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1 Court No. 01 Item No. SL-1, 2 & 3 SKB & SN (ORDER PASSED) WP (W) of 2017 (Subhankar Chakraborty & Anr. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) with WP (W) of 2017 (Uttam Basak Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) with WP (W) of 2017 (Youth Bar Association of India (Regd.). Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) Mr. Partha Ghosh, Advocate Mr. Sumit Chowdhury, Advocate Mr. Amajit De, Advocate Ms. Sanchita Burman Roy, Advocate Mr. Shamik Chatterjee, Advocate Mr. Hemraj Adhikary, Advocate Mr. Ashima Roy Chowdhury, Advocate Mr. Mohan Roy, Advocate Mr. Jiten Paul, Advocate Mr. Manabendra Bandopadhyay, Advocate Mr. Saptarshi Dutta, Advocate Mr. Narendra Gupta, Advocate Mr. Amrit Lal Dhar, Advocate Mr. Tarunjyoti Tewari, Advocate for the Petitioner (in WP (W) of 2017) Mr. Smarajit Roy Chowdhury, Advocate Mr. Uttam Basak, Advocate Mr. Radha Mohan Roy, Advocate for the Petitioner (in WP (W) of 2017) Mr. Raj Dip Ray, Advocate Mr. Kuldeep Rai, Advocate Mr. Ricky Ray, Advocate Mr. Somnath Adhikary, Advocate Ms. Mousomee Shome, Advocate Mr. Debanjan Gupta, Advocate Mr. Sunny Nandy, Advocate for the Petitioner (in WP (W) of 2017) Mr. Kishore Datta, Learned Advocate General Mr. Abvhrotosh Majumdar, Ld. Addl. Advocate General Mr. Pantu Deb Roy, Advocate Mr. T.M. Siddiqui, Advocate Mr. Nilotpal Chatterjee, Advocate Mr. Lal Mohan Basu, Advocate for the State These three writ-petitions are filed by some public spirited persons to achieve the identical desired reliefs with the common aims through different path. The fact emanates from the aforesaid three writ-petitions are common and in order to avoid the prolixity of repetition of facts, the short details would suffice to address the points raised before this court. The first writ-petition being WP (W) of 2017

2 2 was filed and duly affirmed on September 8, 2017 challenging the action of the State in relation to the immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 beyond p.m. and complete embargo is created for October 1, It is stated therein that an announcement was made by the Hon ble Chief Minister of West Bengal that there would be a restriction on the immersion of Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 beyond p.m. and a complete prohibition on October 1, The aforesaid announcement was widely published and circulated through different medias and affects the religious sentiments of the Hindu community, more particularly, the citizens of the State where the Durga Puja is considered to be one of the major festivals. The petitioners therein have impinged the said decision of the State in absence of any policy or the declarations/notifications issued in this regard. The second writ-petition being WP (W) of 2017 is at the instance of a practicing Advocate of this court for the identical reliefs based upon the similar facts. The said writ-petition was affirmed on September 5, 2017 but was filed after the earlier writ-petition. It is categorically stated in the said petition that putting restriction on immersion of Durga Idol upto p.m. on September 30, 2017 and an absolute prohibition on October 1, 2017 has no foundation or basis. The aforesaid decision of the government is impinged on the fact that the order restricting or prohibiting the religious ceremony to be performed by a particular section of the society without any declaration/notice, is par se illegal and in colourable exercise of power. The third writ-petition being WP (W) of 2017 is filed by an Association, registered under the Society Registration Act, 1860 along with their office bearers on

3 3 the basis of the statement of the Hon ble the Chief Minister posted on the official twitter account communicating her decision that except for 24 hours period on the day of Muharram, the immersion of the Durga Idol can take place on the subsequent three days. It was further indicated therein that on an auspicious day of Bijaya Dasami, immersion of the Idol is permitted upto p.m.. According to the said writ-petitioners such decision hurts the sentiments of the Hindus and has also percolated a wrong signal in the orderly society governed by the rule of law. All the aforesaid writ-petitions are filed founding basis on the statement of the Hon ble Chief Minister of the State of West Bengal posted on her twitter account or published through various visual and printed media. At the time of hearing of the aforesaid writ-petitions, a copy of the order dated September 9, 2017 issued by the Principal Secretary, Home and Hill Affairs Department of the State was submitted before the court to negate the stand of the aforesaid writ-petitioners that the said decision has been taken without following the procedure of law. The said order reveals that the decision to restrict the immersion of Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 till p.m. and total prohibition on October 1, 2017 due to Muharram has been taken in the interest of maintaining law and order and to rule out the possibility of any untoward incidents. By a subsequent clarificatory order dated September 14, 2017, the time for immersion of Idols on September 30, 2017 was extended till p.m. A uniform argument is advanced on behalf of the petitioners of three respective writ-petitions that the aforesaid orders have no reasonable basis and issued on mere caprice, surmise and conjecture and violative of the

4 4 rights guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. According to the petitioners, every citizen of the country enjoys the right of freedom to prefess and propagate religions subject to public order and such public order should have been based on rational and reasonable foundation and not at the whims of the executive authority. The public order therefore, should not be confused with the disturbance of law and order as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr. reported in (2004) 12 SCC 770. A decision to restrict or prohibit the celebration of the festivals must involve an element of subjectivity on the cogent and convincing materials and placed reliance upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia reported in (2004) 4 SCC 684. It is ardently submitted that the performance of the rites, rituals and ceremonies are essential to the tenets of the religion and in view of Article 26(b) of the Constitution, the State cannot interfere therewith. To buttress the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed upon a Division Bench judgment of this court rendered in case of Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr. reported in AIR 1991 Cal 263. A further reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Rabindra Kumar Dara Singh Vs. Republic of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 490 in support of the contention that the State must treat all religions and the religious groups equally as opposed to any decision or order defeating the very solemn object of the founding fathers of the Constitution and the Constitution itself. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General

5 5 submits that the right expressed under Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not inchoate or absolute right but is subject to the public order meaning thereby the sovereign can restricts and prohibits any individual or the group belonging to a particular religious community from performing or observing the religion ceremonies. According to the learned Advocate General, if an order is passed by the State to maintain the law and order, restricting and prohibiting the immersion of an Idol on a particular date coinciding with the mourning of the Muharram by a Muslim community, it cannot be impinged on the ground of unreasonableness and relies upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gulam Abbas & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in (1984) 1 SCC 81. It is ardently submitted by the learned Advocate General that the maintenance of law and order is within the realm of the executive powers and executive functions leaving hardly any room for interference by the judiciary under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of the aforesaid contention the reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Rama Muthurtamalingam Vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mannagudi & Anr. reported in AIR 2005 Madras 1. It is vehemently submitted that the judgment rendered in Gulam Abbas (supra) was considered by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision rendered in Mohd. Hamid & Anr. Vs. Badi Masjid Trust & Ors. reported in (2011) 13 SCC 61 interpreting the expression public order to mean an order to maintain and place the rights of the respective religious communities in the larger interest of the society. It is arduously submitted that Regulation 135 of the Police Regulation of Bengal, makes it imperative on any person or class of person to apply for a license in respect of an assembly or procession with the Superintendent in

6 6 a prescribed format in tune with Section 30(2) of the Police Act, According to the learned Advocate General, the identical provision is contained in Regulation 32 under Chapter 4 of the Police Regulation of Calcutta empowering the Officer-in-charge of the police station to consider the procession, assemblies and meetings. The learned Advocate General put more emphasis on Section 62 of the Calcutta Police Act wherein the power is conferred upon the Commissioner of Police to pass an order with a view to secure public safety and convenience. Several sections viz. Sections 30, 30A, 34, 34B of the Police Act, 1861 are pressed in action by the learned Advocate General to uphold the aforesaid order. The learned Advocate General emphasized on the maintenance of law and order in the decision restricting the immersion of an Idol till p.m. on September 30, 2017 and an absolute embargo on October 1, 2017 i.e. day of Muharram. We are not unmindful of the fact that the aforesaid public interest litigations are filed impugning the action of the State in putting restriction on immersion of the Idol on Bijaya Dashami and prohibition in this regard on the day of Muharram. Durga Puja is celebrated throughout the State and epitomizes the victory of the good against the evil. It is one of the major festivals of the Hindu community and the performance of each rituals which is inherent and inbuilt is followed in a time schedule as provided in various almanac or panjikas. One of the important customs is Devi Baran followed by Sindoor Khela which can only be performed after sunset and are sine qua non to customary rites and ceremonies before the immersion of the Idol. Large sections of the Hindu community are performing the Puja privately or through community, which not only attached to their sentiments and religious belief but the sense of security as well that it

7 7 would bring all good in their life. Equally, the Muslim communities are sensitively attached to mourning on the eve of Muharram. Both the sections of the society can profess and propagate their religion with harmony and unified manner. The founding father of the Constitution never dreamt of any artificial or real distinction amongst each religions in the country and incorporated Articles 25 and 26 in Part-III of the Constitution. The enlighting observations of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Kumar Dara Singh (supra) may be noticed in this regard wherein it is held:- 96. In a country like ours where discrimination on the ground of caste or religion is a taboo, taking lives of persons belonging to another caste or religion is bound to have a dangerous and reactive effect on the society at large. It strikes at the very root of the orderly society which the Founding Fathers of our Constitution dreamt of. Our concept of secularism is that the State will have no religion. The State shall treat all religions and religious groups equally and with equal respect without in any manner interfering with their individual right of religion, faith and worship. 97. The then President of India, Shri K.R. Narayanan once said in his address that Indian unity was based on a tradition of tolerance, which is at once a pragmatic concept for living together and a philosophical concept of finding truth and goodness in every religion. We also conclude with the hope that Mahatma Gandhi's vision of religion playing a positive role in bringing India's numerous religion and communities into an integrated prosperous nation be realised by way of equal respect for all religions. There is no justification for interfering in someone's religious belief by any means. It is axiomatic to record that the State has no religion, which is one of the fundamental facets underlying secularism. There should not be any order of precedence in performance of the religious rites, rituals, ceremonies and mourning amongst the religious

8 8 communities. There should be an equality in every citizen s right with corresponding obligation of very State to protect the same. The Division Bench in the case of Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (supra) reported in AIR 1991 Cal 263, interpreted the religion within the contour of Article 25 of the Constitution to be understood in contradistinction to what is secularism. It has been held therein that the expression matter of religion used in Article 26(b) of the Constitution should be read and construed as religion simplicitor and not a religion meaning thereby that it express the right of every religious denomination or a section thereof to manage its interference in the matter of religion. The order of the Division Bench in the above case was challenged before the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta & Anr. reported in (2004) 12 SCC 770 and an argument was advanced on the interpretation of public order appearing both in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The provisions from the different Police Regulations and the Police Act, 1861, relied upon by the learned Advocate General essentially applies in different field occasioning the application for license when an apprehension is anticipated of public tranquility on an impeccable and discreet materials and report and not on a mere surmise and conjecture, assumption or presumption. Though the power is enshrined under the aforesaid provisions upon the Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police, as the case may be, but such power can only be exercised in the event, the condition set forth therein is truly satisfied and supported on the basis of an incorrigible materials or the reports. The reliance upon the aforesaid provisions is

9 9 thoroughly misplaced and does not apply in the instant case, more particularly, the manner in which the impugned orders have been passed. We do not find that the State Instrumentality have laid any foundation on the basis of cogent materials. There is no material available with the State, far to speak of any cogent or convincing material and the impugned orders which can be decided by the court on the ground of fairness, reasonableness, arbitrariness, discriminatory and colourable exercise of power. 58. In India, persons of whatever sect are entitled to conduct religious procession through public streets so long as they do not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets by the public and subject to such directions as the Magistrates may lawfully give to prevent obstruction of thoroughfare or breaches of public peace. The power to suspend is extraordinary and the Magistrate should resort to it only when he is satisfied that other powers are insufficient. This authority of the Magistrate should be exercised in defence of rights rather than in their suspension. Though it is not expressly recorded therein the various provisions of the Police Act, 1861 and the Police Regulations of Bengal as well as Calcutta, but it can be succinctly inferred from the observations made in Paragraph 60 and 61 thereof that the aforesaid provisions were duly noticed in the following words:- The Apex Court interpreted the public order to be of wide amplitude than the law and order in the following manner:- 60. Moreover, public order has a larger connotation than law and order. Contravention of law to affect public order must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is not one which affects public order. The right to perform the religious rituals were duly recognized in the said report and protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. It would be apt to quote the observations recorded in paragraph 91 of the said report

10 10 which runs thus:- 88. Therefore, Ananda Margis have the right to take out a procession in public places after obtaining necessary permission from the authorities concerned and they are also entitled to carry trishul or trident, conch or skull so long as such procession is peaceful and does not offend the religious sentiments of other people who equally enjoy the fundamental right to exercise their religious freedom. An Ananda Margi is entitled to transmit or spread religion by taking out procession in public places and also carry trishul, conch or skull. However, any religious right is subject to public order. The State has got ample powers to regulate the secular activities associated with religious practices. Religious activities are protected under Article 25 of the Constitution. No doubt, such religious freedom is subject to health and subject to laws made for social welfare. Every person has got the right to follow, practise and propagate his religion. Clause I of Article 25 of the Constitution puts a reasonable restriction upon the freedom of conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate religion. The said clause starts with the expression subject to public order morality and healthy and to other provisions of the Act and, therefore, it would not be correct to say that the same is an absolute right. The aforesaid Article though guarantees every person in India to have freedom of conscience and right to profess, practice and propagate religion but subject to restrictions imposed by the State on the ground of public order, morality, health and other provisions of the Constitution which does not authorize to outrage the religious feelings of any religious class or the community with deliberate intent. Both the Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution protects the right of a citizen to practice rituals, profess their religion and does not abridge or overturn the faith which is the foundation of any religion. Apart from the same, Article 26 confers a positive right on an individual or religious denomination or any

11 11 section thereof to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion which cannot be abridged or interfered with at all unless there is a solid and concrete foundation leading to any apprehension or possibility of untoward incidents. In such a case, where there is any possibility or apprehension for disturbance of peace, the State is to take steps to prevent or regulate which in the instant case can be done by issuance of license, then to stop a religious sect or community from exercising its faith and rituals on any day. It is certainly not a case of morality, health and to other provisions of the said part but the restrictions and/or prohibitions are based upon the maintenance of law and order and on possibility of untoward incidents. A query was raise by the court to the learned Advocate General on the number of applications seeking license from the Muslim community for procession (Tazia) to observe mourning on the eve of Muharram or on a Muharram day. Only one application could be produced which does not reveal any discord or disharmony because of the conflict between these two religious communities in the State of West Bengal. There should be a reasonable basis to form an opinion that there may be a possibility of untoward incident if both the religious sections of the society performs or observe the procession under their religious compulsions. No case has been made out in course of an argument that there was any past antecedent, which may reasonably lead to the possibility to untoward incidents for which the reasonable restriction or prohibition can be made in the interest of maintaining law and order. There is not the slightest of doubt in our mind that the State can regulate the procession or the religious

12 12 ceremonies to be performed but it does not vest them an absolute and/or inchoate power to prohibit a performance of ceremony in absence of any materials sufficient enough for formation of such opinion/decision. We are unable to comprehend from the submissions advanced at the Bar, more particularly, from the State any reasonable basis for putting restriction on immersion of Durga Idol till p.m. on September 30, 2017 and absolute prohibition on October 1, The maintenance of law and order is within the domain of the State and the decision to prevent and protect any untoward incident should be founded on the cogent and convincing material and not merely on one s perception. The petitioners have relied upon a chart indicating that on many years the Durga Puja and Muharram had coincided yet there was no restrictions and/or prohibition imposed by the then Government. Furthermore, no incident has reportedly been disclosed by the State which may reasonably lead to possibility of untoward incidents. We are tempted to quote the observations of the Single Bench dealing with the writ-petition being WP (W) of 2016 when an identical restriction and prohibition was imposed in the following manner:- It has been ascertained from Mr. Majumder that number of processions (tajia) taken out on the roads, streets and thoroughfares in the State of West Bengal on the eve of Muharram is not known to the administration. No effort worth the name has been made to satisfy this Bench that processions (tajia) on the eve of Muharram are an inseparable part of the mourning that is associated with Muharram. There has never been a holiday declared either by the Central Government or the State Government, on the eve of Muharram to facilitate processions (tajia). There has been a clear endeavour on the part of the State Government to pamper and appease the minority section of the public at the cost of the majority section without there being any plausible justification. The reason therefor is, however, not far to seek.

13 13 It also does not appear that there has been any study undertaken by the police administration of the State for identification of routes to be followed by those associated with immersion of Durga idols and those associated with processions (tajia). The administration has failed to take note of the fact that Muharram is also not the most important festival of people having faith in Islam. To put it curtly, the State Government has been irresponsibly brazen in its conduct of being partial to one community, thereby infringing upon the fundamental rights of people worshipping Maa Durga. In Mohd. Hamid & Anr. Vs. Badi Masjid Trust & Ors. (supra) reported in (2011) 13 SCC 61, the Apex Court held that Article 25 of the Constitution though express the ritual rights of every person and every religion but subject to public order and the maintenance thereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society. The said judgment is not a pointer to an issue involved in the instant public interest litigation and does not in fact decide the basis of putting restriction or the prohibition on performance of ceremony by the majority sections of the country with the minority section. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down by the Madras High Court in the case of Rama Muthurtamalingam Vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mannagudi & Anr. (supra) reported in AIR 2005 Madras 1, that the court should not ordinarily interfere with the matters related to public order provided it is in violation of some Constitutional or Statutory provisions and is clearly illegal or shockingly arbitrary. Though the public order is a matter within the domain of the State legislature and executives and it would not be proper in all cases to make interference yet the same is not an absolute proposition and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. We make it clear that the State being a welfare State, does not have any right to curb or do away with the

14 14 rituals of any community on a certain date or dates. In the instant case, as indicated above, the order dated September 9, 2017 and clarificatory order dated September 14, 2017 are issued without any reasonable basis and clearly creates a distinction between the rights of the two religious communities which does not appear to be sound and healthy for unified secular country. The judgment relied upon by the learned Advocate General in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat reported in (2005) 8 SCC 534 does not throw light on the clinching issue involved in the instant public interest litigation. The paragraphs relied upon by the learned Advocate General unequivocally says that the Regulation includes prohibition and the State can put a reasonable restrictions to practice any profession or any occupation, trade or business enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. There is no ambiguity that by regulating a reasonable provision, prohibition or restriction can also be imposed but such prohibition or restriction must be judged on the touchstone of fairness, transparency, reasonability and rationality. It would be apt to quote the observations made in paragraphs 75 and 77 of the said judgment wherein the Apex Court succinctly held that the restriction must be judged on the decree of prohibition and on other materials surfaced before the competent authority. 75. Three propositions are well settled: (i) restriction includes cases of prohibition ; (ii) the standard for judging reasonability of restriction or restriction amounting to prohibition remains the same, excepting that a total prohibition must also satisfy the test that a lesser alternative would be inadequate; and (iii) whether a restriction in effect amounts to

15 15 a total prohibition is a question of fact which shall have to be determined with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, the ambit of the right and the effect of the restriction upon the exercise of that right. 77. In Krishna Kumar the Constitution Bench held that when the prohibition is only with respect to the exercise of the right referable only in a particular area of activity or relating to a particular matter, there was no total prohibition. In that case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with the case of adatiyas operating in a market area. A certain field of activity was taken away from them, but they were yet allowed to function as adatiyas. It was held that this amounts to a restriction on the exercise of the writ petitioners' occupation as an adatiya or a seller of grain but does not amount to a total ban. The judgment rendered in Gulam Abbas & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (supra) reported in (1984) 1 SCC 81 is totally misplaced and is not relevant in the present context. A miscellaneous application was filed as an offshoot of the order passed by the Apex Court in the writ-petition on a dispute inter se between the members of the Sia and Sunni section of the Muslim community of Banaras on the performance of the religious rights. Five fatawas were issued by the religious heads of the Sunni sects from Delhi, Benaras and Patna on the statement of Sheriat Law. Under the aforesaid fatawas, the shifting of the deadbodies after digging the old grave was stated to be impermissible in the Sheriat Law as it would amount to interference with their religious rights. By overruling the same, the court held:- 6. Counsel for the Sunnis relied upon five Fatwas issued by their religious heads (Head Muftis and Shahi Imams) from Delhi, Banaras and Patna stating the position under Sheriat Law. The common theme in all these Fatwas is that under Sheriat Law respecting of graves is the religious obligation of every Muslim, that shifting of dead bodies after digging old graves in which they are lying buried is not permissible and to do so would amount to interference with their religious rights. True, this position under Sheriat Law cannot be doubted but as explained earlier the religious rights of every person and every religious denomination are subject to public order, the

16 16 maintenance whereof is paramount in the larger interest of the society. For instance, the ecclesiastical edict or right not to disturb an interred corpse is not absolute as will be clear from Section 176(3) of Criminal Procedure Code which permits its exhumation for the purpose of crime detection and this provision is applicable to all irrespective of the personal law governing the dead. In fact, quoting a Hadit, one of the Fatwas relied upon by the contesting respondents states unnecessary shifting of graves is also not permissible. The edict clearly implies that it may become necessary to shift graves in certain situations and exigencies of public order would surely provide the requisite situation, especially as the fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 are expressly made subject to public order. In the circumstances in directing the shifting of two graves in question for the purpose of maintaining public order which would be in the larger interest of the society, we do not think that we are doing anything irreligious. In the circumstances the first objection is overruled. It is thus apparent from the aforesaid observations that the order passed by the State in larger public interest and the then avowed object to bring a harmony between to classes of the Muslim religion. The aforesaid consideration is conspicuously absent in the instant case and this court does not find any reasonable basis or foundation for issuance of the aforesaid orders abridging and/or curtailing the right to profess religion and performance of rituals. Neither any case has been made out in course of argument nor any material or any iota of evidence which can be deciphered by the court for coming to the conclusion that there is or there was possibility of any untoward incident or that any such incident was there in the past. It appears in course of hearing that as per the three Panjikas which are followed by the Hindu community, permit the immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 till 1.26 a.m. of October 1, There is no case made out in the instant writ-petition that the immersion of

17 17 Idol can be made on October 1, 2017 as per the said Almanac. It is within the competence of the State to designate a separate route both for the procession (Tazia) by the Muslim community and the procession for immersion of the Durga Idol on September 30, 2017 or even on October 1, 2017 if the immersion is found permissible, shall ensure that adequate protections are provided to maintain the public order or the peace and harmony. This court hereby directs the Director General of West Bengal Police and Commissioners of all respective Commissionerates in the State to specify a separate route for immersion of Durga Idols and Tazias and shall ensure that such routes do not overlap each other. The aforesaid authorities shall make a wide publication through various media, the routes earmarked for immersion of the Durga Idols and Tazias. The immersion of idols shall be allowed till 12 midnight and shall ensure that any procession that reaches before the aforesaid time shall be permitted to immerse the idol. The aforesaid arrangement shall continue on all days commencing from September 30, The police administration is directed to provide adequate personnel inside the State to meet any exigencies at the spot and shall handle with care and caution and circumspection to get the harmony between the two religious communities. The respondents are directed to file affidavit in opposition within three weeks after reopening of this court following Puja Vacation for the year Reply thereto, if any, be filed two weeks thereafter. Matter to appear in the list five weeks after

18 18 reopening of this court following Puja Vacation for the year (Rakesh Tiwari, A.C.J.) (Harish Tandon, J.) Later: After the delivery of the order in open court the learned Advocate General prays for stay of operation of this order. After due consideration, we do not find that this is fit case where the operation of the order should be stayed. The prayer is thus rejected. (Rakesh Tiwari, A.C.J.) (Harish Tandon, J.)