended his sermons at the Finsbury Park mosque. 36 Other members of Mohammed Bouyeri s Dutch based terrorist cell, the Hofstadgroup, accessed ideological texts and propaganda produced in London and uploaded material on the Internet. 37 Bouyeri and his accomplices consulted texts concerning the rejection of democracy and man-made laws, and clarification about the legitimacy of conducting operations in Holland. 38 The terrorist cell which attempted to execute car bomb attacks in central London, and against Glasgow airport in 2007 (known as the Doctors Cell ) also downloaded ideological texts and propaganda from the Internet. One individual involved in the plot spent time in Iraq the year before the operation where he, allegedly, joined Al Qaeda in Iraq. On a computer retrieved from a car used in the attempted suicide attack on the airport terminal in Glasgow, experts secured ideological and strategic texts and audio-visual material by Al Qaeda s leaders bin Laden and al-zawahiri, the former head of Iraqi branch, the late Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, and several texts by Al Qaeda associated preachers and activists in Saudi Arabia, such as Sulayman ibn Nasir Al-Ulwan, Husayn ibn Mahmud and Hamud bin Uqla al-shuaybi. Several of the texts had been downloaded from At-Tibyan Publications. 39 The ideological texts dealt with rulings on the conduct of suicide bombings and weapons of mass destruction, and rulings on the killing of Americans outside the Iraqi theater of war. 40 There were also concrete signs that the cell was influenced by Abu Qatada. In a letter from Qatada that was smuggled out from prison and published on the Internet in 2009, the preacher explains how he encountered members of the cell Bilal Talal Abdul Samad Abdulla and Mohammed Asha inside prison, and how he was impressed by them. He also claimed that Abdullah had told him that he had been influenced by Qatada s audio taped sermons. 41 Europe as support base 7 I knew that this game would be dangerous, and that it would be beneficial to us to push the jihadist current forward in a new phase after the Afghanistan-period if we exploited this opening correctly. If we erred in this, it would have fatal consequences. It was almost like a mission by special commandos operating behind the enemy lines, but of a political-security-media [not military] character. 42 During the 1980s, following the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, Islamist radicals from Arab countries fled to Europe in order to escape persecution by their regimes. 43 In European countries many of them joined support networks for insurgents in their home countries, the anti-soviet resistance in Afghanistan, as well as mujahidin in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. Ideologically, before Al Qaeda declared jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, Europe s jihadists seem to have agreed on the legality, utility and necessity of supporting jihad in Muslim countries from behind enemy lines. 44 However, ideological conflicts did emerge over the conduct of local struggles, especially concerning the excommunication and killing of fellow Muslims, as well as over the allocation of resources: questions of which armed conflicts should benefit from fundraising efforts. Moreover, there were fierce conflicts between militant and the moderate (political) Islamists such as the European branches of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Muslim Brotherhood. 45 The most important project and mobilizing cause for the European militant networks in the early 1990s, however, was the Algerian Civil War and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 46 The GIA was formed by Algerian Afghanistan veterans in concert with local guerilla groups, which had been operating in Algeria from the late 1970s. 47 At first, the GIA adopted the

8 ideology of the Arab Afghans, educating its cadre in texts by Sayyid Qutb and the theorizing of Al Qaeda strategists Abu Musab al-suri and Ayman al-zawahiri. 48 The first leaders of the GIA such as Qari Said and al-sharif Qusmi had close ties to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Arab Afghans living in Europe. 49 However, when the struggle in Algeria got out of hand under the leaderships of Emirs Djamel al-zitouni and Antar Zuwabri, and the GIA excommunicated the Algerian people and declared war on competing Islamist groups, the organization clashed ideologically with Al Qaeda and supporters in Europe. 50 Abu Qatada was an ardent supporter of the GIA, and he theologically justified strategies and tactics used by the group in the war against the military regime. He issued a religious ruling in which he defended the killing of the wives and children of representatives of the regime. 51 After Zitouni loyalists killed leading FIS activists Mohammed Said and Abd al-rasaq Rajam, as well as emissaries of the Libyan Islamic Fighting group during 1995 (accusing them of collaborating with the regime and propagating political Islamism), the group s supporters in London and co-editors of the GIA magazine al-ansar, Abu Qatada, Abu Musab al-suri and representatives of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, withdrew their support on the grounds that the GIA failed to provide evidence that the murdered Islamists had in fact been collaborating with the government. 52 Abu Qatada, who had built much of his reputation and following around supporting the GIA, was reluctant to denouncing the group, but he was left with no choice when Zitouni exceeded the limits of extremism and lost popular support. A protagonist of classical jihad in Muslim countries, Qatada concentrated mainly on supporting insurgents and terrorists the Middle East and the Chechen separatists. Illustrating his focus on local struggles, in one of his his most popular texts written during the 1990s Qatada stressed that fighting the groups of apostasy that govern the lands of the Muslims.takes precedence over others besides them from the polytheists and the hypocrites and the people of the book. 53 Displaying populist characteristics, by the time of the September 11 attacks, Qatada issued statements and gave interviews in which he vehemently supported bin Laden s strategy. 54 Before his personal assistant Bisher al-rawi, however, he reportedly spoke against the attack and criticized Al Qaeda. 55 After Abu Qatada denounced the GIA he concentrated on backing the Chechen rebels before he was arrested for inciting violence in Although London s main pundits had turned their backs on the GIA, there were forces within Europe s militant underground which continued to back the group. Qatada pupil Abu Hamza took over the editing of al-ansar and stood shoulder to shoulder with the GIA until the statement by Emir Antar Zuwabri, in which he excommunicated the Algerian people in August Just like Qatada, Abu Hamza was first and foremost a protagonist of classical jihad, his main passions being the Algerian struggle and the war in Bosnia. When the GIA became too extreme, he started focusing on the prospects for establishing an Islamic state in Yemen. The third major ideologue-preacher among the London jihadist crowd, the Syrian Omar Bakri Mohammed, was mainly focused on the liberation of Kashmir and dreamt about an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. 57 Europe s most influential ideologues were thus for all intents and purposes proponents of classical jihadism. When Al Qaeda proposed the global strategy of striking the far enemy in the second half of 1990s, they were forced to position themselves vis-à-vis bin Laden. Rather reluctantly is seems, they gradually accepted the call for global jihad. Qatada, Hamza and Bakri condoned and hailed the September 11 attacks, but for strategically or ideological reasons (or both) they seem to have had certain reservations about launching terrorist attacks in western countries. 8

9 Classical jihad in Europe The un-islamic regime s oppressive practices which are backed by France were never seen except during the French occupation over 132 years and which is still continuing today. France is now a full partner in Genocide by paying mercenaries and rewarding its agents and financing arms deals. 58 The GIA s bombings in France during 1995 were ordered by Emir Djamel Zitouni and the group s Chief of External Affairs Radwan Abu Basir against the advice of the group s Advisory Council. 59 The main ideological driver for the attacks in France appears to have been the enemy perception of Zitouni, seeing the Algerian regime as the main enemy, but France as a full partner in the war triggered by the army s cancelling of Algeria s first democratic elections (1992), in which the political Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win. 60 He appears to have considered the campaign in France an integrated part of, and necessary condition for success on the Algerian battlefield. An off-shoot of the Arab Afghan salafist-jihadist movement, the GIA was always fiercely anti-western, and violently opposed to French interference in Algerian affairs. The anti-westernism was expressed through hateful characterizations of France and the U.S., and accusations that these powers covertly supported the apostate regime in killing Algeria s Muslims. According to GIA communiqués, France committed disgusting crimes against the Algerian Muslim community (ummah), and pressured the tyrannical (taghut) Algerian regime to slaughter innocent and unarmed civilians. 61 Djamel Zitouni blamed French colonialism for the oppressive practices of the un-islamic regime, and characterized France as an accomplice in genocide by supporting the military regime. 62 The GIA gradually stepped up operations against French interests and citizens inside Algeria before the group internationalized the conflict. 63 The Al Qaeda associated strategist Abu Musab al-suri boasts about having planted the seeds of the idea to transfer the battle to French soil. He claims to have advised the third Emir of the GIA Sharif Qusmi that attacks in France, would be beneficial to draw France into an openly declared support for the Algerian regime, a support which existed, but only in secrecy. This will unify the Islamic Nation around the jihad in Algeria as it unified the Islamic Nation in Afghanistan against the Soviets. 64 The GIA campaign in France was controversial and disputed ideologically and strategically in Algeria (opposed by the majority of GIA s Advisory Council) and certainly, the attacks in France caused problems for the group s supporters in Europe. The campaign jeopardized support cells in France, Belgium, the UK and other countries, and thus stole resources from an organization with its back against the wall locally, locked in fierce conflict with various defector groups, the FIS and its armed wing AIS, - in addition to taking serious military defeats in clashes with the Algerian army and security forces. To what extent the perpetrators of the attacks were committed to the ideology of Zitouni s faction of the GIA remains unknown. Several members of the terrorist network had been indoctrinated and received training in the Algerian Khalden camp in Afghanistan, but the attacks also included marginalized immigrant youths from French suburbs recruited, socialized and trained in France. Although GIA s terrorist campaign in France had strategic elements to it and was consistent with the strategic thinking of Al Qaeda, the extreme beliefs, ambitions and recklessness of one man, Djamel Zitouni seem to have been a very important triggering factor. Global jihad in Europe Between 1998 and 2003 European security services uncovered several plans by Al Qaeda linked cells to execute attacks against U.S., Jewish, French and Russian targets. The terrorists 9

10 target selection, attack methods, as well as justifications offered by leading figures indicated that these cells lacked a unified enemy perception and strategic vision. 65 Identifying partly with local insurgents in Muslim countries and partly with Al Qaeda s global war, it seems as if both ideologues and operational activists within Europe s militant networks disagreed on the questions of who constituted the most important enemies and how to combat them. Moreover, because of the crackdowns of Algerian networks in the wake of the GIA terrorism campaign in France, the strategic value of Europe as a support base had decreased both for the GIA and other militant groups. When Europe s jihadists came under increased scrutiny by the security services it became problematic for them, ideologically, to justify living in the land of the unbelievers. Striking local or global enemies? After Al Qaeda issued the declaration of global war against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, European and intelligence services and U.S. counterparts received information that a number of Arab-based terrorist cells linked to Al Qaeda planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli interests in Europe. In December 1998 Al Qaeda reportedly struck a deal with an ex-gia member going by the alias Abu Doha. 66 Abu Doha acted as a facilitator and recruiter for Algerian guesthouses and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 67 Allegedly, in exchange for funding and support, Doha s network in Europe was to execute terrorist attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda inside Europe. 68 Little is known about the ideological affinities of Abu Doha s terrorist network. Its members attended sermons of Qatada and Hamza in London and became indoctrinated in religious schools and training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 69 Doha s men typically maintained simultaneous links to GIA defector groups in Algeria (such as The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and Protectors of the Salafist Call) which prioritized the struggle against the Algerian regime; Al Qaeda calling for war against the U.S. and Israel; and militant pundits in London ideologically fluctuating between local and global aspirations. The terrorists target selection and legitimizations suggested that the multiple allegiances caused disarray. For example, the Algerian members of the Frankfurt Cell preparing to bomb the Christmas marketplace in Strasbourg on New Year s Eve 2000 seems to have disagreed both among themselves and with their central leadership over enemy perceptions and target selection. Whereas the original mission of the cell was to bomb US or Israeli targets for Al Qaeda, they decided instead to bomb French civilians in line with the Algerian perception of France as enemy number one. Moreover, although recruits at Al Qaeda s camps in Afghanistan were urged to commit martyrdom operations, the militants planned remote control attacks and planned to escape to Algeria after the operation. 70 A second Algerian cell linked to Abu Doha, but headed by the Algerian Djamel Beghal seemed to identify more clearly with Al Qaeda s ideology than the Frankfurt Cell. Beghal s group took orders directly from bin Laden and planned suicide operations against the U.S. embassy in Paris and an American airbase in Belgium. 71 Justifying their actions, members of the cell used Al Qaeda rhetoric complaining about global injustices against Muslims, specifying the suffering of the Palestinians at the hands of Israel. 72 However, the cell members also seemed to identify strongly with Algerian insurgents, lambasting French interference in Algeria and persecution of Algerians in France. 73 A third Doha-linked and Algerian based terrorist cell uncovered in France appeared to be even more complex in terms of its ideological allegiances. Just like the Frankfurt Cell, the terrorists appear to have been commissioned by Al Qaeda agents to strike US and Israeli targets. Members of the cell were GIA defectors who had become recruited and radicalized first in Algeria and later joined Al Qaeda run training camps in Afghanistan and Georgia. 10

11 Identifying strongly with Chechen rebels they decided to attack the Russian embassy in Paris, indirectly hurting French interests. Another good example on Arab-based cells that ideologically seemed situated somewhere in between classical and global jihad, is a plan by the Jordanian terrorist group al- Tawhid to execute attacks on Jews in Germany. Al-Tawhid was headed by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-zarqawi and mentored ideologically by Abu Qatada. Al-Zarqawi started out as a local radical. He co-founded the Jordanian jihadist movement together with Abu Mohammed al-maqdisi and Abu Qatada in , after which he became implicated in local terrorist acts and arrested. Released from prison in 1999 he sought to join Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden personally rejected him as a member on the grounds that he was too extreme and too inclined to sectarian violence, combating impious Muslims (especially the Shias). 74 Al Qaeda kept al-zarqawi on as a close ally, though, and helped him establish a camp in Herat on the Iranian border especially for Middle Eastern militants. During the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-zarqawi escaped to Iraq via Iran and eventually became the leader of Al Qaeda s wing in Iraq. While Al-Zarqawi s group fought the Americans in Iraq, he appears to have maintained a predilection for launching attacks against the Jordanian regime, Shia Muslims and Israeli targets, however. Al-Zarqawi s focus on the regional Middle Eastern conflict and his hatred for Israel is also illustrated by his famous statement we fight in Iraq with our eyes on Jerusalem. 75 The fact that al-zarqawi s terrorist cell in Germany decided to strike Jewish rather that than German targets (although Germany had deployed forces to Afghanistan) indicate that the cell was closer to pursuing regional Middle Eastern objectives than Al Qaeda s globalist aspirations. 76 Should we stay, or should we go? Strengthening the hypothesis about ideological identity crisis, in 1999 Abu Hamza addressed the dilemmas of living Islamically in the land of the unbelievers in a speech before his congregation in London, as well as foreign guests from Sweden, France and Germany. The speech was filled with contradictory and confusing statements about the role of Muslims in Europe. 77 Hamza opened by explaining it was forbidden to stay among the unbelievers, and that Muslims had to constantly plan and prepare for leaving. 78 Whereas in interviews with the media Hamza spoke about a covenant of security between British Muslims and the government, implying that the country s Muslim citizens were not permitted to harm British interests, before his followers behind closed doors, he referred to the covenant of security concept simply as crap. 79 The main project of militants in Europe (that according to Hamza were not allowed to stay there in the first place) was to safeguard themselves and their families, engage in the calling to Islam (dawa), prepare for jihad and travel to the battlefields. However, while focusing on dawa, they also had an obligation to engage in jihad, and were permitted to kill unbelievers for any reasons. 80 In other speeches, Hamza also talked about how to conduct jihad and the permissibility of using any means available. 81 Although Abu Hamza justified violent jihad in any country, including non-muslim host states, he remained mainly focused on supporting insurgencies and liberation wars in Yemen, Chechnya and Kashmir until he was arrested in Global jihad against Europe 11

12 In the present abnormal situation, where there is no application of the Shari ah laws upon the earth, the Muslims worldwide find themselves scattered living beneath the laws of Kufr from the East of the East s and the West of West s. Since there is no Daar ul-islaam for the Muslims to make Hijrah to, each individual Muslim has a specific relationship pertaining to his own security with the country he is residing in. It is important to emphasise that a Muslim either has a contract of security with the nation he is residing in or not. If a person has a contract or covenant of safety (Aqd Amaan) with the United Kingdom, this does not mean that individual also has a covenant with the United States or with any other Kufr allied country. 82 Europe as enemy for Al Qaeda Between the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, jihadist ideologues and opinion makers in Europe and internationally focused more on Europeans as enemies and called for attacks against European countries. As rationale for targeting European interests the militants did not only point to the deployment of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to insults against Muslims, such as the ban on veils and the publishing of Prophet Mohammed caricatures by the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten in At the operational level the call for jihad translated into terrorism. Cells erupting from the second generation of jihadist networks in Europe began to plan prepare and execute attacks against the U.S. s European allies. The terrorists justifications in threat communiqués, martyrdom testaments, or during interrogations and trial hearings echoed recent speeches by the Al Qaeda leadership, accusing Europeans of leading a crusade against Islam. 83 Although several European countries contributed to the invasion of Afghanistan, Europe had a relatively marginal place in Al Qaeda s enemy perceptions until Then, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-zawahiri used to speak in more general terms about the Europeans role in the historical crusades and European colonialism, - focusing mainly on France, UK and Italy. In addition they condemned France post-colonial interference in Algeria and the UK for its role in the first Gulf War. After European countries sent troops to Afghanistan, Al Qaeda increasingly began to mention and threaten specific European countries. For example, in October 2002 al-zawahiri threatened Germany and France. France did not send troops in Iraq, but has contributed in Afghanistan and is generally perceived as an arch-enemy by most Islamists because of the support for the Algerian regime. 85 In November 2002, bin Laden issued a statement in which he threatened all of the U.S. s allies. 86 In May 2003 al-zawahiri threatened the U.S., UK, Australia and Norway for their military contributions in Iraq. 87 In an October 2003 statement, bin Laden threatened Spain, the UK, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy, and said that Al Qaeda would attack the U.S. allies at the suitable time and place. 88 However, Europe as a collective term was almost non-existent in Al Qaeda s ideological communication before bin Laden s speech The first letter to Europe s people, which was released in April 2004, nearly one month after the Madrid bombings. 89 In this statement Al Qaeda s Emir offered a truce to our neighbours north of the Mediterranean, saying the attacks in Madrid were consequences of European contributions to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Semi-diplomatically, the world s most famous Saudi appealed to the The European people to pressure their authorities to accept the truce offer within a threemonth deadline. The truce would begin the moment the last European soldier left Muslim territories. 90 After the April speech there has been a tendency towards Al Qaeda (especially bin Laden) talking to the Europeans as one entity (although Al Qaeda still threatens specific countries in the communiqués). 12

13 The terrorists that launched the attacks in Madrid and London appear to have identified themselves strongly with Al Qaeda, echoing the organization s ideological statements and adapting its symbols. 91 For example, the Madrid bombers called themselves The Military Wing of The Supporters of Al Qaeda in Europe, or The Supporters of God (ansar allah), and the cell behind the 7 July 2005 attacks in London referred to themselves as soldiers of Allah, focused on global jihadist causes such as Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, and lionized Al Qaeda. 92 Lately, there has also been a marked increase threats against European countries by Al Qaeda s regional branches and allies, such as the Algerian-based Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, known by the acronym TTP), although such threats have yet to materialize as attacks on European soil. 93 Global crusades, persecution and insults against the Prophet In recent years Al Qaeda s leadership has increasingly portrayed domestic European politics as a manifestation of the global crusade against Islam and Muslims. In February 2004 al- Zawahiri portrayed the forbidding of veils in French schools as a new sign of the enmity of the western crusaders against Muslims even while boasting of freedom, democracy and human rights..., an enmity equivalent to the burning of villages in Afghanistan, the destruction of houses over the heads of their inhabitants in Palestine, the massacre of children and the theft of oil in Iraq. 94 In April 2006 Al Qaeda s media wing al-sahab released an audiotape in which bin Laden condemned the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed and instigated the youths of Islam to kill the cartoonists and punish Danish authorities for allowing the publication. 95 During 2006, 2007 and 2008 al-zawahiri and bin Laden repeatedly threatened European countries because of the cartoons. 96 Addressing insults against Islam in Europe Al Qaeda referred to Ibn Taymiyyah s sunnah-based rulings on individual punishment (killing) of whoever insults the Prophet. According to Taymiyyah, whereas other types of violations of treaties between Muslims and non-muslims do not necessarily justify jihad, the killing of people who had offended Islam is specifically commanded. 97 Security treaties and Jihad in Europe In wake of the invasion of Iraq ideological disputes seemed to intensify among important opinion makers in Europe and internationally about treaties between Muslims and non- Muslims. In the UK, the leader of al-muhajiroun, Omar Bakri Mohammed was for a long time a propagator of a covenant of security between British Muslims and British authorities. As explained by Bakri, a Muslim living in a non-muslim country enjoying protection for himself, his family and being able to practice his religion, finds himself in dar al-aman (the land of safety). 98 According to the covenant of security the protected Muslim is forbidden to harm wealth and citizens of the country offering such protection. However, Bakri emphasized that the protected is not prohibited from participating in jihad in other countries, be it in Muslim countries, in Europe, or the U.S. (for example 9/11). 99 Omar Bakri highlighted two specific factors disqualifying a security contract between a given government and the individual Muslim citizen. Firstly, the deal is off the minute a country starts arresting Muslim citizens on a wide scale. 100 Secondly, the contract is broken when the host country supports or participates in acts of war against Muslims. By arresting and combating Muslims the protector state turns into dar al-fitnah (a country in which Muslims no longer enjoy security), something that essentially justifies jihad. 101 Omar Bakri portrayed himself and his ideological position on covenants of security as constraint jihadist terrorism in Britain. 13

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