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2 securitystudies.org

3 Executive Summary President Trump has proposed withdrawing American forces from Syria. This plan outlines a way to implement this by creating an international protectorate and rebuilding force for the parts of Syria not controlled by the Assad regime upon the defeat of ISIS. The danger that Iran will otherwise end up with de facto control of the Sunni areas and safe transit across Syria is extremely high. A third major Sunni insurgency is also likely if Iran or its proxies control these areas. Turkey is negotiating a separate peace with Iran and Russia for control of the North. To avoid these consequences, troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with command and control and air support from the U.S. and other allies should institute a protectorate in the Sunni regions. Further north, Turkish forces should be allowed to control territory west of the Euphrates; east of the Euphrates should be protected for our Kurdish (YPG) allies. Advantages: GCC countries have a strong interest in limiting Iran. GCC troops could be trusted by the local populace. A cooling off period may allow eventual peaceful reintegration of Sunni. Slowdown or cessation of hostilities between Turkey and Kurds. Isolate the Assad regime, Iran and Russia to Western Syria. Obstacles: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Russia will all likely oppose. GCC countries will require significant motivation. U.S. leadership needed to overcome international inertia. Russia, Iran and Assad working to consolidate territory; time is limited. Removing U.S. forces now without creating a framework for security and rebuilding would allow Russia and Iran to control the majority of Syria and Turkey to take the Northern regions. We must convince Turkey to avoid a separate peace and invite them and our other allies from the region to create an international protectorate in the Sunni regions and the norther tier of Syria. The gains by Iran during the recent counter-isis campaign put them in an even greater position to capitalize on a power vacuum. They are currently in possession of a land bridge to the Mediterranean Sea, although across disputed territory. This plan is a step toward a more stable environment by separating groups with both sectarian and historical animosities. It isolates the Assad regime to only the territory it now fully controls and also thwarts Iran s ability to expand or consolidate their control in the disputed areas which is consistent with U.S strategy for the region.

4 Strategic Overview President Trump has proposed withdrawing American forces from Syria upon the defeat of ISIS. This would leave a vacuum that could be filled in a number of ways. One way would be for the Russians to exert control over the Assad regime and Iran to keep them from opposing US interests. However, that relies on an unlikely convergence of U.S. and Russian interests. It is more likely that Russian and Iranian interests will remain converged. Another possibility is for Russia, Iran and Turkey to come to an agreement essentially carving up Syria amongst themselves. This was a topic of the recent meeting between the leaders of these countries and any agreement they reached is unlikely to serve U.S. interests. Ideally the U.S. should try to split Turkey off from these other two by offering it some control over the areas along its border where the Kurds have been causing them concern. In addition, we should foster an economic revitalization in the Sunni and Kurdish regions of Northern Syria, so oil, other resources and agriculture can flow on their natural path out through Turkey. A third potential is for a painful war to occur. If Turkey, Iran and Russia don't reach an agreement, the conflict in Syria could evolve into a great power war similar to the two World Wars. In both of those conflicts, the winning American strategy was to avoid becoming committed to the conflict until the other great powers were already badly damaged by the war. By allowing Turkey, Iran, and Russia to come to blows without the capacity to drag the United States into the conflict, it is possible that the United States could once again find itself in the position to impose a settlement on exhausted powers at the end of a bloody war. A U.S. withdrawal could also revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Currently Turkey is more aligned with Russia and Iran, and opposed to the United States and France, but that is largely an artifact of Turkish attempts to oppose American policy on the ground. If US forces left, Turkey s attempt to take territory within Syria could bring them into conflict with Iran and with Syria itself. Turkish gains cut into Iran s long-desired Shi a Crescent, a land bridge between the borders of Afghanistan and the Levant. This crescent has largely been realized as a result of this conflict, although much of it lies within currently disputed territory. Turkish gains in Syria threaten to sever this crescent. As Turkey falls into conflict with Iran and Syria, it will also come into conflict with their Russian backers. Turkey could find that it needs the NATO alliance to avoid embarrassing losses. In any case, withdrawing American forces poses significant risks. The most substantial of these involves a northern Middle East dominated by an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy combining Iranian hegemony with Russian-provided S-400 missiles. This would create an effective barrier for US airpower that would sever our Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies from our European allies. It would also hinder airstrike options for dealing with Iran should they begin aggressively advancing their nuclear program. 2

5 Turkish success could serve to partially prevent this A2/AD zone from coming to be in northern Syria. Turkish forces are likely to succeed in their current advance. The Turks have the largest and most powerful combined arms military in the region, a fact that will continue until and unless the United States should deploy major regular combat forces. However, if the Turks move too far they could be opposed by a highly developed Iranian unconventional warfare network. After their initial advance, the Turks could find themselves being bled white by guerrilla tactics from both Kurdish forces and Iranian proxies. Advanced Russian arms will also stymie their progress if they should attempt to press deeper into the territory controlled by Assad s forces. In western Iraq and in southeastern Syria, a different strategy is needed to prevent the Iranians from securing their crescent and establishing the A2/AD zone there. These regions are predominantly Sunni and tribal, a population that is deeply distrustful of the established governments and that is well practiced in insurgency. Controlling these areas will require a force whose presence is accepted as legitimate by the local populations. These requirements suggest a force that is international in character, and from Sunni nations of good local reputation. Such a deployment could be supported by American airpower and special operations forces (SOF), while themselves serving as a guard force and tripwire for those American forces to respond if Iran or Russia decided to actively oppose this effort. Alternatively, it is possible that the power vacuum in which the Turks and Iranians could fight will spill over the whole of western Iraq and southern Syria. Potentially this could affect the stability of American allies including Jordan and Israel, as well as broadening the Iranian crescent and the A2/AD zone excluding American airpower from the region. Interests of the Factions Convincing allies and compelling enemies to accept America s preferred disposition will be difficult, especially given that a withdrawal will limit our most direct forms of persuasive power. A careful consideration of the interests and motivations of each faction is crucial given this dynamic. The factions will be described in descending order based on their current capacity to project power into the conflict. Then the U.S. position will be considered. Turkey As a NATO member, the Turks wield an effective veto on any major decision by the alliance given that NATO s major decisions must be unanimous. Although they are not a first-world nation, Turkey is without question the most powerful actor currently on the field. Turkey has a fully integrated combined arms program, including a modestly effective air force and special operations forces. The Turks are head and shoulders more effective than any other potential American partner in the area. 3

6 The Turks are motivated in part by opposition to Iran s crescent, but also to a Kurdish state that might similarly post a hostile power on their southern border. Should the Kurds establish a secure ground line of communication to Mediterranean ports, they would also secure an economically viable national project. A Kurdish free state would likely tear parts of Turkey away, which would also damage Turkish economic interests. This is particularly true with regard to oil, as Kurdish regions are oil-rich but rely on Turkish pipelines. An alternative route to the sea for the Kurds would deny Turkey leverage over the Kurds, and also revenue from the pipeline fees. Erdogan s government has been posturing as if it were going to cast off ties to the West and NATO in favor of re-embracing its Islamic heritage. This does represent a potential future for Turkey, as the last widely-accepted claimant of the title of Caliph and thus legitimate political leader of the Islamic world was the Turkish ruler of the Ottoman Empire. However, Turkish sources tell SSG that they think the posturing is an attempt to win concessions from NATO and the West rather than a genuine precursor to breaking ties. The Turkish interest is in weaning the United States, especially, from its support for the Kurds. The Turkish interest is thus to more fully dominate the Kurds, while also blocking Iran s attempt at regional hegemony. Half of this program is in line with U.S. interests. The problem will be managing the half aimed at subjugating the Kurds. Creating an economic incentive for Turkey to negotiate with the Kurdish elements along its border rather than working to conquer them is a way to mitigate this. Trade from the Sunni and Kurdish regions needs to be part of any rebuilding efforts and gaining Turkey s support for that should be a U.S. goal. Iran Iran has a highly advanced network of proxy fighters deployed throughout the region, which serves as its primary method of projecting power in this conflict. Especially through their Quds Force, an unconventional warfare subset of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran has trained native Shi a forces throughout the Middle East. These forces are ideologically shaped to be loyal to the Iranian vision of politics under the dominion of the approved clerical caste based in Iran. Iran has always had strong ties with the Shi ite population in Iraq. Their status as members of that sect and their direct proximity to Iraq allowed them to host Shi ite refugees during Saddam Hussein s reign. Many of those who sheltered in Iran are now leading figures in Iraq. The precipitous US withdrawal during the Obama administration s first term both allowed Iraq s Shi ite leadership to act on its worst impulses toward minority groups, and also provided Iran unrestricted opportunities to dominate Iraq. That has only increased during the counter-isis operations. The Iranians have nurtured Shi a militias who have been a major part of this clearing mission. They have had advisors and even direct command and control from the IRGC s Quds Force. Some of these militias openly declare support for Iran s theocracy instead of Iraq s secular government, ensuring that Iran has a capacity to influence Iraq even when Iraq s government would prefer to act independently. 4

7 In Syria, Iran has backed, and often commanded, Hezbollah s combat operations in support of the Assad regime, providing IRGC troops and advisers and raising auxiliary units of volunteers from Afghanistan and other areas. Local Shi ite populations in Syria were highly motivated to accept Iranian support and training in order to resist ISIS, which waged its theological war in part against Shi a Muslims and their holy sites. As a consequence, Iran s network within Syria has flourished in spite of the heavy casualties associated with the wars against ISIS and against rebel factions of the civil war. In addition to these proxy forces, Iran has a large conventional military that is so far mostly not engaged in the fighting. Iran has very limited airpower, but has attempted to substitute large quantities of short range ballistic missiles and rocket artillery. The Turkish entry into the conflict could compel the Iranians to bring their conventional forces to bear, which would offer the possibility that those forces would be reduced. Iran has a major goal of opening a line of communication across Syria to the Mediterranean Sea to complete the Shi a Crescent. This would allow them to supply Hezbollah and other proxies much more easily. They could push missiles into Southern Syria capable of threatening Israel and Egypt in the same way they have done so to attack Saudi Arabia with missiles from Yemen. If they and the Russians put S400 anti-aircraft systems in place, they would also effectively cut the region off from Europe and NATO. Russia The Russians correctly understand that the battles being fought right now in the Middle East are going to determine much of the world s power relationships for at least a generation. The questions at stake include whether Russia will continue to have a naval base in the Mediterranean Sea; whether Iran will cement its domination of the northern Middle East, and its oil; whether the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, will have their own oil exports subject to closure by Iran and its proxies; and whether or not the United States will remain a major player in the Middle East at all. Turkey s status, and thus NATO s continued viability, are in play as the Turks thus far are being pulled away from the West by this conflict. Israel s survival is not necessarily of much interest to the Russians, but it is certainly also an issue that could be settled by this conflict insofar as it enables Iranian domination of Syria and Lebanon. For the Russians as for Iran and the United States, this is more of a proxy war than a war. Each of these powers is pursuing their own ends via the support of different coalitions of native forces. Iran took an early lead here via its support to regional Shi a militias across Mesopotamia and the Levant. These forces are irregular but numerous and widespread. Some of them are also well-established and well-provisioned with arms, especially Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias that the Iranians operated. and still control, during counter-isis operations in Iraq and Syria. The Russians came late, backing a Syrian regime that has already had its formal forces shattered by the civil war. The Syrian forces that the Russians and Iranians are propping up are not powerful. 5

8 That is why the Syrian government continues to use chemical weapons: their traditional forces are too weak to bring the conflict to a close. On the other hand, Russia s geostrategic opponent the United States has chosen to engage the war with quite limited military assets, backing a coalition led by Kurdish fighters that are chiefly talented irregulars. The Kurds are also politically divided, and geographically strung out. The Russians believe they can contest the US-backed irregulars. In addition to their own operators and direct proxies, the Russians count on bringing to bear Syria s limited forces and Iranian-backed proxies including Shi a militias. Russia is trying to win a grand strategic victory with limited resources, trusting to American lack of commitment and the exhaustion of many of the forces involved in the Syrian conflict. The entry of the Turkish military into the conflict represents a serious danger to the Russian position. While the Russian military is stronger and more advanced than the Turkish one, it is mostly not deployed in this region. Such Russian forces as are deployed have very extended supply lines. The Turks powerful conventional forces and short, protected ground lines of communication are very dangerous to Russia s ambitions. The Russians are likely to respond by appealing to their Iranian allies for a heavy guerrilla war against the Turkish forces, but also by increasing the pace of deployment for advanced Russian weaponry in theater. The most serious threat among this weaponry are the S-400 missile systems, along with their earlier S-300 systems. The older systems will be able to help negate Turkey s advantage in airpower, while the newest systems may be able to contest Israeli or even American airpower. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia (KSA) is already invested by Iran s proxies, which have repeatedly executed missile attacks on the Saudi capital. KSA might have been expected to escalate its war in Yemen as a consequence. Instead, the Saudi government closed the border with Yemen and stated that Lebanon and Iran have declared war upon them. The Saudi government is facing a severe threat from an emboldened and enriched Iran that has recently regained access to global oil markets. This worsened a glut that was already threatening Saudi revenue streams. In addition, Iran s Houthi proxies in Yemen have been engaging in an anti-ship missile campaign designed to bleed KSA naval resources. These same missiles could be used to close the Asian oil routes that supply a substantial part of the Kingdom s national income. 6

9 Figure 1: Oil pipelines are in green on the map above The Iranian navy and ballistic missile array could potentially close the Straits of Hormuz to Saudi traffic. The Yemeni missile batteries can do the same at the Bab el Mandeb strait. This threatens to cut off the Pacific routes for Saudi oil exports, leaving Iran free to feed the Asian oil demand. The Saudis cannot afford to ignore the Yemeni front, which Iran must have hoped would cause them to double-down on Yemen in the face of the missile strike on the Saudi capital. Iran benefits from the Saudi war in Yemen due to its asymmetric nature. The Saudis are spending a great deal of money fielding naval and air forces against Houthi proxies, which are of minimal cost to Iran to supply and train. A further commitment of formal military resources by the Saudis to the Yemeni front will only increase this asymmetry, tying down more of Saudi s power projection capacity in the south. 7

10 Keeping the Saudis focused on the south is to Iran s benefit and helps in their ongoing goal of establishing a Shi a Crescent in the north. With the fall of ISIS and the submission of the Kurds, Iran has largely succeeded at this grand strategic goal. The Saudis are facing a northern Middle East that is close to being completely dominated by Iran. Saudi leaders must look on this situation as exceptionally grave. If Iran finalizes its hegemony in the north it can devote its full resources to control over the Asian oil routes. The potential of that crippling financial and strategic loss is not the only thing that must figure in the Saudi decision-making. Iran has also been challenging the Saudi claims to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Ayatollah Khomeini said during the worst brutality of the Iran/Iraq war that he could forgive Saddam, but never King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for KSA s use of Mecca. Just last year, the Ayatollah Khamenei stated that the Saudis could no longer be trusted to hold the holy sites of Islam and called for Muslims to change that. Iran is close to being in a position to affect that agenda. The Saudis must oppose Iran because, from their perspective, this is an existential crisis. Iraq The Iraqi government has a military force (ISF) that has some combined arms elements, created and trained by the United States and allied Coalition Forces during the Iraq War. However, the personnel trained during that conflict have largely departed the force in the seven years since the US withdrawal of major combat forces from Iraq. Though the current ISF have been hardened in the recent fight against ISIS, the force as a whole is integrated with Iranian-backed PMF. These PMF include not only irregulars but tank crews who have obtained M1 Abrams tanks originally given to the ISF. The presence of these PMF throughout the military means that Iran has a metaphorical knife at the throat of ISF commanders, and indeed at the Baghdad government s. It is likely that even the Shi a factions within Iraq s government resent Iranian attempts to compel their obedience. It is certainly true that Sunni and Kurdish factions in Iraq resent Iran s role. If Iraq were presented with a genuine opportunity to throw off Iran and exert self-determination, it is likely that they would take it. However, such an opportunity is currently not on the table without a larger US deployment. For the moment, Iraq must be considered an Iranian proxy. Nevertheless, that tension should not be forgotten. It may be possible later in the conflict to make use of Iraqi resentments. The GCC Nations The other GCC nations have reason to fear Iran s rise even more than the Saudis do. An Iranian success at dominating the Persian Gulf would reduce the GCC to subservience. They are oil-rich, but have since the 18 th century relied on Western alliances to keep themselves secure and free. Bahrain, for 8

11 example, entered itself into protectorate status with the British Empire in return for British support for its ruling clan. Today it hosts the US 5 th Fleet for the same purpose. Currently the GCC is trying to corral Qatar, which has been endangering their mutual defense against Iran by playing both sides against the middle. American assistance in compelling Qatar s submission to GCC norms would be worth something to them. On the other hand, Turkey has joined Iran in backing Qatar s independence. The GCC maintains the Peninsula Shield Force, a relatively modern combined-arms force of about two brigades. It is unlikely to deploy this force outside of a defensive role for itself, however, as the force is not large and lacks the logistical support for a power projection mission. Jordan The King of Jordan is an important ally of long standing against Islamic radicalism and took an important role in the fight against ISIS. Jordan s military is professional and well-equipped. It is organized on a brigade structure into regional commands, supported by special operations and maintenance capabilities. Jordan s chief interest has to be in not being swept up in the massive instability that has overtaken their neighbors in Syria and western Iraq. American diplomats should be able to convince them to play a role in the protectorate this plan aims to set up if the Jordanians can be convinced that the protectorate would form an effective buffer state to the chaos that threatens them. Syria The Assad government is now a client state, remaining in power only through Russian and Iranian intervention on its behalf. After years of war, however, it has managed to survive. Its ruthlessness in deploying weapons of mass destruction against civilians has gone unpunished, and is likely to set the tone for the upcoming conflict. The Syrian military, to include its paramilitary assets, is fully involved in the existing conflict. As such they are largely fixed in position, with minimal reserves. The IRGC effectively operates as the command and control for Syrian forces so they must be considered an extension of Iran. The Assad regime can only maintain control of its territory through ruthless oppression. If left to try to govern the Sunni areas within its borders it will create ideal conditions for another Sunni insurgency. This lack of military capability has encouraged the regime to continue attempting to break the will of its population with murderous strikes such as the recent chemical weapons attack in Ghouta.. 9

12 The Kurds The Kurds have proven to be highly talented and committed irregulars, and they have a long tradition of friendship with American forces that dates to well within the Saddam era. US Special Forces have built deep ties with them during the period between the Gulf War and the present conflict. Kurdish forces have played key roles in the counter-isis fight. The Kurds chief interest in the conflict is to secure political independence for their people. However, the Kurds are divided between two political factions that are in competition for overall leadership. As a result, they have proven incapable of resisting Iraqi incursions on their semi-autonomous region within Iraq. The Kurds are also widely distributed geographically, from Afrin in Syria to parts of Iran. They could hold this wide swathe of territory against other irregulars such as those presented by ISIS, but they cannot expect to hold the territory against the Turks or the Iranian-backed ISF. They simply are not in a position to assert either political leadership or military control over this region at this time. United States The United States military currently deploys about two thousand personnel in an advisory role. Force protection for these elements is comprised largely of air and fire support. These assets recently allowed a small contingent of American forces to wipe out a large Russian mercenary element. Nevertheless, the strength of the position should not be overestimated. American personnel are spread out and isolated from one another in many places. They are advising, and are thus co-located with, irregular forces that could not have themselves withstood the Russian mercenaries. The Turkish military, which is likely to aim at America s Kurdish allies, is far more powerful and has integrated air support, fire support, and the capacity to contest control of the air with fighters and anti-aircraft defenses. Russian technology limiting America s air support advantage will only grow with time, and the Russians have reportedly deployed advanced Su-57 stealth fighters in theater. Additionally, American elements in Iraq are co-located with Iraqi units that feature Iranianbacked Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as skirmishers. These PMF are loyal to Iran, and could be turned against scattered Americans or even headquarters elements at a moment s notice. This points to how untenable is the United States military position in Syria, as well as the position of its support elements in Iraq. When in such a position, military science dictates that the position be either abandoned or reinforced. Otherwise the deployed American forces are at risk of becoming hostages to the enemy at best. At worst, they are at risk of being destroyed. 10

13 The Protectorate The proposed Sunni, Kurdish & Turkish protectorates are outlined roughly on this map. Specific boundaries and responsibilities need to be worked out in negotiations. The GCC nations led by the Saudis would be asked to provide funding and peacekeeping forces. Turkey would be given control of some of the area they have already moved into and a Kurdish protectorate for the YPG as U.S. allies would be established. The United States would largely withdraw, under the President s plan, although some Special Operations forces would remain in the protectorate to respond to attempted incursions. These would be backed by American air support and logistics. Security, humanitarian and redevelopment operations would be conducted throughout the protectorate. A primary goal would be establishing an economic zone in the resource rich portions of Syria that would flow on it's natural trade routes through Turkey. An additional trade corridor to Iraq and Saudi Arabia would be a unifying factor as well. These will help fuel stability and growth for the region. This protectorate would also ensure no Shi a Crescent can be finalized by Iran. 11

14 The protectorate involves rebuilding operations in Sunni parts of Western Iraq, and peacekeeping and stability operations in the parts of Eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian rebels. Some areas in Syria envisioned for the protectorate are currently controlled by forces loyal to Assad; their disposition would need to be negotiated. An important carrot for Assad and his allies would be that forces in those regions would be freed up to fight elsewhere, e.g., defending against the Turkish incursion in the north. Provided that the protectorate was based on a long-term commitment to not undermining the sovereignty of existing governments, the Syrians might find the terms acceptable. The pink areas represent a Kurdish protectorate. They are lightly shaded to clarify that the Kurds mostly have only irregular forces and loose territorial claims. Currently the Kurds are co-deployed with American forces in the central parts of this region, where American forces recently repelled an attack by Russian mercenaries on a stronghold near Deir ez-zur on the Euphrates. It is not clear that the Kurds can hold those areas if the US forces withdraw. Potentially any unshaded area may end up under Turkish control or, alternatively, the control of Iranian-backed proxy forces. The scope of Turkish ambitions in the region is not yet clear. They may be satisfied with pushing east to the Euphrates, or they may decide to take everything in the north of Syria. It is also unclear how far south into Syria they will be inclined to press. However, for the moment Turkish ambitions seem directed mostly against the Kurds. The United States must determine if the Turks can be satisfied with the proposed protectorate if they are given good economic and diplomatic incentives. The Iraqi government may accept the terms of the protectorate provided that it promises to secure Iraqi sovereignty over the regions within its territory for the long term. The ISF would be relieved to have international support for their positions, and to avoid a potential third Sunni insurgency directed principally against themselves. Saudi interests in the conflict are, as mentioned above, existential in degree. The danger is not that they would refuse to engage the war, but rather that they will elect a course that is safer for them but less helpful for US interests. It would not be difficult for a Sunni insurgency to develop in Syria and Iraq right now. Sunni tribes have valid complaints against the government in Baghdad and there is no real control in Sunni areas of Syria. SSG has argued that there is already a distinct possibility that the Sunni regions will blossom into a third insurgency, with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State (ISIS) having been the first two. Iranian involvement in retaking Sunni areas from ISIS was marked by war crimes conducted by aggressive Iranian-led Shi a militias. They have done, and are continuing to do the same in Syria. 12

15 The Protectorate is necessary to remove that malign presence from the Sunni areas in Syria and continued political efforts with the Iraqi government are needed to reintegrate the Sunni population there. If the Saudis do not support the protectorate it will be much more difficult to stop the actualization of the Shi a Crescent across Syria. Even if the Turks shore up the Northern regions, a failure to have some security force not tied to the Russians or Iran is vital to stop Iran developing a real line of communication all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. The proposed protectorate offers a more stable approach, but at the cost of exposing Saudi forces to losses early. The United States has three cards it can play to convince the Saudis to go along with the US plan. 1. The United States can offer KSA Major Non-NATO Ally status. Jordan already possesses this status, as do two GCC nations, Kuwait and Bahrain. This status offers substantial economic and military benefits, which will be highly attractive to KSA given their need to compete with a rising Iran. 2. The United States can offer increased assistance to the Saudi campaign in Yemen. The Yemen war represents a costly second front to the Saudis, distracting them from the real Iranian threat to the north. The Saudis might be offered a free hand to crush the Houthi rebellion and the barrage of Iranian-made missiles that it has directed against Saudi territory. If more of a carrot is needed, they might be offered US air support. 3. The United States can offer to help compel Qatar to submit to the GCC/Egyptian demands. This would tighten up the GCC s defense against Iran. If the Saudis are convinced to engage in supporting this protectorate, the GCC nations (except Qatar) should fall in with them. Once it looks as if there are adequate forces to stabilize at least the parts of the protectorate closest to Jordan, the Jordanian government is likely to agree to the plan as well. 13

16 The second major agreement that is needed for this plan to succeed is with Turkey. Under Erdogan, Turkey has been slipping away as an ally. In the counter-isis efforts they have been more focused on attacking the Kurds due to their own security concerns. The U.S. should make a major effort to reverse this course. Concerns about the PKK have been at the forefront of Turkish considerations about Northern Syria. An attempt should be made to restart peace negotiations between them and Turkey. The U.S. could agree to validate the areas Turkey has already taken de facto control of as their part of the protectorate. Then a development project in the combined Kurdish and Sunni areas along Turkey's Southern border that includes the oil rich regions could provide an economic incentive for Turkey to participate. 14

17 Conclusion The U.S. should execute a phased withdrawal from Syria that transitions to peacekeeping and development operations by allies in the region. The U.S. should urgently negotiate an agreement with the GCC to provide both economic development and military resources needed to create a protectorate in Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria. The U.S. should negotiate an agreement with Turkey to gain their support, mitigate their concerns about Kurdish expansion on their border and protect YPG allies The U.S. should facilitate an economic exchange of oil and other products from Syria. The U.S. should limit Russian and Iranian influence to only those areas already under control of the Assad regime. The Shi a Crescent envisioned by Iran must not be allowed to form across Syria. This plan is consistent with President Trump's stated objectives of creating a transition for U.S. forces from primary responsibility, ensuring participation by partners in the region, and stopping Iranian expansion. 16