Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?

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1 Ars Disputandi ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine? Anthony Dupont To cite this article: Anthony Dupont (2008) Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?, Ars Disputandi, 8:1, To link to this article: The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. Published online: 06 May Submit your article to this journal Article views: 416 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 25 December 2017, At: 20:04

2 Ars Disputandi Volume 8 (2008) ISSN: Anthony Dupont KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN, BELGIUM Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine? Is There an Early Augustine and What is his View of Grace? Review article of: Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; xii pp.; hb , pb ; ISBN: / The discontinuity thesis In Rethinking Augustine s Early Theology. An Argument for Continuity, Carol Harrison 1 argues against the thesis proposed by Peter Brown (pp ) that Augustine s thinking underwent a revolution around 396. According to this thesis, the Ad Simplicianum that Augustine composed in that year is a rupture between his early, philosophical thinking and his later theology. 2 This thesis is based on the presupposition that Augustine s thinking in the period mid 380s-mid 390s was not fully matured by a study of Paul. This early period, , should show us a Platonic-optimistic Augustine believing in the natural capacities of humanity to do the good. The second, real conversion should have happened around 396/397, as is testified in Ad Simplicianum 1.2. In this view, Augustine should finally have become Pauline orthodox, and according to Brown for the first time Augustine came to see man as wholly dependent on God. (p. 154.) Kurt Flasch radicalised this thesis. After 396, after reading Paul, Augustine leaves his original optimistic anthropology and constructs a theology based upon a Logik des Schreckens ( Logic of Terror ). 3 More recently Gaetano Lettieri even dares to speak about L altro Agostino, the Augustine of Ad Simplicianum is allegedly alien 1. Dr. Carol Harrison is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religion at Durham University, and succeeded prof. dr. Gerald Bonner at the chair of History and Theology of the Latin West. Her research focuses on Christian art and spirituality, Patristics in general and Augustine in particular. She already published two monographs on Augustine, on his theological aesthetics (Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine, Oxford 1992) and on the context of his thought (Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity, New York/Oxford 2000). 2. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography, London 1967, pp , A New Edition with an Epilogue, London 2000, p Kurt Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. Augustinus von Hippo, De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum I 2, (Deutsche Erstübersetzung von Walter Schäfer. Herausgegeben und erklärt von Kurt Flasch. Zweite, verbesserte Auflage mit Nachwort), (Excerpta classica; 8), Mainz c August 8, 2008, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows: Anthony Dupont, Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?, Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008),

3 to the one of the early writings (p. 155). 4 A parallel presupposition is that the Augustine of was a (proto-)pelagian. This assertion is based on the fact that Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum appealed to Augustine s early, so-called philosophical, writings. It seems that Augustine was quite confident in the natural capacities of human beings and advocated a strong version of human freedom, was not convinced of the need of internal grace to find the bonum, fides, iustitia before the year 396 and this seems to be in contradiction with the doctrine of grace he formulated in the anti-pelagian writings. Scholars advocating the two Augustines thesis (pp ) claim that the Augustinian paradigm shift took place in 396: in Ad Simplicianum. According to their reading of this work, Augustine, commenting on Romans 7 and 9, starts reflecting on the peccatum originale for the first time, and realizes also for the first time the insufficiency of human nature, the complete dependence on an efficious and internal grace even the capacity to beg God for help is already inserted by grace. Put differently, there is a discontinuity between the early and the later Augustine, and 396 is the turning point. 2 A plea for continuity The thesis of this book is that the real revolution in Augustine s thought happened not in 396 but in 386, at his conversion, and that the defining features of his mature theology were in place from this moment onwards. (p. 7) Harrison connects with the thesis of Goulven Madec and others that the main concepts of Augustine s later theology were already in nucleo present in the early writings. 5 Concretely, Harrison takes positions against three misunderstandings about the pre-396 Augustine: (1.) The early Augustine recognized in a proto-pelagian way the sufficiency of human nature. (2.) Augustine originally wrote that free will is not subordinate to grace, but cooperates with grace on the same footing to achieve the good. (3.) The year 396 presents a radical and even dramatic volte-face. For the first time Augustine realizes the absolute need for grace, not only for every individual human action but also for the capacity to ask God for help. Harisson criticizes the 396-revolution thesis from two angles. Firstly, she proves that the Confessiones report of the conversion in the garden in Milan is 4. Gaetano Lettieri, L altro Agostino. Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamorfosi del De doctrina christiana, Brescia Harrison already published on this subject, i.a.: Delectatio Victrix: Grace and Freedom in Saint Augustine, in Studia patristica 27, Leuven 1993, ; Augustine of Hippo s Cassiciacum Confessions. Toward a Reassessment of the 390s, Augustinian Studies 31 (2000) ; The Role of creatio ex nihilo in Augustine s Confessions, in Le Confessioni di Agostino ( ): Bilancio e prospettive. XXXI Incontro di studiosi dell antichità cristiana, Roma, 2 4 maggio 2002, (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum; 85), Roma 2003, A summary of the main ideas of this book can be found in The Early Works (386 96), in T.J. van Bavel, B. Bruning (eds.), Saint Augustine, Brussels 2007, Goulven Madec, Sur une nouvelle introduction à la pensée d Augustin, Revue des études augustiniennes 28 (1982) Ibid. Review: Kurt Flasch, Logik des Schreckens, Revue des études augustiniennes 37 (1991) Ibid., Saint Augustin: Du libre arbitre à la liberté par la grâce de Dieu, (Lectures Augustiniennes), Paris 2001, Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 68

4 authentic, and not a post factum recuperation of Augustine attempting to (unjustly) represent his 386 conversion, which then actually was a choice for a Neo-Platonic Christianity, as a conversion to the Pauline doctrine. Secondly, and this is the main research avenue of the book, she illustrates in depth that the early tractates are genuinely Christian, having Christian theology as goal and using Neo-Platonic tools for this aim and not vice versa. The essential Christian and theological nature of these early writings is guaranteed by the presence of the biblical concept of the creatio ex nihilo, a concept that as Harrison elucidates implies the human tendency to sin and the intrinsic need for divine help. In the same way other key concepts of Augustine s gratia theology are not absent in his works before 396, such as fides and electio, both conceived as gratia. One fundamental exception, that was a direct cause for the 396-revolution hypothesis about the two Augustines, are Augustine s comments on the letters to the Romans and the Galatians (Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio, Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula Apostoli ad Romanos, Expositio Epistulae ad Galatas), written in Reacting against Manichean determinism, Augustine entrusts the initium fidei to the human will. However, Harrison observes that this can be considered as an hapax within Augustine s oeuvre, fundamentally different from the content of the earlier writings, a content Ad Simplicianum on the contrary completely is concordant with. In Ad Simplicianum Augustine realizes that his acceptance of the post-lapsarian free will, a concept he uttered for the first time in his Commentaries on Romans and Galatians, cannot be sustained. For this reason, Ad Simplicianum rejects the hypothesis of human initiative in opting for faith, and reconnects with his previous thinking, however with a renewed terminology and clarity, according to which also the initium fidei is grace. As such, Ad Simplicianum does not imply a brutal rupture, but is rather a return to his original thinking, correcting the mistakes he made in his anti-manichean attempt to interpret Paul s letters in Arguments for continuity The methodology Harrison opted for is a careful study and a close reading of the early writings (e.g. Cassiciacum dialogues, De libero arbitrio, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichearum, De magistro, De uera religione, the Commentaries on Paul, etc.) to show the presence of the main features of Augustine s doctrine in the early works, and she also compares these writings with later anti-pelagian writings (e.g. De dono perseuerantiae, De praedestinatione sanctorum, etc.) in order to establish continuity. In the first part of her monograph (chapters 1 5), Harrison scrutinizes the earliest works. In the first chapter, The Context (pp. 3 19), she gives an overview of the discontinuity hypothesis as mentioned here above. The first chapter sketches the context of the first decade in which Augustine was active as a writer: Cassiciacum ( ), Milan and Rome ( ), Thagaste ( ), Hippo ( ), the history of a convert devoting himself to study, later on being ordained and taking the responsibilities of his office. Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 69

5 In the subsequent chapter, The Revolution of 386 (pp ), Harrison dismantles a first prejudice, namely that the account of the Milanese Conversion in the Confessiones 8 is an example of hineininterpretieren. Augustine is accused of giving a retrospective reading of his conversio: in 386 Augustine did not grasp the meaning of sin and grace, actually being converted to Neo-Platonism and not to Christianity. In 397 however, when he started to compose his Confessiones, he had already gained these insights and retrospectively puts them in his description of his conversion experience of 386. This assertion questions the nature and the impact of the conversion in 386, and alleges that the real conversion has to be found in the first mature synthesis of Ad Simplicianum. Harrison counters this accusation by explaining that Augustine s real conversion was not caused by his reading of Paul in the 390s but has its root in his discovery of the books of the Platonists in the period leading up to his conversion in 386. She points out the intrinsic similarities between two other reports of the Milanese Conversion which also indicate the important role of Augustine s discovery of the Libri Platonici in his conversion process (Contra Academicos and De beata vita 1.4), written much closer to 386 and years before the Confessiones, indicating that already in 386 sin and grace were an essential part of his faith and not some insights he only found in 396. These earlier descriptions of his conversion have a twofold parallel with the Confessiones: the historical, factual setting of the conversion and the theological understanding of the human condition. This parallel guarantees the authenticity of the Confessiones account. Underlying this critique on the 386 conversion is the prejudice that Augustine s early writings essentially differ from his (later) theology that made him write his Confessiones. In the next chapters Harrison refutes this claim of discontinuity. What did Augustine learn from the Platonists and how did they bring him on the way to Christianity? This question is answered in Chapter 3 Ascent (and Descent) (pp ). The Platonists learned Augustine to shift from a materialistic interpretation of God to an acceptance of a spiritual transcendence. They also gave him an answer to the problem of evil: evil as a priuatio boni. The Platonic books provided Augustine with the concepts of a transcendent Creator and of the ascent of the soul to God. Augustine combines these (Neo-)Platonic notions with the Christian idea of a creatio ex nihilo. The philosophical ascensional scheme and the Christian creational scheme worked together in Augustine: the Plotinian levels of reality reflect the levels of humanity s closeness and absence to God (as consequences of grace and sin), and this is already the case before the Confessiones (e.g. De ordine and De quantitate animae). Augustine considers ascent as the gracious uplifting of humanity by God. The soul can not make any progress without divine initiative. This idea again can be found before Confessiones, e.g. in the Soliloquia. This observation rebukes Brown s assertion that Augustine s early theology is characterized by a gradual abandonment of the idea of earthly human perfection (p. 63). Besides this awareness of human imperfectness, in the early works features also the insight that reason despite its importance is always submitted to faith. Reason requires faith and authority, is weakened by the fallen condition of mankind (p. 67). Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 70

6 Augustine conceived of the (Platonic) transcendent God as being a Creator God. God created human beings from nothing (Chapter 4. Creation from Nothing. pp ). Augustine took the creatio ex nihilo as point of departure to reflect the articles of faith in his early writings, especially in his reaction against Manichean and Gnostic dualism, giving his earliest thought a distinctive Christian substance. The first theological synthesis of Augustine s processing of the notion of creatio ex nihilo evil as the privation of good, the transcendence of God, human dependence on God, the defect of the human will, the need of a continual inward grace to do and will the good, grace as a constant (re)forming (of nothingness) is to be found in the opening prayer of the Soliloquia, and these different elements also appear in the other early works. Put otherwise, thanks to the idea of creatio ex nihilo, the transcendence of God, the fallen state of humanity, and the need of divine grace are the central tenets of Augustine s theological system far before 390. This insight in the human contingency (and consequently the human need for divine grace), as reaction against the ontological dualism of the Manicheans, forecasts Augustine s reaction against the Pelagian ethical dualism (p. 82). This early Christian philosophy (creation as giving form to nothingness) of Augustine is fully integrated into a Trinitarian theology (form as relation, as beauty and as word Trinity as form). In the extensive fifth chapter, Paul (pp ), Harrison argues that Augustine s 390s reading of Paul was not a dramatic rupture with a so-called earlier optimism regarding human autonomous free will. Instead it was a culmination and affirmation of what he always believed: complete dependence upon gratia to achieve the good life. Harrison shows that Augustine holds on to an orthodox reading of Paul from the very beginning. Augustine s early writings do not only contain the Pauline theology of sin and grace, but also the Pauline understanding of conversion and the Christian life (p. 118). His attempt to refute Manichean determinism, combined with the pastoral concern to exhort his congregation to live morally and to give a rational explanation of divine justice, and perhaps his reading of Ambrosiaster, Tyconius and Hilary distanced him somewhat from Paul by emphasising human freedom however without accepting absolute freedom or completely denying grace resulting in the commentaries on Paul of the mid 390s (p. 141). Augustine expressed this freedom by placing the initium fidei within the initiative of human free will. His pastoral practice experiencing the falleness of humanity in concreto however, urged him to reconsider, to leave this optimism and to return to his earlier view of the absolute need for grace. In this sense Ad Simplicianum represents a grace regained. God s grace precedes every human merit, precedes even man s answer to God s call to faith. Augustine connects with Paul s thinking on the post-lapsarian human will. The human will is weakened by original sin, the sin of Adam in which whole humanity participates. The will is impotent to do the good, unless justified by the grace of faith, a grace that inspires by delight. Grace is not only external, but is essentially an internal operation. Harrison shows the broader biblical framework by guiding us through other biblical texts Augustine took interest in during this early period: the Psalms and Matthew 5 7. In the same period, Augustine explores in his Pauline com- Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 71

7 mentaries Paul s concept of the human voluntas and gratia fidei, he remains very faithful to his deepest conviction in his sermons on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos 1 32, 392) and on Matthew 5 7 (De sermone Domini in monte, 394), namely that grace is given freely and unmerited to humanity. In these sermons there are no indications to suspect Augustine of holding the opinion that faith is the result of human initiative. In the second part of the monograph (chapters 6 8), Harrison turns to the subsequent writings up until Ad Simplicianum (396/397), and argues that the three key concepts of Augustine s theology fall, will, grace are also characteristic features of his early thinking. First, she turns to Augustine s early writings about The Fall (Chapter 6. pp ). According to Brown, Ad Simplicianum was the moment of insertion of the notion of the fall within Augustine s anthropology, while Augustine previously thought it was possible to attain perfection in this life. Athanase Sage and Patout Burns take this assertion even further. They claim that the concept of humanity s fall only appears for first time in anti-pelagian writings. 6 Harrison responds. Augustine never sustained the thesis that perfection on earth is possible. Specific technical aspects of his fall doctrine grew during the years, especially through the Pelagian controversy, but the basis of this doctrine and its impact on human will is already detectable before Ad Simplicianum. Harrison explains that the framework of the early Augustine to conceive of human sinfulness is the creatio ex nihilo. Sin is the tendency to distance oneself from the Creator towards nothingness, is proudly thinking having no need of God. That pride is the root of evil, and is the failure to acknowledge the utter dependence upon God. These notions can already be found in Augustine s earliest writings such as De beata vita (386) and De genesi ad Litteram ( ). Evil is giving the creature the place the Creator should be given, is not maintaining the rightful position between God and body. This turning away from God has devastating consequences. It diminishes the human self and its powers, leads to losing control over the body, making it impossible to return to God. These ideas appear in writings before 390 (e.g. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichearum, De ordine, etc.). Put otherwise, the understanding of the fall and its consequences is not something that revolutionized Augustine s thought in , instead it was an integral part of his faith from the moment of his conversion (p. 184). Central features of Augustine s thinking on the fall human solidarity in Adam s sin, the relation between sin and mortality, causing ignorance, difficulty in doing the good and the consuetudo of sinning, the human incapacity to avoid sin, the concept of lust, and sin vitiating and disordering the human will are far from absent in Augustine s writings before mid 390s. Also in his early writings, Augustine holds the idea that the human will is unable to act properly without divine help (Chapter 7. The Will. pp ). Brown c.s. contend that Augustine was in favour of the freedom of the human 6. Athanase Sage, Péché originel. Naissance d un dogme, Revue des études augustiniennes 13 (1967) James Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine s Doctrine of Operative Grace, Paris Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 72

8 will before 396, and that he afterwards changed his mind. An early example of this interpretation is that the Pelagians thought to have found a proto-pelagian in Augustine s early works (p. 199). Harrison counters, there is proof that before 396, Augustine states that ignorance and difficulty disable the human will, and these are effects of Adam s pride turning away from God. James Wetzel and Paul Séjourné support Brown s assertion of Augustine s volte-face, and they apply this idea of a shift to De libero arbitrio. 7 They perceive a split within this early writing. The first part, book I, is written by a young optimistic convert convinced that happy life lays within reach, believing in the self-determination of the will. The second part, books II III, reveals a disillusioned clergyman, correcting the concept of human will he developed in book I. Ignorance and difficulty of the will are now the central features. As such De libero arbitrio in a micro cosmos brings together the two Augustines : a confident and optimistic one versus one who accepts a pessimistic fallen humanity. Harrison accepts the challenge and meticulously reasons that also in this micro cosmos Augustine s thinking offers a continuity (p. 203). The unity of this writing is to be found in similar descriptions of preand post-lapsarinan will in the three books of De libero arbitrio. Moreover, what Augustine says about the human will in De libero arbitrio relates with what he says on the same subject in other works he composed in the period 388 (beginning of book I) to 394/395 (completion of the treatise) (e.g. De beata vita, Contra Fortunatum). The latter illustrates that Augustine had from the start on a consequent structure in mind encompassing the three books as a unity, and not a first idea in book I he corrected later on in books II III. In this context it is fascinating to observe that De libero arbitrio appears at the same time of the Paul commentaries (mid-390s), and that this tractate underlines the priority of the action of grace. Only by grace are human beings, who are subject to original sin, empowered and enabled. This insight contradicts the attribution of free choice to the will in responding to God s vocation to faith in the commentary on Romans. Instead De libero arbitrio holds that the post-lapsarian will has to admit its absolute dependence on God s grace (p. 236). On the meta-level, scholars who claim to see a contradiction between book I and books II III do not understand the basis structure of this writing: book I covers the operation of the will before the fall while books II III deal with the operation of the will after the fall. This dramatic opposition between the preand post-lapsarian state of the human will was present in Augustine s writing especially his anti-manichean tractates from the early beginning and precisely this opposition constitutes the unity structure of De libero arbitrio (pp ). From his conversion in 386 onwards, Augustine realizes that Grace (Chapter 8. pp ) is necessary for being able to convert oneself and become a believer for the rest of the human life because mankind is incapable of the 7. James Wetzel, Pelagius Anticipated: Grace and Election in Augustine s Ad Simplicianum, in J. McWilliam (ed.), Augustine. From Rhetor to Theologian, Ontario 1992, Ibid., Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, Cambridge Ibid., Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination, in R. Dodaro/G. Lawless (eds.), Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, London/New York 2000, Paul Séjourné, Les conversions de saint Augustin d après le De libero arbitrio, Recherches de science religieuse 25 (1951) ; Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 73

9 good without the divine help. Augustine s later writings distinguish providentia naturalis from providentia uoluntaris. Harrison argues that, because of Augustine s belief in God s providential care in his early works (esp. De vera religione), this distinction is already present there. On the one hand, Augustine sees the work of God in creation, in ordering the creation, in the continuance and growth of creation. On the other hand, he stresses the need for God s ineffable healing because of sin. The latter is a divine operation beyond natural providence, it is grace operating upon and within the human will. Augustine never maintained, also not in the early writings, that grace constitutes a synergy with man. On the contrary, grace is laying hold, causing pain, disregarding, overriding. More specific, grace is gratia Christi. Christ is indeed a teacher, example, and authority for the early Augustine, but he is also, and most importantly, the saviour of fallen humanity through his sacrificial death; the mediator between God and sinful humanity in his humble descent and self-emptying in the incarnation; the one who effects the reformation of the image of God in human beings which has been deformed; and the life-giving source of grace in the mysteries. Those scholars who suggest that the early Augustine maintained that all human beings need is teaching and example seem to be motivated by a vain attempt to preserve human beings free will, autonomy, and powers of self-determination in the early works, and a fundamentally mistaken understanding of the nature and effects of the Fall, of sin and evil, and of the need for grace. In short, they are once again making the early Augustine a Pelagian before Pelagius. (p. 260.) Brown c.s. assert that Ad Simplicianum introduces a threefold turn in Augustine s concept of grace: (1.) a new psychology of delight (delectatio), (2.) a new understanding of the manner in which grace works to effect the operation of the feeble will, (3.) the introduction of the concepts of divine election and predestination. Harrison shows how from the very beginning the idea of grace working via delight is featuring in the early writings. Delectatio is the place where Augustine locates the operation of grace upon the will and inspires the fallen will to do the good (pp ). This delight is a gift of the Holy Spirit (p. 271) and is beyond human control. Contrary to Burn s hypothesis, namely that the early writings only contain an acceptance of the external operation of grace, Augustine perceives from the very beginning grace as not only the calling and assistance of the human will, but understands it also as the divine activity within the will. The example of the conversion of Saul to Paul in the early writings testify that Augustine was convinced that election is based on God s unfathomable mercy rather than to look for any merit in fallen humanity. The only thing humanity deserves is condemnation and punishment. There is no merit, everything is grace.... in various ways scholars have been all too keen to make the Augustine of the early works appear more Pelagian than Pelagius himself: they have failed to identify anything resembling his later doctrine of the Fall and original sin; they have understood his attack on Manichean determinism as a defence of human autonomy grounded in a classical ideal of perfection; they have Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 74

10 argued that when he speaks of grace, he is referring simply to its external operation; that he understood Christ s role as purely pedagogical, not salvific; that divine admonitio, including the work of the Holy Spirit, is merely external and didactic rather than internal and therapeutic. Looking back on the early works from the vantage point of the later Pelagian controversy scholars have tended to reduce them to a caricature, which provides a sharp and satisfying contrast with his later views, and which dramatically demonstrates just how far he has advanced from philosophical, classical ideals and a late-antique mindset, to a distinctive and radical interpretation of Christianity. (p. 280.) In conclusion, Harrison argues fervently that everything that can be labelled typically Augustinian is already to be perceived in the early writings. Throughout the early writings, following the grace experience of 386, there was already the primacy of faith above reason, grace above law, love above fear, spirit above letter, humility above pride, dependence above autonomy (p. 286). The fundamental features of Augustine s theology, which some scholars think only emerge from 390s and Ad Simplicianum, are actually very much present in the early works: fall, original sin, flawed will, need for divine grace. The fundamentals or the content of Augustine s faith and doctrinal position did not change, the specific circumstances in which he found himself, however, and the questions and concerns that urged him to write did change. Being bishop of Hippo is not the same context as a philosophical retreat in Cassiciacum. His duty to preach brought him to a better knowledge of Scripture and this influenced the way in which he expressed his thinking on grace (cf. pp. 8 13, p. 72, pp ). 4 Some observations 4.1 A plea for evolution and development I strongly support Harrison s plea for continuity, but I would even suggest to enlarge the scope of continuity she suggests. Can we really say that 386 was a landmark, a complete transformation from unbelief to belief? Put in terms of the philosophy of history: should Augustine s conversion be considered as an event, or as a product, or as a process? We can only observe that Augustine, unlike his father, was never a pagan. The quest that led him through Manichaeism, Scepticism, (Neo-)Platonism was precisely a search for genuine Christianity, the correct understanding of Christian faith. From this point of view, 386 and here Harrison is right in rebuking Brown and the two Augustines thesis was not a turn from being not-christian to Christian, but from (Neo-)Platonic to Catholic Christianity, with Paul as catalytic converter. Harrison does not neglect this, but prefers to regard 386 as a breaking point. Here, I would like to underline the continuity of this discontinuity, a continuity that may not be disregarded, namely that Augustine was always Christian and that the orthodox faith of the (new) convert has very important pre-conversial roots. This sense of a continuity, extending also before his conversion, makes it even more understandable that Augustine s doctrine was the result of a development and not a Deus ex machina. Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 75

11 Harrison admits that she at times... failed to allow for the new convert to evolve into the new bishop (p. vii). I agree with Harrison s argument for continuity, but I am also somewhat concerned about how continuity should be construed. Continuity does not imply that no change occurred between August 1, 386 and August 28, 430. Firstly, this would be an insult to Augustine s intellectual capacities and would depict him as forced to clinging to some positions without critically investigating the alternatives, precisely this explains better his excursion into the concept of the meritum fidei in the commentaries on Paul of the mid 390s. Secondly, enlarging or opening up the concept of continuity leaves more space for the idea of growth and development. Also Augustine s thinking on grace of which the fundamental intuitions are indeed present from the very beginning of his writing (since they were the reason and the essence of the 386 conversion) underwent a process of deepening, development and refinement. This evolution is caused because Augustine s thinking in general matures, by aging, by his pastoral experiences and the theological controversies he was entangled in. His reflections on the matters of grace and free will were originally conditioned by his own wrestling with Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism, later he faced the challenges of Donatism and Pelagianism. This led to new perspectives, new approaches, the constant adaptation of the theological vocabulary and grammar of Augustine s system. Augustine himself constantly indicates the importance of progress to his faithful in his sermons, progress stimulated by study, fastening and praying. Ultimately, he sees this progress as the gift of the Holy Spirit. Harrison refers to Augustine s attempts in his Retractationes to present his early writings as proto-anti-pelagian. Firstly, this is not a valid argument against the two Augustines thesis, it even supports their thesis of Augustine s post factum recuperation strategy: as he represented his conversion in a way that was different from what really happened in his autobiography Confessiones, he is now rewriting his early works in his autobibliography Retractationes. Moreover, using the testimony of the accused as a witness for the defence is not really the appropriate juridical strategy. In this context we should not forget that the accused himself admits some of his early mistakes. In De dono perseuerantiae, an anti- Pelagian stronghold, in which Augustine stresses that his opinions on the grace of perseverance and on predestination were already set out in Ad Simplicianum (De dono perseuerantiae 21.55), he at the same time warns his readers for his early mistakes, he confesses his thinking was far from perfect in the beginning and that he gained theological insight during the course of years. The monks of Provence appealed to De libero arbitrio. Augustine admits that he discussed the fate of the new born in such an anti-manichean way that the Pelagians can find support in it for denying the existence of original sin ( ). Augustine defends himself by pointing out he was writing against Manichean dualism, and was not dealing with the topic of the gratuity of grace, and as such this writing should not be used for discussing the latter (12.29). And even more fundamentally, Augustine notes that at the moment he began to write De libero arbitrio he was still a layman, in doubt about the fate of the paruuli, and no one, I think, would be so unjust and envious that he would forbid me to make progress (12.30). Augustine Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 76

12 himself states that a different context results in a different formulation, and that he also was a child of progress. In the same context we should accept that when Augustine in some early writings utters the opinion perfection can be reached in this life an opinion he will strongly refute later on this is a result of process and progress, instead of trying to read something else in these early writings. Augustine s doctrine of grace, the core ideas, as he fully developed in the Pelagian Controversy, were already in Augustine s mind from the beginning. However, to label this early thinking as proto-anti-pelagian is perhaps a bridge to far, is anachronistic, is actually making the same mistake that the two Augustines tenet is Augustine accusing of in the Confessiones: changing the past afterwards with the desired future in mind. The clash with the Pelagians, resulting in a polemical and sometimes black-and-white thinking and writing, just was not present in the context and set of mind of the early Augustine. Mutatis mutandis one could call the zealous young Augustinian monk Luther a proto-anti-catholic. As an avenue for further research, I would also like to note that continuity works in two directions. Harrison solidly illustrates that Augustine s so-called later thinking is present in his early writings. Naturally, this has its reverse, which kind of escaped her attention. Continuity also includes that the so-called early thinking is not absent in his later writings. An example of this is Augustine s interest in philosophy (vera philosophia as philosophia christiana) in Contra Iulianum (421/422). 8 This kind of archaeology, the earlier in the later, would supply additional arguments for continuity. Forced as a reviewer to give at least some critical comments, I would like to make the observation that the book, despite its many repetitions and syntheses, lacks a somewhat sharp conclusion. The second part of the book, especially approaching the end, sometimes gives the impression of an exhausted top athlete, who lacks a bit of the finesse of the beginning of the game. Actually a compliment for this praiseworthy book is the amount of book reviews it already received. 9 A recurring critique is that the reviewers suggest a more nuanced presentation of Neo-Platonism. This is a valid remark, if this book would have been a study of Neo-Platonism. However, it is a study of the early Augustine and his perception, use and recontextualisation of Neo-Platonism. 4.2 Court of Appeal One can hardly consider Harrison as a lonely voice crying in the desert. The discontinuity hypothesis is already thoroughly countered by amongst others 8. Goulven Madec perceives continuity in Augustine s writing around the concept of (vera) philosophia Christiana. Goulven Madec, Philosophia christiana, in ibid. & Jean Pépin, Petites études augustiniennes, (Études augustiniennes. Série Antiquité; 142), Paris 1994, pp John Rist, New Blackfriars 87 (2006), Joseph Lam Cong Quy, Augustinianum 46/2 (2006) Chad Tyler Gerber, Journal of Early Christian Studies 15/1 (2007) Josef Lössl, The Journal of Theological Studies 58 (2007) Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 77

13 Thomas Gerhard Ring, 10 Volker Henning Drecoll, 11 Pierre-Marie Hombert, 12 and Nello Cipriani, 13 standard works that are not given a strong voice in Harrison s analysis while they laid the basis for her argument. Indeed, Augustine really deserves a lawyer against unjust complaints. His cause is however already pleaded by eminent jurists. Harrison, as a good lawyer defending her client, repeats the arguments in favour of her plea and is less inclined to give much room for the counter arguments that could lead to a different reading of some texts, and as such help to give a more nuanced insight in the complexity of Augustine s continuity. In this sense Harrison somewhat missed the opportunity to be, instead of being a enthusiastic lawyer that splendidly complements and elaborates the pleas of her predecessors, a judge in a Court of Appeal or even an Appeal in Cassation: to list and to evaluate, precisely because of her exhaustive knowledge of the case, all the arguments pro and contra, and as such be able to conclude that the discontinuity appeal cannot be sustained, that the claim is dismissed and that Augustine can be cleared of all charges. More specific, there is one particular chance of higher appeal, deeper evaluation of continuity in Augustine s concept of grace: Christology. Harrison refers to Augustine s early thinking on Christ (pp ), however she does not elaborate on this. For doing this, she could have consulted Tarsicius Jan van Bavel. 14 In his study of Augustine s Christology he explicitly investigates the early works regarding Christ, and compares them on the one hand with Neo-Platonism and on the other with his later writings, and doing so he proves that the early works ( and ) contain a synthesis of Augustine s mature Christology, that they are Christian writings. Harrison restricts herself to stating that her monograph does not aim at studying Augustine s early Christology. Such kind of a study however could prove itself being essentially to establish continuity regarding grace. Augustine precisely holds that there is no grace without Christ, connecting Christology and soteriology. I would cordially recommend reading this study, since it is an example for all who want to reflect critically, to approach a text and an author without prejudices, to allow the text to say what it intends to say, and not evaluating it in a specific way to fit it in an already extant (ideological) framework. Seldom I have read such a fierce defence of Augustine in recent literature. Harrison offers 10. Thomas Gerhard Ring, Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegriff Augustins? Kritische Anmerkungen zu K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. Augustinus von Hippo, Die Gnadenlehre von 397, Augustiniana 44 (1994) Volker Henning Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins, (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie; 109), Tübingen Ibid., Gratia, Augustinus-Lexikon 3 (2004) Pierre-Marie Hombert, Gloria Gratiae. Se glorifier en Dieu, principe et fin de la théologie augustinienne de la grâce, Paris Ibid., Augustin, prédicateur de la grâce au début de son épiscopat, in G. Madec (ed.), Augustin prédicateur ( ). Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5 7 septembre 1996), Paris 1998, pp Nello Cipriani, L altro Agostino di G. Lettieri, Revue des études augustiniennes 48 (2002) Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L humain et le divin dans le Christ d après saint Augustin, (Paradosis 10), Fribourg Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 78

14 Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine? the reader a brilliant anthology of the early Augustine and is as such a valuable thematic introduction in the writing and thinking of Augustine before 396. But the monograph is much more, it is a meritorious overview of the several key elements in the continuity of Augustine s development, a well constructed plea to see this continuity and a lesson in understanding how the central features of Augustine s conversion remain fruitfully present in his thinking. Ars Disputandi [ 8 (2008) 79