How similar were the Scottish Covenanters and English parliamentarians in their aims and objectives between 1640 and 1643?

Transcription

1 How similar were the Scottish Covenanters and English parliamentarians in their aims and objectives between 1640 and 1643? Abstract The fact that in 1643 the English Parliamentarians and the Scottish Covenanters found themselves fighting side by side against their King leads to ask to what extent their religious and political plans, developed in the previous years, were actually similar, and to what extent, instead, the alliance was just a matter of temporary political expediency. This essay analyses and compares trying to avoid generalisations the pre-1643 religious and political situation in each of the two kingdoms, considering some contemporary sources, and keeping in mind subsequent developments, which cannot be artificially isolated from their antecedents. It shows how Covenanters and Parliamentarians, beyond rhetorical declarations of brotherhood, ultimately perceived themselves as entirely separate groups: while the Covenanters Presbyterianism was incompatible with the religious ideas of part of the English Parliamentarians, more generally both sides were chiefly interested, rather than in a common cause, in the specific benefits that could be gained for their own kingdom. This, it is suggested, naturally derived from the distinct identities of two countries which, although recently drawn together under one monarch, had very different histories and religious traditions, and were politically still far from ideas of Union. Keywords: Scotland; England; Covenanters; Parliament; Alliance When comparing the ideals and goals of the Scottish Covenanters and the English Parliamentarians, three difficulties immediately emerge. First of all, it is necessary to decide whether the period should or can be considered in complete isolation. Hindsight, and especially the knowledge of what was to happen later in the decade, can undoubtedly distort a historian s assessment. However, particularly in such short time-spans, everything is linked, and often earlier events can be fully understood only looking at their outcome. Consequently, whilst giving adequate weight to the changed circumstances, the post-1644 Parliamentarian 1

2 factionalism, as well as the fracture with the Scots which would turn them to the Royalist side, will be here taken into account when trying to examine the real extent of similarities in the period Secondly, both groups were quite heterogeneous in their composition, making their comparison a rather complex task. In looking for similarities and differences, this essay will try to keep in mind that Covenanters and Parliamentarians were not simply abstract labels, but encompassed a great number of individuals, with a vast range of different political and religious positions, some closer to those of the other group, others quite distant indeed, and many of them changing over time. Thirdly, it is particularly difficult to decide how to structure this analysis: while our modern mind will always prompt us to consider the religious and the political spheres as distinct, such distinction did not always exist for seventeenthcentury people. However, since in England broad religious labels such as Independent and Presbyterian do not seem to have always implied univocal correspondence with coherent political equivalents, especially before 1644, it is perhaps better to consider the two issues separately, whenever possible. 1 This study will compare first religious, and then politico-constitutional aims of Covenanters and Parliamentarians, trying at the same time both to contextualise them in the period and avoid generalisations. The comparison between Covenanters and Parliamentarians religious objectives is perhaps the most difficult task, because this was probably the point on which both groups were less homogeneous within themselves. The ambiguous language of the Scottish National Covenant, in particular on the issue of episcopacy, seems to suggest the presence of different positions among the early Covenanters. 2 At the end of 1638, however, the Scottish Assembly voted the abolition of episcopacy and all popish innovations, and the return to a Presbyterian church 1 Lawrence Kaplan, Presbyterians and Independents in 1643, The English Historical Review, 84:331 (1969), p. 244; Allan I. Macinnes, The Scottish Moment, , in John Adamson (ed.), The English Civil War: Conflict and Contexts, (Basingstoke, 2009), pp ; David Underdown, The Independents Reconsidered, Journal of British Studies, 3:2 (1964), pp , 65-6, 76-9, John Morrill, The National Covenant in Its British Context, in John Morrill (ed.), The Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 11, 14-5; Charles L. Hamilton, The Basis of Scottish Efforts to Create a Reformed Church of England, , Church History, 30:2 (1961), p. 172; Peter Donald, The Scottish National Covenant and British Politics, , in John Morrill (ed.), The Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context (Edinburgh, 1990), p

3 system. 3 By 1640, evidence surrounding the negotiations for the Treaty of London shows a clear commitment, on the Covenanters side, to have the English episcopacy abolished, too, and to create uniformity in church and faith throughout the two kingdoms, in order to protect their own Reformation. 4 The real problem, when drawing a comparison, is determining a general religious position not for the Covenanters, but for the Parliamentarians. Historians have long debated on the existence, consistence and nature, both religious and political, of Independent and Presbyterian parties, or even on chimerical concepts like Presbyterian Independents. 5 Because these groups tended to emerge as fully polarised only at a later stage, moreover, the picture of Parliamentarian religious and political positions in the period is even more blurred. 6 What is clear, however, is that by no means all the MPs were committed to Presbyterianism. If some especially before 1642 were more conservative than the Covenanters, wishing to maintain a reformed Episcopalian system, others were far more radical, calling for the complete abolition of any national church. 7 This was obviously unconceivable for the Covenanters. Although never fully implemented, and debated at length some feared, indeed, that it might alienate English allies, in the summer of 1640 an act was passed by the Scottish Assembly in Aberdeen, forbidding any form of sectarian congregationalism in the kingdom. 8 This was reiterated in the August act against Impiety and Schisme : conventicles ( Meetings ), while not evil in themselves, were nonetheless dangerous, because open to error and abuse. 9 It is perhaps worth noting that, while the long debates surrounding these acts indicate that some Covenanters supported the idea of congregations, they were nevertheless different from the most radical English Independents, because they tried to legalise 3 Macinnes, Scottish Moment, pp ; James Scott Wheeler, The Irish and British Wars, : Triumph, Tragedy, and Failure (London and New York, 2002), p. 18; Martyn Bennett, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 1997), p See: Hamilton, Basis of Scottish Efforts, pp Underdown, Independents Reconsidered, pp ; Stephen Foster, The Presbyterian Independents Exorcized. A Ghost Story for Historians, Past & Present, 44 (1969), pp. 52-9, 67-75; Blair Worden, The Independents: A Reprisal in History, Past & Present, 47 (1970), pp Kaplan, Presbyterians and Independents, pp. 244, Ann Hughes, Religion, , in Barry Coward (ed.), A Companion to Stuart Britain (Oxford, 2003), pp David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution : The Triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp ; Letter To Mr. William Spang, Killwinning, August 20 th, 1641, in: Robert Baillie, The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, ed. David Laing (Edinburgh, 1841), vol. I, pp , 362,

4 them within the framework of the established Church, seeking the approval of its very Assembly. Moreover, if the terms of this act show that at this stage most Covenanters feared congregational activities but were not intrinsically opposed to them, this would gradually change in the following years, with the rise of the Independent threat in England and the proliferation of radical sects. Robert Baillie, who in 1641 seemed not entirely unfavourable to the meetings, by 1645 would publish a venomous anti-independent pamphlet, in which Liberty of Conscience, and Toleration of all or any Religion were defined a prodigious impiety, and both the Independents congregationalism and their delaying of a church settlement in the Westminster Assembly were categorically condemned. 10 On a very general level, consequently, it could be said that Covenanters and Parliamentarians were united, on religious grounds, by a common dislike for Charles s popish innovations. 11 Their answers to this problem, however, varied considerably. Some of the Covenanters and some of the English may have agreed between them, but this is not enough to say that the two groups, in general, shared a common view. What ultimately drew them into a military alliance were indeed, most of all, political considerations. Even the fact that they decided to cooperate, however, does not mean that they were doing it for the same reasons and with the same objectives. It could perhaps be useful, here, to distinguish between political expediency and political and religious, inevitably tied to it at least in the Covenanters case ideal. Clear example of this is the 1643 Solemn League and Covenant, signed despite religious differences. While the text of the treaty was decidedly Presbyterian, the only vaguely ambiguous sentence, which stated that the reformation of religion in England would be done according to the Word of God, was promptly seized upon by English Independents in the following years, and actually, according to some commentators, had been deliberately put in place by Henry Vane Jr., to avoid a 10 Baillie during the 1641 debates seems to have been more for a limitation of the meetings than for their complete banishment: regarding Henderson s first drafted solution to the issue, and the way in which the most extreme anti-congregationalists received it, he wrote: the clause into it of the number, which I lyked best, did most mislyke them; they alleadged the permitting of any to meet, in the smallest number, was ane establishing by ane act the thing itself. Letter To Mr William Spang, Killwinning, August 20 th, 1641, in: Baillie, Letters and Journals, vol. I, p. 362; Robert Baylie, A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time: Wherein the Tenets of the Principall Sects, Especially of the Independents, Are Drawn Together in One Map, for the Most Part, in the Words of Their Own Authours, and Their Maine Principles Are Examined by the Touch-stone of the Holy Scriptures (London, 1645), The Epistle Dedicatory, pp Wheeler, Irish and British Wars, p

5 definitive commitment to Presbyterianism. 12 Deducing the precarious and somewhat opportunistic nature of the treaty from its subsequent breakdown could be seen as a teleological and rather weak argument, if contemporary sources did not confirm that indeed, during the negotiations preceding its drafting, the English commissioners already were for keeping of a doore open in England to Independencie. 13 So the document itself was signed, if not in bad faith, at least with the consciousness that its terms were just covering up a fundamental dissention between the two sides. Wedgwood, following Baillie, has argued that the essential difference between Scots and English when signing the alliance was that the former were chiefly moved by religious concerns, interested in signing a religious Covenant, while the latter wanted a political alliance, a civill League. 14 This, however, could give the impression that the Scots were somehow more godly, preoccupied first and foremost with the defence and triumph of their faith, while the English had a more practical, down-to-earth political attitude. Actually, while the voices of contemporaries are undoubtedly precious, we should be wary of Scottish selfpropaganda. The truth is probably that the Scots were interested in political matters, too, but only as far as their own country was concerned, and the best way for them to secure both their religious and political conquests was to impose a religious bond between themselves and the English. 15 Surelie wrote Baillie in a rather selfcomplacent nationalist tone it was a great act of faith in God, and hudge courage and unheard of compassion, that moved our nation to hazard their own peace, and venture their lives and all, to come to the help of the irrecoverablie ruined English in Actually, there clearly was more to the Covenanters intervention than knightly godliness and disinterested kindness of heart. Despite individual sympathies, it had taken them more than a year to move to the help of Parliament. Again, it is necessary here to take into account internal complexities: in 1643 some 12 C. V. Wedgwood, The Covenanters in the First Civil War, The Scottish Historical Review, 39:127 (1960), pp. 7-8; The Solemn League and Covenant, 25 September 1643, art. I, in: Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution , 3 rd ed. (Oxford, 1906), p Letter To Mr. William Spang, September 22 nd [1643], in: Baillie, Letters and Journals, vol. II, p Wedgwood, Covenanters in the First Civil War, p. 7; Letter To Mr. William Spang, September 22 nd [1643], in: Baillie, Letters and Journals, vol. II, p Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp Letter To Mr. William Spang, September 22 nd [1643], in: Baillie, Letters and Journals, vol. II, pp

6 of the Covenanters were still openly royalist. 17 The intervention came only once, as shown by Wedgwood, Charles s promises had been proven unreliable, and it had become clear that his victory would have severe consequences for Scottish peace and security, too. 18 Both sides, then, had specific and more or less explicit political motivations, which did not necessarily coincide. It can be interesting to examine, now, how these were declined in terms of both concrete policies and constitutional theories, comparing the two kingdoms even before they formally signed an alliance. Particularly between 1638 and 1640, Covenanter printed propaganda, aimed directly at the English public, emphatically stressed the brotherhood between the two peoples, and the self-evident, when rationally explored, similarity of their interests. 19 The representation of similarities often has, to a certain extent, the power to create them. Scottish and English political acts, indeed, quite often tended to resemble each other and follow the same direction, especially at the beginning of the Long Parliament: the attacks on Strafford and Laud, for example, were part of a common campaign against Charles s evil counsellors, which found support in Ireland as well. 20 Moreover, both parliaments similarly refused to recognise the King s authority to dissolve them, and some pieces of English legislation were direct imitations of Scottish ones, like the Triennial Act of February 1641, which mirrored the analogous 1640 Scottish resolution. 21 In general, we might classify all these actions as answers to Charles s absolutist way of ruling his domains, which, despite some institutional and legal differences, was equally felt in both kingdoms. 22 English and Scottish grievances were often specific to the situation of their respective countries the English protest against the Ship Money, for example, or the Scottish demands for war reparations, but their origin was the 17 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp Wedgwood, Covenanters in the First Civil War, pp Sarah Waurechen, Covenanter Propaganda and Conceptualizations of the Public During the Bishops Wars, , The Historical Journal, 52:1 (2009), pp. 67-9, Wheeler, Irish and British Wars, p. 39; Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp ; David Cressy, Revolutionary England, , Past & Present, 181 (2003), p. 44; Jane Ohlmeyer, The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, History Today, 48:11 (1998), p The Act against Dissolving the Long Parliament Without Its Own Consent, 10 th May 1641, in: Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, pp On this and on the Triennial Act see: Macinnes, Scottish Moment, pp ; Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, p Morrill, National Covenant, pp. 4, 6; Waurechen, Covenanter Propaganda, pp. 75-6; Keith M. Brown, Monarchy and Government in Britain, , in Jenny Wormald (ed.), The Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2008), pp

7 same. 23 Beyond these superficial similarities, however, there lied profoundly different views on constitutional solutions. As it became clear already in 1641, the Scots believed that, in order to preserve their security and the peace between the two kingdoms, it would be necessary to achieve not only religious unity, but a closer civil union as well. 24 However, their proposals for the institution of conservators of the peace in both countries, for parliamentary approval as indispensable to wage war on each other, for military cooperation and for cross-border commercial rights were received quite coldly by the English Parliament, which conceded to some but postponed indefinitely consideration of the others. 25 In general, in the following years, while the Scots remained committed to a federative although not federal, as stressed by Allan Macinnes reconfiguration of Charles I s domains, under the terms of a religious Covenant, this idea did not find much support in England. 26 The religious differences certainly played a part in this, but the main reason is probably that the English, maybe wrongly, did not consider themselves affected by the internal situation of Scotland as much as the Scots felt affected by the English one; as noticed by John Adamson, Scotland was in a situation of inferiority, both economically and politically. 27 A clear barrier was perceived between the two kingdoms, and whenever the Scots tried to interfere too openly with English issues they raised considerable hostility, even among their allies: already in 1641, when the very continuation of the Long Parliament seemed to depend on the presence of the Scottish army, several Parliamentarians felt nonetheless outraged by the Covenanters excessive intromission in English affairs. 28 Ultimately, the reason why Scottish and Parliamentarian aims were not as similar as they could have been is probably that, despite their declarations of brotherhood, at heart they still saw each other as foreign and alien. Even when, in the case of the Scots, seeking a confederal reorganisation, each of the two groups still put the safeguard of political and religious conquests in their kingdom at the 23 On the details of English and Scottish grievances in see: Wheeler, Irish and British Wars, pp. 30-4; Donald, Scottish National Covenant, p Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp Charles L. Hamilton, The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations of , The Scottish Historical Review, 41:131 (1962), pp. 84-5; Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp Macinnes, Scottish Moment, pp. 126, 135, 138-9; Morrill, National Covenant, pp. 6, 20; Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp Both Morrill and Stevenson use the adjective federal. 27 John Adamson, The English Context of the British Civil Wars, History Today, 48:11 (1998), pp Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, pp

8 top of their agenda, and regarded the circumstances of the other as potentially similar, advantageous or damaging to theirs, but always as distinct. This is understandable, since the still quite recent union of the Crowns was the only formal link between England and Scotland: they remained little more, to each other, than two of the King s separate bodies. 29 To conclude, the Covenanters and the Parliamentarians grievances were similar only inasmuch as they were all Protestant subjects of the same monarch, living under one King, and being of one reformed religion, as the Solemn League and Covenant put it. 30 However, radical differences in their history, economy and culture, and especially in the form their respective Reformations had taken, meant not only that certain issues were specific only to one of the kingdoms, but also that the proposed solutions even to the common grievances were, in general, rather different. The fact that the Parliamentarians had no unified religious position, in , and that Independent ideas were actually quite widespread among them, meant that there could be no complete coincidence between their religious goals and those of the rather univocally Presbyterian Covenanters. The formal alliance of 1643, in turn, and the similarity between some Parliamentarian and Scottish political acts, can actually be seen, more than as a sign of shared politico-constitutional plans, as a case of, respectively, political expediency and temporary convergence of interests. 29 Brown, Monarchy and Government, pp ; Adamson, English Context, pp Solemn League and Covenant, in: Gardiner, Constitutional Documents, p

9 Bibliography Primary Sources Baillie, Robert, The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, ed. David Laing (Edinburgh, 1841). Baylie, Robert, A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time: Wherein the Tenets of the Principall Sects, Especially of the Independents, Are Drawn Together in One Map, for the Most Part, in the Words of Their Own Authours, and Their Maine Principles Are Examined by the Touch-stone of the Holy Scriptures (London, 1645). Gardiner, Samuel Rawson (ed.), The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution , 3 rd ed. (Oxford, 1906). Secondary Sources Adamson, John, The English Context of the British Civil Wars, History Today, 48:11 (1998), pp Bennett, Martyn, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 1997). Brown, Keith M., Monarchy and Government in Britain, , in Jenny Wormald (ed.), The Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2008), pp Cressy, David, Revolutionary England, , Past & Present, 181 (2003), pp Donald, Peter, The Scottish National Covenant and British Politics, , in John Morrill (ed.), The Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context (Edinburgh, 1990), pp

10 Foster, Stephen, The Presbyterian Independents Exorcized. A Ghost Story for Historians, Past & Present, 44 (1969), pp Hamilton, Charles L., The Basis of Scottish Efforts to Create a Reformed Church of England, , Church History, 30:2 (1961), pp Hamilton, Charles L., The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations, , The Scottish Historical Review, 41:131 (1962), pp Hughes, Ann, Religion, , in Barry Coward (ed.), A Companion to Stuart Britain (Oxford, 2003), pp Kaplan, Lawrence, Presbyterians and Independents in 1643, The English Historical Review, 84:331 (1969), pp Macinnes, Allan I., The Scottish Moment, , in John Adamson (ed.), The English Civil War: Conflict and Contexts, (Basingstoke, 2009), pp Morrill, John, The National Covenant in Its British Context, in John Morrill (ed.), The Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context (Edinburgh, 1990), pp Ohlmeyer, Jane, The Wars of the Three Kingdoms, History Today, 48:11 (1998), pp Stevenson, David, The Scottish Revolution : The Triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 1973). Stevenson, David, Baillie, Robert ( ), in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Vol. III: Avranches - Barnewall (Oxford, 2004), pp

11 Underdown, David, The Independents Reconsidered, Journal of British Studies, 3:2 (1964), pp Waurechen, Sarah, Covenanter Propaganda and Conceptualizations of the Public During the Bishops Wars, , The Historical Journal, 52:1 (2009), pp Wedgwood, C. V., The Covenanters in the First Civil War, The Scottish Historical Review, 39:127 (1960), pp Wheeler, James Scott, The Irish and British Wars, : Triumph, Tragedy, and Failure (London and New York, 2002). Worden, Blair, The Independents: A Reprisal in History, Past & Present, 47 (1970), pp