Are We Witnessing Changes in the Iranian Scene? Policy Studying Unit

Transcription

1 Are We Witnessing Changes in the Iranian Scene? Policy Studying Unit 31 Mar 2017

2

3 HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity. To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, (4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit. A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and electronic press.

4 Contents 1. Introduction First: Iran and America Second: Iran and Russia Third: Iran and Turkey Fourth: Iran internally Conclusion

5 1. Introduction Since its victory in February 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran raised the slogan of "exporting the revolution." This slogan was a gateway to destabilize the Gulf region and then to start the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in the early 1980s, which ended with Iran s defeat and drained the two strong neighbours politically, militarily and economically. Without going into the events of the final decade of the last century after the war (the Gulf- Iraqi tension, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the first Gulf War and expelling Iraq from Kuwait and placing it under guardianship and sanctions, etc.), Iran resumed rebuilding its position, but that did not stop it from raising its slogan of "exporting the Islamic Revolution", not hesitating to destabilize the region by mobilizing a destructive sectarian approach to serve its policies aiming to extend its hegemony and influence, along with the adoption of terrorist means in order to reach its goals. All this led to the destruction of the whole system of regional security, and threatened the international security system, and put Iran in an open confrontation with America and the West and with the international community. 2. First: Iran and America During both consecutive administrations of Obama, the US-Iranian relationship, witnessed an unprecedented state of flexibility and calm since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979, and the changes that have taken place in America's relations with the countries of the Middle East after 11 September 2001 have paved the way for that state. These changes were essentially based on the idea that the origin of terrorism that was hitting in America and the world was caused by "radical Sunni Islam. Such ideology was causing instability in the area which in turn threatened the stability of the US interests and national security in the region, the US, and in the world. Therefore, it was necessary to confront this extremism, wherever it was, and eliminate it. The first confrontation was with (al Qaeda) in Afghanistan. 2

6 In line with this strategy, Iran launched its regional expansion phase by supporting the US invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, providing concrete facilities for the US invading forces. In late 2002 and early 2003, when US preparations for the invasion of Iraq began, Iran pushed its followers from Iraq's Shiite political forces to cooperate with the Americans, and provided misinformation to Washington about Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons to drive the invasion. While Iran's cooperation with the Bush administration in Afghanistan has been somewhat underground, cooperation with it in Iraq was "public." Iraqi Shiite leaders were flying from Tehran to London and Washington to meet with US officials and to provide Iraqi cover for the imminent war on Iraq. Over the following years, Iraq's Shiite political forces, closely linked to Iran, emerged as the main ally of the occupation administration, on top of becoming their tool for rebuilding the Iraqi state. Iraq has not seen a single confrontation, after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, between the Iraqi Shiite political forces and occupiers, out of concern for Iraq and its independence. Not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran never stopped working to impose its hegemony and influence in a number of Arab countries -especially during the Obama administration- as in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and elsewhere, using the weapons of sectarianism and terrorism, stirring feelings of hatred, revenge, and retaliation, which threatened these communities with disintegration, and sectarian wars with unidentifiable ends and outcomes. Iran took advantage of two things, the first was the strategic direction, which the Obama administration took in dealing with the Middle East, starting from the idea that Iran, a capable Shiite state, was the most qualified to play an active role in the face of "Sunni extremist terrorism", and then to impose stability on this region, even if that meant tolerating the "Shiite terrorism" which was tied by a ruling referential, unlike "Sunni terrorism" which had no reference to turn to; the second was Obama s laid back policies with Iran, which insisted on negotiations, no matter how long, arduous, and difficult, on the "joint action plan "Known as the" nuclear deal "which was reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015, and especially that Obama believed that to reach such agreement, would represent the greatest achievement of his reign. 3

7 There is no doubt, despite all what has been said about America's withdrawal from the region, that the Middle East remains one of the major challenges to US foreign policy. The new US administration does not seem to be in line with the Obama s administration vision of the region, in addition to the fact that the initiators of this administration suggest a different policy from that of Obama towards Iran over the previous period. Iran s problem, and even Russia s, is not the moody statements of Donald Trump during his election campaign, but the most prominent members of his administration who have begun to formulate a Middle East strategy starting with Syria and working to establish bases and facilities, from safe areas and alliances with regional countries to confront Iran, and a zone of influence in the north-east of Syria, overlooking Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and put Eurasia under watch, which departs from the framework of tactical policies that are suitable for negotiations, to the core of a competitive strategy that is integrated into the heart of rival geopolitical projects in the region, threatening to remove competitors, or making the costs of their projects very expensive. US President Donald Trump has set the fight against terrorism as a priority; that is to say, the war on Daesh in Al-Mosul and Al-Raqqa was the first objective. This war appears to be accompanied by a vow of confrontation with Iran, which has been classified by the new administration as the most prominent state sponsor of terrorism and a destabilizing element of the region, as well as a threat to global security. It received a flood of warnings after a package of sanctions., but most likely Washington's goal is to reduce its areas of expansion and influence in the region, from Yemen to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. There is no doubt that this confrontation is the toughest test of the new policy of the United States. But it is not enough to liberate Mosul and Raqqa to stabilize Iraq and Syria. It is not enough to have an international and regional consensus on the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Syria to launch an understanding on a desirable regional system, which is a fundamental building block of the international system. Most likely, they will walk a path of many battles and interactions. Two major events have contributed to putting the region at a crossroads in the last three years: The Declaration of the (Caliphate) or (the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham), and (the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan known as the Iranian Nuclear Agreement) of 14 July

8 between Iran and the (P-5 plus one). But while the world was focusing on these two events and their implications, in the region, Europe, and the United States, Iran was working regularly to achieve its two main objectives: to strengthen its regional hegemony, and to link Tehran through Iraq and Syria with southern Lebanon, and to implement both objectives by securing a geographical corridor through the three countries, and the acquisition of the political decision in the three capitals: Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut. The report, published in the Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, and was based on the views of Russian experts on US President Donald Trump's statements about Iran, a Russian ally, proves how serious the confrontation is. The report said: "It was only one month after Donald Trump came in the White House, we began to hear the clanking of the swords after being drawn out of their sheaths. " The report revealed how analysts expressed concern about the recent statements of the American president that "Iran was the number one terrorist state." Adding that "what is important now is how Iran will act along with this American position. Iran can simply withdraw from the agreement on the nuclear program and return to the resumption of uranium for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons". It is not surprising that the Israeli view, which was in conflict with Obama's vision, especially with regard to the nuclear agreement with Iran, has some effect in shaping the new American directions. The Israeli approach to what was going on in the region is starting to penetrate the administration of President Donald Trump. This suggests an American policy that tries to answer Israel's concerns in one hand and coordinate with Russia on the other hand, as well as the role that will be given to Turkey in Syria or in the north at least. In his anti-iran speech, the US president with his administration seems to have dispelled the concerns that have emerged in recent years among a number of Arab parties, especially after the signing of the nuclear agreement between the administration of former president Barack Obama and Tehran, as they were convinced that the US has changed position and moved its alliances to the other side, that is to Iran. However, it seems that these Arab parties, which are no longer concerned, did not take into account that the change that may occur in the American position on Iran is often composed of the interest of Israel, not in terms of Arab interest. 5

9 3. Second: Iran and Russia The ruling elite in the Islamic Republic is concerned about the possibility of reaching an understanding between Washington and Moscow. They realize that the barter will not be on the Crimea, in exchange for refusing to bargain for Russia's presence in Syria and maintaining its bases in the country, the Russian president could sacrifice the head of the regime in Damascus and agree to engage in a political process that would be its way out of the existing situation. This is what the Iranian regime fears, which has invested so much and has made human and material sacrifices over the years, to maintain the rule in Damascus. Iran has therefore rushed to obtain economic concessions in communications, phosphate mines and oil exploration, and is seeking to obtain a port on the Mediterranean Sea. There has been growing talk of a clash of views between Russia and Iran over Syria starting to take place in the field for real this time. Hence, the possibility the rift widening between them has been enhanced through Russia s cooperation with Turkey, which is more useful for Russian presence in this country on the long run, especially if it was accompanied by International and regional efforts for a political settlement among the Syrians. It is clear that Russia has strengthened its understanding with Turkey during the Battle of Aleppo, and then in securing a ceasefire. It relies on its role in persuading the political and armed opposition to participate in the political process. This Russian-Turkish bilateral understanding, regardless of the present evident tension features, which started to surface after calling the Russian chargé d'affaires in Ankara to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, following the Russian military presence in the region of Afrin, and the targeting of one of the Turkish soldiers on the Turkish border area by a Kurdish sniper, which reflected a conflict between Moscow and Iran, that is deepening further and further. Iran criticised Russia s agreement on the Un resolution on Allepo, and opposed the Russian-Turkish understanding on getting the fighters out from the northern Syrian capital until it included the two Shiite towns of Fua'a and Kafria and expressed its rejection of inviting opposing military factions to Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, as well as the open invitation Directed to other forces that Iran had no interest in their presence. 6

10 The Russian understanding with Ankara for the departure of the fighters from Aleppo, and saving some of what could be saved amid the destructive campaign led by the militias, is the same understanding that will provide a gradual withdrawal from the Syrian quagmire. It relies on Turkey's ability to control the opposition factions, having most of them at the mercy and care of Turkish troops in the north and north-west of Syria. These fighters represent a military force capable of adjusting the balance of power with the Iranian-sponsored militias. On the other hand, during the Astana negotiations, the representatives of Russia, Turkey and Iran discussed the matter of (Shiite groups) fighting alongside the regime's forces, and mostly Hezbollah and its withdrawal from Syrian territory. This was revealed by the Russian newspaper "Izvestia" quoting a Russian military and diplomatic source. The newspaper said that the sites of the Russian Centre for Reconciliations deployed in various areas of Syria would become the main tool to monitor the commitment of the parties to the cease-fire agreement, as well as the movements and spread of the conflicting forces. While the second major task to be carried out by the Russian centre in Hameimim was likely to be "monitoring the withdrawal of (Shiite groups) fighting alongside Assad from a number of Syrian areas", explaining that "The participants in the Astana meeting have discussed this extra sensitive issue." The website of "Iranian Diplomacy", which is close to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referred to the tripartite meeting in Antalya, where the chiefs of staff of the Turkish, Russian and American armies held a meeting accompanied by a remarkable silence from Tehran. The site stressed that this meeting was another proof of the marginalization of the Iranian role in the Syrian file and a prelude to the removal of Tehran from this arena. It explained that the assumption that Russia maintained the interests of Iran on the table in Antalya was unconvincing and unacceptable, and that the restoration of the Syrian regime to the eastern areas in the city of Aleppo through the pivotal Russian role and the US acceptance of that should be explained, and that it has reduced the role of Iran in Syria. The site pointing at the statement of the US ambassador to the United Nations on the need to remove the Iranian forces and it loyal militias from Syria, while threatening and demanding Turkey to enter to Manbj, and pointing out that this case must be studied thoroughly and deeply. The article touched on the goals of the Antalya meeting, saying that the meeting identified Iran's future 7

11 position in the Syrian file, and that Washington and Moscow took Turkey's interests into account, but they put them third after their interests, ignoring Iran s interests completely. "The shock is near," the website said, "we must look for ways and mechanisms to reduce its impact on us." It is notable that in early March, Syria was a key focus of talks between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and directly followed by talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. According to some information in Moscow, Netanyahu sought to establish a joint mechanism with the Russians to impose "strict control over the activity of the Shiite forces allied to Bashar al-assad," na the mely sectarian militias operating under the supervision of Iran. The Israeli Prime Minister held talks with the Russian leadership focusing on expanding security cooperation between Moscow and Tel Aviv in Syria. The newspaper "Izvestia", which is close to the Russian government, quoted a Russian diplomatic-military source that Netanyahu stressed on working to strengthen "joint mechanisms for overseeing and monitoring in areas near the northern border" of Israel, in addition to discussing "additional assistance to be provided by Moscow to Tel Aviv to confront any moves in the region. " As revealed in Israel, Netanyahu conveyed to Putin an Israeli-American message that was agreed during his pre-visit talks with US President Donald Trump, implying that Washington and Tel Aviv would launch a deterrent operation to prevent Iran from extending its influence in Syria. Thus, the slogan "Death to Russia" raised by the hundreds of thousands who took part in the funeral of the former Iranian president, the head of the Diagnostic Department of the regime Sheikh Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was the most expressive of the Iranian public resentment of the emerging Russian positions. 8

12 4. Third: Iran and Turkey For the first time, Turkey and Iran have entered into an open political conflict and their exchange of accusations have outshined their mutual economic and trade interests. This unprecedented deterioration in the history of the relations between the two countries was a natural result of the development of events and the new strategic landscape in the region. The escalation of Turkish rhetoric towards Tehran began by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said on the side-lines of his visit to the Gulf in February, "the terrorist organization (Hezbollah) is moving in Syria too, and if Iran says it is against massacres and not behind them, we must cooperate and stand together to stop the bloodshed in Syria. " At the Munich Security Conference in February, the Turkish Prime Minister Ben Ali Yildirim responded to a question about the new US position that saw Iran as a threat by saying: "Not only Iran, there are other countries in the region, and the most important thing is that no country should have a certain influence in Syria or Iraq, " adding: "Iran is our historic neighbour. Our relations have seen many fluctuations, but we are upset about one of the issues here, if we focus on the doctrine, there will be a lot of damage." But the biggest attack came from the Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud Gawishoglu, who described the Iranian role in the region as "a destabilizing role, especially as Tehran seeks to spread Shi'ism in Syria and Iraq." The sudden Turkish attack on Iran's policies carried many indications; its timing was irregular, escalating since the Arab Gulf tour, in which he roamed the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar, and focused on cooperation in regional files and the protection of common interests, followed by the Turkish army Chief of Staff s visit to the United Arab Emirates. In addition, the Turkish position came in the context of the rigid positions shown by the new US President, Donald Trump, against Tehran. Ankara is therefore seeking to exploit this issue in an attempt to enhance its chances of opening a new page and forging stronger relations with Trump who made many positive references to Turkey. It is likely that the tension between them will not ease, and its outcomes will remain unknown, before a political settlement path appears in Syria, and the nature of the future regime in Damascus is known; 9

13 and before knowing the repercussions that will accompany the reclaiming of Mosul from the "Baghdadi State". Both matters are closely linked to the new US administration's policy toward the Middle East, the Islamic Republic, and Russia. This tension will continue to be governed by the parties limited capability to change the equations and drawing a new map for the intersected interests in the region. It is also certain that the emergence of a "Daesh" and then the start of the international war to eliminate the "Caliphate State" have increased the pace of competition between them. Tehran, which had stood from the very first moment of the (Syrian revolution) alongside the regime in Damascus and deployed its militias, despite all the intensive efforts made by Ankara to reach a political settlement, and then established the Popular crowd forces in Iraq, did not feel that Turkey would have a great influence in the situation, or it would be able to change the course of events, until the Russian military intervention, which represented a threat to the project of the Islamic Republic in the Levant, and limited its influence and ability to manoeuvre. Then came the understanding between the Russian and Turkish presidents, Vladimir Putin and Erdogan, to provoke their anger and exacerbate the threat to its role. To make things even more complicated, the administration of President Donald Trump has openly declared that one of its priorities was to eliminate terrorism and then to encircle the Iranian role in the region, not only in the Levant but throughout the region. This means that both agents, American and Russian have created a difficult challenge in the way of the Islamic Republic expansion towards the Meditarean, and its dominance on (four Arab capitals). Iranian Diplomacy website confessed that the recent visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow was part of Turkey's strong diplomatic activity, which means that Tehran s policies have failed in the region, but it was negotiating a superpowers like Russia on sensitive files, including the files of Iraq, Syria and the Kurds, and the purchase of the world's most advanced missile defence system S-400, describing the analysis of Iranian officials who believed that Turkey's policy in Syria has failed, and believing that Iran has achieved its goals, as mere wishes and illusions, confirming that "a deep perception of what is happening in Syria shows that if Ankara did not achieve its objectives in Syria, it did spoil the equations that were in Iran's interest, and made the situation there detrimental to Iran's interests," adding: "Iran's bid on the dispute between Ankara and Washington over the (Kurdish file) is a losing one, 10

14 because the two capitals can resolve this dispute as they did before, when they ended the dispute over the file of the Kurds of Iraq." The site that is close to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry confirmed that "It is not farfetched that Ankara will accept a second Kurdish territory, this time in northern Syria, through negotiations with Washington, but the latter has become Tehran's first enemy." Turkey has succeeded in introducing the file of the Iranian militias in Syria to the political solution program, after being limiting to talk of foreigners to those who were fighting alongside "Daesh" after Barack Obama s and all the consultations of the Security Council and previous understandings ignored the subject. The Turkish achievement did not stop at this point, rather, it raised the question of the demographic changes that Iran was seeking to establish in the Syrian north as an obstacle to any Russian-Turkish cooperation. This led Russia to a take position against Iran's ambitions in Syria and to take practical measures In Aleppo after a phase of ignoring it. 5. Fourth: Iran internally The essence of the current "Iranian scene" lies in Tehran's successive policies for more than a decade and a half. It sought to be the dominant regional superpower, offering to the countries of this region nothing but sectarian fanaticism and feuling internal wars. These wars, however extended and intensified, could not be an ingredient for stainable domination. Iran, whose "republican regime" was born from a mass popular revolution, played the role of counter-revolution in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, without paying any attention to the hopes and sacrifices of the peoples of these countries. It has worked to complete its regional project with the help of Shiite sectarian militias brought from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, operating under the control and supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. It invested unimaginable resources, funds, fighters and energy in this project and in all its external interventions. Iran's public disgruntlement with these policies can be seen in the declining support for these interventions: in Iraq (from 87% in 2014 to 64% in 2015 to 47% last year). And in 11

15 Lebanon (from 88% in 2014 to 43% in 2016). And in Yemen (from 62% in 2014 to 29% last year). General Mohsen Rezai, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard and Secretary of the System Diagnostic Council, warned that his country's regime was about to collapse from within due to corruption and mismanagement, similar to the positions of other Iranian officials who warned that the regime would wear from within as a result of widespread corruption, embezzlement and thefts of millions, the spread of patronage and bribes, and the weakness of state institutions. Rezai said that "regime officials should pay attention to the interior as much as they give importance to the expansion of Iran's regional influence," in a speech in the city of Najan, Isfahan province, according to his official website. "A country may look strong, but it is practically about to collapse from within," he said, referring to the collapse of the two Safavid and Khajari states in Iran after they reached their peak. "Inside Iran, deviations, mismanagement and corruption are time bombs. If we do not face them, we will collapse from within," he said. It is worth to mention that corruption in the state institution has reached an unprecedented level in Iran, too high it is threatening the regim; "The regime in Iran will not fall by a coup, a military attack or a velvet revolution," said Ahmad Tukli, an Iranian politician and former presidential candidate, in an interview last October, the widespread corruption is what will lead to the overthrow of this system. " "Corruption is pervasive in all state institutions, including supervisory committees," said Toukli, who has held several ministerial and administrative positions in previous Iranian governments, as well as two-term parliamentary membership. International Transparency organisation puts Iran at the top of the list of the most corrupt countries, ranking 136 out of 175 countries in terms of corruption, according to a study by the non-governmental Transparency International. Experts believe that corruption in Iran stems from the dominance of religious institutions and groups associated with the tip of the regime s pyramid, and groups belonging to the house 12

16 of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which occupies a large part of the Iranian economy and is not subject to any censorship. The battle over the disclosure of corruption files reached the top of the power pyramid in Iran, where the poles of the Iranian regime were exchanging attacks after the billionaire Babak Zanjani, who was also detained and sentenced to death for major corruption cases, disclosed grants to Iranian President Hassan Rowhani to fund his campaign in 2013, when Rouhani was attacked by the head of the judiciary, Sadiq Ameli Larijani. The case of Zanjani relates to the corruption network uncovered by former Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, who spoke of a list of ministers and officials of former President Ahmadinejad's government implicated in a financial scandal involving the withdrawal of about $ 70 billion from the state treasury in the form of loans and grants to government enforcers and the Revolutionary Guards. Larijani's attack on Rohani was followed by accusations of financial corruption by reformist deputies, at the forefront were 63 personal bank accounts that generated billions of monthly profits from the interests on these accounts, as well as financial guarantees for citizens with court cases. But Iran itself seems to be looking for a way out of the scene in which it has found itself, having just discovered the results of losing the cover provided by the Obama administration, enabling it to pass its foreign interventions and exploit terrorist groups, and felt that renewing sanctions would make lifting them an elusive goal without making compromises that it has rejected for long time. Between the escalation of the Revolutionary Guard manoeuvres and the departure of President Hassan Rowhani on his first visit to the Gulf, Iran appears confused and puzzled more than confident and defiant. In its search for an exit, it appears to be considering its options to respond to the administration's new hostile position. According to the February 23, 2017 edition of Al Quds Al Arabi, and based on sources close to Iranian reformists, concessions were made in the energy sector, especially oil and gas, and the establishment of joint Russian-Iranian military bases in the Persian Gulf, in return for Moscow's commitment to defend the Iranian regime in the event of any threat, as well as to escalate the situation between Hezbollah and the 13

17 Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel on the other to paralyze the Trump management in the Middle East and deplete it. 6. Conclusion The international strategic landscape is likely to undergo profound changes as the new US administration moves to change the rules of the game, or to correct what it sees as an imbalance that has crippled the ability of the United States, its global presence, its military establishment, and its national interests. As for Iran, it is not surprising that in the coming days it will announce its "withdrawal of advisers" from Syria, since the mission has been completed. It may also reduce the provocative appearance of its general, Qasem Soleimani, who appears to be under scrutiny by the US media now. In the context of these potential developments, it must be emphasized consistently that the frame of reference for the Iranian expansionist project was sectarian from the outset, and the dynamo and engine for the mechanisms and tools of this project. This sectarian project has generated deep and costly divisions in Arab societies with sectarian diversity, provoking hatred and animosities that could not be extinguished quickly. There is no doubt that the response to this project from different sectarian positions will exacerbate the extent of these divisions, hatreds and enmities. It is absolutely necessary to face the Iranian project from a national, Islamic, modern and universal background, but this confrontation will never achieve its goals if it fails to read the reality of reference and the tools from which the expansion policies of Iran emerge. 14

18

19 harmoon.org