Israel Tunnel Warfare

Transcription

1 Israel Tunnel Warfare 2015 Homeland Security Research Corp.

2 Israel Tunnel Warfare August 2015 Homeland Security Research Corp. (HSRC) is an international market and technology research firm specializing in the Homeland Security (HLS) & Public Safety (PS) Industry. HSRC provides premium market reports on present and emerging technologies and industry expertise, enabling global clients to gain time-critical insight into business opportunities. HSRC s clients include U.S. Congress, DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, NATO, DOD, DOT, GAO, and EU, among others; as well as HLS & PS government agencies in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Singapore. With over 750 private sector clients (72% repeat customers), including major defense and security contractors, and Fortune 500 companies, HSRC earned the reputation as the industry s Gold Standard for HLS & PS market reports. Washington D.C , 601 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Suite 900, Tel: , info@hsrc.biz, Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

3 Table of Contents 1 Israel Subterranean Warfare Technologies Market Israel Clandestine Tunnels & Underground Structures Background Gaza Strip Tunnels: Background Gaza Strip Smuggling Tunnels Gaza Defensive Tunnels and Underground Structures Gaza-Israel Attack Tunnels The Tunnel Warfare Lebanon Israel Border, Underground Military Structures and Tunnels Lebanon Israel Border Techno-Tactical Issues List of Figures Figure 1 - The Gaza Strip Map... 5 Figure 2 - Tunnel Workers Taking a Pray on the Gaza Side of Rafah... 6 Figure 3 - Gaza-Israeli Attack Tunnels Map... 9 Figure 4 - The Lebanese-Israeli & Lebanese-Golan Heights Border (Blue Line) Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

4 1 Israel Subterranean Warfare Technologies Market Israel Clandestine Tunnels & Underground Structures Background In recent Gaza strip conflicts, wherever the Israeli forces have overwhelming combat power; Hamas adversaries have sought to fight on very primitive levels. Hamas understand the value of hiding themselves and their sensitive equipment underground. Subterranean operations are conducted in the worst urban environments imaginable Gaza Strip Tunnels: Background Israel started construction of the first 60 Km (37 mi) long land barrier (which didn t include at that time tunnel detection systems) between the Gaza Strip and Israel in 1994 Three different kinds of tunnels existed beneath Gaza: Smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt Defensive tunnels and underground structures inside Gaza, used for command centers and weapons storage; and connected to the defensive tunnels Attack tunnels used for cross-border attacks on Israel", including the capture of Israeli soldiers. Ihab al-ghussein, spokesman for the Hamas-run interior ministry, describes the tunnels as an exercise of Gaza's "right to protect itself." According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the tunnels have been constructed by the military wing of Hamas under the Israel-Gaza border for the purpose of "terrorist attacks" on Israel. Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

5 Figure 1 - The Gaza Strip Map Gaza Strip Smuggling Tunnels The Gaza Strip smuggling tunnels are passages that have been dug under the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow strip of land, 14 km in length, situated along the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt. After the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 the town of Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, was split by this Corridor. One half of the town belongs to Egypt, and the other half is located in the southern part of Gaza. After Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, the Philadelphi Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

6 Corridor was placed under the control of the Palestine Authority until When the Hamas seized power in 2007, Egypt and Israel closed borders with Gaza. The tunnels are normally dug by individual contractors from basements of houses or an olive grove under the border at depths of up to 30 meters, and reaching up to 800 meters in length. In many cases, the owners of the houses enter into a business arrangement with the tunnel builders. They may receive a portion of the profits from the smuggling or some other sort of financial compensation from those who contract the tunnel construction. While many tunnels are of a generally high quality of engineering and construction with some including electricity, ventilation, intercoms, and a rail system they are still very dangerous and are prone to cave-ins. The openings to many tunnels are found within buildings in or around Gaza's southernmost city of Rafah. Figure 2 - Tunnel Workers Taking a Pray on the Gaza Side of Rafah Exploiting these tunnels, Hamas was able to assemble a sizable arsenal of rockets and small arms, as well as allow militants from other radical Islamist and Palestinian groups, including al-qaeda affiliates, to infiltrate into Gaza. This materiel and personnel figured in recent conflicts with Israel, including Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense, as Hamas and other groups fired their rockets arsenals at Israeli towns and cities. In 2009, Egypt began the construction of an underground barrier to block existing tunnels and make new ones harder to dig. In 2011, Egypt relaxed restrictions at its border with the Gaza Strip, allowing Palestinians to cross freely. In July 2013, General Abdel Fattah el-sisi ousted the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt led by Mohamed Morsi, which supported its Palestinian Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

7 counterpart Hamas. The latter retaliated by launching attacks from Gaza against Egyptian military forces in Sinai. The new Egyptian government responded by closing the Egypt-Gaza border in September In , Egypt's military had destroyed most of the 1,200 smuggling tunnels which were used to smuggle food, weapons and other goods into Gaza. The tunnels were crucial not just to Hamas s military strength but also to maintaining its financial solvency and political clout in Gaza. Hamas taxed consumer goods smuggled into Gaza, yielding a major revenue stream. Yet between the end of Operation Pillar of Defense in late 2012 and early 2014, a series of events progressively strangled Hamas s underground lifeline and severed its ties to regional backers. Isolated and no longer able to smuggle (and tax) goods, Hamas s revenue streams dried up. The local economy stagnated further, shortages of basic services like water and electricity spread and the group s leadership increasingly struggled to pay public employees salaries. In April 2014, Hamas attempted to resolve this crisis by agreeing to a Palestinian unity government with its erstwhile rival Fatah. Hamas hoped this would allow it to use the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority s funds to pay Gazans salaries in arrears without compromising its own control over Gaza s military infrastructure. However, Fatah evinced little interest in this arrangement, seeking instead to increase their leverage over Hamas by withholding such support. As these combined pressures grew, some observers believe Hamas concluded that the moment was right for increased violence against Israel. In this view, Hamas hoped to create a sense of alarm that would unite Gaza behind its leadership, compel Israel to lift its economic cordon, and engender support among the Egyptian people for ending their government s blockade of Gaza Gaza Defensive Tunnels and Underground Structures In the Gaza Strip, the governing authority of Hamas developed a sophisticated network of Underground Military Structures. The Underground Military Structures within the Gaza Strip have several functions. Hamas uses structures and tunnels to hide its arsenal of rocketry underground, to facilitate communication, to permit munition stocks to be hidden and to conceal militants, making detection from the air difficult. By means of these Underground Military Structures and tunnels, rockets could be launched by remote control. One IDF expert said the low-tech network was effective in enabling Hamas "to move, conceal, surprise and disappear." The Underground Military Structures and tunnel system branches beneath many Gazan towns and cities, such as Khan Yunis and Jabalia and the Shati refugee camp. Destroying the tunnels was a primary objective of Israeli forces in the 2014 Israel Gaza conflict. Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

8 1.1.4 Gaza-Israel Attack Tunnels The Israeli government refers to cross-border tunnels as "attack tunnels. The cross-border tunnels were used in the capture of Gilad Shalit in 2006, and multiple times during the 2014 conflict; in practice only Israeli military targets have successfully been attacked through them. However, Israel reportedly stopped an attempt to raid a kibbutz during the war, and uncovered evidence that the tunnels were being prepared for massive attacks against Israeli civilians. Hamas s main Attack Tunnels strategy during the 2014 Gaza war was a victory in the court of international opinion, but it still confronted Israel on the battlefield, where it deployed tactical and technological innovations to negate Israel s military advantages tothe highest degree possible. Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

9 Figure 3 - Gaza-Israeli Attack Tunnels Map Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

10 (Source: IDF) It sought to penetrate Israeli territory not only with rockets and missiles, but also from underground tunnels as well as the sea and air, demonstrating an unprecedented, albeit limited level of jointness in its operations. Indeed, the most significant of these was Hamas s use of tunnels. An extensive network beneath Gaza offered cover and concealment, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Israelis to detect or prevent movement of fighters, munitions and weapons. In other words, Hamas s tunnels countered Israeli aerial reconnaissance capabilities. Infiltration tunnels allowed a limited number of Hamas fighters to reach Israeli territory undetected The Tunnel Warfare The Gaza tunnels posed a tactical challenge for the IDF. Hamas s ability to flank the IDF using tunnels redefined the concept of the front line. They also distracted IDF ground force commanders from their main effort by substantially increasing the risk of attacks against civilians in areas proximate to the Gaza border. Hamas s attack tunnels also proved difficult to target and destroy. The IDF did not possess a technology capable of determining where each branch of the Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

11 tunnel went, or their exit points within Israel. In short, the IDF underappreciated the extent of Hamas s recent tactical and technological innovations, especially tunnel warfare. The Hamas plan consisted of what was to be a surprise attack in which 200 fighters would be dispatched through each of the dozens of tunnels dug by Hamas under the border, and seize kibbutzim and other communities while killing and kidnapping Israeli civilians. Israeli analysts claimed that Hamas was preparing for the next conflict with Israel following the uncovering of an Israeli-Palestinian smuggling ring which attempted to transport high-tech equipment, such as infrared cameras and remote control security cameras - into the blockaded enclave. Hamas s main strategy might have been victory in the court of international opinion, but it still confronted Israel on the battlefield, where it deployed tactical and technological innovations to negate Israel s military advantages to the highest degree possible. Hamas sought to penetrate Israeli territory not only with rockets and missiles, but also from underground tunnels as well as the sea and air, demonstrating an unprecedented, albeit limited, level of jointness in its operations. Undoubtedly, the most significant of these was Hamas s use of tunnels. An extensive network beneath Gaza offered cover and concealment, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Israelis to detect or prevent movement of fighters, munitions and weapons. In other words, Hamas s tunnels countered Israeli aerial reconnaissance capabilities. Infiltration tunnels allowed a limited number of Hamas fighters to reach Israeli territory undetected. These tunnels posed a tactical challenge for the IDF. Hamas s ability to flank the IDF using tunnels redefined the concept of the front line. They also distracted IDF ground force commanders from their main effort by substantially increasing the risk of attacks against civilians in areas proximate to the Gaza border. Hamas s attack tunnels also proved difficult to target and destroy. The IDF did not possess a technology capable of determining where each branch of the tunnel went, or their exit points within Israel. In short, the IDF underappreciated the extent of Hamas s recent tactical and technological innovations, especially tunnel warfare. Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

12 1.2 Lebanon Israel Border, Underground Military Structures and Tunnels Figure 4 - The Lebanese-Israeli & Lebanese-Golan Heights Border (Blue Line) The Lebanese-Israeli blue border length is 80 Km (excluding the Lebanese- Golan height blue border). Hezbollah's greatest interest is Hamas performance in battling an Israeli ground invasion using cross border attack tunnel. Hezbollah use the so called underground nature preserves, which are located underneath southern Lebanon s quaint villages and thicketed hills. Both militias have designed these bunker networks to ambush entire Israeli infantry companies simultaneously from multiple directions in close combat, using cover fire from ultra-accurate anti-tank missiles and mortars fired from kilometers away. Hezbollah s fortified underground structures proved a major stumbling block for the 34-day Israeli offensive that ended in a truce on At least a dozen commandos died storming them, and guerrillas used them to shell northern Israel from cover. Footage of the site showed tunnels high enough to walk in, with ventilation and lighting systems, bathrooms, painted walls and reinforced ceilings. Hatches to the outside were screened by trees and shrubs. A mortar launcher was shown tucked, half concealed, in an open-air trench nearby. Lieutenant-Colonel Ghassan Alyan, the Israeli mission commander, said the Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

13 underground network covered an area of 2 square km (0.8 square miles). "Dozens of command bunkers were built inside the network, divided into two or three rooms each," he told Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper. "They enabled the terrorists to come out of the bunkers, fire mortars at Israel, and re-enter the bunkers without being discovered by anyone." Israeli television said the military believed there were about 10 more similar networks in southern Lebanon Lebanon Israel Border Techno-Tactical Issues (Source: M. Orbach, H. et al) Hamas tunnels in the Gaza Strip are a child's game compared with what the Lebanese Hezbollah built during the last two decades, judging by reports published in recent years in the Arab press. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) first encountered the Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War in However, according to reports, the tunnels have been upgraded and expanded since, in both equipment and range. It is thus naturally feared that they already reach into Israeli territory, and Iranian experts have been involved in the massive development of the tunnels. With Iranian funding, Hezbollah has upgraded its tunnels along Israel s northern border, where, according to experts, they might reach as far as Israeli territory. The tunnels dug in southern Lebanon extend south of the Litani River, all the way to the Israeli border. In an article published earlier this year, the Arab news magazine Al Watan Al Arabi reported apparently, based on bragging by a Hezbollah source that the tunnels under discussion were most sophisticated, and that quality-wise, they are on par with the metro tunnels in the major European cities. These are well-lined tunnels, equipped with highly advanced communication, lighting, control and surveillance means, and with whatever it takes to enable a lengthy stay and battle management over long periods of time, including war rooms. As far as is known, the Iranians have built underground missile launching sites for Hezbollah that can be operated either manually or by computer. It is one of the lessons learned by Hezbollah in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, when the Israeli Air Force succeeded in destroying vehicle-mounted missile launchers. It seems that the Iranians and Hezbollah have thought of every detail, leaving nothing out. The tunnels have thus been equipped not only with weaponsstorage facilities and command and control equipment, but also with kitchens, bathrooms, clinics and everything needed for a few hundred fighters staying at any given moment inside the tunnels. It is not clear whether Hezbollah has continued digging the tunnels into Israeli territory. Yet, two factors may be cited in corroboration of this assumption: One of these is the threats made by Hezbollah that in the next confrontation with Israel, its fighters will be able to take over towns and villages in the Galilee in northern Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

14 Israel. The other factor is the Hamas attack tunnels along the Gaza Strip border. After all, it s from Hezbollah that Hamas learned the tactics of tunnel warfare. According to sources in Lebanon, since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has reinforced the tunnel city in the Bekaa Valley, being concerned that this could be one of the organization s weak points. And, in fact, its reasoning has proven true, all the more so since 2011, following the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-assad. Supervised by Iranian experts, and with a large financial investment, Hezbollah has developed a system of tunnels in the Bekaa Valley. One can only imagine what the organization tried to haul through the tunnels or what was actually transferred by the Syrian army through the tunnels in support of Hezbollah since the rebels managed to gain a foothold in the regions controlled by Assad. The funding for the Hezbollah tunnels comes from Iran, as well as from the income sources of the Shiite organization itself. It is estimated that Iran used to allocate on behalf of Hezbollah a budget of $200 million per year. And following the Second Lebanon War, Iran has reportedly increased this aid budget, through special grants designed to accelerate the restoration of Hezbollah's power. In addition, there are other government-related agencies in Iran that transfer aid funds to Hezbollah. However, according to various reports, in view of the huge Iranian investment in Syria following the uprising against the Assad regime, which flared up about three and a half years ago, the financial aid granted by Tehran to Hezbollah has been cut. Over the years, Hezbollah has developed its own independent sources of income. These include, among others, donations from not only the Arab and Islamic world, but also the West. In Lebanon itself, Hezbollah operates a network of economic interests, including trade, service and investment companies. At the same time, Hezbollah conducts extensive business activity overseas, specifically in the diamond sector. What s more, Hezbollah has been reported to be involved in drug trafficking and also in document-forgery networks both inside and outside Lebanon. The aforementioned article in Al Watan Al Arabi cites a senior Hezbollah official as stating, International intelligence agencies from time to time send agents to areas where they believe tunnels have been dug, for surveillance and information-gathering purposes. We are aware of that activity; they are welcome to try [to do] whatever they want. Experts approached by Israeli daily Calcalist do not rule out the existence of tunnels in the north, although, as they point out, it is obviously completely different terrain from that in the south. If such infrastructure actually exists or is under construction, Israel should start looking for tunnel location means, not only along its southern border but also in the northern part of the country. Yet, according to the experts, it is not the detection and location means per se that pose the problem, but rather, and above all, the concept adopted by the Israeli Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #

15 security establishment, which relies primarily on military specialists and fails to consult geology professionals. Yair Rotstein, executive director of the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation and former CEO of the Geophysical Institute of Israel, believes that it is much harder, although quite possible, to dig tunnels in the northern part of the country. I think that tunnels in the north may be detected sooner than in the south, he says, but adds in the same breath, If the tunnels have already been excavated, it could be much more difficult to locate them in the north. Dov Frimerman, a geologist who formerly served as a senior executive at the Geophysical Institute of Israel, agrees with Rotstein. The northern part of the country is characterized by a rocky terrain, which is quite different from the southern terrain, and therefore, it cannot be excavated using simple means, the way it has been done in the south. Hence, excavation activities in the north can be more easily detected. As to the ability to detect and locate tunnels, Frimerman notes that quite a number of solutions have been developed for the detection and location of tunnels at the various stages of excavation. He maintains, however, that the major problem currently facing Israel is not the location of tunnels, but rather the concept adopted by the security establishment. Instead of seeking advice from terrain professionals whether geologists or physicists, and there are many of those in Israel specialists who developed the Iron Dome are consulted. However, they are not dealing with the terrain their field of expertise is optical and electronic sensors. I cannot figure it out; Israel has two institutions dedicated to the exploration of the terrain, boasting an array of experts and vast experience, but neither of them has been tapped. Yiftah Shapir, senior research fellow and head of the Middle East Military Balance Project at the Institute for National Security Studies, maintains otherwise. In his opinion, there is currently no technological solution capable of locating all the tunnels. Everything has been considered and everything has been tried at one time or another trenches and tunnels were dug, and iron piles were driven into the ground; however, they just dug underneath. Here, they have dug as far deep as 25 meters [82 feet]; in Mexico, they have dug tunnels 40 meters deep; and in [North] Korea, they have already reached 70 meters [below ground level. Shapir says in conclusion, It may well be that there is a tunnel shaft near some northern community. Alas, at present, there is no solution. What s left is intelligence, and in fact, many of the tunnels [in the south] were discovered thanks to intelligence activity. More information can be found at: Subterranean Warfare (Tunnels & Underground Structures Detection and Subterranean Robots) Technologies: Global Market Copyright 2015 HSRC. All rights reserved Copy #