Tech Savvy Militants in the Age of ICT Globalization: Online Radicalization to Violent Extremism in Kenya

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1 Issue No: 3, September 2017 Tech Savvy Militants in the Age of ICT Globalization: Online Radicalization to Violent Extremism in Kenya WORKING PAPER By Dr. Wilson Muna

2 The introduction of the 21 st century information and communication technologies (ICT) has broken a new space for radicalization to VE. The explosion, globalization and development of the ICT sector, particularly cell phones and the internet has created an opportunity for millions of youth, even those in far-flung areas to get in touch with social-economic, religious and political developments across the world. Violent extremists like the Al-Shabaab have now shifted their focus to the use of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp to advance their agenda. This means that they can post radical ideologies online without much physical contact with their targets. According to the Lamu County Plan for CVE, the internet and mobile phone tools have enabled youth to create platforms where they can meet, discuss and interact on social issues, where at times radicalization is alive and violent extremism is glorified. 1 As a case in point, Fouad Belkacem, the spiritual leader of the outlawed terrorist organization Sharia4Belgium 2 - is known to have managed a highly effective online campaign through videos that led to the recruitment of many young Belgians to jihad. 3 Under his command, the Sharia4Belgium claimed responsibility of having recruited 10 percent of Belgium s jihad foreign fighters. 4 The emergent ICT platform has given birth to a brand new concept, that is selfradicalization. This concept refers to the process whereby an individual (is radicalised and) becomes a violent extremist without any specific terrorist group engaging him directly; it often occurs through access to extremist propaganda via media and the Internet. 5 Elucidating, Ali 6 argues that the internet has turned out to be the primary radicalization and recruitment platform. He posited that more than 5 prominent militant Islamic extremist websites were being exclusively managed by Somali Jihadists by As Mitchell and Bhatt argue 7, internet radicalization traverse three distinct phases: 1 Boga, Hamadi Iddi. "Lamu County plan for countering violent extremism." (2016). 2 The organization rose to distinction in 2010, following a protest against the proposed public headscarf ban. 3 Arutz Sheva Staff, Radical Belgian Jihadist Group Gets Jail Time, Arutz Sheva, (February 11, 2015). Available on: Retrieved on August 24, Duncun Crawford, Sharia4Belgium trial: Belgian court jails members, BBC NEWS, (February 11, 2015) Available on: Retrieved on August 24, Boga, Hamadi Iddi. "Lamu County plan for countering violent extremism." (2016). 6 Ali, A. "Radicalization process in the horn of Africa-phases and relevant factors." Institut für strategie- Politiksicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung, (2009). 7 Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. New York: Police Department, (2007).

3 1. In the Self-Identification phase - the internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology. It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-salafi message they have encountered. 2. During the indoctrination phase, when individuals adopt this virulent ideology, they begin interpreting the world from this newly-formed context. Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the Internet allows the aspiring jihadist to view the world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further reinforcing the objectives and political arguments of the jihadi-salafi agenda. 3. In the Jihadization phase, when an individual commits to jihad, the Internet serves as an enabler providing broad access to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of weapons. In Kenya, evidence is replete indicating that the Al-Shabaab and their agents are using the internet such as blogs, Twitter and video and/or audio recordings to indoctrinate and radicalise potential recruits to VE. 8 In an attempt to understand the process and trends of youth radicalization in both Mombasa and Nairobi through an empirical field research, Mwangi found 9 that most individuals and groups spreading violent extremist ideologies preferred to use WhatsApp to spread their messages in lieu of the perception that the app is encrypted. This belief gave them confidence that third parties, especially government authorities were kept at bay. Both closed groups such as WhatsApp groups and open platforms such as available public content would contain carefully prepared narratives that would justify the pursuit of violence. Fieldwork findings indicate that the messaging revolves around themes such as an assault on Islam, claims of Christian and or Western invasions in places such as Iraq, Somalia and Syria As Mwangi 10 posits, violent extremists also prefer to disseminate their messaging through YouTube, with a strong persuasion that it would reach a crosscutting wider audience. Individuals, especially young people struggle to look for meaning, identity and purpose and are constantly looking for relevant messages that can satisfy their quest. Cognisant of the 8 Botha, Anneli. "Radicalisation to Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: a Political Socialisation Perspective." Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 5 (2015). 9 Mwangi, John. "The process and trends of youth radicalization in Kenya s Mombasa and Nairobi counties." (2016). 10 Ibid.

4 fact that radicalization is a continuous process, the first thing an individual comes across would be propaganda and then a tailored message that would seem to respond to some of the individual s psychological, emotional, social, or religious needs. In Kenya for example, videos and online text messages by violent extremists are custommade around a string of localized historical grievances such as land injustices at the Kenyan Coast. Others may exploit perceptions of police harassment in major cities in the disguise of countering violent extremism and terrorism, which could then be manipulated to coin an entry point to radicalization and eventually being recruited. In a nutshell, a scapegoat has to be pointed out to justify the use of violence or be actively involved in a violent extremist movement. 11 In his findings, Mwangi 12 observed that following Al-Shabaab s attack on Westgate in 2013, a series of propagandist videos have been generated and always ends with an appeal for interested individuals and groups to join the movement. He further observed that after the 2016 Al-Shabaab attack on the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in their El-Adde military base, the leader of the Al-Hijra wing of the al-shabaab in Kenya posted an online video praising and used the same platform to call for recruitment of interested individuals. According to Mutanda 13, it is evident that the Al-Shabaab media team Al-Khataib, is highly tech savvy and produces online Jihadist materials that are of high quality. Foreign expert fighters such as those from Europe and the U.S. are part of the media team that conscript jihadist messages. The Al-Shabaab has perfected the art of sending videos through internet and social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Twitter. Today, internet has become more accessible and cheaper and is no longer viewed as a significant barrier to access information. According to Patterson 14, rapid internet diffusion in Kenya has led to a mushrooming of cyber-cafes charging users less than a dollar per hour. These spaces have largely remained uncensored and have become critical radicalization sites for many youth. According to Kenya s National Security Intelligence Service (NIS), Al-Shabaab militants and their agents in Kenya are growingly alluring well-educated university students to join their 11 Mwangi, John. "The process and trends of youth radicalization in Kenya s Mombasa and Nairobi counties." (2016). 12 Ibid. 13 Mutanda, Darlington. "What Makes Terrorism Tick in Africa? Evidence from Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram." Jadavpur Journal of International Relations (2017). 14 Patterson, William R. "Islamic Radicalization in Kenya." Joint Forces Quarterly (78) (2015).

5 course through online platforms. 15 Through the use of online media like blogs, social media, magazines and online videos, Al-Shabaab have recently invaded the media space to lure professionals and disillusioned youth with special skills in medicine, engineering, among others They are being given job offers of up to $700 monthly, economic benefits for their families plus a host of other promises. 16 In the context of the foregoing, the Kenyan people need to be wary of tech savvy extremists who are busy producing content that is targeted at its population, particularly the young people. Parents have particularly a critical role to play in guiding their children while surfing the internet, and protect them from harmful content. In order to manage this looming threat, the government, through its multi-agency security sector and parliament are to establish legislative and policy frameworks that will insulate its population, particularly the youth from being lured into violent extremism. 15 Kenya National Security Intelligence Service (cited in Sunguta West, 2016), Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Officials, the Jamestown Foundation, Available on: Retrieved on September 08, Sunguta West, Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Officials, the Jamestown Foundation, (2016). Available on: Retrieved on September 08, 2017.