MULTI SECTOR RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SINJAR TOWN

Transcription

1 MULTI SECTOR RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SINJAR TOWN Overview details Date(s) of field assessment 15/05/18, 28/05/2018, 04/07/18 Governorate Ninewa District Sinjar Location type (town, camp, etc) Town Location name Sinjar Town Map of assessment region: REACH, July 17 NRC does not endorse any boundaries shown on map Page 1 of 8

2 Desk review Sinjar town (also referred to as Shingal in Kurdish) had an estimated population of 88,023 in with the Sinjar district being home to 237,073 individuals 2 (primarily Yazidi but with substantial minorities of Kurdish, Arab, and Christians). The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) governed Sinjar following the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with both KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces initially establishing control of the district and KDP party personnel implanted into local administration positions, further disenfranchising both Yazidis and other ethnic groups in Sinjar district. 3 In August 2014, Sinjar was captured by the Islamic State group (IS), causing massive displacement and destruction. An estimated 30,000 4 people from Sinjar district immediately fled into the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and up to 100,000 sought refuge in the Sinjar Mountain ridge, where thousands of civilians remained for over a year attempting to avoid IS. 5 The battle to retake Sinjar was prioritised by all sides due to its location on the main supply routes from Raqqa in Syria to Mosul and within the disputed territories between KRI and the Iraqi central government. The town was retaken by Peshmerga, Kurdistan Worker s Party (PKK) and People s Protection Units (YPG) in November 2015, and then by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in October 2017 following the KRI referendum 6 and the subsequent shift in control of disputed territories. Around 49,212 individuals 7 returned to Sinjar district by 31 st May 2018, with 6,000 returning to Sinjar Town 8 according to REACH (NRC estimates that 20-25,000 people have returned). More are now expected to return due to anticipated closure of schools in camps for IDPs in the KRI, where the majority of Sinjar IDPs are living. Despite these returns, Sinjar town has been accessed far less by humanitarian actors, whose aid efforts have largely focused around Sinuni town and surrounding rural villages which experienced earlier waves of return. Returns to Sinjar town began in June 2017 under authorisation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) but have remained slow; the primary reason cited by many of those who have not returned is lack of livelihoods and services. Muslim IDPs have cited safety issues connected with social tensions and potential reprisal attacks. 9 In March 2017, a comprehensive survey by IOM showed that only 65% of displaced persons from Sinjar District planned to return at some point. This figure is now estimated to be higher, 10 though social cohesion issues will remain a significant challenge for the foreseeable future. The pre-existing tensions are compounded by the atrocities committed in Sinjar under IS group rule, which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have described as genocide as well as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Yazidis. 11 Methodology note Mixed methodology assessments for NRC s first two scoping missions included: community entry with local authorities; Key Informant Interviews (KII) with religious leaders, local authorities, mukhtars, local business owners, female and male school leadership, female and male shoppers in the market, and market vendors; transect walk and drive; desk reviews; and coordination with humanitarian partners in Sinuni, Tel Afar and Mosul. Information was captured using NRC s scoping mission tool, a multi-sectoral quantitative and qualitative questionnaire. The geographic scope was confined to the urban population center and its immediate surroundings, but questions were designed to gather secondary data across the whole district. Assessment teams were comprised of persons identifying as Yazidi, Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, Kurdish, and internationals with expertise in Urban Displacement and Out of Camps (UDOC), Informational Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA), youth, logistics, security, protection, and education. The initial assessments included only one female Iraqi participant, however female staff were hired and based in Sinjar prior to the follow up assessment missions which expanded the teams access to female populations. These scoping missions form the foundation for comprehensive community based assessments to be conducted in the near future. 1 Regularly cited by federal, KRI and Yazidi writers but true source unknown 2 IAU and OCHA, Ninewa Governorate Profile, March Winning the Post-ISIS Battle for Iraq in Sinjar, ICG, 20 February Sinjar Mountains IDP Red Flag Report, REACH, 5 August MSRNA among Conflict-affected Populations on Sinjar Mountain, MedAir, 5-7 November Winning the post-isis Battle for Iraq in Sinjar, ICG, 20 February DTM Round 96, IOM, May ROAR Sinjar and surrounding areas, REACH, May ROAR Sinjar and surrounding areas, REACH, May Obstacles to return in retaken areas of Iraq, IOM, March They came to destroy : ISIS Crimes against the Yazidis, OHCHR, 15 June 2016 Page 2 of 8

3 Context, general security situation, population movements and trends Villages to the south of Sinjar are widely reported to be contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), and the comprehensiveness of the decontamination efforts in Sinjar town, especially the Old City, appear to be a concern for residents. However, from discussions within the town, the impact of this on returns appears to be limited. The current return movements to Sinjar town does not appear to have the patterns of coercion (camp closures) or restrictions (security clearance requirement) as in other areas of western Ninewa. This is partially due to the returning population being less likely to be suspected of IS affiliation, and the uncertainty around the potential IDP camp school closures in Dohuk. However, the impact of the school closure factor will increase ahead of the start of next year, and may become a major push factor to return. The contamination in rural villages will have contributed to the lack of returns, alongside the primary concern of limited livelihood opportunities. There is also some evidence of intentionally blocked returns to create a buffer region between the predominantly Yazidi populations of Sinjar and the predominantly Sunni Arab populations of Ba aj. Sinjar town appears to actively block (through real or perceived measures) movements of Sunni Arabs from Mosul to Ba aj and its surroundings, including of an Iraqi parliament member who reported being denied access through Sinjar. However, NRC received confirmation that Sunni Arab NGO staff would not face difficulties working in Sinjar. Local governance in the area has been in flux and has not been representative for decades (see desk review). Current control by ISF and the Shia PMF (outside of Sinjar town) have started to introduce structures but this has also displaced many of the local authorities that were more aligned with the KDP back into camps in the KRI. This is not to say that the preference among the population is a return to Kurdish rule; respondents stated that trust of Kurdish forces and rule was definitely diminished by their retreat in the face of the IS group advance. However, no concerns were raised about having Kurdish NGO staff working in the town. In terms of current local governance, there are about 20 mukhtars in Sinjar Town who have been selected by the mayor. The number of mukhtars per neighborhood varies from one to three, and NRC was able to interview multiple mukhtars to inform the report. Current line ministries are lacking in all sectors in Sinjar with little oversight or support from Mosul government bodies or ministries. The current mayors of both Sinjar and Sinuni town have been appointed since the shifting of territorial boundaries between the KRI and federal Iraq, and are apparently not recognized by all community members or authority structures. The former mayors are now residing in the Dohuk governorate and claim to be the figures through whom access should be coordinated. Estimated population and affected population data for the area Most current residents returned to Sinjar in either June or September of 2017, appearing to align with the dates of permission to return under KDP rule. NRC encountered estimates ranging from 2,000 4,000 households currently living in Sinjar town; these figures are significantly higher than the estimated 6,000 individuals stated in the rapid overview of areas of return (ROAR). Displacement locations included Dohuk and Zakho camps, Syria and Mount Sinjar. Respondents stated that lack of livelihoods opportunities was the key factor limiting return, rather than security concerns. Some respondents reported that people simply do not have the money to leave the camps and return to Sinjar. The (current) mayor said that many people will return after their children have completed their exams in schools in KRI. 100% of the population in Sinjar are returnees and rates of return are expected to increase over the next three months. Around a quarter of the total urban population have returned so far, and the remainder indicate that they would like to but are waiting for livelihoods and services to become available, according to residents NRC spoke to in Sinjar. However, these intentions and estimations probably do not capture secondary displacement probabilities, such as the rural populations moving from the camps to Sinjar town, but not to their homes in surrounding areas. Gender disaggregated estimations of populations were not available and this will have to be examined in follow up community assessments, including the gendered realities of current returnees and the gendered dimensions of future returns, including specific risks. Age and mobility status were also difficult to assess in these initial scoping missions and will need to be examined prior to programming to ensure appropriate inclusion actions are implemented. Page 3 of 8

4 Key problems and priorities identified by the affected population General concerns Lack of livelihood opportunities and quality accommodation options in villages which have been damaged or destroyed were identified as barriers. There is a likelihood that as returns increase, displacement of current returnees may occur as new arrivals seek to reclaim their properties, and that this will exacerbate inter and intracommunal tensions. Any examination or assessment into occupancy of houses must include a risk analysis to ensure that service providers are not contributing to tensions linked to secondary occupancy issues. Risks associated with humanitarian assessments may disproportionately affect secondary occupiers, women and girls released from IS captivity, non-yazidi populations within Sinjar, or persons displaced to different areas who have different lived experiences of displacement. Stigma reduction methods have been used by Yazidi religious leaders with mixed results, though these approaches do appear to have decreased the stigmatisation of women and girls abducted by IS group. Security and civilian authorities speak openly about the need for NGOs to provide support to women and girls who experienced sexual violence during abduction by the IS group. However, sensitivity should be demonstrated when broaching this issue and it should not be assumed that the dynamics are truly stigma-free. The presence of GBV prevention and response partners has varied in each area of displacement. Freedom of Movement While freedom of movement appears to be conducive to recovery in Sinjar town, movement to the rural areas around Sinjar is still limited for the civilian population. Many respondents do not currently live in their own houses and the reasons given (ERW/homes destroyed) do not fully explain the high rates of secondary occupancy. Access to services There is only one primary health care center (PHCC) run by the Ninewa Department of Health, and it can respond only to minor health issues; there is no reproductive health support and no surgical services or referral pathway. There is a standard fee of 3,000 IQD per visit. MEDAIR also provides services in the PHCC, including psychosocial support and a female physician. Persons with severe illnesses that have the capacity to travel can either access services in the KRI or Qamishli, Syria for treatment. It is not clear why people are not accessing services in Mosul, though this is likely explained by the reluctance of Yazidis to enter a predominantly Sunni area. There was no reported knowledge of any other lifesaving service provider within the town. There were no reports of access constraints to any other services (education, market, police) on the basis of gender, age, or ethnicity although all respondents for the scoping missions were Yazidis. Safety A general feeling of safety was reported within Sinjar town, with the risks of violence and accidents perceived as limited to rural areas. There was no complaint of intimidation, coercion, or deprivation by any of the various security forces operating within the area, although these scoping missions will not have gained enough community acceptance to thoroughly assess these issues. The risks mentioned in rural areas included ERWs, with reports of farmers being injured and killed in Sinjar district when accessing their farms, and the possibility of attack by Sunni Arabs in areas south of the town. Specific Needs There were no persons with visibly reduced mobility within the town and no signs of either elderly or pregnant populations. This suggests that anyone with specific needs is likely staying inside their place of residence and comprehensive information dissemination campaigns through house to house outreach will be required to access these populations. From the KIIs the key humanitarian gaps raised by respondents were: Mayor: jobs/ livelihoods, cash, support to women and girls released from ISIS captivity Most common response from other KIIs: jobs, food, schools, education, reconstruction of buildings, water supply Page 4 of 8

5 External Actors local and international organisations operating in the area NGOs Organization Description of activity, location, target group, time frame Harikar IRC MAG JEN MedAir DoE Mayor DoW UN UN Habitat Shelter repair, focussed on ground floor repair work Civ. Actors UNFPA funded, Women and Girls Community Centre in the government district Previous periodic cash distribution Mine risk education (unclear) Sinuni based (unclear) Mobile medical clinic support to PHCC Middle School principal Anecdotal reports of NGOs visiting Sinjar to register beneficiaries and never returning has led to a small amount of distrust towards NGOs. Future surveys in Sinjar should be limited to collection only of data not already available, in order to reduce assessment fatigue and manage expectations. CCCM/UDOC All respondents reported being unable to access basic service provision in Sinjar. Access to information is primarily obtained through family members and neighbors. There are no formal mechanisms of information dissemination, and respondents reported that they did not know who to contact in order to access NGO services. Some respondents reported accessing radio shows, but they mentioned that these broadcasts are in Arabic and therefore not understood by all inhabitants. Community areas for discussions, meetings, trainings, recreational engagement etc. are lacking. Formal structures for community coordination and information sharing have not been formed and civil society organisations do not appear to have ever existed in Sinjar, though this cannot be stated with confidence. ICLA Key documentation needs identified included: marriage certificates, PDS cards, birth certificates and civil identification documents. Needs around housing, land and property (HLP) especially with regard to compensation claims were also identified as key issue. There are no functioning courts or legal service providers in Sinjar. Both the government and UNDP have referenced plans to re-open the court in Sinjar but there is no clarity on the timeframe of this. There is one court in Sinuni which can hear Sinjar cases once per week (on Sundays). The land registry office was completely destroyed during the fighting and there are no plans to re-open it in the near future. The Iraqi Intelligence commanders stated that they are unable to issue documentation due to having no printing facilities. There are no directorates open in Sinjar Town, though civil ID and nationality certificates can be processed in Tel Kaif; Sinuni and Hammam Al-Alil (HAA). Transportation and accommodation were both listed as obstacles to accessing these services, along with low awareness of legal processes and access to documentation. Affected communities appear to have limited knowledge about their legal rights and possibilities for accessing civil documentation, legal identity papers or basic HLP entitlements, so increasing awareness around these themes is a major need. Possible locations for general awareness sessions to be hosted by NGOs could not easily be identified during the scoping mission. This will require increased engagement with varied communities and authorities. Several of the respondents interviewed at their place of current dwelling stated that they did not know who the owner of the house was, which is expected to create conflict between original owners and secondary occupants. Such disputes are currently solved with the assistance of mukhtars and community leaders, but there might be a need to provide those bodies with support and further build their capacity on Collaborative Dispute Resolution (CDR) methods. There are no legal aid actors working in Sinjar at this time. Page 5 of 8

6 Education and Youth There are two primary schools and one middle school in Sinjar town. There were previously two secondary schools although now there is only one school open and is located outside of Sinjar town, 4-5 km to the north (towards the mountain). School officials said that secondary students have dropped out of school because they cannot pay for transportation. Limited and low intensity child labor could be seen within the market. When asked why, the response from two sets of parents was that they were disappointed in the quality of the schools that had opened and they were therefore home schooling alongside having their children help out around the house throughout the day. Exams had finished on 5th May (except for 6th grade students) so most children were not in school. Children at the football field said that the only spaces available to them are the football field and the cafeteria. Both male and female children were seen playing in approximately equal numbers. Youth reported feeling safe to move around the urban area with no reports of harassment. This applied to both male and female respondents. They primarily move during the daytime when it s not too hot, and also in the evenings where there is a cafeteria with billiards that young people often visit. However, there are currently no options for youth to engage in education, vocational training or livelihood activities because secondary schools have been closed since 2014 and the vocational training center was destroyed by military campaigns in Livelihoods In the early phases of the response, several food distribution organizations were reported to have registered beneficiaries but then failed to return to Sinjar. There has not been any emergency food security or livelihoods response in Sinjar except the Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) response provided by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). There are two distinct market areas; the one near the main petrol station appeared to be operating at about 70% occupancy, with primarily small convenience items but also some hardware items and service providers. The first markets re-opened in August last year but there was very limited growth until January of this year. Almost all items for sale in the market came from Mosul. There were no customers seen in the market during the assessment but this was likely due to the time of day; they apparently become busier at night. A secondary market on the main highway provides mostly mechanical support and tire repair, suggesting that a sufficient number of traders move through town through to Ba aj, further West towards the border, or to multiple possible final market locations. Items in the markets included: dry goods; fruit & vegetables; liquor; clothing; hardware; white goods; fuel. There are limited service industries but they include: barbers; mechanics; wheel and tire repair. Prices are high, with fruit and vegetables costing around double the price of other towns in Ninewa. All respondents reported that there are no jobs currently available within Sinjar Town. The economy previously relied upon wheat and barley agriculture and the operation of large scale grain stores. Secondary sector livelihoods opportunities included operating oil fields (though these closed decades ago) and working in the large scale cement factory outside of town that was destroyed during the military operation to retake Sinjar. There are agriculture options within Sinjar town in the form of a large communal farming area on the banks of the stream through the middle of the town. More remote farms would have to undergo a comprehensive risk analysis before NGOs consider support due to the large amounts of contamination. Shelter UN HABITAT have planned activities in Sinjar in the form of ground floor repair works to some dwellings and shopfronts. Sealing off kits were initially distributed by Mission East after the retaking of the town, but there has been no additional NFI support for the last year and a half. There has been large scale damage to the old city, while other areas of the town having suffered more targeted destruction. Shelter needs are apparent and require more detailed assessment. Page 6 of 8

7 WaSH From observation and from the comments of the local police, access to clean water is a major gap in Sinjar. Most houses rely on their personal water source (well) if they have one; the cleanliness of this could not be ascertained. Previously there were also water networks but these are no longer functioning, and the water tank in town has been completely destroyed. Water trucking operations are for-profit: 1,000 liters costs 2,000 IQD. The water tank in town has been destroyed. Garbage is being collected every 10 days within Sinjar. Additional information access, logistics, communications Sinjar Town is approximately 3 hours drive west of Mosul, one-hour south of Sinuni, and 45 minutes north of Ba aj. Road conditions remain good when weather conditions are dry for small and medium sized vehicles. Heavy goods vehicles struggle to pass several of the large bridges that have been damaged. During periods of heavy rain, the side passes to the damaged bridges can become impassable following heavy rains. There are multiple armed actors operating within Sinjar town (ISF, Yazidi PMF, local police and Iraqi Intelligence). However, all appear to be cooperative and the only request has been to provide a copy of the cover page from the JCMC letter (not the list of staff names) to the entrance (ISF) checkpoint, and a summary (in Arabic) for the current mayor of the activities that an NGO is considering providing in the town. The mayor requested that hiring of local staff be channeled through him but was content with the explanations of open recruitment and physical postings of vacancies throughout the town (market place, restaurants, cafes etc). As a focal point redacted summary of the security forces operating within and around Sinjar: Group Local Police ISF Yazidi PMF Shia PMF PKK YPJ Location Urban Perimeter Urban Rural Rural/Urban The Tel Afar ISF checkpoint requests registration of the names of NGO staff passing from Mosul to Sinjar to be provided to both ISF and to military intelligence, though this can be pushed back on. Blue clothing, emblems and logos should be avoided in Sinjar Town as the colour is considered taboo/offensive in Yazidi culture. There are properties that can be identified for guest houses and offices in varying states of repair. The prices quoted range from 300 USD to over 1,000 USD per month, and there should be a united NGO effort to not over pay for properties. The title deeds of all properties must be examined carefully prior to any formal agreement and care should be taken to minimise the chance of evicting families. The market has hardware items for sale and foodstuffs for sustenance. Any sophisticated assets (generators, pumps, etc.) must be brought from Mosul. There are minimal vehicles available for rent in Sinjar Town. Korek phone network operates throughout all of Sinjar Town but reduces to zero coverage towards Ba aj, where Asia Cell has slightly better reception. 3G internet is weak but functional in Sinjar Town. For additional information, contact: nick.lacey@nrc.no Page 7 of 8

8 Middle School north of town. Exams 5 May Old Sinjar Ruins of Old Sinjar Targeted demolition during IS group control Page 8 of 8