A Critical Assessment of Cornelius Van Til Paul Cornford Introduction. Van Til s Apologetic Method Summarised

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1 A Critical Assessment of Cornelius Van Til Paul Cornford 1994 [An address by Paul Cornford, Pastors and Elders Conference, Tamborine Mt., August 1994 ] Introduction Van Til s apologetical method is known as something of a Copernican revolution in the field of Christian Apologetics. He is often called Mr Presuppositionalism and his apologetics has become an index of Reformed orthodoxy. I myself confess to having been totally captivated by his radical and seemingly uncompromising stance And in spite of certain present misgivings which I aim to expand upon in this lecture, I still believe that Van Til deserves a place amongst the theological greats of the twentieth century. Van Til s Apologetic Method Summarised It is essential, says Van Til, that we presuppose the Christian theistic position before we can engage in any meaningful predication of the facts of the universe. To make any other sort of beginning is to presuppose one's own mental autonomy thereby setting oneself the impossible task of knowing all in order to know anything. To explain this last difficulty, Van Til holds to the view that any fact in the universe derives its meaning from the place it occupies in the overall system of created truth. Therefore to know any one fact truly is to know its place in the overall system and therefore to know the overall system itself. Since God alone knows the overall system, only God can interpret the facts as they truly are. We must accept his interpretation on authority thereby thinking his thoughts after him. We may justly ask: does Van Til include all facts here including the facts of science, the arts and the humanities? The answer is yes. As Van Til points out, the bible is authoritative on whatever it speaks and it speaks on everything. So Van Til offers us more than an apologetic but an epistemology as well. It is his claim to bring every thought captive to the obedience of Christ that gives his apologetic a revolutionary flavour. For example, Van Til refuses to talk about consciousness per se or anything per se for that matter. For him there is the regenerate consciousness and the unregenerate consciousness. There are the facts as entertained by the unregenerate and the facts as entertained by the regenerate with no common ground between them. Nor can we simply talk about being as such or even logic, for Van Til would ask: whose conception of these things are you talking about? Are you talking about the abstract being of the would be autonomous mind which seeks to encompass God along with everything else or are you talking about the being that takes into account the creator creature distinction? It is this refusal to allow for any neutrality in the apologetical endeavour that makes Van Til's method so apparently Reformed and attractively uncompromising. So what is the point of contact then between the believer and the unbeliever for Van Til? Do they really speak two completely different languages? It is at this point that Van Til introduces the sensus deitatus i.e., sense of deity as per Rom.1:18-2O. Psychologically, says Van Til, they have everything in common. Indeed, the universe is lit up with the truth about God, 1

2 albeit a non-saving truth. But epistomologically, i.e., in accordance with their mutually exclusive principles of knowledge, they have nothing in common. So what bearing does all this have on the apologetic method of Van Til? Well, says Van Til, the Christian apologete must insist that until the unbeliever exchanges his claim to autonomy for the absolute God of the scriptures he will never be able to ascertain correctly the facts of scripture, or any facts for that matter. Indeed his rebellious nature will twist everything the believer tells him as he continues to suppress the truth in unrighteousness. The Christian apologete must, therefore, show the unbeliever that according to his presuppositions his experience of the world must reduce to an incoherent maze of brute and therefore mute factuality. It is hoped that somewhere in this process the Holy Spirit will change his heart to accept Christ and thereby get his starting position right. Well, I guess it's time to ask the question: is Van Til as radically Reformed and uncompromisingly biblical as he seems? There are a number of areas that are worth close examination, but the one of most interest to me is Van Til's conception of reason. Van Til and Reason We have already seen that Van Til would distinguish between the Christian and non-christian conceptions of reason, the latter being entirely erroneous of course. This is not to say that Van Til would disqualify the non-christian's reasoning power. Indeed, he compares it to a buz saw which cuts extremely well but does so crookedly because it is incorrectly set. It is the non-christian's conception of reason, i.e., its purpose, its place in the scheme of things, and its application, that Van Til would disqualify as essentially erroneous. But even within the Christian conception of reason an important distinction obtains between reason as it applies to God and reason as it applies to man. Concerning God, he says, He...[God]...is self contained rationality. His rationality is not something he possesses but is something with which his being is coterminous. [p.1 Systematic Theology. p.206] Now if you were inclined to put some sort of meaning content into that word rationality think again; because for Van Til divine rationality has nothing to do with human rationality. Let me explain. In The Defense of the Faith, p.44 he says, Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical. As examples of these paradoxes, which Van Til also calls antinomies and/or apparent contradictions, he cites the case of answered prayer (How does a sovereign and eternal God who hasforeordained all things in eternity answer the prayers of a temporal being whose prayers are by nature extemporaneous?) In other places he cites the example of the apparent tension between divine sovereignty and human responsibility. In the mind of God Van Til insists that 2

3 these things are perfectly harmonious. Therefore, for Van Til, divine rationality has nothing to do with human rationality. What it does have to do with we are never told. But don't be mistaken about Van Til's passion for divine rationality; it's certainly alive and well for Van Til has introduced the idea of the apparently contradictory which is not a simple throwaway description of difficult doctrine but a formal concept that forms part of his special vocabulary and designed to dogmatically and, in my opinion, quite gratuitously kill off any hint of irrationality in God. There is one example of Van Til's apparent contradiction which is actually quite serious and it involves his view of the Trinity. He says in In Defence of the Faith ; Vol.5, p.220, We speak of God as a person; yet we speak also of three persons in the being of God... To avoid any possibility of misrepresentation here I quote from Junior Systematics (pp.178,179), We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person...we must maintain that God is numerically one, He is one person. Despite the confessions of the Western church since the fifth century and of all the Reformed churches since the Reformation that the trinity consists in a plurality of persons under a singularity of essence, Van Til is quite comfortable with this rather novel formulation. And no wonder as it fits quite neatly into his bifurcated schema of human and divine rationality. But we must ask the question: is there any difference then between Van Til's apparent contradictions and formal logical contradictions? There would appear to be none. A formal contradiction is irreconcilable and so are Van Til's apparent contradictions. And this is as Van Til would have it. Again I quote from The Defense of the Faith p.44, Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical. (Emphasis mine) Even more passionate about this is Van Til in Common Grace and the Gospel, p.9, While we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory, we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory. Why does Van Til embrace with passion the apparently contradictory? Because for him it is the dividing line between the creator and the creature which must be preserved at all times, even epistomologically. Van Til embraces with passion his 1=3 and 3=1 formula within the Trinity, seeing it as the very solution of the problem of the one and the many. This solution, however, is never in the human mind but only in the divine mind. Still, argues Van Til, it is not for us to think originally but always analogically and derivatively. To appreciate the problem here we need to be clear about Van Til's idea of apparent contradiction. It is not a mistaken notion on the part of the perceiver that he sees a contradiction where there isn't one. He does see a proper, formal contradiction. But what makes it only apparent is that it is only a contradiction 3

4 to the human mind. To the divine mind it is not a contradiction at all and therefore perfectly reconcilable. Finally, as additional evidence that human logic and divine logic are, to Van Til, totally equivocal, I quote from In Defense of the Faith ; Vol.5, p.92. He says, The laws of logic as God had created them in the universe were not broken by sin We know that sin can never make = 5 but is it true that logic was created along with the universe? And if it was in what sense was God logical in eternity? For Van Til then I propose that divine rationality and human rationality are total strangers. Therefore, to say that God is rational is, according to Van Til s conception of it, meaningless. And yet this is at the very heart of Van Til's epistemology and indeed, his theology. Van Til and Analogical Knowledge Given that Van Til is not a fideist or skeptic, we may well ask how it is that a transrational or hetera-rational God can communicate with humanly rational man. After all, Van Til points out, God's thinking is not only quantitatively different from man's but it is also qualitatively different. As hinted at earlier, the answer lies in the use of analogy. To be sure, man does think God's thoughts after him, but only analogically so. Man could never have precisely the same thoughts as God because if he had God would cease to be God and become enveloped in the same abstract categories as man. But for Van Til, analogy means paradox. Again, in Defense of the Faith ; p.44 he says, Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical. We have seen by now that by paradoxical he means actually contradictory. But we must ask the question: in what sense is contradiction revelation? What do we learn from the contradictory? It does us no good to have Van Til assure us that the contradictions are only apparent and fully reconciled within the mind of God. I would suggest that the truly contradictory is also the truly confusing and therefore the truly uninformative. Such is the very opposite of revelation. Well may Van Til passionately defend his idea of apparent contradiction, but the church has with equal passion defended the doctrine of the internal consistency of biblical revelation. Indeed, our whole doctrine of scripture stands or falls on this. We take comfort from the knowledge that in Him there is no shifting shadow. Neither is he the author of confusion, i.e., confusion in us. If Jesus promises to return we can be certain that his idea of return is not something totally alien from our idea of it. Indeed it must be the same to be of any use to us. But what of analogical knowledge? Is there a case for it? I would suggest that the difference between human knowledge and divine knowledge is not so much a difference of essence but of mode. God's knowledge is certainly comprehensive and analytic, i.e., (instant and immediate a Van Tilian term); our knowledge, on the other hand, is limited and discursive. But besides the obvious quantitative difference, should not the truth be the same for each? When the scriptures tell us that Jesus died for sinners can we not safely assume that for God Jesus did just that and not something entirely different? Is Van Til a True Presuppositionalist? Despite the fact that Van Til is called Mr. Presuppositionalism it would seem that VanTil is not as consistently presuppositional as he would have us believe. For 4

5 example, he does not disqualify the theistic proofs but says in Introduction to Systematic Theology ; p.102, Men ought to reason analogically from nature to nature's God. Men ought, therefore, to use the cosmological argument analogically in order thus to conclude that God is the creator of this universe...men ought also to use the ontological argument analogically. In In Defense of the Faith; p.197, he says, The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is objectively valid. We should not tone down the validity of this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound. It is difficult to know how the theistic proofs would be argued analogically as Van Til never attempted this feat himself. Indeed, if contradiction is a hall-mark of analogical reasoning and if the theistic proofs as traditionally formulated as exercises in autonomous logic, then some considerable mental gymnastics is required to even begin to imagine how anybody could do it. But in the Protestant Doctrine of Scripture; p.137, Van Til the presuppositionalist reemerges with renewed vigour, Of course Reformed believers do not seek to prove the existence of their God, To seek to prove or to disprove the existence of this God would be to seek to deny him. To seek to prove or disprove this God presupposes that man can identify himself and discover facts in relation to laws in the universe without reference to God. A God whose existence is proved is not the God of scripture. Is Presuppositionalism Strictly Biblical? Over the past couple of years of ministry I have found myself reflecting on the way I have spontaneously gone about trying to convince people to accept Christ, Holy Spirit permitting. And I ask myself the question: how many have I persuaded into the kingdom by first convincing them of the futility of their apostate epistemology? Have we really told them that that flower in the crannied wall cannot be known unless they know the world and all? Toward his latter years Van Til admitted that the absence of exegesis in his writings was a serious omission. His references to scripture are only cursory and one wonders if his apologetic might have taken a completely different turn had he concerned himself with it. To answer the question as to whether the presuppositional method itself truly stands up under the light of scripture I want to turn to a few passages. John 20:30,31 - Jesus did many other miraculous signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not recorded in this book. But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name. John here asks his readers to accept Jesus as the Christ on the strength of his miracles. We remember the words of the Samaritan woman who, AFTER Jesus had told her all she had ever done, said to him, Sir, I perceive that you are a prophet (Jn.4:19). She later confessed Jesus as the man who told.. [her]...every thing...[she]...ever did. Could this be the Christ? Clearly the woman was impressed with Jesus' heavenly 5

6 power. Concerning the wonder working of Jesus we read in Acts 2:22, Men of Israel, listen to this: Jesus of Nazareth was a man accredited by God to you by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did among you through him, as you yourselves know. And finally, the apostle Paul convinces his Corinthian readers of the resurrection of Jesus in the following terms:... and that he appeared to Peter, and then to the twelve. After that he appeared to more than five hundred of the brothers at the same time, most of whom are still living though some have fallen asleep. We cannot deny the overwhelming importance of the miracles of scripture as evidences for the heavenly identity of Jesus and the truth of the gospel in general. Obviously the unbeliever is asked to reason as follows: only God can work miracles; Jesus has God s approval; therefore what Jesus says about himself is true. That there is no excuse for missing the first observation is demonstrated by the seriousness of the sin of those who would attribute his miracles to something else, namely, the devil. The sin here can be no accident. But in each case the unbeliever is asked to begin with the evidence and to proceed to the conclusion of the Christ. Now according to Van Tillian apologetics the order here is wrong. We cannot, argues Van Til, begin with some neutral appeal to evidences, even miraculous evidences. If we do Van Til warns us: We must allow that it is quite possible that at some future date all the miracles recorded in the Bible, not excluding the resurrection of Christ, may be explained by natural laws. (Christian Theistic Evidences, p.63). No, says Van Til, we must insist on starting with the (verbally) self-authenticating Christ and only then will the miracles take on the truly heavenly significance they are meant to have. In other words, Van Til's self-authenticating Christ, or more particularly his self-authenticating scripture, self-authenticates by its simple claim to be the word of God as per 2 Tim.3:16,17. Not even the eye witnesses to the miracles of Christ had a right to reason from them to the Saviour as Son of God. They too had to begin with his naked word. It is not surprising therefore that presuppositionalism involves itself in circular reasoning: we must believe the bible as the word of God because it says it is the word of God...and so on. Incidentally, Van Tillians do not deny circular reasoning but escape embarrassment by claiming all reasoning to be either circular or infinitely regressive. Biblical Self-athentication and the W.C.F. There is nothing new about biblical self-authentication. Calvin taught it, the Creeds confess it, and all the Reformed greats believed it. But of what stamp? the presuppositional with its accent upon bare acceptance or the evidential with its accent upon autonomous predication? Let's consult the W.C.F. for its own statement on biblical self-authentication: We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture, and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man 5 salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet notwithstanding our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts. [W.C.F., Ch.1; Para. V.] In closing we notice that the internal evidence for the truth of the scriptures according 6

7 7 to the W.C.F. is no naked claim to divinity but a hearty sounding forth of its internal excellencies. Perhaps the church does need to get back to moving and inducing people to a high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture, at the same time relying on the Holy Spirit to bring full persuasion and assurance. Is not the real battle today for the integrity of the bible? And is there a short cut to refuting the gain sayers? I think not.