CONFLICTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Transcription

1 CONFLICTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

2 HOSSEIN ASKARI: SELECTED RECENT PUBLICATIONS The Middle East Oil Exporters: What Happened to Economic Development? Foreword by Robert M. Solow, 2007 Globalization and Islamic Finance: Convergence, Prospects, and Challenges, with Z. Iqbal and A. Mirakhor, 2009 The Stability of Islamic Finance, Foreword by Sir Andrew Crockett, with Z. Iqbal, N. Krichene, and A. Mirakhor, 2010 Islam and the Path to Human and Economic Development, Foreword by Ali Allawi, with Abbas Mirakhor, 2010 Risk Sharing in Finance: The Islamic Finance Alternative, with Z. Iqbal, N. Krichene, and A. Mirakhor, 2011 Conflicts and Wars: Their Fallout and Prevention, Foreword by George Akerlof, 2012 Collaborative Colonialism: The Political Economy of Oil in the Persian Gulf, Foreword by Robert E. Looney, 2013

3 Conflicts in the Persian Gulf Origins and Evolution Hossein Askari

4 CONFLICTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF Copyright Hossein Askari, Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN in the United States a division of St. Martin s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number , of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN DOI / ISBN (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: November

5 To Anna, whose love, friendship, and support have made everything I do a joy

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7 Contents List of Illustrations Foreword (Dr. Ahmad Ghoreishi, former chancellor, The National University of Iran) Preface Acknowledgments ix xi xv xix Chapter 1 Catalogue of Persian Gulf Conflicts 1 Chapter 2 Conflicts Sectarian and Religious Disputes 31 Chapter 3 Conflicts Ethnic and Tribal Disputes 57 Chapter 4 Conflicts Territorial and Resource (Oil, Natural Gas, and Water) Disputes 87 Chapter 5 Conflicts The Impact of Governance, Underdevelopment, Deprivation, and Injustice 117 Chapter 6 Conflicts The Impact of Foreigners 129 Chapter 7 Conflicts The Fallout 139 Chapter 8 Conflicts The Evolution 149

8 viii CONTENTS Chapter 9 Conflicts Islam and Reconciliation 161 Chapter 10 Conclusion 171 Notes 179 References 197 Index 205

9 Illustrations Figures 4.1 Population (in millions) of Persian Gulf and regional countries (2011) GDP (in $ billions) of Persian Gulf and regional countries Per capita GDP (in $) of Persian Gulf and regional countries (2011) Combined oil and natural gas wealth (in $ billions) of Persian Gulf countries at $50/barrel Per capita oil and natural gas wealth (in $ millions) of Persian Gulf countries at $50/barrel 89 Tables 7.1 Average annual GDP and GDP per capita percentage growth rates in the Persian Gulf United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and HDI trends for Persian Gulf countries,

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11 Foreword In 1947, with the communists on the march in Eastern Europe and civil war raging in Greece, the British government informed the Truman administration that it was no longer capable of defending Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean area. Without delay, President Truman summoned his advisors and after due consideration and debate they came out with the most revolutionary expansion of US strategic interests. Earlier, America had declared the Western Hemisphere as a region of vital national interest (the Monroe Doctrine). Now for the first time in its history, the United States was looking at the other side of the world, declaring the security of Greece and Turkey of vital interest and committing to their defense. This became known as the Truman Doctrine. Since then, the United States has adopted a number of other doctrines pertaining to the Middle East the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine, and the Bush Doctrine with varied degrees of success and failure. The Truman Doctrine was without a doubt the most successful of these. With Greece and Turkey coming under the US defense umbrella, it was obvious that Iran under the shah would be the next in line. Although Iran was never mentioned in the Truman Doctrine, it was understood by all powers that the United States would be committed to its defense, and it was inevitable that the Persian Gulf would also be included. From the very beginning the US objective was to keep the Persian Gulf in friendly hands. The goal was to keep any hostile power out of the region. This included communist states or extreme nationalistic states such as Nasser s Egypt. America wanted the Persian Gulf to be safe in support of Western economic and strategic interests. To a very large extent the US succeeded in its quest. The Persian Gulf became the main supplier of oil to the Western industrial world as well as to the emerging markets. Under friendly regimes, strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal, Bab-ol-Mandab, and the Straits of Hormuz

12 xii FOREWORD remained safe and open. But circumstances have evolved. The power most hostile to the United States and to Western interests, namely Iran, cannot be kept out of the Persian Gulf. In fact, it is right in the center! What makes the situation even more unusual is the fact that Iran is the odd man out in the Persian Gulf. Iran is the only non-arab state in the region. Culturally and historically it has frosty relations with the Arab world. It is also the major Shiite country in the region. In fact, up to Saddam Hussein s overthrow it was the only Shiite-controlled country. It is also the largest country in terms of population. It has more people than all the other Persian Gulf states combined. Geographically it occupies the northern and eastern shores of the Persian Gulf and controls the Straits of Hormuz. All these facts make Iran the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf. But of course power is a relative term. Compared to US forces in the region, Iran is weak. The military power of Iran is vastly exaggerated, but compared to Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia, Iran is the power that Arabs fear the most. Put another way, it is not that Iran is so strong but that the Arab states are so weak. There are many factors underlying their weakness. They are all artificial states. The oldest, Saudi Arabia, is of 1920 vintage. The rest came into existence as late as the 1960s and 1970s. None of them has much experience in self-governance. They were part of the Ottoman Empire and later the British Empire. And they are all tribal societies ruled by hereditary rulers kings, sheiks, and emirs. There is little or no feeling of nationalism. They all fall under the Arab national umbrella, yet have disputes with one another. Saudi Arabia has border disputes with all its neighbors. Bahrain has disputes with Qatar, and Qatar has disputes with the UAE and with Saudi Arabia. And of course Kuwait has an existential dispute with Iraq. These and more disputes are thoroughly discussed in these pages. Cooperation among the Arab states is difficult. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is nothing but a Saudi invention to save its influence in the region and to try to contain Iran. But Iran s threat to these states is not military. It has no territorial dispute of any significance with any of its neighbors. The dispute with the UAE, or more precisely with Sharja over Abu Musa, is for all practical purposes over. As Teddy Roosevelt said of the Panama Canal, the shah stole the islands fair and square. As Professor Askari points out, the threat to the Arab states is internal. The first cause of concern is the composition of their populations. Without exception, all states are heavily dependent on foreign workers. In some, as in Qatar, the UAE, and even Kuwait, there are more expats than indigenous people. This has implications.

13 FOREWORD xiii The loyalty of these workers is very much in doubt and they resent their treatment. Even their security forces have large numbers of foreign personnel. The air force of some of these countries the UAE, Qatar, and to some extent Saudi Arabia have employed foreign pilots, largely Pakistanis. The oil sector, which is the backbone of their economies, is almost entirely run by non-arabs. The rulers are fully aware of this fact and have undertaken measures to remedy the situation by training more indigenous technical people. Still there are more students in Saudi Arabia doing Koranic studies than engineering. It will be a long time before these states can be self-reliant. The very foundation of these Arab countries is under question. Tribal societies and hereditary rulers do not fit well with the twentyfirst century and with Arab aspirations. The two largest states Iran and Iraq are essentially against monarchy and are run by Shiites whom some Sunni rulers of the region do not even consider Muslims. The Shiite influence in the Persian Gulf states is of great concern. In this book, the religious conflict is well documented and discussed. All these states have major Shiite minorities, but what is even more critical for the rulers is the fact that Shiites populate all the major oilproducing regions. The most recent Shiite uprising was in Bahrain, the home of the US fifth fleet, where in fact Shiites are the majority. In order to save the Sunni regime, the Saudis had to intervene militarily to restore order. The situation, however, is still fluid and far from over. Shiites in Kuwait the most democratic state in the Persian Gulf are even causing problems. The Kuwaiti parliament has seldom managed to complete its term without being dissolved by the ruling family. There is demand for more participation and less royal rule in all these countries. But there are problems even within the ruling families. The current ruler of Qatar overthrew his own father and King Faisal pushed his brother aside in Saudi Arabia. The most important of these countries, Saudi Arabia, has been ruled by the Al-Saud family since its creation. It is the only country in the world that is named after a ruling family. Because of its vast wealth and small population, it has up to now managed to survive by buying the loyalty of its citizens, but the situation is becoming more difficult by the day. The population is growing at a faster pace than are the country s resources! As a result of the improvement in education and technology, people are more aware of the outside world and are less willing to be ruled by bread alone. Interestingly, as the Arab Spring unfolded, with the overthrow of governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the ruling Al-Sauds announced multibillion dollar handouts to citizens. Up to now the family has more or less kept its cohesion. But there are

14 xiv FOREWORD constant rumors of disputes within the family. King Abdullah and his crown prince are both old and not in good health and they are among the last sons of King Abdul-Aziz. It will soon be the turn of Abdul- Aziz s grandchildren who are if anything numerous. Not all of them have political ambitions, but many who do are not in agreement with how the kingdom should be governed. Most have received education in Western universities and may want to modernize the system by loosening religious controls. That may be the end of Saudi Arabia as we know it. In de Tocqueville s words, The Reformist Monarch is the Last Monarch. A good example is the shah of Iran. Should anything happen in Saudi Arabia it will have far-reaching implications for all the GCC states. And what the future holds for Western interests in the region is far from certain. The dependence of the outside world on the Persian Gulf is obvious and extremely well documented in Professor Askari s book. This dependence will continue for some time. It is often said that the United States will be energy independent in ten years. This may be true, but it does not reduce the importance of the Persian Gulf. China, India, Western Europe, and emerging markets all look to the Persian Gulf for oil. China, the main rival of the United States, is interested not only in Persian Gulf oil, but in oil wherever it can be found, in Latin America, Canada, Africa, and Asia. Its thirst for oil has no limit. This fact alone would make the Persian Gulf of strategic interest for the United States. The control of the Straits of Hormuz will remain of vital concern for the United States regardless of its dependence on oil. It may be a cliché to say that the Persian Gulf is in a period of transition, but this is true nevertheless. As pointed out in this timely book, hereditary rulers cannot continue to rule forever. The many reasons are discussed in great detail. This book is a must read for all those who are interested not only in oil but in the political and economic future of the Persian Gulf. DR. AHMAD GHOREISHI, former chancellor, The National University of Iran

15 Preface Intrastate and interstate disputes in the Persian Gulf are attributable to a host of factors, including religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal feuds; disputes over borders, water rights, and other valuable natural resources such as oil and natural gas; political, social, and economic deprivation and discrimination; economic injustice; heavy military expenditures; foreign intervention; simple greed; and especially past conflicts that encompass human fatalities, economic loss, and the thirst for justice and revenge. The origins of some disputes are multifaceted, interconnected, and go back over a thousand years, while others are more focused and began only a few centuries or decades ago. Disputes have, in turn, led to conflicts that have taken the form of discrimination and armed struggle and interstate and intrastate wars for years, decades, and centuries. These and other acts of aggression have unimaginable human, social, political, economic, and environmental costs that span generations and are more than likely to spawn new conflicts years, decades, or even centuries into the future, as the vast majority of conflicts are not new but have a history and continue to evolve. Irrespective of the origins of conflicts, most do not end with reconciliation. The human fatalities, loss of land, destruction of property, forced migration, and other fallouts fester, evolve, and are reborn, with revenge, restitution, and justice as the battle cries. A fundamental reason for many of the disputes may be the vast oil (gas) reserves of the region and the differences in their per capita endowment across the region, with the more powerful countries much poorer in oil and gas than the small, vulnerable countries. Just imagine some of the differences in oil and natural gas (in oil equivalent) wealth in the region. Qatar s combined oil and gas reserves (in oil equivalent) are about half of Iran s, but Qatar s native population (excluding expatriates who clearly do not have a claim to this wealth) is less than 0.5 percent of Iran s, making the average Qatari about 130 times richer than the average Iranian in oil and gas wealth! 1 Iraq s per

16 xvi PREFACE capita oil and gas wealth is roughly the same as Iran s, so again the average Qatari is 130 times richer than the average Iraqi. The average United Arab Emirates (UAE) citizen is roughly 34 times richer (based largely on wealth that belongs to Abu Dhabi, which would make average citizens of Abu Dhabi as rich as those of Qatar if the wealth was so allocated) than the average Iranian or Iraqi, while the average Kuwaiti is about 26 times richer than the average Iranian or Iraqi. In absolute terms, the rough per capita oil and gas wealth of citizens in the region is Qatar ($34,000,000), the UAE ($8,800,000), Kuwait ($6,700,000), Saudi Arabia ($812,000), Oman ($295,000), Iran ($260,000), Iraq ($258,000), and Bahrain ($193,000). These are vast differences in per capita oil and gas wealth, with Qatar being the richest, followed by the UAE, Kuwait, then a big gap, followed by Saudi Arabia, another gap, followed by Iraq, Iran, Oman, and Bahrain (relying on Saudi support for oil output). Just imagine how the economic failure of the bigger countries, Iran, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia, could be quickly remedied by annexing a sparsely populated neighbor with vast oil and gas wealth! This was a temptation that Saddam Hussein could apparently not resist! On top of Kuwait s vast oil wealth, there were its vast foreign assets! Abu Dhabi has even more wealth locked away abroad than Kuwait. Countries have gone to war for much less. If the bigger countries continue to have economic problems, slow growth, and high unemployment, the temptation for adventure can only be expected to increase. Given the vast size of proven oil (and gas) reserves and the likelihood that much more may be yet discovered and proven, under the waters and under the soil of the Persian Gulf, oil (and gas) reserves are the prizes that have been, are, and will be in contention (and domination) for years to come. And with this prize up for grabs, foreigners foreign governments, corporations, and influential individuals are also in the mix! What a breathtaking barrel of conflicts, and at first glance conflicts, that appear to offer little hope for reconciliation and resolution. While many of the intrastate and interstate conflicts in the Persian Gulf may be viewed as a mix of sectarian, religious, ethnic, or tribal, to us the underlying or evolving factor is, in most if not all cases, a power struggle over resources their ownership and distribution that will not be reconciled quickly. Surely, the Sunni-Shia conflict today, whether in Iraq, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, is no longer to get Sunnis to concede Ali ibn Abu Talib s rightful succession to Prophet Mohammad as the leader of the Muslim community in Arabia? Even if all Sunnis accepted this Shia belief, what practical difference would

17 PREFACE xvii it make today? The practical reason for the Sunni-Shia divide has over time become economic. A family or a faction in power in any of these countries has viewed (and divided) the country along sectarian (tribal or ethnic) lines; appealed for support to retain power and control; and has rewarded his sect (tribe or ethnic group) and supporters with political and economic benefits. Alternatively, a family or faction in power claims strong sectarian affiliation as the basis for conflicts with a neighboring country. As a result, discrimination, aggression, and conflict ensue. It is the classical case of us against them. In the market for aggression, there is market failure. Aggressors receive a benefit from their aggression, as the price is negative. 2 They are not forced to pay the full fallout price of their aggression, as the international community does not hold all aggressors uniformly accountable, with some even supported by powerful foreign backers. If governments were elected and accountable, if national constitutions recognized the equality of all citizens in every sphere of life, and if religious freedom was acknowledged, many of these intractable conflicts would be diminished, and possibly extinguished, over time. As it is with unaccountable governments, rulers receive economic benefits and are unwilling to yield any power and reform their political, social, and economic institutions. They wield illegitimate power, consciously divide and conquer along sectarian lines (tribal or ethnic), and use economic rewards (derived almost solely from oil resources) as the instrument of power. If, and when, the rulers are overthrown, be they a sectarian majority or minority, a tribal family, or anything else, the conflict will continue because the new rulers are very likely to do exactly what those in power had done before divide and reward along sectarian, religious, ethnic, tribal, and party lines. It is thus naïve to believe that regime change in any Persian Gulf country will quickly lead to a modern functioning, democratic state any time soon. It will take fundamental political, as well as economic, reforms to resolve the conflicts. In sum, we believe that the evolution and continuation of most of these conflicts is the quest for power to control resources and to determine their beneficiaries and distribution. We hope to show that the underlying reasons for most of these apparently diverse conflicts have, over time, morphed into one the control over resources. It is economic resources that are at stake. Although the origin of each conflict may be different, as conflicts evolve, the quest for revenge and justice to settle old scores is only the apparent fuel of conflicts, but its essential fuel is the control of resources. Yet the morphing of conflicts

18 xviii PREFACE into one offers the region an opportunity to address them all comprehensively. Our goal is to present a vision of how the region may pull back from the ongoing path of continuous conflicts and armed struggle, which will surely lead to disaster, and instead embark on the path of reconciliation, cooperation, and mutual resurgence as free, democratic, and prosperous societies. There should be little doubt that the region desperately needs a long period of peace for human, political, and economic development to take hold and flourish. We believe this will require the simultaneous adoption of a number of foundational reforms by the eight countries in the Persian Gulf, with the commitment of their ruling elites and the full cooperation of the global powers, especially the United States. It will also require some time and commitment to stay the course.

19 Acknowledgments I must thank a number of former and current students at the George Washington University for their contributions: Danna Zahran for doing rough drafts of most of the material for chapters 2, 3, and 4; Nick Rouner for helping to put together chapter 1 ; and Hossein Mohammadkhan for collecting all the data, drawing the figures and the tables, and putting together the index. I am indebted to Professor Ahmad Ghoreishi, a scholar, and former university chancellor and secretary-general of the Rastakhiz Political Party in Iran, for writing the foreword for this endeavor and endorsing it. I am grateful that a number of renowned and respected experts on the Middle East have taken the time from their busy schedule to endorse this book. I am grateful to my editor Farideh Koohi-Kamali at Palgrave Macmillan, her team that worked on this book, especially Sara Doskow, Erin Ivy and Deepa John, and an anonymous referee for some helpful comments on an earlier draft of some chapters. Most importantly, my wife Anna, as always, has supported and encouraged me throughout all these endeavors. I am forever indebted to her.