A QUEST FOR POLITICAL STABILITY OR REGIONAL PRESTIGE?

Transcription

1 Analysis No. 177, June 2013 A QUEST FOR POLITICAL STABILITY OR REGIONAL PRESTIGE? EXPLAINING THE GULF MONARCHIES ROLE IN ARAB COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION Sally Khalifa Isaac This analysis is aimed at both empirically highlighting the centrality of the Gulf monarchies 1 and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Arab transitions, and analytically explaining their seemingly contradicting roles. It will start, therefore, with a close look at the initial reactions of the Saudi kingdom specifically, which appeared to strongly lead what was referred to as "a counter revolutionary role". Then it will move on to address how the Gulf monarchies were keen to keep the wave of public revolts out of their area, which was manifested in their efforts to crack down on the Shiite led revolts in Bahrain; and finally how they extended what is widely deemed as selective and controversial assistance to both Arab countries in transition and other Arab countries not experiencing transitions. Generally, the analysis will explain how GCC states policies are largely driven by the interest of maintaining the political stability of their own monarchies and that of the region at large. But it will also highlight how such policies and actions can be derived from prestige and status affirmation. Sally Khalifa Isaac, Associate Professor of Political Science, Cairo University 1 Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait 1 The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo

2 Initial Reactions: Saudi Arabia s Rapid Moves in Response to the Arab Uprisings Saudi Arabia, aided by the rest of the Gulf States, has moved quickly in response to growing regional challenges as a result of the Arab uprisings in general and the upheaval in Bahrain in particular. This was manifested in the initial and immediate response of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (aimed at appeasing the political demands of his own people and fending off the contagious effect of public revolts) to release huge financial packages, estimated at more than $37 billion, as a royal gift in social, unemployment and housing benefits. Later, the figure reached a total of $130 billion spent as extra subsidies on housing and social benefits. This was followed by reports of likely assistance estimated at $10 billion for Bahrain alone, a country whose population slightly exceeds one million. Also worthy of note in these initial moves was Saudi Arabia's decision to grant asylum to Tunisia s ex-president, Bin Ali, and to support Egypt s ex-president, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, during the course of Egypt s revolution. Similar signs of support came from other Gulf regimes, with Oman and the UAE sending a special envoy and a Foreign Minister respectively to Cairo when the Egyptian revolution was still ongoing. The public support given to Bin Ali and Mubarak, especially amid rumors of Saudi opposition to the trial of Mubarak, was indeed important in indicating the keenness of the Gulf States to avoid setting a precedent in dealing with ousted Arab presidents. In February 2011 when public revolts hit the Gulf, spurred by a Shiite-led uprising in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent their troops and armaments to crack down on them. With the continuous eruption of public revolts in Bahrain, in May 2012 the GCC monarchies started considering the possibility of creating a political federation to unify their foreign and defense policies. It is quite telling that the proposal was originally promoted by Riyadh in December As a start, the federation is envisaged to be launched with a political union between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, whose political elites remain the most enthusiastic in the Gulf States for such a union. Even if the realization of this monumental plan seems to be long way off, the ongoing official discussion of such a proposal with this timing is indeed indicative 2. In May 2011, in a further step to prop up the legitimacy of the Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia backed a 2 D. ROBERTS, Gulf Disunion, in «Foreign Policy», 2 May 2012, foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/02/gulf_disunion (accessed 8 May 2013); see also C. Saudi Arabia, aided by the rest of the Gulf States, has moved quickly in response to growing regional challenges as a result of the Arab uprisings in general and the upheaval in Bahrain in particular With the continuous eruption of public revolts in Bahrain, in May 2012 the GCC monarchies started considering the possibility of creating a political federation to unify their foreign and defense policies 2

3 proposal to enlarge the GCC so as to include the two monarchies of Jordan and Morocco. This Club of Monarchies proposal has been widely interpreted as an attempt to single out fellow monarchies from instability and has reflected the fear that the fall of even a single monarchy could have irreversible consequences for all the rest 3. With the stagnation of the process aimed at enlarging the GCC to Jordan and Morocco 4, the GCC Secretary General, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, announced in December 2011 the creation of a $5 billion fund for Jordan and Morocco in support of development projects 5. In addition, Arab monarchies implemented a series of steps aimed at demonstrating their willingness to undertake major political reforms. Yet, these moves resulted in minor (in Morocco and Jordan) or de facto nonexistent changes (in the Gulf) 6. As a consequence of these actions, many analysts from within and outside the Arab region have actually accused the Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia as their main inspirer, of leading a counter-revolutionary effort aimed at maintaining the political stability of the region and preserving the status quo of their own monarchies. No Room for Revolutions in the "Stable" Gulf: the Blatant Case of Bahrain Across the Gulf, and specifically in Saudi Arabia, the Shiite-led revolts in Bahrain were seen as alarming. They were believed to be supported by Iran (which had issued territorial claims over the small Bahrain Island in the past), which has been accused of using the Shiite majority in Bahrain to export the revolution to the wider region. Saudi Arabia in particular feared that what happened in Bahrain could have a spillover effect in the Gulf and at home, where two million Shiites live in Saudi Arabia alone. In a recent analysis, Across the Gulf, and specifically in Saudi Arabia, the Shiite led revolts in Bahrain were seen as alarming. They were believed to be supported by Iran, which has been accused of using the Shiite majority in Bahrain to export the revolution to the wider region CROUCH, Gulf Considers Political Union to Handle Iran and Arab Spring, Iran Primer: United States Institute of Peace, 1 May 2012, 01/gulf-considers-political-union-handle-iran-and-arab-spring (accessed 8 May2013). 3 See for instance: P. RAZOUX, The New Club of Arab Monarchies, Views, «International Herald Tribune», 2 June Reuters, No Consensus on Morocco, Jordan joining the GCC, Arab News, 30 November 2011, (accessed 8 May 2013). 5 $5bn fund to help Jordan and Morocco, Gulf Daily News, 21 December 2011, (accessed 8 May 2013). 6 Cf. M. OTTAWAY - M. MUASHER, Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet, The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December

4 Mohammed Nuruzzaman also highlights how economic factors related to the possibility of the loss of oil fields, terminals and crude-processing plants, the loss of investment and future investment prospects, shrinking business opportunities for Saudi business firms and corporations in the Gulf sub-region represent key explanations for Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain 7. As a consequence, and amid international relative silence, Saudi Arabia together with the UAE while still under the GCC umbrella - sent their troops and armaments to crack down on the Shiite led uprising in Bahrain in March The troops, the Peninsula Shield Forces, were composed of 1,600 riot-trained paramilitary members and more than 20 tanks 8. Kuwait also sent elements of its navy to Bahrain to protect its national waters 9. These military steps were accompanied with a GCC decision in March 2011 to allocate $20 billion to developmental projects in Bahrain and Oman over 10 years 10. The silence that prevailed in the case of Bahrain reaffirmed the supremacy of security and strategic considerations over democratic ones, and that the North African paradigm cannot be applied to the Gulf. The Gulf region has huge oil reserves, represents a hub for international financial investments, and enjoys extreme geostrategic importance. Bahrain is governed by a minority Sunni elite, while the Shiite majority is politically marginalized. As has been always the case, the issue was seen from a security perspective, since a rise of Shiites on the north-western shores of the Gulf would signify increased Iranian influence in the region. Furthermore, Bahrain s relevance is not limited to the Gulf area only, as the country itself is considered one of the important US allies in the area. It enjoys Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status and its capital, Manama, is the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which is permanently stationed in the Middle East with its area of responsibility identified as the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. U.S. personnel in the 7 M. NURUZZAMAN, Politics, Economics and Saudi Military Intervention in Bahrain, «Journal of Contemporary Asia», vol. 43, no. 2, 2013, pp S. HENDERSON, Bahrain Boiling, «Foreign Policy», 23 September foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/bahrain_boiling (accessed 8 May 2013). 9 Reuters, Kuwait Says Navy Heading to Bahrain Soon: Ambassador, 17 March 2011, (accessed 8 May 2013). 10 GCC, Statement of the 118 th Summit of the GCC Ministerial Council, 10 March 2011, (accessed 16 April 2013). 4

5 Manama facility control key assets, including forces deployed to counter Iranian threats in the region and the Combined Task Force that contributes to international counter piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa area. Bahrain's strategic importance was further emphasized in February 2012, when Fifth Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Mark Fox, announced that his forces were prepared to prevent Iran from blocking the Strait of Hormuz. This came as a response to Iran's previous rhetoric, which was widely perceived in the West as a threat to oil tankers passing through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which around 20% of the world's daily oil demand passes 11. While the U.S. and Europe have expressed doubts about the wisdom of the brutal crackdown in Bahrain, both have failed to clearly and publicly condemn the Saudi-Emirates sponsored repression. Gulf Assistance and Support to Arab Countries in Transition Against this backdrop it might seem odd that the GCC states have promised assistance funds to many Arab countries in transition, and have supported Arab revolts in other crisis areas across the Arab region. The following analysis addresses the various cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen, which all contrast with assistance provided to non-arab Spring countries such as Oman, Jordan and Morocco. Unlike the case of other external actors, the Gulf States showed remarkable clarity in deciding on both the direction and the means necessary to cope with the revolutionary events in the Arab region, enjoying a greater ability to influence Arab countries economically, socially and politically. The growing Gulf influence in MENA has been evident both before and after the Arab uprisings. This is not only in terms of aid provision on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as the Gulf area represents an attractive market for hundreds of thousands of Arab laborers. Also, the oil-rich kingdoms have been assuming a rising political role in regional policies, and many of the Gulf's sheikhs have influenced Arab politics, especially through heavy funding to Islamist movements with their varying degrees of conservatism. The oil rich kingdoms have been assuming a rising political role in regional policies, and many of the Gulf's sheikhs have influenced Arab politics, especially through heavy funding to Islamist movements with their varying degrees of conservatism 11 S. HENDERSON, Nervous Bahrain Marks Anniversary of Shiite Protests, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 13 February 2012, (Accessed 8 May 2013); see also: Idem, Iran's Strait of Hormuz: A Challenge to U.S. Policy, Policy Alert, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 December

6 Egypt: Increasingly Contentious Gulf Assistance The massive Gulf assistance funds promised to Egypt have raised much controversy and triggered geopolitical analysis of the real intentions behind them. Early in 2011, Saudi Arabia promised $4 billion in budgetary aid, but it was not effectively until May 2012 that the Saudi Kingdom provided Egypt with $500 million in aid and in the fourth quarter of 2011 deposited an additional $1 billion in Egypt's central bank (CBE) in support of the country's shrinking hard currency reserves 12. Besides, Saudi Arabia, with its total foreign direct investments estimated at $240.4 million in 2011/ , is expected to extend $750 million in the form of credit lines to support its exports to Egypt. Other Gulf assistance includes $3 billion promised by the UAE in support of SMEs and housing projects; $10 billion promised by Qatar for planning projects; and $168 million in investments from Kuwaiti state-run businesses 14. As for Qatar, only $500 million has been deposited at the CBE. In January 2013, it again announced that it would lend Egypt $2 billion and provide $0.5 billion in grants, while intending to buy government bonds worth $2.5 billion 15. No information is known about the conditions associated with these generous offers of assistance, nor has anything been declared to clarify the basis on which these funds will be delivered. Yet, even with the stagnation in delivering the promised assistance, it is presumed that such aid is aimed mainly at investing in Egypt's political stability and blocking potential Iranian influence in this major Arab country. The fact that Egypt's relations with some Gulf States essentially the UAE but also to a certain degree Saudi Arabia have been experiencing sharp fluctuations since the electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a major factor in explaining the stagnation in delivering the promised aid. Saudi Arabia is generally against trying Mubarak and has been eager to see a new moderate regime in Egypt that keeps business as usual, Saudi Arabia has been eager to see a new moderate regime in Egypt that keeps business as usual, particularly regarding regional politics 12 Saudi to grant Egypt $500mn, deposits $1bn in CBE, Al-Ahram Online, 10 May 2012, t-egypt-mn,-deposits-bn-in-cbe.aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 13 R. OMAR, Gulf Neighbors Extend Positive Triggers to the Egyptian Economy, Egyptian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation Center For Project Evaluation and Macroeconomic Analysis, Quarterly Newsletter, vol. XI - 2, April E. E-SHENAWI, Are Egypt's Old Chums Coming Soon?, Al-Arabiya News, 12 July 2011, (accessed 8 May 2013). 15 R. OMAR, op. cit. 6

7 particularly regarding regional politics. The UAE, and also to a certain degree Kuwait, perceive the rise of the Brotherhood as potentially threatening to the political stability of their monarchies as well as to the cohesion of their societies. The arrest of Egyptian MB members in the UAE and the proposal to change the name of a street in Kuwait City dedicated to Hassan al-banna the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 are just some examples of their position. However, the controversy over Qatar's role in Egypt has developed into a contentious issue over the past few months. The Egyptian opposition, intellectuals, media, and enormous segments of the Egyptian public followed with great repulsion the many rumors on MB intentions to lease the Suez Canal to Qatar, and those peculiar rumors regarding the proposal of some Qatari firms to sponsor tourism in Egypt's ancient sites. Qatar, which ranks as the fifth Arab state after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Tunisia and Kuwait in terms of net foreign direct investment in Egypt according to 2011/2012 estimations, has shown much interest in boosting its investment in the Egyptian economy. The process started when Qatar's state-owned QInvest made a deal to buy a controlling share of EFG-Hermes, Egypt s largest investment bank 16, as well as the French Société Générale bank in The fact that Qatar has come to be the closest Gulf ally of the new MB led government in Egypt, and that Qatari funds have been directed to support the MB in Egypt in various ways 17 has also triggered much mistrust of Qatar's oversized ambitions or planned role in the country. Not only in Egypt but also in the Gulf itself, Qatari support of the MB is observed with concern and reacted to with various forms of support for different opposition currents in Egypt. Tunisia: an Interesting Contrast with the cases of Jordan, Morocco and Oman Unlike the case of Egypt, and more in accentuation of the trivial strategic and political importance of Tunisia, official Gulf assistance for Tunisia has been neither generous nor rapidly promised. Only in mid 2012 did some Gulf States start to offer Tunisia modest assistance loans and humanitarian aid. In this respect, in mid April 2012 the Tunisian central Unlike the case of Egypt, and more in accentuation of the trivial strategic and political importance of Tunisia, official Gulf assistance for Tunisia has been neither generous nor rapidly promised 16 The deal has been held up by Egyptian regulators in April Cf. M. ELAGATI, Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution, AFA-FRIDE-Hivos, 2013, (accessed 8 May 2013). 7

8 bank announced that it had received a $500 million loan from Qatar, which also expressed willingness to provide 20,000 jobs in Qatar to Tunisians 18. On another front, in February 2012, Saudi Arabia sent five humanitarian aid planes to Tunisia loaded with 530 tons of humanitarian aid and relief materials 19. It would actually be very interesting to contrast these modest assistance funds for Tunisia, the first Arab Spring country that also paid a heavy economic bill for toppling Bin Ali, with the Gulf assistance funds for Jordan, Morocco or Oman. These three countries top the list of GCC assistance even if they are not generally included in the Arab countries in transition group, with $10 billion of developmental projects allocated to Oman 20 and $5 billion to both Morocco and Jordan. This approach contrasts with the limited financial support provided to Tunisia. This is a clear indication that Gulf generosity is not meant to help out countries in transition, de facto underlining that Gulf generosity is more addressed to stabilization (be it in the Gulf or the Levant) than to generic support for Arab countries in transition. Libya, Syria, and Yemen: Stability First Another aspect of Gulf support to Arab countries in transition was: i)supporting the NATO intervention in Libya, ii) demonstrating willingness to intervene in Syria as well as arming the opposition there, iii) adopting what came to be known as the Gulf initiative for a smooth transfer of power in Yemen. As for Libya, two Gulf States, namely Qatar and the UAE (out of a total of four Arab countries including Jordan and Morocco) have joined NATO's efforts in Libya, which has indeed added much to the broader perception of legitimacy of the NATO operation. Qatar specifically has played a dual role in assisting the NATO operation with six Mirage fighter jets and providing targeted support to the Islamists in Libya 21. Moreover, and 18 Qatar to give Tunisia billion dollar aid, provide job, «The Arabian Gazette», 26 April , (accessed April 2012). 19 Foreign Ministry of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Ambassador to Tunisia receives 1st Humanitarian Aid Plane, 28 February 2012, mofaen/servicesandinformation/news/ministrynews/pages/articleid aspx (accessed 8 May 2013). 20 GCC, op. cit. 21 G. STEINBERG, Qatar and the Arab Spring: Support for Islamists and New anti-syrian Policy, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Comments 7, February 2012, p. 4. 8

9 according to David Roberts, "Qatari special forces reportedly provided basic infantry training to Libyan rebel fighters in the Nafusa Mountains, to the west of Tripoli, and eastern Libya. The Qatari military even brought Libyan fighters back to Doha for special exercises. And in the final assault on Qaddafi's Bab al-aziziya compound on August 24, Qatari special forces were seen on the front lines of the fight" 22. Here, the importance of Libya as a major player in the world oil and gas market, as well as the previous Gulf antagonism with Qaddafi's regime, are indeed sufficient features to trigger intervention and assistance, mainly from the oil rich Gulf. But it is also more relevant to point out the consistency in the ambitious role of Qatar, which has taken the lead (compared to all other Arab efforts in Libya) in order to enhance its prestige and political and security presence in the region's major developments. In Yemen, which started to emerge as one of the main al-qaeda centers 23 in the region and where violent confrontations between the regime and the opposition forewarned of a potential civil war, the GCC countries were fundamental in persuading the Yemeni president Ali Abdalla Saleh to step down and in preparing the ground for a smooth transfer of power. As a sign of support and in a demonstration of conversion of its visions of the region's political stability, the United States extended its support to the Gulf initiative and to Gulf efforts in stabilizing Yemen, through effective collaboration with the Yemeni government in fighting al-qaeda there. In May 2012, Yemen received the assistance of the US military, which contributed with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, most of them armed with missiles), drones, and 30 military experts to the battle against al-qaeda fighters in the south. By the end of May 2012, news came to announce that the US-aided Yemeni army had pushed al- Qaeda out of the Zinjibar in Abyan, the southern part of Yemen. In Syria, some Gulf states have voted to expel Syria from the Arab League and have demonstrated a bold willingness to engage. On February 27, 2011, Qatari Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassim al-thani, told the Friends of Syria conference in Tunis that Arab states "should do whatever 22 D. ROBERTS, Behind Qatar's Intervention In Libya: Why Was Doha Such A Strong Supporter of The Rebels?, «Foreign Affairs», 8 September 2011, -in-libya (accessed 16 April 2013). 23 Cf. D. GREEN, The al-qaeda Crescent in Yemen, Policy Watch 31821, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, templatec05.php?cid=3374, 22 June 2011 (accessed 8 May 2013). 9

10 is necessary to help (Syrian oppositionists), including giving them weapons to defend themselves" 24. On March 31, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-faisal, said that "the arming of the (Syrian) opposition is a duty" 25. With the aggravation of the situation in Syria, in January 2012 the Emir of Qatar, Hamad al-thani, suggested that "Arab troops should be sent to Syria to end the political unrest in the country" 26. However, with the increasing complication of the Syrian crisis and noting the many limits on direct involvement there, the Gulf States seemed to take a step back, at least concerning their strong rhetoric calling for intervention. Nonetheless, much Saudi and Qatari assistance, whether in the form of weaponry or funds, has reportedly been delivered to various elements nationalist, secular and Islamist of the increasingly fragmented Syrian opposition. Also, Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, were pioneers in pledging humanitarian aid, estimated at approximately $1.5 billion, to Syria at an international conference in Kuwait last January. Important neighboring countries such as Jordan and Turkey supported Gulf shipments of arms, with the alleged external support of the United States 27. Early in March 2013, media reports highlighted a US coordination of a massive airlift of arms to Syrian rebels from Croatia paid for by Saudi Arabia - with the help of Britain and other European states 28. Gulf eagerness to extend military assistance to various fragments of the Syrian opposition is strongly believed to be an effort to achieve a certain balance between the fighting groups, especially by countering al-assad s forces which are supported by Iran, and offsetting jihadist groups which are believed to be better equipped than other factions of the opposition. Jihadist elements specifically, and their crucial role on the ground, have alarmed many Western, regional and Gulf powers. 24 M. KNIGHTS, Could the Gulf States Intervene in Syria?, Policy Watch #1929, Washington D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy., 17 April Ibidem. 26 Qatar's Emir Suggests Sending Troops to Syria, Aljazeera News, 14 January 2012, (accessed May 8, 2012). 27 C.J. CHIVERS E. SCHMITT, Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria With Croatian Arms, «The New York Times», 25 February See also C.J. CHIVERS E. SCHMITT, Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands With Aid From C.I.A., «The New York Times», 24 March R. SPENCER, US and Europe in 'major airlift of arms to Syrian rebels through Zagreb, «The Telegraph», 8 March

11 Conclusion The Gulf monarchies' policies and strategies towards the different Arab uprisings boost the Gulf as a driver for political stability in the entire MENA region. Gulf States policies within the GCC area apparently led by Saudi Arabia signal a determined effort aimed at maintaining the political stability of the region and preserving the status quo of their own monarchies. Tiny Qatar specifically has performed an oversized role, which is believed to be mainly exerted to enhance its prestige and political, economic and security presence in the region's major developments. Consistent with this logic, the Gulf States stepped into the post 2011 Arab scene to promise assistance funds to many Arab countries in transition, and have supported Arab revolts in other crisis areas across the region. In order to play an influential role amid the high fluidity of many Arab transitions and to comply with the rise of Political Islam in moderate and radical forms to dominate the scene, Gulf assistance was not limited to the formal governmental level but was also extended to various non-state actors. This includes supporting various political parties, especially in their electoral campaigns, as well as influential social movements on the political scene 29. Gulf support of developments in Libya, Syria and Yemen may appear peculiar at first glance and inconsistent with the policies at home and in neighboring Bahrain. However, it is indeed consistent with the Gulf States' eagerness to maintain political stability and avert chaos on their southern border in the case of Yemen, in the niggling Levant in the case of Syria, and even in North Africa in the case of oil-rich Libya 30. This positive support is resiliently driven by a strong Gulf conviction that such instability and chaos may well encroach on their own stability and security. The above analysis further demonstrates that not only did the Gulf States approach the various cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen with diverse forms of assistance, they more vigorously approached non-arab Spring countries with more assistance, as in the cases of Oman, Jordan and Morocco. This confirms that Gulf generosity is not meant to help out countries in transition but rather to maintain the political stability of key Arab actors in the Middle East. 29 For further information on Gulf States funding to Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood, and other social movements see: M. ELAGATI, op. cit. 30 C. KOCH, op.cit. 11