Max Security Special Report Middle East & North Africa: Regional stability outlook for 2013 January 2, 2013

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1 Max Security Special Report Middle East & North Africa: Regional stability outlook for 2013 January 2, 2013 General Entering into 2013, regional stability remains threatened by political strife, sectarian tensions, weapons proliferation, and armed conflict. In North Africa, the newly-revolutionized nations of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt are expected to be impacted by persistent political instability between Islamist and liberal political parties, particularly during election periods. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the conflict in Syria is likely to deteriorate, increasing the prospects for violent spillover into neighboring Jordan and Lebanon is also likely to witness decisive developments in the crisis over Iran s nuclear program, with Western powers and Israel increasingly likely to consider military action in the event that negotiations fail to produce an end to uranium enrichment. Syrian conflict: Assad regime likely to be ousted from Damascus by mid-2013 Pillars of Assad regime strength cracking: Currently, several pillars preserving the Assad regime s control over Syria have begun to show signs of deterioration. These pillars include the regime s control over the main cities of Aleppo and Damascus, foreign backing from Russia and Iran, the unraveling of key military units such as the air force, and a depletion of economic resources. Support from the Alawite sect and other minorities for the Assad regime is expected to prolong the conflict for the coming months. Aleppo and Damascus: As Syria s economic capital and largest city, complete rebel control of Aleppo would signal a decisive victory in the conflict. Reports of fighting near the Aleppo international airport, one of the city s most protected installations, signal that the Syrian military may be losing its control over the area. Furthermore, rebel forces have scored numerous successes in seizing key towns along routes linking Damascus to Aleppo after sustained sieges in an effort to cut off Syrian military units from reinforcements. In Damascus, rebels have seized and maintained control over several outlying districts of the city, and have made efforts to isolate the capital s international airport. As a heavily-defended installation and possible escape route for regime officials, the capture of the Damascus International Airport would further signal the imminent ousting of the regime from the capital. Support from Russia and Iran: The Assad regime s war fighting capabilities have since been bolstered by diplomatic and economic support from Russia, and economic and military support from Iran. Recent statements made by Russian officials expressing doubts over the Assad regime s ability to defeat the rebels militarily, in addition to preparations to evacuate Russian nationals from the country highlight Moscow s waning support. While Russia is not expected to fully relinquish support for the regime, reports indicate that its gradual reduction of support has hindered morale within the upper echelons of the Assad regime. Iran s continued support for the Assad regime is expected to come under increasing scrutiny, particularly ahead of Iranian presidential elections in June. As the Iranian economy continues to deteriorate due to international sanctions, the continued devotion of resources to Syria is expected to become an increasingly unpopular issue. Reports indicate that Iranian officials have become critical of the Assad regime s reluctance to heed Iranian advice, while accusations of embezzlement of Iranian funds by Syrian officials have further increased these tensions. A withdrawal of economic support from these allies is expected to exacerbate the regime s depleting currency reserves, with direct consequences on its war-fighting capability. At the current rate, reports

2 indicate that the government may lack the resources to compensate the Syrian military or provide troops with food and other resources by mid Increased rebel military strength: Militarily, Syrian rebels have overcome several key advantages held by the Assad regime, gains expected to expedite prospects for a seizure of Damascus. In recent months, Syrian rebels have neutralized Assad regime s air power, primarily through the seizure of multiple air forces bases in the north and east of the country. The acquiring of advanced anti-aircraft missiles by rebels has led to numerous shoot downs, forcing the Assad regime to increasingly resort to long range artillery, including Scud missiles. Meanwhile, the rebels have proven the ability to capture and hold territory, while conducting sustained sieges of key military facilities for weeks at a time. Most importantly, the rebels have proven their ability to replace manpower and other resources lost in combat, while the Assad regime has been unable to do the same. Prospects for seizure of Damascus: Following the end of the winter season, Syrian rebels are expected to increase their efforts to oust the Assad regime from Damascus. Under current conditions, the regime is expected to lose additional territory in northern and eastern Syria, allowing rebels to focus their efforts on capturing the capital. By this time, defections by Sunni members of the Syrian military will have increased due to the regime s inability to provide compensation in addition to a drop in morale from rebel gains. Support from the Alawite minority for the Syrian military is expected to remain strong, particularly within key artillery and special forces units, and contribute to the defense of the capital. Developments which could expedite the ousting of the Assad regime or the conclusion of the main combat phase of the conflict include a political settlement or the exile of Bashar al-assad and his inner circle. Despite mounting international pressure, the Syrian opposition is unlikely to agree to any political settlement which does not include the ousting of the Assad regime. Meanwhile, reports indicate that while Bashar al-assad has sought safe-haven for his family outside of Syria, members of the President s inner circle remain intent on remaining in the country to protect the Alawite minority from anticipated persecution by Sunni rebels. Should the regime abandon Damascus, the focus of fighting will likely shift to Alawite enclaves of northwestern Syria, where Assad loyalists are likely to entrench themselves. Syrian conflict spillover: Deterioration of Syrian conflict to pose increasing security threats in Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey Chemical weapons: The potential for foreign military intervention in Syria is also likely to increase in 2013, triggered by the proliferation of chemical and other advanced weapons. Under current conditions, both the regime or Syrian rebels are not likely to employ a broad chemical weapons attack, for fear of invoking international condemnation or military intervention. That said, the transfer of Syrian chemical weapons to jihadists or Hezbollah militants in Lebanon would likely trigger Israeli air strikes against those sites. Israeli intervention in Syria against Hezbollah would likely spark retaliation by the group s fighters in Lebanon, including rocket fire on Israeli cities. Foreign powers, including NATO and Russia, are thus likely making concerted covert and diplomatic efforts to ensure that chemical weapons remain secured. Reports indicate that British, U.S., and other NATOaligned militaries have stationed chemical weapons teams in Jordan, while the U.S. military has finalized a number of intervention options to counter the threat of chemical weapons usage or proliferation. Israel meanwhile, has increased its cooperation with Jordan in preparation for a possible strike in Syria, as highlighted by a rare meeting between King Abdullah II and P.M. Netanyahu. Impact of jihadist infiltration: Islamist militants have considerably increased their activity in Syria, in many fronts comprising the main assault force on regime positions. These groups are composed of both local Syrians, in addition to foreign fighters originating from Iraq, North Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf

3 states, and the Russian Caucasus, and commonly identify with al-qaeda and its global jihad ideology. In recent months, jihadist militants in Syria, primarily the al-nusra front, have stated their intentions to attack neighboring countries following the ousting of the Assad regime, mentioning Israel specifically. Lebanon: In Lebanon, reports indicate that Syrian jihadists have already infiltrated into northern portions of the country, arming local Lebanese militants. These elements are expected to increase their activity with the aim of upsetting Lebanon s delicate sectarian balance, a jihadist strategy commonly witnessed in Iraq. The majority of sectarian violence will likely be witnessed in northern Lebanon, including the targeting of local Alawite and Christian communities. Jordan: Jordan is also likely to be targeted due to the monarchy s alliances with Western powers and Israel. Security forces have thwarted multiple attack plots in the past decade, while 2012 witnessed an increase in infiltration attempts by jihadist militants directly from Syria. Israel: Israel has already begun increasing its defenses along the Syrian border in the Golan Heights region. Currently, Assad regime forces control all Israeli border crossings, but have come under increasing attack by rebels seeking to capture those sites as a symbolic victory. Iraqi jihadists are said to be amongst those rebel units fighting near the Syrian border. We assess that the probability for cross border attacks from Syria will increase in 2013, particularly in the event that the Syrian military relinquishes its positions along the Israeli border. While Syrian jihadists do not pose a threat to major Israeli cities, a successful cross border attack could result in Israeli incursions into Syrian territory and increase prospects for a broader conflict. Turkey and Kurdish separatism: As the conflict in Syria deteriorates, Kurdish residents in regions bordering Turkey and Iraqi are likely to attempt to form autonomous zones, with Kurdish militants providing security. Many of Syria s Kurds are sympathetic to militant separatists in southern Turkey, and have been accused of collaborating on a logistical and operational level. As such, increasing Kurdish control and autonomy in northeastern Syria may increase effectiveness of Kurdish groups in Turkey. The summer fighting season of 2013 will serve as an indicator of their effectiveness, in addition to the Turkish government s response policy. Iran: Tensions over Iranian nuclear program to mount in 2013, increasing potential for diplomatic solution or military conflict Triggers for military conflict mount: Currently, the Iranian regime has acquired the technology and capability to produce a nuclear weapon, including the ability to enrich and stockpile uranium at 20% levels. These advancements have increased international pressure considerably over the past year, contributing to a sharp deterioration in the Iranian economy. Under current conditions, the regime could stockpile the 250kg of enriched uranium needed to produce one nuclear device by the spring of 2013, at which point the prospects for Israeli preemptive military action against Iranian nuclear sites will increase considerably. That said, reports indicate that considerable amounts of enriched uranium have been diverted for civilian uses since August 2012, in a likely effort to stave off imminent military conflict. Meanwhile, the Iranians have steadily increased their military capability through domestic production. Notable advancements have been noted in long-range missile capability and naval warfare capability, including the development of fast attack boasts and anti-ship missiles. In 2013, the Iranian regime is likely to continue slowing its enrichment efforts, further pushing prospects for confrontation to the summer or autumn months. The regime s key considerations for this delay include

4 preserving stability during the presidential election period in June, in addition to efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the West during the spring. Prospects for negotiated settlement: In the coming months, Western powers are expected to provide an enhanced incentives package to the Iranians. This package is expected to include the permitting of a peaceful and monitored nuclear program and the gradual lifting of sanctions following a halting of 20% uranium enrichment and international inspections. Under current conditions, the Iranians remain likely to reject the offer, insisting that all sanctions be lifted immediately. Instead, the Iranians are likely to continue efforts to stall negotiations by calling for prolonged breaks in between talks and offering muffled responses to proposals. Additional sanctions and a sharp economic downturn which threatens the Iranian regime s tenure will increase the prospects for concessions to western demands. In the event that negotiations materialize in the coming months and fail to generate a diplomatic solution, we assess that the United States will begin to threaten military force, using the rejected proposal to garner international support for such a move. Israel meanwhile, is likely to continue adhering to its own timetable regarding triggers for a military strike, despite increased cooperation with U.S. efforts to reach a diplomatic solution. Israel s main trigger at this point is most likely the stockpiling of 250kg of 20% enriched uranium, at which point the Iranians would be able to quickly assemble a nuclear device. Alongside economic sanctions and efforts to resume negotiations, covert campaigns to slow Iran s nuclear progress are likely to continue, focusing primarily on cyber attacks. Ongoing disruptions to Iranian computer networks are likely to increase the Iranian regime s efforts to stage reprisal cyber attacks against Western allies in the region, primarily Saudi Arabia. North Africa: Deteriorating economic conditions, liberal-islamist tensions to threaten stability in newly-revolutionized nations Pressure mounts on Islamist governments: Despite sweeping successes in post-revolution elections, Islamist-led governments in Egypt and Tunisia are expect to face mounting challenges to their ability to govern or be re-elected in 2013 parliamentary elections. These challenges include deteriorating economic conditions and tensions with both liberal opposition groups and ultraconservative Islamists over the application of Islamic law in governing affairs. Tunisia: In Tunisia, unemployment has contributed to persistent civil unrest in provincial towns across the country, namely a string of clashes in the city of Siliana in November 2012 which nearly triggered nationwide labor strikes. Meanwhile, the policies of the Ennahda-led government towards civil liberties and the perceived unwillingness to confront Islamist militancy has sparked protests amongst Tunisia s largely secular-leaning middle class. Parliamentary elections slated for June 2013 are expected to increase tensions between liberal and secular factions and Islamists, with the Ennahda party facing internal divisions over support for the country s ultraconservative Salafists. Egypt: In Egypt, President Morsi is expected to face similar challenges, primarily in regards to restoring the economy. Any attempt to implement austerity measures, including subsidy cuts, threatens to exacerbate internal divides inside the Muslim Brotherhood, whose constituency consists primarily of middle and lowerclass citizens. Failure to improve the economy will likely bolster the influence of liberal opposition groups ahead of parliamentary elections slated for February 2013, should they be able to unify into one bloc. Liberal factions are not likely to garner a majority of seats in the next parliament, but are expected to increase their amount of seats at the expense of the Muslim Brotherhood s Freedom and Justice Party. Throughout the year, Islamist-dominated legislatures in Egypt are expected to use the newly-approved constitution to draft laws which infringe on press freedom and other civil liberties, raising the prospects for backlash by liberal groups. Triggers for protests include the closing or imprisoning of prominent media

5 groups or personalities, in addition to the legislation of laws banning secular practices, such as alcohol consumption. Cooperation between the military and the government remains a key factor in maintaining stability in Egypt, and could be threatened by government attempts to infringe on Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) budgetary privileges, or overrule the SCAF on national security-related issues or the sacking of prominent generals. Libya: Despite deep tribal divides which have hindered reconciliation and the consolidation of security forces, Libya has shown a steady improvement in political progress. In 2013, Libya s newly-elected General National Congress (GNC) is expected to draft the country s new constitution, and undertaking which could increase tensions with federalist factions in eastern Libya and Islamist elements. The makeup and election of the constituent assembly is likely to trigger tensions with political factions in eastern and southeastern Libya, who fear disproportionate representation by the Tripoli region. During the drafting phase, issues pertaining to the role of Islamic law are likely to foment tensions with Libya s fringe Salafist elements, some of whom may resort to violent attacks against religious minorities and government installations. Crisis in Northern Mali: The 2011 seizure of northern Mali by jihadists and tribal separatists has increased smuggling and terrorism threats throughout North Africa, threats expected to remain constant during Pending foreign intervention by ECOWAS nations is unlikely to restore stability to the area, and further risks pushing militant groups into neighboring countries, including Libya and Algeria. Persian Gulf: Gulf Cooperation Council nations to remain stable despite mounting internal political, sectarian challenges Curbing domestic discontent: Stable economic conditions continue to reduce prospects for unrest in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in the coming year. Despite these conditions, generally stable nations such as Qatar and Oman have taken measures to preempt popular discontent by initiating elections for advisory bodies at the national and municipal level. The UAE meanwhile, is expected to continue its crackdown on internal Islamist elements, primarily the al-islah group under the guise of preventing threats to national security. Kuwait is expected to take similar measures to prevent foreign-linked Islamist elements from increasing their influence, while the country s opposition movement is expected to lose momentum due to a heavily pro-government parliament. Saudi Arabia: In Saudi Arabia, we assess that internal divisions on issues of civil rights will increase in the year witnessed an uptick in criticism of the monarchy from civil rights activists, but remained largely confined to online forums. However, a recent string of arrests against prominent activists triggered calls for protests in Riyadh, some of which materialized. In 2013, King Abdullah s health is further likely to deteriorate as well, increasing the prospects for public feuding amongst the royal family over his successor. Saudi Arabia s oil infrastructure is likely to become an increasing target for sabotage by a number of entities. These threats range from cyber attacks by Iranian groups, in addition to physical sabotage at oil installations perpetrated by jihadist groups and Shiite militants from the Eastern Province. Sunni-Shiite Tensions: Tensions with the Sunni populations of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are likely to persist throughout In both nations, Shiite opposition movements are expected to become increasingly radical, raising the prospects for an uptick in violence. The Bahraini monarchy is expected to continue efforts to negotiate with the Shiite opposition in an effort to appease international pressure for reconciliation, although such efforts are unlikely to curb unrest. Strict policing measures coupled with Bahrain s Island geography are expected to limit the potential for the current unrest to deteriorate into a low-scale insurgency. In Kuwait, the unprecedented success of Shiite politicians in parliamentary elections

6 has raised fears that these groups may begin to vote as a sectarian bloc, increasing tensions with the country s Sunnis. Kuwaitis are heavily invested in the Syrian conflict, with Sunnis and Shiites supporting opposing sides of the conflict. DISCLAIMER: Please note that any views and/or opinions and/or assessment and/or recommendations presented in this text are solely those of Max Security. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this text. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. Max Security Solutions accepts no liability for (i) the contents of this text/report being correct, complete or up to date; (ii) consequences of any actions taken or not taken as a result and/or on the basis of such consents. Copyright 2013 Max Security

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